

Political visions and historical scores

Political transformations
in the European Union by 2025

German response to reform
in the euro area

Crisis or a search for a new formula
for the Humboldtian university

The end of the Great War and Stanisław
Hubert's concept of *postliminum*

American press reports on anti-Jewish
incidents in reborn Poland

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle on Poland's
situation in 1937-1939

Memoirs *Nasza Podróż (Our Journey)*
by Ewelina Zaleska

On the dispute over the status
of the camp in occupied Konstantynów

The beginnings of the Polish
administration in the Kłodzko region

The US Consulate in Poznań (1946-1951)

The issue of compensation for victims
of Nazi crimes living in Poland

The Orthodox Church in Ukraine
and Russia after 2013

Polish sport under the shadow
of the swastika

A propagandised image of Polish sport
in the Polish Film Chronicle

Polish candidates for and members
of the International Olympic Committee

2019
Special Issue



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Political visions and historical scores

Dear Readers of “Przegląd Zachodni”/”Western Review”,

We place in your hands yet another special English-language edition of the journal of the Instytut Zachodni (Institute for Western Affairs). The translations presented in the volume are a selection of articles from the 2018 issues. Though like any anthology the selection is to a degree subjective, it reflects the interdisciplinary profile of the journal, in which studies on the present transformations in Europe are integrally linked to the study of the past.

Systemic changes within the European Union and the reforms of the euro area continue to exert an impact on the world of politics and economy, engage citizens and influence their opinions. The attention given to these processes by scholars is a vital element of ongoing debates and crystallization of concepts. The dynamics of the surrounding reality is certain to topple many of the currently sketched out theses. But this does not mean that the voices of researchers will prove to be merely archival records – on the contrary, they are the building blocks of a difficult but fascinating process of European integration. Whether the voice of scholars is duly reflected in it also depends on the academic ethos and the formula of the university that meets modern needs.

Year 2018 marked the centenary of the regaining of independence by Poland and was an inspiration for historians of the recent past. Selected articles recall the meanders of this challenging one hundred years in the history of Poland. The authors focus on specific issues, and yet lead the reader along a chronological path from the beginnings of Poland’s reborn statehood, through the growing tension of international relations in the 1930s to Ewelina Zaleska’s dramatic account of the first days of the 1939 war. The years of occupation, the beginning of post-war administration of the Recovered Territories or the Cold War fate of a US diplomatic post are shown from the perspective of the latest research based on the now accessible sources or discussions among the youngest generations of researchers. The breakthrough in Polish-German relations after 1989 was part of the change that transformed Europe; the painstaking laying of new legal foundations is recounted by a witness and participant in the diplomatic activities from thirty years ago. The arduous 20th century can also be glimpsed through the increasingly close interactions between sport and politics – only seemingly distant spheres of human activity.

Finally, I would like to inform you that work on the next special edition of the “Western Review” in English is already underway. It will include a selection of articles from the 2019 issues. We invite you to read our journal!

Natalia Jackowska

JANUSZ JÓZEF WĘC
Kraków

PROSPECTS FOR THE SYSTEM REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BY 2025: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This article examines prospects for the system reform of the European Union (EU) by 2025. The first section describes five scenarios found in the European Commission White Paper of 1 March 2017, as well as five Reflection Papers that resulted from it. The second section contains an analysis of the speech on the state of the EU given by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on 13 September 2017 in the European Parliament. The third section is devoted to an evaluation of the White Paper and Juncker's speech on the state of the EU from a Polish perspective. In the fourth section conclusions and recommendations for Poland are formulated.¹

SCENARIOS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU IN LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S WHITE PAPER AND REFLECTION PAPERS

The White Paper of 1 March 2017

On 1 March 2017, the European Commission published a White Paper on the future of Europe.² It contained five scenarios for the further development of the EU by 2025. The first of these assumed the continuation of the current programme of reform within the political guidelines of the European Commission, "A new start for Europe" dated 15 July 2014, as well as the Bratislava Declaration accepted on 16 September 2016 by the heads of state or government of EU Member States.³ This means, among other things, a strengthening of the Common Market including the energy and digital

¹ This article was written as part of the project from the Jean Monnet Chair, *EUCRIS: European Union in Crisis: What is Wrong and How to Fix It?* The grant was awarded by the European Union (EU).

² The presentation of this document was announced by the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on 14 September 2016 during his address on the state of the EU; cf. European Commission, *State of the Union 2016 message: towards a better Europe – a Europe that protects, strengthens and defends*, Strasbourg, 14 September 2016, Speech/16/3043, p. 2.

³ An informal meeting of 27 heads of state or government. The Bratislava Declaration, 16 September 2016, pp. 1–6.

technology sectors, gradual progress in improving the functioning of the euro area, strengthening cooperation in managing the external borders of the EU and building a common European system of asylum, as well as more intensive cooperation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).⁴ The second scenario foresaw further development of the common market only in the areas of the movement of goods and capital, without fully guaranteed free movement of services and labour. In addition, it assumed no further progress in cooperation in the euro area, immigration policy, external border control and asylum policy, as well as the CSDP.⁵

The essence of the third scenario was, on the one hand, deepening cooperation of one or more groups of countries in defined areas, and on the other the continuation of the current process of integration by the remaining EU Member States according to the first scenario. Deepening cooperation in this scenario would mean the realisation of integration goals in accordance with the concept of two or more integration speeds, that is *de facto* within the framework of strengthened cooperation⁶ in the areas of tax and social policy within the euro area, in immigration policy, the defence of external borders and in asylum policy of the EU and the CSDP (the coordination of cooperation in military and arms policy).⁷

The fourth scenario indicated strengthening cooperation as well as more effective execution of initiatives undertaken only in selected areas. These include minimal common standards within the common market, the development of innovation, a common trade policy, the strengthening and stabilisation of the euro area, the management of external borders, asylum policy, counterterrorism, and also deepening integration in the CSDP together with the creation of a European Defence Union. This scenario also assumes the abandonment or restriction of cooperation in such areas as regional policy, public health and social and employment policy, although only in as far as this is not related to the functioning of the common market.⁸

The fifth scenario foresees a deepening of integration (through the strengthening of the community method as well as the creation of new norms and instruments) in all policy areas based on the common decisions of Member State governments. This would mean on the one hand the harmonisation of standards in the common market, the establishment of a Finance Union, Fiscal Union and Economic Union within the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union in accordance with the report of 22 June 2015, and on the other hand, similarly to the fourth scenario, the

⁴ The European Commission, *White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 until 2025*, Brussels, 1 March 2017, COM (2017) 2025, pp. 16–17. Page numbers cited here refer to the Polish version of the document, as consulted by the author.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

⁶ The provisions for enhanced cooperation stipulate that if there is no other solution, a group of at least nine Member States may adopt legal measures that are binding only for the countries participating in such an agreement. The rules for establishing and restrictions applicable to enhanced cooperation are set out in Article 20(1–4) TEU and Articles 329(1–2), 330 and 331(1–2) TFEU.

⁷ The European Commission, *White Paper, op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

strengthening of cooperation in managing the external borders of the EU, asylum policy, counterterrorism and the CSDP, together with the creation of a European Defence Union.⁹

The Reflection Papers

The White Paper became the subject of debate on the future of the EU with the participation of, among others, the European Commission, the European Parliament, national parliaments and interested Member States. In the period from April to June 2017, the European Commission published five “Reflection Papers”. The first of these concerned the establishment of a social dimension of Europe (26 April), the second opened debate on the possibilities flowing from globalisation (10 May), the third concerned the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (31 May), the fourth was devoted to the further development of a common security and defence policy for the EU (7 June), and the fifth concerned the future of EU finances (28 June). These documents only contained propositions and not decisions concerning the development of the EU to 2025.¹⁰

It is worth underlining that the Reflection Papers clearly differed in terms of congruence with the five scenarios presented in the White Paper. The report on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union assumed that the further development of the EU should take place according to the components of the third and fourth scenarios. The paper on the social dimension of the EU contained three scenarios which correspond to the propositions of the second, third and fifth descriptions from the White Paper. The report concerning the future of the CSDP also describes three versions of possible reforms in that area according to elements of the first, fourth and fifth scenarios of the White Paper. The report on the further development of the EU’s finances is most strongly tied to the five scenarios. The report on globalisation, however, undertakes an analysis of the gains and losses resulting from that process and only to a lesser degree based on the scenarios. Because the most important for the future of the EU are the papers on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union, the development of a common security and defence policy, the social dimension of the EU and the future of EU finances, only those will be analysed in detail here.

Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union

The paper concerning the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union is logically connected to the process of structural reforms in the euro area being carried out since 2012. The first reform attempts made in the years 2011–2012 led to strengthen-

⁹ Ibid., pp. 24–25. Cf. European Commission, Press release, Brussels, 1 March 2017, IP/17/385, pp. 1–3. For an analysis of the White Paper, see European Commission, *Biała Księga dotycząca przyszłości UE*, *Przegląd Spraw Europejskich*, 2017, No. 3, pp. 5–6.

¹⁰ The European Commission, *White Paper*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

ing of the economic and budget management of the Economic and Monetary Union. They relied upon, among other factors, the introduction of oversight mechanisms and procedures, the acceptance of several new legal acts as well as the signing of international agreements. The new regulations were the Euro-Plus Pact (in 2011), the European Semester (2011), Sixpack (2011), Two-pack (2011), the Fiscal Pact (2012) as well as the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (2012). These initiatives did not however bring the hoped-for results. In 2012 the euro area debt crisis was not only still in being, but there was also a real threat of it spreading among Member States. In this situation the idea was born to conduct comprehensive structural reforms in the euro area. Implementation began on 12 December 2012 based on proposals found in the Herman Van Rompuy package and is currently being continued on the foundation of the Five Presidents' Report of 22 June 2015. To the extent that the Van Rompuy package mapped out a clear direction, the Five Presidents' Report formulated very concrete goals, instruments, methods as well as a precise schedule for implementing reforms. The European Commission's Reflection Paper of 31 May 2017 analyses the course of structural reforms in the euro area, and also modifies some goals and tasks as well as the timeline for implementation. It does, however, confirm the year 2025 as the end date for the creation of a true Economic and Monetary Union.

The evaluation of work on structural reform in the euro area is not impressive. Only two of the three pillars of the Banking Union have been achieved. The first pillar was the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The second pillar is made up of the Single Resolution Mechanism for restructuring and orderly liquidation along with the Single Resolution Fund. To the extent that the Single Resolution Mechanism fills the function of a bankruptcy mechanism, the Single Resolution Fund plays the role of a bankruptcy fund in relation to credit institutions, including banks. For the second pillar there is still no Common Backstop, that is, a credit line for the Single Resolution Fund. In addition, it has not yet been possible to create the third pillar of a Banking Union, a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). As part of the constituted Fiscal Union the Sixpack came into force (December 2011), followed by the Two-pack in May 2013 and the Fiscal Pact in January 2013. The European Fiscal Board was also created (October 2015). However, within the framework of Economic Union it was only possible to modify the European Semester (the division of the semester into two phases as well as strengthening the powers of the European Parliament and national parliaments within it) while the process of creating national productivity councils is underway.¹¹

The Reflection Paper on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union simultaneously confirms and revises the assumptions of the Five Presidents' Report of 22 June

¹¹ See J. Koleśnik, Europejska unia bankowa – nowy wymiar ryzyka systemowego, *Problemy Zarządzania*, 2013, No. 2, pp. 101–103; A. Jurkowska-Zeidler, Fundamentalne zmiany regulacji i nadzoru jednolitego rynku finansowego Unii Europejskiej w ramach Unii Bankowej, *Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze*, 2015, vol. XXXIII, pp. 189–192; J. J. Węc, Dynamika reformy ustrojowej strefy euro w latach 2012–2016, *Politeja*, 2016, No. 6, pp. 174–181.

2015. It sanctions the general direction of euro area reform as well as Economic and Monetary Union, including the creation of a Financial Union, a Fiscal Union and an Economic Union. However, as mentioned, some fundamental goals and tasks undergo changes, as do the timelines for their completion. The task with the highest priority is the creation of the Financial Union, in particular the creation of the CB within the Single Resolution Fund as well as the introduction of the EDIS. Unlike the Five Presidents' Report, which foresaw that this would happen by mid-2017, this document pushes back the date of establishing new structures to 2019, or in the case that they are not successful, to 2025. The Common Backstop is to be created, as far as possible, by the end of 2019, and the EDIS by the end of 2025. The Backstop is to be the last of several instruments supporting the process of restructuring or liquidating credit institutions. It will be possible to make use of it when the financial resources of shareholders and creditors of banks as well as the Single Resolution Fund itself turn out to be insufficient. The sources of its financing are still a subject of debate. In its Reflection Paper the European Commission proposes two alternative sources. The first is a credit line with the European Stability Mechanism after the necessary regulatory changes have been made, since it has not only the ability to make loans, but also knowledge on market functioning as well as creditworthiness. The second would be loans or guarantees for the Single Resolution Fund extended by the euro area countries. The European Commission also recognises that the most important task is the final establishment of a Capital Markets Union by 2025. Together with the Banking Union this would create a Financial Union. This is needed primarily to make it easier for businesses and homeowners to access capital financing and to relieve banks or even become competitive with them in this area.¹²

Within the Fiscal Union, one of the fundamental tasks should be the establishment of a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism for the euro area. This would supplement national budget stabilisers in the case of strong asymmetric shocks and make it possible to run "smoother aggregate fiscal policies for the euro area in unusual circumstances when monetary policy reaches its limits". The European Commission admits that there is ongoing debate about several variants for creating this new structure, including as well, as in the Five Presidents' Report, a mechanism for fiscal capacity in the euro area. The two primary tasks for the macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism for the euro area would be the protection of public investments from the effects of the deterioration of the economic situation (a European Investment Protection Scheme) and a system of unemployment reinsurance in case of sudden rises in the percentage of unemployed (European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme). The source of financing for this mechanism should be either the European Stability Mechanism (after making the necessary changes in current regulations) or the general budget of the EU (on the condition of its being joined to the Multiannual Financial Framework) or some completely new instrument, strengthened by national contributions based on a share

¹² European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 May 2017, COM (2017) 291 final, pp. 19–23, 33.

of GDP or VAT, or revenues from excise levies or corporate taxes. The mechanism for macroeconomic stabilisation for the euro area should be established by the end of 2025. The idea of establishing a separate budget for the euro area is still considered, although in this paper only in a way that is not clearly defined.¹³

Within the Economic Union the basic goal should be, as in the Five Presidents' Report, the deepening of social and economic convergence in the euro area as well as in the EU. In the opinion of the European Commission this should be achieved by completing four tasks. The first of these is the further strengthening of the European Semester and at the same time the coordination of economic policy of Member States by the end of 2019. The second is the utilisation of existing or projected EU structures for deepening social and economic convergence (a single market, including a Digital Single Market as well as an Energy Union, Financial Union and Fiscal Union by the end of 2025). The third is greater access by Member States of the euro area and the EU (undertaking structural reforms of their economies) to monies from EU structural and investment funds (by the end of 2025). The fourth is the guarantee of minimal social standards as foreseen in the European Pillar of Social Rights which is mentioned in the report of the European Commission of 26 April 2017.¹⁴

Unlike the Five Presidents' Report, the European Commission does not mention the necessity of creating a Political Union in the Reflection Paper. There is only a reference to the gradual development of political integration of the euro area. Following this, the Commission foresees that by the end of 2019 there will be further strengthening of powers of the European Parliament and national parliaments in the euro area, especially in the European Semester. Progress on the road to a stronger external representation of the euro area will be achieved, along with an application submitted to the Commission on the joining of the fiscal pact to EU law.

Broadening of the competencies of the European Parliament and national parliaments should be guaranteed in "an agreement on the democratic accountability of the euro area" signed by the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Eurogroup as well as other institutions and entities involved in euro area reform. It is to be concluded before the elections to the European Parliament in 2019 and in the future to be included in EU law. Work on establishing a stronger external representation of the euro area should however concentrate in the next two years on the acceptance of the European Commission proposal of 21 October 2015 by the Council of the European Union.¹⁵ By the end of 2025, however, the permanent office of Eurogroup chairman should be established along with decision-making powers, and in the future this body should become part of the Council of the European Union.¹⁶ The external representa-

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–27, 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–26.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

¹⁶ The permanent chairman of the Eurogroup and/or Economic and Financial Affairs Council would also be the minister of finance to whom the 'ministry' of the treasury/finance of the euro area would report. The 'ministry' of the treasury would be responsible for economic and budgetary oversight, the functioning of the macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism and the euro area budget, coordination of the possible

tion of the euro area should be harmonised, the remaining international agreements regarding the euro area and the Economic and Monetary Union should be integrated into EU law, and a European Monetary Fund should be created.¹⁷

Reflection Paper on the future of European Defence

The Reflection Paper on the future of the common security and defence policy presented by the European Commission on 7 June 2017 is a contribution to the debate on reform of the CSDP announced slightly less than a year earlier in the new external security policy of the EU.¹⁸ Within this debate from July 2016 to March 2017 the governments of Member States and EU institutions adopted many important declarations, political conclusions and programmes. These were the Warsaw declaration of strengthening cooperation between the EU and NATO signed on 8 July 2016 by Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker and Jens Stoltenberg,¹⁹ the Bratislava declaration by the heads of state or government of 16 September of the same year,²⁰ the Rome declaration by the heads of state or government of 25 March 2017,²¹ the conclusions

issuance of a European safe asset, as well as the activities of the European Stability Mechanism/European Monetary System. In the future, the position of permanent chairman of the Eurogroup could be merged with the office of the Commissioner for Economy and Finance; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁸ On 28 June 2016, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, presented a global strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy to the European Council. On that same day, it was adopted by the European Council and replaced the Union's external security strategy of 2003. The new strategy set out five lines of action. These were security and defence, counterterrorism, cyber security, energy security and strategic communication (better communication with partners, acquainting citizens with the Common Foreign and Security Policy). She predicted, among other things, the implementation of the Member State treaty obligations for mutual assistance and solidarity, using the permanent structural cooperation procedure to make the CSDP more flexible, ensuring coherence between the EU's internal and external security through cooperation by CSDP missions and operations with Frontex and specialised agencies, making migration and asylum policy more effective (including preventive measures and humanitarian aid in migrant countries of origin), resolving procedural, financial and political obstacles to the deployment of combat troops, the further development of the Petersberg Tasks, and strengthening crisis management structures, strengthening cooperation between the European External Action Service and EU institutions, and also extending the EU's external activities to include energy, cultural and economic diplomacy; cf. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security policy*, Brussels, 28 June 2016, pp. 2–49. On the debate in EU institutions and bodies preceding the adoption of a new strategy for external security, see J. J. Węc, *Debata nad nową strategią bezpieczeństwa zewnętrznego na forum instytucji i organów Unii Europejskiej w latach 2012–2015*, *Politeja*, 2016, No. 2, pp. 211–236.

¹⁹ *Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en>, pp. 1–2.

²⁰ An informal meeting of 27 heads of state or government. The Bratislava Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²¹ *Declaration of the leaders of 27 Member States and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, The Rome Declaration*, Rome, 25 March 2017, pp 2–3.

of the Foreign Affairs Council of 14 November 2016 and 6 March 2017 on the realisation of a global EU strategy in the area of security and defence,²² the conclusions of the European Council of 15 December 2016,²³ and also the communiqué from the European Commission of 30 November 2016 containing the European action plan in the defence sector.²⁴

The Reflection Paper of 7 June 2017 contains three scenarios for reform of the CSDP. The European Commission stressed that these are not mutually exclusive but rather point to three different levels of integration within the CSDP. The first scenario basically foresees the maintenance of current levels of cooperation in the CSDP.

As it has so far, the EU should only complement the voluntary actions of states, while the principle of solidarity should be *ad hoc* in nature and be interpreted individually by Member States. This means that European operations should be limited, as has been the case so far, to crisis management with the help of the Petersberg Tasks, however more complicated operations should be carried out by those states with greater military resources. Cooperation between the EU and NATO should also be based on current principles. Changes in the CSDP as well as the policy of external EU border control would essentially lead to the strengthening of the powers of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in the area of monitoring and defence of external union borders, and also the establishment of the European Defence Fund, whose resources should only finance select projects (such as cooperation in the area of reinforcement and advanced technologies, but not in the area of creating new capabilities and forces).²⁵

The second scenario assumes, like the first, that the EU should only complement the voluntary actions of states. However, it foresees a change in the form of introducing a division of labour between the EU and Member States as well as the establishment of guarantees of operational and financial solidarity. This will make the shared financing of key operations and the building of multi-national forces possible with the use of European Defence Fund funding. The EU should also increase “its ability to project military power and to engage fully in external crisis management” as well as strengthen cooperation in those areas where internal and external security overlap, such as counterterrorism, countering hybrid and cyber threats, external border control as well as maritime and energy security. Member States would intensify cooperation in the exchange of intelligence information as well as carrying out European pro-

²² Foreign Affairs Council configuration. *Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence*, Brussels, 14 November 2016, 14149/16, pp. 1–16. Foreign Affairs Council configuration. *Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence*. Press release, Brussels, 6 March 2017, 110/17, pp. 1–4.

²³ European Council. *Conclusions*, Brussels, 15 December 2016, EUCO 34/16, pp. 3–5.

²⁴ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, The Council of the European Union, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, Brussels, 30 November 2016, COM (2016) 950 final, pp. 1–23.

²⁵ European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence*, Brussels, 7 June 2017, COM (2017) 315 final, pp. 12–13, 16–17.

grammes serving to develop advanced technologies. Cooperation between the EU and NATO would also be intensified in such areas as coordinating oversight, counterterrorism operations, and external security missions and the defence of borders.²⁶

The third scenario is based on a radical deepening of integration in the CSDP, and the eventual establishment of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) within it.²⁷ The creation of this new structure would mean the implementation of an idea which Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg raised in 2003 during the Iraq crisis.

In conjunction with this, the European Commission foresees the following stages in forming the ESDU. The first in these is support for cooperation between Member States based not only on the principles of operational and financial solidarity but also on the mutual assistance guaranteed by Article 42 paragraph 7 of the TEU (alliance clause). The second is the establishment of systematic intelligence sharing, threat assessment and contingency planning. The third is the creation of a European defence research agency whose activities would lead to the development of a European defence market. The fourth transfers cyber security to the EU level. The fifth strengthens Frontex through the use of standing European maritime forces and European intelligence assets such as remotely piloted aircraft systems or satellites. The sixth fully synchronises Member State defence planning. The seventh is the common procurement of capabilities in the area of space, air and maritime surveillance, communication and also strategic airlift and cyber-defence “with the support of the European Defence Fund”. The eighth is “a greater level of integration of Member States’ defence forces”. Conducting advanced defence operations, including “operations against terrorist groups, naval operations in hostile environments or cyber-defence action” would fall under the umbrella of the ESDU. It would however not be in competition with NATO, but rather complement and enhance the goals of that international organisation.²⁸

Together with the Reflection Paper on the establishment of the ESDU, on 7 June 2017 the European Commission submitted two more documents. The first of these was a draft regulation of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union concerning the adoption of the defence industry development programme, and the second a memorandum on the creation of the European Defence Fund. The legislative proposal foresaw the acceptance of a development programme for the defence industry from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2020. This programme will have as its goal the increase of competition in the defence industry in the EU including that of cyber defence, through supporting cooperation between enterprises involved in the development of defence products and technologies. However only those projects realised through at least three companies with headquarters in at least two Member States would receive financing. A key element in the programme would be the establishment of the European Defence

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14, 16–17.

²⁷ The White Paper of 1 March 2017 speaks of the establishment of a European Defence Union, while the Reflection paper of 7 June of the same year speaks of the creation of a European Security and Defence Union. For greater clarity, the latter term is used in the present analysis.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15, 16–17.

Fund.²⁹ The legislative proposal, considered within routine legislative procedures, has so far been discussed three times in proceedings of the Council of the European Union or its preparatory bodies and is still subject to the legislative process.³⁰

In the aforementioned memorandum of the European Commission, however, the principles of operation of the European Defence Fund are specified. It would be made up of two legally separate but mutually materially complementary windows, one devoted to research and the other devoted to the improvement of defence capabilities. Both windows would be managed by a coordinating council made up of representatives of the European Commission, the High Representative of Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Defence Agency, Member States and also, relative to the situation, representatives of defence industry firms. The research section, which began preparatory activities in 2017, is to be financed exclusively from the general budget of the EU. A total of 90 million euro has been earmarked for the realisation of the programme to the end of 2020, while after that year its budget is estimated as 500 million euro a year. Projects (to the B+T level) are to be funded from this programme, taking into account priorities from the areas of defence capabilities agreed upon by the Member States, including projects within Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).³¹ The section for improving defence capabilities would serve the financial support of projects (above the B+T level), the building of prototypes (such as drones), and ordering military products and technologies. It will be financed jointly from national budgets and the general EU budget. The budget for the capability section will be 500 million euro until the end of 2020, and is estimated at one billion euro annually after that. Together, then, after the year 2020 the European Defence Fund budget will reach 1.5 billion euro annually. It is however estimated that European Defence Fund operations will “leverage national financing with an expected multiplying effect of 5”. Taking these calculations into account, it can be assumed that the entire investment in the development of defence capabilities after 2020 should amount to five billion euro annually, of which the EU’s contribution will total 20%. It is projected that the European Defence Fund will eventually be the motor in the process of building first a common arms (defence) market and then the ESDU.³²

²⁹ European Commission, *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU defence industry*, Brussels, 7 June 2017, COM (2017) 294 final, pp. 1–17.

³⁰ Procedure 2017/0125/COD, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu> (accessed 14 September 2017), p. 1.

³¹ On 23 June 2017, the European Council decided for the first time to launch permanent structured cooperation between the Member States concerned on the basis of Articles 42(6) and 46(1–6) TEU and Protocol No. 10 on permanent structured cooperation, annexed to the TEU and TFEU; see European Council, *Conclusions*, Brussels, 23 June 2017, EUCO 8/17, p. 5. For more on the principles for establishing and the status of permanent structured cooperation, see J. J. Węc, *Traktat Lizboński. Polityczne aspekty reformy ustrojowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2007-2016*, Kraków 2016, pp. 256–258.

³² European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Launching the European Defence Fund*, Brussels, 7 June 2017, COM (2017) 0295 final, pp. 1–19.

Reflection Paper on the social dimension of Europe

The economic crisis in the euro area began in 2010.³³ It was manifested, among other things, by an increase in public and private debt, mainly in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. The consequences of the crisis affected above all the younger generation in a very painful way. In 2016 the rate of unemployment for the EU was 18%, in the euro area it reached 20%, but in Spain, Italy and Greece it reached 40%. Since 2010, EU activities in the area of social policy were mainly directed toward managing the crisis. It was not until 2017 that the European Commission decided on long-term action. The White Paper and Reflection Paper were expressions of this in relation to creating a European Pillar of Social Rights from 26 April of that year. The Swedish government and the European Commission called for a social summit for fair jobs and growth in Gothenburg on 17 November 2017.³⁴

Following the assumptions of the White Paper, the Reflection Paper of 26 April 2017 discussed three possible scenarios for the further development of EU social policy. The first involved limiting the “social dimension” to free movement, the second was the extension of social policy to principles of enhanced cooperation, while the third foresaw strengthened cooperation of all Member States in social policy.

The first scenario involves focusing exclusively on the common market, which would be synonymous with maintaining regulations that facilitate the cross-border movement of people and protecting the social security rights of mobile citizens, foreign posting of employees, cross-border healthcare and the recognition of diplomas. On the other hand, such a solution would mean giving up EU regulations regarding employee protection in the areas of health and safety, working hours and breaks, a minimum 20 days of paid holiday, norms concerning 14-week maternal and paternal leave as well as parental leave for family reasons, the equal treatment of part-time employees, and also EU support in employment policy (EU recommendations on solutions to youth or long-term unemployment). A further consequence resulting from such a solution would be the abolition or limitation of EU funds for the reconversion of regions affected by globalisation as well as social programmes of Member States.³⁵

³³ The European Commission dates the debt crisis to the turn of 2010 and 2011; see European Commission, *Memo – Banking union: restoring financial stability in the Eurozone*, Brussels, 15 April 2014, p. 1. For more on the causes, course and conclusions resulting from the debt crisis of the euro area, cf. J. Frankel, *Causes of Eurozone Crises*, [in:] *Eurozone Crisis. A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Solutions*, ed. by R. Baldwin and F. Giavazzi, London 2015, pp. 109–120; T. Beck and J.-L. Peydró, *Five Years of Crisis (Resolution) – Some Lessons*, [in:] *Eurozone Crisis, op. cit.*, pp. 63–71; P. De Grauwe, *Design Failures of the Eurozone*, [in:] *Eurozone Crisis, op. cit.*, pp. 99–108; T. Kunstein, W. Wesels, *Die Europäische Union in der Währungskrise. Eckdaten und Schlüsselerscheidungen*, *Integration*, 2011, vol. 4, pp. 308–322; M. Pietrzykowski, *Polska na drodze do reformowanej strefy euro*, Poznań 2014, pp. 44–58; M. Götz, *Kryzys i przyszłość strefy euro*, Warsaw 2012. See also M. Gruszczyński, *Kryzysy walutowe, bankowe i zadłużeniowe w gospodarce światowej*, Warsaw 2013.

³⁴ European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe*, Brussels, 26 April 2017, COM (2017) 206 final, pp. 8–12.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

The second scenario would proceed according to the idea of enhanced cooperation within a multi-speed Europe. This would mean that some Member States (such as those in the euro area) would accept common standards concerning the labour market, competitiveness, the business environment and public administration and some aspects of tax policy (such as basic tax levels for legal persons). In participating countries there would be higher benefits for the unemployed than in the remaining countries, and also the automatic recognition of secondary and post-secondary diplomas and even joint programmes for integrating refugees. On the other hand, the realisation of this scenario would mean separate standards in areas such as social policy, social insurance, health care and education and even different standards for accessing EU funds. This would, in effect, lead to the deepening of differences in the areas of economic, social and territorial cohesion.³⁶

The third scenario foresees close cooperation between all Member States of the EU to integrate the labour market, to unify social rights including pensions and social security protections, as well as in the fields of healthcare, education and the mutual recognition of diplomas. Despite this, this scenario also assumes that the main burden in social policy will remain in the hands of Member States, their national and local governments as well as social partners. In effect the economy of all states should be more immune to macroeconomic shocks, while the economies of countries not belonging to the euro area should be better prepared to join the euro.³⁷

Together with the Reflection Paper of 26 April 2017 the European Commission published a recommendation, a memorandum as well as a proposal concerning the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The recommendation on the establishment of the European Pillar of Social Rights contains the basic laws concerning the labour market as well as systems of social security previously dispersed in different legal sources, and also new principles resulting from social, technological and economic changes in the EU in the 21st century. In particular this pillar is based on the Council of Europe's European Social Charter of 18 October 1961 and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 9 December 1989, but also on the achievements of the EU in the areas of social policy of the previous 30 years in the form of new regulations introduced into treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in its version of 13 December 2007, as well as judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The regulations contained in the European Pillar of Social Rights should enter into force both at the level of the EU and at the level of the Member States within the limits of their jurisdiction and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Their establishment would not infringe upon the rights of Member States to determine their own basic systems of social security and would not influence their economic equilibrium. Turning its resolutions into reality will have a very profound effect on the situation in the labour market, the effectiveness of national social security systems as well as the ability of euro area Member

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

States to quickly amortise macroeconomic shocks, react to those shocks and deal with their social effects. After inter-institutional discussion, the European Pillar of Social Rights will be proclaimed by the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.³⁸ It has been designed first of all for the countries of the euro area, but other EU Member States will be able to join. This means that the Commission has decided to pursue EU social policy in accordance with the second scenario contained in the Reflection Paper of 26 April 2017.

Reflection Paper on the future of EU finances

As mentioned previously, the Reflection Paper on the future of EU finances is most strongly tied to the five scenarios of the White Paper. It adapts its goals regarding expenses and general EU budget revenues to those scenarios, and foresees the further development of its finances according to each of them. Therefore, unlike the other Reflection Papers it also contains five scenarios concerning the form, structure and goals of the general EU budget. The first scenario reflects the current state of reform in the EU but assumes a lowering of expenditure on regional (cohesion) policy and the common agricultural policy in order to fund expenditure in new priority actions, especially for migration policy and external border control as well as common security and defence policy (scientific research and the development of military capabilities). Revenue for the general budget could be based primarily on the current system, but rebates would be abolished and other sources and charges would be introduced.³⁹ The second scenario assumes a radical reduction of EU budget expenditure on regional policy, the common agricultural policy, migration policy and external border control, the CSDP and also for the Erasmus programme, scientific research, innovations, health and culture. The general budget revenue should be based on the present system but without rebates.⁴⁰

The third scenario foresees maintaining budget expenditure at the level given in the first scenario, but also increasing it through the use of new financial instruments such as the pooling of funding beyond the EU budget, including expenses for strengthening cooperation to the general budget or instruments to strengthen the stability of the euro area (investment protection, unemployment reinsurance and a rainy day fund). General budget revenues would be similar to those foreseen in the first sce-

³⁸ European Commission, *Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/761 of 26 April 2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights*, Official Journal of the European Union L, 2017, no. 113, pp. 56–61; European Commission, *Wniosek w sprawie międzyinstytucjonalnej proklamacji Europejskiego filaru praw społecznych*, Brussels, 26 April 2017, COM (2017) 251 final, pp. 1–10; European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights*, Brussels, 26 April 2017, COM (2017) 250 final, pp. 1–12.

³⁹ European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances*, Brussels, 28 June 2017, COM (2017) 358 final, pp. 30–31.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

nario but would also be increased by new own resources (such as a financial transaction tax) or through *ad hoc* contributions by Member States participating in deepened integration in accordance with the idea of a multi-speed Europe.⁴¹

The fourth scenario comprises a more radical version of the first in terms of expenditure. It is oriented toward limiting EU budget expenditure in the area of regional policy and common agricultural policy and increasing it for new priority areas in the CSDP (military and counterterrorism), migration management and external border control, as well as strengthening existing priorities (including smart transport and energy grids, external policies and structural reforms related to the European Semester). This scenario also foresees fundamental changes in general budget revenue. All rebates would be abolished, and VAT-based own resources would be eliminated or reformed. They would be replaced by the establishment of new own resources based on sources such as the tax on financial transactions, a green tax or a common consolidated corporate tax base as well as the creation of new revenue sources or fees.⁴²

The fifth scenario assumes an increase in the own resources ceiling and greater usage of financial instruments and guarantees, and at the same time a significant increase in general budget expenditure, in particular for the financing of new priorities and external policy. In the wake of this, expenditure on the common agricultural policy would increase, as well as new and already existing priorities outlined in the fourth scenario. The goals of the CSDP would be financed from the general budget of the EU complemented by an extra-budgetary fund. This would also lead to the creation of a separate budget for the euro area and the European Monetary Fund, as well as the joining of the European Development Fund to the general EU budget. On the other hand, expenditure on regional policy would be only slightly higher than in the first scenario. Revenue from the general budget, however, would undergo a radical change, exceeding even the proposals of the fourth scenario. This would involve the creation of completely new own resources as well as other revenue sources or fees.⁴³

THE EU STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS OF 13 SEPTEMBER 2017

On 13 September 2017, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, summarised the debate on the future of the EU in his annual state of the Union address. He also presented a plan that he called a sixth scenario. In the wake of some of the proposals contained in the Reflection Paper of the European Commission of 31 May 2017 on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union, Juncker spoke in favour of continued systematic reform of the euro area. He considered the completion of the Banking Union through the establishment of the controversial (especially in Germany) EDIS as the most essential short-term goal. To encourage Member States

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

to join the euro area he also proposed the creation of a special accession instrument assuring technical and financial aid to interested countries. The most important institutional changes in the euro area would be based on turning the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund, as well as creating a European Minister of Economy and Finance, who would simultaneously be a Vice-President of the European Commission and preside over the Eurogroup. This position would arise out of the joining of two functions, the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and the rotating chair of the Eurogroup. The Minister of Economy and Finance would report to the European Parliament. The responsibilities of the position would include supporting structural reforms and coordinating all EU financial instruments that Member States could access during a financial or economic crisis. Juncker also announced the Commission's withdrawal of institutional changes that were too far ranging and controversial, especially for countries in the euro area. This included the idea of creating a separate parliament and budget for the euro area. Related to this, he proposed the establishment of a separate euro area budget line within the general EU budget.⁴⁴

A complement of "true" Economic and Monetary Union would be changes in the social and welfare policies of Member States. Therefore, in connection with the above-mentioned Reflection Paper of 26 April 2017, Juncker came out in favour of the establishment of a European Pillar of Social Rights that would guarantee minimal norms in social policy but without infringing upon the responsibilities of Member States in this area. He also announced the creation of a European Labour Authority, which would be responsible for monitoring the situation in the labour market. He confirmed the changes proposed by the European Commission to directive 96/71 regarding the posting of workers. After rejecting the objections of eleven Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) on 20 July 2016 the European Commission maintained its position in this matter. These changes assume that workers posted by their employers to other EU Member States for a certain time should have the right to the same salary as a local employee and not just to a minimum wage, and after two years must be completely covered by the labour regulations of the receiving country.⁴⁵

In reference to the above-mentioned Reflection Paper of the European Commission of 7 June 2017, Juncker also announced the continuation of reforms to the CSDP, in particular the establishment of the European Defence Fund, the implementation of regulations from the Treaty of Lisbon on permanent structural cooperation, and also the creation of the ESDU by the end of 2025. A new aspect of reform was the creation of a European Cyber Security Agency in order to more effectively fight cyber crime. It would be created on the base of the already existing European Union Agency for Net-

⁴⁴ European Commission, *President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address 2017*, Brussels, 13 September 2017, Speech 17/3165, pp. 7–8.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

work and Information Security. Cyber security was recognised as an unusually critical aspect of EU security, since cyber attacks, as Juncker argued, “can be more dangerous to the stability of democracies and economies than guns and tanks”.⁴⁶

The reform of the CSDP will be supplemented by fundamental changes in policies in the areas of freedom, security and justice. In consequence Juncker appealed to the governments of Member States for rapid and more generous contributions to the EU Trust Fund for Africa, whose reserves should boast 2.7 billion euro, and from which the creation of new jobs in African countries will be financed. He proposed easing restrictions so that qualified migrants could receive a “blue card” in order to increase legal migration. He also announced the introduction of a new legislative package to introduce regulations facilitating legal migration, changes to rules regarding the return of illegal migrants as well as increased financial aid for Africa. He called for the establishment of a European intelligence unit that would ensure that information concerning terrorists and foreign fighters was automatically shared among intelligence services and with the police, and also for tasking the future European Prosecutor with the prosecution of cross-border terrorist crimes in accordance with Article 86(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.⁴⁷ Despite the ongoing firm opposition of Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, Juncker came out in favour of Bulgaria and Romania joining the Schengen area and broadening it in the future to include Croatia. In his opinion, he said, such a decision would lead to the strengthening of the EU’s external borders.⁴⁸

In addition, Juncker announced further systematic changes in the EU. Some of these are completely new, while others are related to proposals made long ago. The new initiatives are changes in the procedures for making decisions in the Council of the European Union in some aspects of tax policy, the announcement of the creation of new European frameworks for monitoring investments, and the elaboration of a new strategy in industrial policy, the idea of creating a new task force for subsidiarity and proportionality, changes in regulations regarding the establishment of citizens’ initiatives, the acceptance of a new code of conduct for commissioners, as well as a revision of the rules for financing parties and political foundations.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 3–4.

⁴⁷ The draft Council regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is making its way through the legislative process, cf. *Procedure 2013/0255/APP*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu> (accessed 14 September 2017), pp. 1–3. As unanimity was not achieved within the Council on this matter, first 16 and then 20 Member States decided to set up a European Public Prosecutor’s Office as part of enhanced cooperation. It will be established three years after this regulation comes into force and will be based in Luxembourg. The countries that have decided to set up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain; cf. Council of the European Union, *20 Member States agree on details on creating the European Public Prosecutor’s office (EPPO)*. Press release 333/17, Brussels, 8 June 2017, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁸ European Commission, *President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5, 7–8.

Change in the decision-making process of the Council would include abandoning the requirement for unanimous votes in favour of a qualified majority in cases such as unified CIT and VAT policy, taxes in the cyber sector as well as the tax on financial transactions. This modification would be carried out with the help of a simplified treaty revision procedure, that is the passerelle clause (Article 48(7) TEU). The new investment monitoring guidelines would ensure control and transparency in the acquisition of defence technology, energy infrastructure and ports by external entities. The new strategy in industrial policy would have the goal of strengthening industrial competitiveness in EU Member States through the development of new technologies, digitisation and decarbonisation. The task force would carry out a “critical” review of all EU policies from the point of view of the division of EU and Member State responsibilities, and after twelve months would file its first report. The task force would be made up of representatives from the European Parliament and national parliaments and would be headed by Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans. The task force has the chance to solve one of the biggest dilemmas of the post-Treaty of Lisbon legal order, that is the inefficiency of the yellow card procedure, caused by a lack of mechanisms that would facilitate better communication and cooperation between national parliaments in this area, and also, on the basis of Declaration 18 on divided responsibilities, facilitate the use of the possibilities guaranteed by the Treaty of Lisbon of returning responsibilities delegated earlier to the EU back to Member States. Amendments to regulations regarding citizen initiatives would lead to, among other things, a reduction in the minimum age of signatories, that is EU citizens declaring their support, to 16. The new code of ethics for commissioners would strengthen requirements for professional honesty for commissioners both during their terms and afterward, and also expressly allow them to participate in elections to the European Parliament. Revision to the rules for financing political parties and foundations would prohibit EU financial support for parties and foundations expressing anti-European views, or in his words, the EU “should not be filling the coffers of anti-European extremists”.⁴⁹

The remaining proposals for systematic changes announced in the State of the Union address are related to ideas proposed in previous years. They include the initiative to combine the positions of President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, as well as the establishment of transnational lists in European elections, and have been known in the EU since the European Convention in 2002–2003 and international conferences in 2003–2004. The proposal to introduce *Spitzenkandidaten* (lead candidates) for parties during elections to the European Parliament was raised in the years 2011–2012 during debates in Germany, Austria and Belgium on the possibility of establishing a Political Union as a method of averting a debt crisis in the euro area.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 3, 7–9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

THE WHITE PAPER AND THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
FROM A POLISH PERSPECTIVE

The White Paper of 1 March 2017

An evaluation of the European Commission's White Paper, as well as the Reflection Papers it generated and other accompanying documents, must be a mixed one. It must be admitted that the presentation of so many scenarios for the future development of the EU is justified, but only with regard to the fact that the EU currently finds itself at a historic crossroads due to an accumulation of crises and crisis-related phenomena. The White Paper only superficially confronts the challenges resulting from these crises, because none of the scenarios within it contains any coherent idea for further development. In addition, the first to fourth scenarios make no reference to the systematic reform of the euro area which has continued since 2012, or to Economic and Monetary Union.

The first scenario would mean that the EU has settled for the status quo. The question arises, however, of how to reconcile the desire to maintain the status quo with the necessity of overcoming the many crises facing the EU, especially the euro area debt crisis and the migration crisis. This scenario also does not give any answer to two other basic questions. The first is how to build a Common European Asylum System, since there are such profound differences of opinion among Member States. The second question is what closer cooperation in the CSDP would be based on, since this sector has been subject to structural stagnation for many years due to a lack of political will for deeper integration. It is not clear what the goal is. It might be to strengthen forces which already exist and have combat duty but whose potential has so far not been realised. Alternatively, measures might be taken to implement the unused provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon such as initial funding, permanent structural cooperation and the mutual defence clause. It could also mean the implementation of the global EU strategy in the area of security and defence from June 2016.

The second scenario is too extreme because it scales back the process of integration to levels from the early 1990s. It foresees the development of just two of the four freedoms of the common market, the free flow of capital and goods. This scenario also questions further cooperation in policies related to freedom, security and justice. Cooperation in the CSDP would be continued, but everything points to that not being effective, as has been the case so far. It is worth noting that the second scenario does not have support in the majority of EU Member States.

These observations lead to the conclusion that the first and second scenarios do not meet the current challenges the EU is facing. They are therefore only of theoretical significance. This leaves three scenarios. The third scenario assumes the further development of European integration at different speeds according to the assumptions of strengthened cooperation. It foresees a deepening of cooperation in one or more groups of Member States in tax and social policy in the euro area, migration policy, border control, asylum policy and in the CSDP (coordinating military and

arms cooperation). On the other hand, it assumes the continuation of the current rate of integration by the remaining Member States according to the first scenario. This scenario is undoubtedly beneficial for the countries of the euro area but less so for the other Member States.

The fourth scenario assumes deepened integration in some areas but at the same times foresees limits in many others. This scenario has many missing elements or even defects. It has no answer to the question of how to strengthen the euro area without closer cooperation in the area of social policy, or how to achieve economic, social and territorial coherence in the EU with no regional policy. It is hard then to imagine stabilising the euro area without deepened cooperation in social policy or even the creation of a social union or some other similar structure in the Economic and Monetary Union. Similarly hard to understand are the limitations on contributions to regional policy, given the persistent and significant differences in economic and social development in particular Member States or between regions in Member States. From this point of view, this scenario is also disadvantageous for Poland and other beneficiaries of regional policy.

The fifth scenario would mean deepening integration in all areas with the participation of all Member States. This is undoubtedly the most advantageous scenario for the EU, and conditionally also for Poland.⁵¹ It confirms the present philosophy of European integration according to which all Member States participate and in which opt-out regulations are truly exceptional (euro area, Schengen area). On the other hand, the full realisation of this scenario seems only conditionally possible as it demands essential corrections. The primary goals are to maintain cohesion and the inclusive nature of the entire EU, as well as to make institutional changes in the euro area. All the institutional changes planned, for example, in the Five Presidents' Report can be carried out within the existing institutional system of the EU. Poland should try to ensure that these changes occur within current EU law and the existing institutional system and not on the basis of international agreements and outside EU institutions.

The State of the Union Address of 13 September 2017

From the Polish point of view, however, Juncker's speech of 13 September 2017 is much more favourable. It is essentially based on the third, fourth and fifth scenarios of the White Paper and not on elements of all five scenarios, as stated by the European Commission President himself. On the other hand, apart from the proposals contained in the White Paper, the plan for systematic change in the EU outlined in the address is much more pragmatic and calculated to preserve its cohesive and inclusive nature. From the third scenario comes the method of con-

⁵¹ *Implikacje reformy instytucjonalnej strefy euro dla procesu wprowadzenia euro w Polsce*, <http://www.mf.gov.pl/ministerstwo-finansow/>, 22 January 2014, pp. 1–3; National Bank of Poland, *Ekonomiczne wyzwania integracji Polski ze strefą euro*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 43, 48, 66, 86–87, 92–97; *Konsekwencje przystąpienia Polski do Unii Bankowej*, ed. B. Lepczyński, Gdańsk 2014, pp. 41–102.

tinuing systematic reform of the euro area and working more closely together in matters of EU social policy (strengthened cooperation), as well as making some changes to the CSDP, especially in the areas of military capabilities (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and judicial cooperation in criminal cases (broadening the powers of the European Prosecutor). In accordance with the fourth and fifth scenarios from the White Paper, other systematic reforms of the EU would be introduced. The first of these would bring about further changes in the CSDP based on the creation of a European Defence Fund and European Defence Union. The second would bring strengthened cooperation in migration and asylum policy, border control and counterterrorism, including the establishment of a European intelligence unit. The third would see changes in the common market (tax, industrial and investment policy).

On the other hand, it should be stressed that the State of the Union Address leaves many questions unanswered. One of these concerns further phases of reform in the euro area, or the establishment of a Capital Markets Union (as an element of the Financial Union), Tax Union and Economic Union in accordance with the Five Presidents' Report of 22 June 2015 and the European Commission Reflection Paper of 31 May 2017. Although the creation of a Banking Union was recognised as a priority, the process of forming a Capital Markets Union, Fiscal Union and Economic Union would be continued.⁵² The European Commission announced that on 6 December 2017 it would present a package of proposed legislation related to Economic and Monetary Union, the goals of which would be to transform the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary System, to create a special budget line for the euro area, to join the fiscal pact to EU law and to establish a dual function for a European Minister of Economy and Finance. The special line would serve four functions. The first would be to extend aid to euro area countries taking up structural reforms. The second would be to fulfil the role of stabiliser for the economies of countries in the euro area. The third would be to function as a defence mechanism for the Banking Union. The fourth would be to aid pre-accession countries that do not belong to the euro area (Euro-accession instrument).⁵³ The decision to establish a special euro area budget line can be regarded as a breakthrough, because it settles a dispute dating back to 2011 in the EU on the establishment of a separate budget

⁵² Some of the secondary legislation needed as a legal basis for these new structures has already been adopted, and some is making its way through the legislative process. The objectives of the reform implemented include the decision of the European Commission of 21 October 2015 establishing the European Fiscal Board (Fiscal Union) and the recommendation of the Council of the European Union of 26 September 2016 to create national Productivity Boards (Economic Union). These legislative procedures, however, include a draft EU Council decision establishing a unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund (Political Union); cf. J. J. Węc, *Dynamika reformy ustrojowej strefy euro*, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–200.

⁵³ European Commission, *State of the Union Address 2017. Roadmap for a more united, stronger and more democratic Union*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2017_en, pp. 1–2.

area.⁵⁴ It also finally answers the question of how the European Stability Mechanism for the Banking Union should function.

The second question refers to the European Commission's draft of 4 May 2016, which has been contested by the governments of many countries, mainly those in the Visegrad Group. It assumes a revision of the Dublin III regulation, especially the establishment of a permanent relocation mechanism for the entire EU as well as a solidarity tax for countries refusing to take in migrants. The reform of migration policy, border control and asylum policy has been ongoing since 2015, yet has clearly stagnated due to the ineffectiveness of the current system of relocation established by decisions of the Council of the EU from 14 and 22 September 2015, and also the divergent views among Member States on changes in the CEAS. These differences especially concern the highly controversial proposal of introducing a quota system for the relocation of migrants and a solidarity tax for countries that do not accept them, and also the proposal by the Visegrad Group of the principle of effective solidarity and goodwill acceptance of migrants instead of the permanent relocation system proposed by the European Commission on 4 May 2016.⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking into account the weight and scope of the planned reforms, it can be stated that the areas of the utmost importance for Poland are the systematic reform of the euro area and the Economic and Monetary Union, the reform of the CSDP and changes in EU finances. Therefore, the subject of this analysis will be limited to those three reforms. It is possible to evaluate the implications of these reforms for Poland, but as mentioned previously, with the proviso that it will be carried out at a high level of generality, since at this stage the particulars for each remain unknown.

Structural reform in the euro area and Economic and Monetary Union

The fundamental problem in the process of systematic reform of the euro area for countries outside it, such as Poland, will be a range of structural changes as well as the ability to reconcile them with the demands of EU integrity. The establishment of three new structures within the Economic and Monetary Union, that is the Financial Union, Fiscal Union and Economic Union, seems to be necessary to finally overcome the debt crisis and improve the functioning and stability of the euro area. On the other hand, this process could lead to a weakening of the EU by deepening the differences

⁵⁴ This opinion is not changed by the latest proposal of French President Emmanuel Macron to establish a separate budget for the euro area, presented on 26 September 2017 in a speech at Sorbonne University. A majority of EU Member States, including Germany, do not approve.

⁵⁵ J. J. Węc, *Niemcy wobec reformy ustrojowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2002-2016*, Krakow 2017, pp. 266–268. See also *Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2014, pp. 61–115.

between the euro area and countries remaining outside it. The scale of the risk will depend on the range of the reforms undertaken. The smallest risk may occur with the establishment of the Financial Union by itself, a greater risk with the creation of the Financial Union, Fiscal Union and Economic Union, while the greatest risk would be in a situation in which the foundations of Political Union were formed within the Economic and Monetary Union.

The speech of 13 September 2017 is the first EU document in which it is unambiguously stated that earlier plans to establish a separate budget, parliament or government for the euro area would not be implemented as part of this reform. This announcement is particularly advantageous for countries outside the euro area, including Poland. In this situation, it will be crucial to maintain transparency for countries outside the euro area. The optimal solution would be to include these countries, at least partially, in the process of decision making in the euro area. However, experiences so far indicate that this would probably be impossible, as France and Germany in particular would oppose it. Therefore, finding another way to ensure a real voice for countries outside the euro area in the course of this reform, and ultimately to guarantee consistency between countries inside and outside the euro area, would be in Poland's vital interests.

Even though the decision to systematically reform the euro zone was correct because it created the possibility for effective and stable functioning in the future, from the point of view of Poland some aspects of the reform may justifiably raise doubts. The first and second pillar of the Banking Union will have few instruments providing security for countries outside the euro area. For example, in the first pillar, Poland as a non-member will not have access to capital support from the European Stability Mechanism. The weakness of the second pillar is the very complicated decision-making process in the Single Resolution Board, which is, in actuality, dominated by Germany and France. This may significantly weaken the effectiveness of the entire mechanism. The voting system in this body facilitates Germany or France forming coalitions that would block the restructuring of banks requiring assistance above five billion euro or involving institutions based in at least one euro area country and one non-euro area country (group restructuring). Furthermore, Germany, as the country with the largest financial share in the Single Resolution Board, will have a decisive voice in all major processes of bank restructuring or liquidation. As a result, it will be able to influence the direction of reforms in countries suffering from financial crisis.⁵⁶ Another disadvantage is that funds accumulated in the account of the Single Resolution Board since its inception are not pooled. On the other hand, since Poland remains outside the Single Resolution Board it can make independent decisions in the case of the bankruptcy of domestic entities in accordance with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. As far as Fiscal Union is concerned, the establishment of a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism for the euro area could

⁵⁶ J. J. Węc, Niemcy wobec reformy ustrojowej strefy euro, *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych*, 2016, No. 3, pp. 71–72.

benefit Poland if it joins the euro area. But the need to implement new solutions (as part of the process of adjustment before adopting the euro) along with Poland's accession to the euro area would significantly reduce the cost competitiveness of the Polish economy in the short term. As regards Economic Union, Poland's accession to the mechanism of contractual agreements in the pre-accession period could accelerate its efforts to increase the structural competitiveness of the economy. This is under the condition, however, that the criteria for providing financial support under them would be set so that the net beneficiaries of the system are not economies with high levels of structural competitiveness at the expense of less competitive economies.

In conclusion it needs to be said that joining the euro area at present would not be in Poland's interest, mainly due to the low structural competitiveness of the Polish economy, the ongoing debt crisis and the still unfinished structural reform of the euro area. However, it is worth considering Poland's joining the Euro-accession instrument whose establishment was announced by the President of the European Commission during the State of the Union Address analysed here, and which will be included in the package of legislative proposals announced for 6 December 2017. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that the reform of the euro area will doubtless result in the need for much deeper adjustment than previously assumed in Poland should the Polish government decide to join in the future.

Reform of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy

Proposed changes to the CSDP should be assessed similarly. After years of debate and a long delay brought on by an accumulation of crises, in particular the outbreak of the debt crisis in the euro area followed by the migration crisis in the EU, it was not until June 2016 that the EU's external security strategy was adopted. This paved the way for ground-breaking reforms in the area of policy related to common security and defence. However, the project to establish a European Defence Fund remains in the legislative phase even though preparatory actions for its creation have begun. Also, the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon on permanent structured cooperation have not been fully implemented. Above all, however, it is unclear on exactly what terms it should function, what its structure should be and on the basis of what criteria the ESDU should be created.

From the Polish point of view, the reform of the CSDP raises some doubts. These primarily concern four issues. The first of these is the possibility of weakening the coherence of the entire Euro-Atlantic system as a result of creating a European Union of Security and Defence. The second involves the consequences of entering into closer cooperation under PESCO. The third issue is concern over unequal competition with national supranational military concerns. The fourth issue is the unfavourable rules for Poland to participate in the process of creating international arms consortia.

Despite concerns about the coherence of the Euro-Atlantic security system as a result of deepening integration within the CSDP, a guideline for the Polish government should be the aforementioned Warsaw Declaration signed on 8 July 2016 on the strengthening of practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. It should be assumed that reform of the CSDP would lead to the strengthening of the EU's position on the international stage and the strengthening of Euro-Atlantic security. Working more closely together under permanent structured cooperation by a group or even groups of Member States may lead to a consolidation of divisions within the EU. However, to prevent isolation within the EU but also measurable financial losses, Poland should try to influence the decision to launch PESCO and as far as possible actively participate in permanent structured cooperation. This is justified all the more since the use of European Defence Fund resources would be linked to participation in PESCO. Uneven competition with national and supranational armament concerns in the procedures for applying for the use of European Defence Fund instruments as well as short deadlines for creating consortia and submitting projects could also be disadvantageous to Poland's security. On the other hand, non-participation in both technological and later arms cooperation would reduce Poland's competitiveness more as well as reducing its chances for obtaining EU funds in the 2021–2027 multiannual financial framework. Therefore, Polish defence firms and research institutes working for the defence industry should take an active role in both preparatory activities and the implementation of the defence industry development programme from 2 January 2019 to 31 December 2020.

Changes in EU finances

With regard to the changes in EU finances foreseen in the Reflection Paper of 28 June 2017, the White Book of 1 March 2017 and the road map for the years 2017–2019 accompanying it, it should be underlined that from the point of view of Poland the most disadvantageous would be the options contained in the first, second and fourth scenarios, due to the significant (first scenario) or radical (second and fourth scenarios) reduction of regional policy and the common agricultural policy. The question arises which scenario would be the most advantageous for Poland. At this moment it would seem to be the fifth, although its realisation could also mean an increase in contributions by Member States, including Poland, to the general budget of the EU. On the other hand, this scenario foresees a clear increase in expenditure on the common agricultural policy as well as regional policy, as well as greater contributions for new priority actions in the CSDP (military capabilities and counter terrorism) and in migration policy and border control. Its weakness, until recently, was the establishment of a separate budget for the euro area foreseen in the report. However as mentioned above, the European Commission departed from that intention in the State of the Union address of 13 September 2017 and decided on the creation of a special budget line within the general EU budget.

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ABSTRACT

This paper contains a critical analysis of the reforms of the European Union planned by 2025, in particular the reform of the euro area, changes in EU social policy, reform of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, and changes to EU finances. The author formulates two research hypotheses. The first is based on the assumption that structural reform will strengthen the European Union. However, the second hypothesis is that these reforms will have a significant impact on Poland's future position in the EU. In this context, the author also formulates conclusions and recommendations on the benefits and dangers for Poland resulting from the planned EU reforms.

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REFORM IN THE EURO AREA GERMAN REACTIONS TO PROPOSALS BY FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The election of Emmanuel Macron, who argued for deeper European integration,¹ as the President of France occurred at a time of increased questioning among Member States of the process of transferring competencies to EU institutions (Brexit and the growth in popularity of parties demanding the retention or increase of Member State decision making powers, both consequences of financial and economic crises). In both Germany and France, this convinced the political elite of the necessity of deepening cooperation between the two countries and of the need for compromise in the matter of reforming the euro area. German parliamentary elections and the lengthening process of creating a new government, however, prevented Germany from becoming engaged in the establishment of common proposals for reform. Following the presidential election in France, the tone of discussions was set by President Macron and the European Commission,² whose proposals aimed to reconcile the positions of various Member States.³

¹ The main proposals were presented by Emmanuel Macron during his election campaign and after he became president during speeches given in Athens (7 September 2017) and at Sorbonne University in Paris (26 September 2017). See: *Le Programme d'Emmanuel Macron*, En Marche!, 2017, <https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme> (4 March 2018); *Discours du Président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, à la Pnyx, Athènes le jeudi 7 septembre 2017*, Présidence de la République française – Élysée.fr, 8 September 2017, <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-pnyx-athenes-le-jeudi-7-septembre-2017/> (4 March 2018); *Initiative pour l'Europe. Une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique*, Présidence de la République française – Élysée.fr, 26 September 2017, <http://www.elysee.fr/assets/Initiative-pour-lEurope-une-Europe-souveraine-unie-et-democratique-Emmanuel-Macron.pdf> (4 March 2018).

² Cf. European Commission. Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 May 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf (10 March 2018), pp. 29-30; European Commission. *President Jean-Claude Juncker's: State of the Union Address 2017*, Brussels, 13 September 2017, Speech 17/3165, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm (4 March 2018).

³ Cf. J. J. Węc, *Perspektywy zmian ustrojowych w Unii Europejskiej do 2025 r. Implikacje dla Polski*, "Przeгляд Zachodni", 2018, issue 1, p. 21.

The goal of this article is to present the German position on the topic of reforms of euro area proposed by France and the European Commission after the presidential elections in France (on 7 May 2017) and until the Eurogroup summit (on 14 December 2018). The research questions posed include the following: What was the German position on issues related to the functioning of the euro area, such as the creation of a separate euro area budget or a special budget line intended for the area within the general EU budget, transform the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund, the creation of a Banking Union as well as the creation of the position of Minister of Finance for the euro area or a Minister of Economy and Finance for the EU? Did Germany emphasise the meaning of budget discipline and structural reform and did it adopt a distanced approach to plans for the sharing of risk in the euro area? Did solutions proposed by Germany, foster a deepening of the divisions between EU Member States?

The analysis was carried out by the comparative method which made it possible to isolate differences and similarities in the positions of Germany, France and the European Commission. The data base of the paper is made up of official government and European Commission documents as well as public statements by the main political actors responsible for forming economic and financial policy at the national and EU levels. The hypothesis is that the government of Germany in its reactions to proposals maintained its demands from previous years concerning the necessity of maintaining budgetary discipline and structural reforms in euro area states as well as scepticism toward the sharing of risk such as that of the European System of Guaranteed Deposits. It is also assumed that Germany sought to adopt measures that would prevent the possibility of increasing the division between Member States.

The starting point is a description of attitudes toward the construction of and prospects for the transition to an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of states that in recent years initiated the reform of this area, that is Germany and France. In subsequent sections, there is discussion of German reactions to the proposals by France and the European Commission regarding reform of the euro area submitted in the above-mentioned period, concentrating on four main questions discussed, among other times, during the European Council and meetings of Eurogroup countries in December 2017 and also in March and December 2018. These include creating a separate budget for the euro area or a dedicated budget line for the area within the general budget of the EU, the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund, completing the Banking Union as well as creating the position of Minister of Finance for the euro area or Minister of Economy and Finance for the EU.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN DISPUTE OVER THE EURO AREA

Since the establishment of the EMU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, Germany has held different positions from France on the functioning of the euro area. These differences are based on different views on economic management and are structural in

nature.⁴ When discussions were held at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s on introducing a common currency Germany was sceptical. In Berlin, it was thought that its creation should not precede the establishment of a political union equipped with instruments for the control of fiscal policy of the countries using the common currency. Germany wanted to avoid the risk of a future rise in costs stemming from the European Central Bank (ECB) conducting a less rigorous monetary policy than that of the *Bundesbank*. France, in turn, similarly to Italy, hoped to replace the strong *Deutsche Mark* with a new currency and for an economic policy that would facilitate investment to a greater degree and lower unemployment. Finally, as a result of resistance from Berlin, it was established that the ECB would function according to the model adopted by the *Bundesbank* and the no-bail-out clause meant the common currency would not require assuming the obligations of other countries. France agreed to this solution despite regarding it as insufficient. In the French opinion, EMU in such a form was (and remains) a project requiring completion. This would be accomplished, among other ways, through equipping the euro area with an instrument such as its own budget, strengthening the processes of convergence and lessening the macro-economic differences between euro area countries. For Germany, on the other hand, the basic rule whose observance would prevent an economic crisis in the area was the introduction of responsible budgetary policy subject to oversight.⁵

Despite the disparities among the countries using the common currency, the ECB applied the same criteria to each of them, establishing a single level of interest rates for the entire area. In the early 2000s, these were too high for the “sick man of Europe” at the time, that is Germany, whose economy depends upon low rates of inflation. The diverse potentials within the EMU were also shown by the financial crisis that began in 2008 and which was felt most strongly by the countries of the periphery, not just Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece but also Ireland. Germany was less affected as it was thriving due to an increase of exports outside the EU. While discussing how to deal with the problem of economic inequality within the euro area, Germany invoked the principles of responsibility and austerity. France and southern countries were accused of trying to extort financial aid from Germany and the northern countries of the EU. Above all, France drew attention to the need for its eastern neighbour to take the principles of solidarity into account while some economists directly criticised Germany for imposing rules for managing the economy on other countries and taking advantage of the fact that EMU was not complete.⁶

Until this time Germany had succeeded in forcing its own view on the direction of transformation of the EMU,⁷ while at the same time taking French proposals into

⁴ Cf. B. Koszel, *On ne touche pas à l'amitié franco-allemande. Współpraca niemiecko-francuska w okresie rządów François Hollande'a*, “Przegląd Zachodni”, 2015, issue 4.

⁵ J. Kubera, *Niemcy i Francja wobec strefy euro*, “Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego”, no. 236/2016, 20 April 2016.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Cf. J. J. Węc, *Niemcy wobec reformy ustrojowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2002-2016*, Kraków 2017, pp. 206-211.

account. Therefore, the remedial measures introduced in recent years at the behest of Germany were accompanied by actions that made them milder in nature from the point of view of the most indebted Member States of the euro area. France accepted German demands of austerity and increased budgetary discipline (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union from March of 2012, also known as the Fiscal Compact) at the same time striving, with the support of German Social Democrats and the Greens, to introduce mechanisms to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment (Compact for Growth and Jobs from June 2012). In addition, the assumptions of the Banking Union related to the supervision of the European banking sector were subordinated to the German view of economic policy.⁸

The election of Emmanuel Macron as the President of France once more opened up and strengthened discussions on reform of the euro area. Macron, who as an advisor of François Hollande (2012-14) and the Minister of Economy and Finance (2014-16) had encountered German scepticism toward mechanisms enabling transfers between euro area states, proposed a European “new deal”.⁹ This would depend on France implementing structural reforms related to the Agenda 2010 of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, which would prove that it understood the German logic of economic management both of the country and the entire euro area, based on the words “stability” and “responsibility”. In turn, Germany would, at the European level, stress terms such as “economic growth” and “solidarity” to a greater degree. The necessity of reconciling both perspectives had also been present in the provisions of joint Franco-German declarations agreed to in previous years, including on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 2013.¹⁰

THE EURO AREA BUDGET

If the contributions to the euro area budget followed the recommendations of the 1989 report by Jacques Delors,¹¹ they would amount to 2.5% of GDP. In such a case,

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

⁹ Macron used this stylistic figure, among other occasions, on 16 March 2017, during the debate he held as a presidential candidate with the then German Minister for Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel and the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. The debate took place at the Jacques Delors Institute Berlin. Cf. *Emmanuel Macron plaide pour un «New Deal» européen*, “Le Monde”, 12 October 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/emploi/article/2014/10/12/emmanuel-macron-plaide-pour-un-new-deal-europeen_4504776_1698637.html (4 March 2018); *Europe: la possibilité d'un «new deal»*, “Le Monde”, 13 May 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/05/13/europe-la-possibilite-d-un-new-deal_5127343_3232.html (4 March 2018).

¹⁰ *France and Germany – Together for a stronger Europe of Stability and Growth*, Die Bundesregierung, 30 May 2013. Also see: S. Gabriel, E. Macron, *Pour une Union européenne solidaire et différenciée*, “Le Figaro”, 3 June 2015, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2015/06/03/31001-20150603ARTFIG00377-macron-gabriel-pour-une-union-europeenne-solidaire-et-differenciee.php> (4 March 2018); H. Enderlein, J. Pisani-Ferry, *Reforms, Investment and Growth: An agenda for France, Germany and Europe*, Report to: Sigmar Gabriel, Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Emmanuel Macron, Minister for the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs, Hertie School of Governance, 27 November 2014.

¹¹ Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Jacques Delors – Chairman, *Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community*, 17 April 1989.

the area's budget would be 246 billion euro (in 2015, the GDP for the euro area was 9.86 trillion euro) of which France would contribute 54 billion euro while Germany would contribute 76.1 billion, in other words 22 and 31% of the entire budget. However, the budget report of the budget committee and the economic and monetary commission of the European Parliament, accepted in the form of a European Parliament resolution on 16 February 2017, mentions that the area's budget should be 5-7% of GDP.¹² In the text there is a call for the creation of fiscal or budgetary capacity, which would be made up of two elements, the European Stability Mechanism as well as "special, additional budgetary possibilities for the euro area". According to this proposal, it would be necessary to connect the position of leader of the euro area and the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and also increase the power of the European Parliament and national parliaments in managing the area.¹³

France expects Germany to agree to the creation of a separate euro area budget whose task would be to make possible the functioning of "solidarity mechanisms", that is to finance investments in the economically weakest southern EU countries. In an interview published on 13 July 2017, President Macron declared, that Germany benefits from the current construction of the euro area and should acknowledge responsibility for the weaknesses of southern countries and earmark part of its budget surplus for investments in the EU.¹⁴ Under the French proposal, the euro area budget would fulfil three functions: supporting investment in the area (investing in shared projects, especially in the area of cyber technology), financial aid for the weakest countries of the area in order to level differences in national economic development and reacting to economic crises. Budget management according to the French proposal should be a task for the Minister of Economy and Finance of the euro area and it should be monitored by a parliament made up of MEPs representing individual euro area countries.¹⁵ The funds would come from unified taxes in the euro area (for example operations in environmental fields and digital technology) or directly from the budgets of euro area countries (a fixed percentage of the GDP).

The European Commission, in response to the debate on the possibility of establishing a separate budget, proposed the creation within the EU budget of a euro area budget line, which would have new instruments at its disposal to stabilize the currency union. These would include help in carrying out structural reforms and technical support to be initiated at the request of Member States as well as a stabilizing mechanism having as its goal the protection of investments in the case of large asym-

¹² *Report on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone (2015/2344[INI])*, European Parliament, 13 February 2017.

¹³ *Ibid.* See: J. Kubera, *Macron i Niemcy: perspektywy współpracy nad reformą strefy euro*, "Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego", no. 308/2017, 24 May 2017.

¹⁴ *Macron: "Je veux conforter la confiance des Français et des investisseurs"*, "Ouest-France", 13 July 2017, <https://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron/exclusif-emmanuel-macron-l-europe-et-la-france-indispensables-l-un-l-autre-5130477> (4 March 2018).

¹⁵ J. Kubera, *Macron i Niemcy: perspektywy współpracy...*; cf. *Le Programme d'Emmanuel Macron...; Initiative pour l'Europe...*

metric shocks. The European Commission, in order to encourage Member States to join the euro area also proposed the establishment, within the euro area budget line, of a special convergence instrument to support countries preparing to accept the common currency.¹⁶

Successive governments in Berlin for over 10 years have distanced themselves from French proposals for creating a separate euro area budget. In October 2017, the German Federal Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble (of the CDU), during a Euro-group meeting expressed opposition to the French president's idea of creating a separate euro area budget.¹⁷ During coalition talks between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD (in February 2018) there were no direct references to the creation of a separate budget for the euro area or a separate budget line for it within the general EU budget. The resolutions of the coalition partners do, however, speak of special funds in a new EU financial perspective (2021-2027) for economic stabilization and supporting convergence in the social dimension in the euro area and also for supporting structural reforms in the area.¹⁸ More concrete declarations on the creation of a separate budget for the euro area appeared in an interview given by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* newspaper on 3 June 2018.¹⁹ In it, the head of the German government spoke in favour of a budget of tens of billions of euro financing investment in the area of innovation and new technologies. At the same time, she positively referred to the proposal of the European Commission concerning the guarantee within a new multi-year financial framework of special funds for supporting structural reforms.

Further Franco-German talks on the euro area budget took place during a meeting between the leaders of both countries in the Brandenburg location of Meseberg (19 June 2018). Merkel, being under the pressure of a government crisis, was forced to make concessions in the question of euro area reforms during her meeting with Macron in order to gain French support in the area of migration policy. The actual plans for a separate budget contained in the signed declaration²⁰ however were far from Macron's intentions, and closer to the proposals contained in the CDU/CSU/SPD coalition agreement. According to the Meseberg declaration, the budget of the euro area would become part of the new Multiannual Financial Framework and not a separate

¹⁶ European Commission, *President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address...*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁷ C. Gammelin, A. Mühlauer, *Schäuble stellt sich gegen Macron*, Süddeutsche.de, 9 October 2017, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/euro-finanzen-schaeuble-stellt-sich-gegen-macron-1.3701753> (8 March 2018).

¹⁸ *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD*, Berlin, 12 March 2018, https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file=1 (6 April 2018), pp. 8-9.

¹⁹ "Europa muss handlungsfähig sein – nach außen und innen", "Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung", 3 June 2018, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/kanzlerin-angela-merkel-f-a-s-interview-europa-muss-handlungsfahig-sein-15619721.html> (5 June 2019).

²⁰ *Meseberg Declaration. Renewing Europe's promises of security and prosperity*, Die Bundesregierung, 19 June 2018.

instrument managed by new organs. It was established that funds from the budget would be earmarked for investments to strengthen the process of convergence among EMU Member States. The construction of the euro area budget proposed at that time was more in line with German ideas and similar to the previously mentioned idea of the European Commission regarding the introduction of a dedicated line within the general EU budget. In Meseberg, the leaders of Germany and France bound themselves to prepare concrete solutions for changes in the euro area by the end of 2018.

These were found in the proposal worked out by France and Germany and presented to delegates taking part in an extraordinary Eurogroup meeting devoted to deepening the EMU, which was also open to other EU Member States. The meeting took place on 19 November 2018 shortly after joint Franco-German observations of the 100th anniversary of the end of WWI and one day after a visit by Macron to Berlin. In the proposal,²¹ Germany and France expressed approval for the creation of a euro area budget as a part of the general EU budget. France succeeded in introducing the word “budget” although it was defined only as one of the instruments promoting competitiveness, convergence and stability in the EU. Another concession from Germany was inscribing the stabilizing function of the instrument, which could pave the way for financial transfers to countries in difficult financial situations (for example in cases of economic shocks). This possibility was eliminated with the introduction of conditions for making use of funds from the proposed instrument. Interested countries in the euro area would have to meet demands that would be more rigorous than at present in the areas of coordinating economic policy and co-financing of investments that would increase growth. These were conceived of as recompense for implementing costly reforms. The solutions contained in the document submitted gave the countries of the Eurogroup the right to establish guidelines upon which the budget should operate. The other EU countries, however, would also monitor it, affecting the coordination of economic policy in EU Member States as well as establishing its size in the context of negotiations over the EU’s multiannual financial framework.

The next euro area summit (14 December 2018) answered the question to what degree the Franco-German proposal was acceptable to the remaining euro Member States. The role of guardian of rigorous fiscal policy, fulfilled during the debt crisis by Minister Schäuble, was taken over by the Netherlands, the Baltic and Nordic states and Ireland, which were referred to by the media as a new Hanseatic league. Their determined position led to the document presenting the establishment of a summit no longer containing an entry on the stabilising function of the euro area budget.²² There was mention of a “budgetary instrument” written into the multi-year financial

²¹ *Proposal on the architecture of a Eurozone Budget within the framework of the European Union [Final version 16.11.2018]*, General Secretariat of the Council, 19 November 2018, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37011/proposal-on-the-architecture-of-a-eurozone-budget.pdf> (16 December 2018).

²² *Statement of the Euro Summit (14 December 2018)*, General Secretariat of the Council, 14 December 2018, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/14/statement-of-the-euro-summit-14-december-2018/> (2 December 2019).

framework of the EU (2021-2027), which, not only in name but also in a functional sense, would not be an equivalent of the euro area budget demanded by Macron. The accepted entry from which “French” accents were removed from the shared Paris and Berlin proposal would be difficult to recognise as a compromise. Thanks to the support of the “Hanseatic league”, the German view on the functioning of the euro area prevailed.

TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM INTO A EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND

The idea of creating a European Monetary Fund (EMF) first appeared in 2010. In accordance with proposals at that time, this institution would guarantee the internal stability of the euro area and extend help to states in the EMU having serious financial problems. The genesis of the idea of the European Monetary Fund was related to the problems Greece encountered as a result of the crisis of trust resulting from its very high debt. In order to avoid the risk of a similar crisis occurring the proposal was made to create a special fund for EMU countries with financial problems modelled after the International Monetary Fund.

In the European Commission proposal, the main task of the European Monetary Fund, similarly to the European Stability Mechanism, would be stabilisation aid to countries experiencing financial difficulties (the European Monetary Fund would be able to lend up to 500 billion euro). The European Monetary Fund would also be an instrument of last resort functioning as a protective mechanism for the Single Resolution Board within the Banking Union. The potential activation of the protective mechanism would in the longer term be neutral regarding the budget because all the funds used would be obtained from the banking sector in Member States participating in the Banking Union. As is the current case with the European Stability Mechanism, decisions on stabilisation aid would be taken by an enhanced qualified majority of 85% in the Board of Governors. The creation of the European Monetary Fund would occur on the basis of article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which would result in it being responsible to the European Parliament while respecting the role played by national parliaments.²³

French commentators evaluated the European Commission’s proposals as possibly acceptable to most Member States, including Germany, yet still far from French ambitions. The European Commission was criticised for focusing on discipline and avoiding the issue of solidarity, including the possibility of using the European Monetary Fund as a mechanism for levelling the macroeconomic disproportions in the area and financing structural reform. In the opinion of France, the functions of the current European Stability Mechanism should be taken over by the euro area budget “[I pro-

²³ European Commission, *A European Monetary Fund*, Brussels, 13 September 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/european-monetary-fund_en.pdf (11 March 2018).

pose] a budget from which funds could be obtained. It will be necessary to change the European Stability Mechanism and then invest in education, transport, etc.”, said Macron on 2 March 2017.²⁴

The idea of transforming the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund was among the proposals presented in October 2017 by Minister Schäuble²⁵ and supported by Chancellor Merkel.²⁶ The European Monetary Fund's task would be to extend loans that would be stabilising in nature in the case of short term fiscal problems, but at the same time these would not be funds intended for structural investment.²⁷ The loans would be extended under the condition of serious reforms being introduced and the maintenance of budget discipline by the country. Another task of the European Monetary Fund would be restructuring debts in the euro area and also help for banks within the Single Resolution Board (the second pillar of the Banking Union). The European Monetary Fund would monitor and enforce the fiscal criteria contained in the Stability and Growth Pact from 1997. According to recommendations by the German Ministry of Finance, the European Monetary Fund would become the main guardian of budget discipline and an instrument lowering the level of risk.²⁸ The European Monetary Fund would also be, like the current European Stability Mechanism, an intergovernmental institution, which would allow Germany to maintain its influence on the decisions taken by it (in the current European Stability Mechanism, Germany has 26% of shares while the qualified majority is 80%, whereas extending stabilisation aid requires a qualified majority of 85%).²⁹ In the coalition agreement by CDU, the CSU and the SPD the question of transforming the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund was not developed further. The will was expressed to establish a European Monetary Fund, enshrined in EU law and monitored by the European Parliament.³⁰

²⁴ A. Robert, *Macron assume une Europe à plusieurs vitesses*, euractiv.fr, 3 March 2017, <https://www.euractiv.fr/section/elections/news/macron-assume-une-europe-a-plusieurs-vitesses/> (11 March 2018).

²⁵ Bundesministerium der Finanzen, *Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union*, <http://media2.corriere.it/corriere/pdf/2017/non-paper.pdf> (14 March 2018).

²⁶ Cf. C. Gammelín, C. Hulverscheidt, *Schäuble will europäischen Währungsfonds*, Süddeutsche.de, 20 April 2017, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wirtschaft-schaeuble-will-europaeischen-waehrungsfonds-1.3470916> (10 March 2017).

²⁷ According to these proposals, the European Monetary Fund would perform some of the functions that Macron foresaw for the euro area budget. For this reason, Schäuble's proposal was perceived as competing with the French proposals.

²⁸ Cf. A. Gostyńska-Jakubowska, *A new deal for the eurozone. Remedy or placebo?*, Centre for European Reform, 24 November 2017, <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2017/new-deal-eurozone-remedy-or-placebo> (6 December 2019); A. Sapir, D. Schoenmaker, *The time is right for a European Monetary Fund*, Bruegel Policybrief, Issue 4, October 2017, http://bruegel.org/reader/The_time_for_a_European_Monetary_Fund# (8 March 2018).

²⁹ Cf. T. G. Grosse, *Niemiecka wizja reform w strefie euro*, “Komentarze Centrum Analiz Klubu Jagiellońskiego” 12 October 2017, <http://cakj.pl/2017/10/12/niemiecka-wizja-reform-w-strefie-euro/> (12 March 2017).

³⁰ *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik...*, p. 9.

Chancellor Merkel in the interview mentioned above from June 2018,³¹ maintained her support for the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund. Her assessment was that it would serve to reduce the dependence of states in the EMU on the International Monetary Fund. The future European Monetary Fund would be, like the European Stability Mechanism, an intergovernmental institution. Questions related to the functioning of the European Stability Mechanism were also discussed during talks between Merkel and Macron in Meseberg.³² Germany and France came to an understanding in the case of enabling the European Stability Mechanism to evaluate the economic situation of individual Member States, conditions for extending aid and also increasing the role of the instrument in creating and implementing aid programs. It was also established that this instrument would be an intergovernmental institution enshrined in EU law, a point that Berlin insisted upon. The question of changes in the European Stability Mechanism was next discussed at the aforementioned Eurogroup summit in December 2018, at which the decision was made to adopt final resolutions in June 2019.³³

COMPLETION OF THE BANKING UNION

The creation of a Banking Union was an effect of experiences related to the euro area financial crisis, which highlighted the close interdependence between the banking sector and the public finance sector, which undermined financial stability in a number of countries of the area. The crisis also showed that differences in national solutions relating to the financial sector led to fragmentation of the financial service industry, which in turn brought about disturbances in lending in the real economy. The countries of the EU agreed that it was necessary to take actions that were institutional in nature in order to limit the risk of a banking crisis occurring and to increase trust in the euro and to bridge the relationship between sovereign and banking debt. The Banking Union would be made up of three pillars. The first of these already introduced is the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which oversees the largest banks in the euro area. Also accepted was the Single Rulebook, which is comprised of legislative acts concerning all institutions and financial products across the EU. The second pillar, also already in force, is the Single Resolution Mechanism, which serves to stop the rescue of banks by the governments of Member States and, at the same time, prevents charging taxpayer's funds. The Single Resolution Mechanism consists of the Single Resolution Board, responsible for managing the entire Single Resolution Mechanism as well as the Single Resolution Fund. The task of the Single Resolution Fund is recapitalizing banks or parts of banks which show promise of continuing operations and also supporting banks taking over liquidated insti-

³¹ *“Europa muss handlungsfähig sein...”*

³² *Meseberg Declaration...*

³³ *Statement of the Euro Summit...*

tutions.³⁴ The implementation of the third pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) has not yet been fully finalized. The goal of the EDIS is to increase the credibility of banks that have issued a large number of bonds to bankrupt states as well as to reduce the risk of a run on a bank whose situation is not good. By 2024, EDIS should comprise 0.8% of guaranteed deposits.³⁵

In October 2017, the European Commission, due to strong differences between the positions of the European Parliament and European Council put forth a more gradual introduction of EDIS compared to the initial proposal from November 2015. This process would have two stages:

1. The reinsurance stage based on progress in risk reduction. At this stage, EDIS would provide deposit guarantees to national systems only to provide liquidity coverage. This would mean that in the case of a bank finding itself in a crisis situation, EDIS would make funds temporarily available in order to ensure full repayment. Next, national deposit systems would be required to compensate this support, ensuring that all losses would be covered within the national system.
2. The co-insurance stage, during which EDIS would also gradually begin to cover losses.³⁶

In 2017, the European Commission also appealed for the launch of the safeguard mechanism for the Banking Union agreed to in 2013. It would be used in cases where the Single Supervisory Mechanism, even after charging losses to shareholders' banks, would temporarily not have sufficient resources to facilitate the restructuring and orderly decommissioning of troubled banks. According to the European Commission proposal, this mechanism would be triggered within the future European Monetary Fund.³⁷

Like the European Commission, French politicians are determined to complete the Banking Union as quickly as possible. The Minister of the Economy and Finance, Bruno Le Maire, during a meeting with his German equivalent Peter Altmaier on 18 January 2018, urged immediate action and the elaboration of a common position regarding this matter between March and June of that year.

Germany is rather opposed to the creation of EDIS, insisting on the introduction of solutions that reduce excessive bad credit burdens of financial institutions, especially Italian banks. Berlin's argument is that it does not want to allow a situation in which German citizens would have to bear the consequences of possible bank failures

³⁴ See: J. Rymarczyk, *Unia bankowa – zabezpieczenie przed kryzysami?*, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu", 2015, issue 407, pp. 14-16; K. Zielińska, *Reforma nadzoru sektora bankowego Unii Europejskiej – Unia bankowa*, "Acta Universitatis Lodzianis. Folia Oeconomica", 2015, issue 5, pp. 157-160.

³⁵ Cf. J. J. Węc, *Dynamika reformy ustrojowej strefy euro w latach 2012-2016*, "Politeja", 2016, issue 6, pp. 174-181.

³⁶ European Commission. *Press release*, Brussels, 11 October 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3721 (14 March 2018).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

in other EU countries. In recent years, Germany also voiced determined opposition to accepting a system of deposit guarantees for German regional and savings banks as proposed by the European Commission and demanded by France. Before a visit to Paris in March 2018, Chancellor Merkel indicated that Germany supported the completion of a Banking Union, but this must be preceded by a reduction of debt and risk levels in Member States.³⁸

The issue of a Banking Union was also raised during a meeting of the French and German leaders in Meseberg in 2018.³⁹ During these talks Berlin succeeded in pushing through its demand for a reduction of risk in euro area countries as a pre-condition for the introduction of EDIS. During the Eurogroup summit in December 2018,⁴⁰ in accordance with Berlin's wishes, the decision desired by France and other southern countries to implement the safeguard mechanism for the Single Resolution Board was postponed. The decision was made dependent upon a 2020 evaluation on progress in limiting risk in the EU banking sector.

A EUROPEAN ECONOMY AND FINANCE MINISTER

In discussions on transformations in the euro area attention was again drawn to the necessity of increasing coordination of economic and financial policy both in the euro area itself and at the level of the entire EU. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in his state of the union address in 2017 proposed the creation of a European Minister of Economy and Finance carrying out the duties of the Vice-president of the European Commission and president of the Eurogroup and answering to the European Parliament.⁴¹ The creation of this position would, in the European Commission's vision, increase the effectiveness of managing the euro area and the economy of the entire EU while fully respecting the competencies of the Member States. The task of the Minister of Economy and Finance would, in particular, include overseeing the use of EU and euro area budgetary instruments (including support for reform), the stabilizing mechanism of the euro area as well as the instrument of convergence in states not belonging to the currency union, overseeing the observance of economic, fiscal and financial regulations, oversight of European Monetary Fund actions, and presenting recommendations concerning the appropriate fiscal policy for the euro zone in support of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank.⁴²

³⁸ *Merkel will die europäische Bankenunion vollenden*, "Handelsblatt", 14 March 2018, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundesregierung-merkel-will-die-europaeische-bankenunion-vollenden/21072148.html> (16 March 2018).

³⁹ *Meseberg Declaration...*

⁴⁰ *Statement of the Euro Summit ...*

⁴¹ European Commission, *President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address...*, p. 8.

⁴² Cf. European Commission, *A European Minister of Economy and Finance*, 13 September 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/european-finance-minister-factsheet_en.pdf (20 March 2018).

Macron, in turn, is a promotor of the idea of creating the position of Minister of Finance for the euro who would manage the euro area. According to his proposal, the position would answer to the European Parliament or only to Members of the European Parliament from the euro area; hence, the influence of the European Council and particular Member States would be limited. France is critical of the proposal of the European Commission, maintaining that it is technical in nature and does not change the essence of managing the economic policy of the area (which would still be determined primarily by the representatives of Member State governments).

In October 2017, Merkel indicated that she was open to the French idea of creating the position of euro area Minister of Finance, drawing attention to the fact that consideration should be given to establishing exactly what competencies the position would have.⁴³ A more sceptical position toward this proposal was taken by Minister Schäuble. During a meeting with the French President in October 2017, he said that a “clear legal basis” would be necessary for this idea, which would mean, in his opinion, changes to existing treaties.⁴⁴ During coalition talks between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD, there was now reference to the idea of creating a European Minister of Economy and Finance. This was also the case in the Meseberg Declaration and in the Franco-German proposal from November 2018.

CONCLUSIONS

Taking into account the description of the German, French and European Commission positions given above it is possible to draw conclusions on the direction of future debate concerning transformations of the euro area.

As far as budgetary questions are concerned, it is very improbable that Germany would approve of the French proposal for creating a separate budget for the euro area, especially since a majority of Member States are also opposed to this idea.⁴⁵ Germany is more inclined toward the European Commission’s proposal for the creation of a budget line for the euro zone within the general EU budget. Germany would probably, in the context of a budget line, agree to extend structural aid, which would be dependent on the euro countries taking care to ensure fiscal discipline. Germany could also support the European Commission’s proposal for the creation of a convergence instrument for countries outside the euro area, which would, in concrete ways, aid them achieve a fluid transition to the single currency.

There is general agreement between Germany, France and the European Commission concerning the appropriateness of transforming the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund. It can be assumed that both Germany and

⁴³ *Merkel bremst bei gemeinsamen EU-Finanzminister*, “Zeit Online”, 10 December 2017, <https://www.zeit.de/news/2017-10/10/eu-merkel-bremst-bei-gemeinsamen-eu-finanzminister-10161402> (8 March 2018).

⁴⁴ C. Gammelin, A. Mühlauer, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Cf. J. J. Węc, *Perspektywy zmian ustrojowych w Unii Europejskiej...*, p. 27.

France support the European Commission's proposals concerning the functioning of the future European Monetary Fund, empowered by EU law under the flexibility clause (art. 352 TFUE), accessed during threats to the stability of the euro area. Berlin and Paris agree that stabilizing aid from the European Monetary Fund should only be extended when it is subject to the establishment of the rules of fiscal discipline of the Stability and Growth Pact from 1997. It can also be expected that Germany will agree to proposals that the European Monetary Fund help banks within the Single Resolution Mechanism (the second stage of the Banking Union) on the condition that systematic risk of bankruptcy in this sector be minimized. However, a condition of Germany for the introduction of these solutions could be the maintenance of the current mechanism of managing the European Stability Mechanism (Board of Governors), which guarantees Berlin veto power (the qualified majority is 85% and Germany currently has 26% of shares).⁴⁶

It is very improbable, however, for a compromise to be reached regarding the completion of a Banking Union. Both France and the European Commission favour the quickest possible creation of the third pillar of the Banking Union, which would include the creation of a common system of guaranteeing deposits. Germany has put off making a decision in the case of EDIS, justifying this by claiming that first it is necessary to reduce the level of risk through lowering the level of debt and risks related to the number of threatened credits and uninsured obligations, a problem especially for Italian banks.⁴⁷

European Commission proposals for increasing the coordination of economic and financial policy are based on creating the position of a minister who could combine the competencies of Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and rotating chair of the Eurogroup. France, however, proposes the creation of a minister position that would coordinate economic policy for just the euro area. It could be expected that in the case of no agreement by other partners in the EU to the creation of a separate budget for the EU, France would support the creation of a position of Minister of the Economy along the lines of the European Commission proposal. Germany's position in this question can be characterised as one of great restraint. Berlin ties decisions on institutional changes in this area to systematic progress in the process of transforming into EMU. It is closer, however, to the idea of creating a position of a European minister who would be responsible for coordinating economic and financial policy for the entire EU.

In summary, it should be stated that during the period studied, the German position was characterised by restraint and significantly less engagement than France and the European Commission in discussions on the direction that transformation of the euro area should take. This would be conditioned to a large degree on internal factors, especially including the electoral campaign for the *Bundestag*, and the subsequent

⁴⁶ A guarantee of maintaining a qualified majority of 85% was included in the proposals submitted by the European Commission.

⁴⁷ Cf. L. Sustala, *Die Euro-Zone: Unfertig, aber stabil?*, NZZ Global Risk, 8 March 2018, p. 3.

prolonged process of establishing a new federal government. Analysing German reactions to proposals of the European Commission and France leads to the conclusion that there is a preference for community method that would be applied to all Member States, and which would simultaneously limit divisions between the euro area and remaining EU Member States. One example of this was the issue of establishing a separate budget along the lines of the French proposal, toward which Germany strongly emphasised its sceptical attitude. The German position was clearly for upholding requirements related to maintaining budget discipline and structural reform in euro area Member States as well as scepticism toward the pooling of risk within the EMU (an example of this was their opposition to establishing a third pillar of the Banking Union). At the same time, the re-entry of the social democrats from the SPD into the governing coalition with the Christian democrats led to a clearer openness by the German Federal Government's representatives to introducing instruments that would serve to increase the level of investment and in this way stimulate economic growth, which in recent years has been urged by France.

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Keywords: Germany, France, European Commission, EU, euro area, Economic and Monetary Union

ABSTRACT

The goal of this article is to present the position of Germany on the issue of transformations within the euro area proposed by France and the European Commission in the period from the presidential election in France (which ended on 7 May 2017) to the Eurogroup summit (14 December 2018). The authors analyse the reaction of German representatives to proposals for reforming the euro area in this period, with a focus on the four most frequently debated issues. These are: the creation of a separate budget of the euro area or a special budget line dedicated to the euro area as a part of the general budget of the European Union, the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund, the completion of a Banking Union, and the creation of a euro area Minister of Finance or a European Minister of Economy and Finance. The hypothesis adopted was that the German government in its reactions to those proposals upheld demands presented in previous years concerning the necessity of respecting budget discipline and the introduction of structural reforms in euro area countries. At the same time, they expressed scepticism toward risk sharing across Member States of the euro area through, among other methods, a European deposit insurance scheme. It was also assumed that Germany pursued the adoption of solutions that would prevent the possibility of increasing divisions between Member States. The source of the study consists of official documents of the German government and the European Commission as well as public statements of the main political actors responsible for shaping economic and financial policy at both the national and EU levels.

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CRISIS OR A SEARCH FOR A NEW FORMULA FOR THE HUMBOLDTIAN UNIVERSITY?

INTRODUCTION

Questions regarding the crisis and transformation of universities are among the most important in higher education research. One element of this topic is the question of the condition of a university operating according to Wilhelm von Humboldt's programme. In using the term "programme" instead of "university model", we are assuming that a university is an important part of society, with significance outside its own direct field of activity (conducting research, education, the vision of an academic career, etc.). It has a social mission and exerts an influence in the social, economic and cultural spheres. The Humboldt programme has become dominant not only in countries with German-speaking cultures. Humboldt's ideals have penetrated to other countries, including Poland, and they have had a significant impact on the shaping of universities and colleges in the United States.¹ Therefore, indirectly, the discussion on the current relevance of the Humboldtian university forms part of the debate about the current transformations of higher education in Europe and in Poland. In the first part of this article we consider the nature of the university crisis and the place of the Humboldtian programme in it. In the second part we describe selected "de-Humboldtisation processes" in universities, presenting some aspects of the programme's deconstruction. In the third part we present selected challenges faced by European higher education and analyse them in the light of the Humboldtian approach. As this approach has become a point of reference in higher education research, the question of the status of the Humboldtian university in the context of the crisis is undoubtedly still a significant one.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSITY?

What is the crisis of the university? Elżbieta Wnuk-Lipińska, in her definition, refers not only to developmental changes, but also to the normative and axiological sphere:

¹ See L. Menand, P. Reitter, C. Wellmon (eds.), *The Rise of the Research University*, Chicago 2017.

What I define as a crisis is a watershed period of the functioning of the university, in which the existing direction of development of the institution faces a turning point or collapse. A crisis may include all or just some dimensions of the university's functioning. It may occur in the sphere of values, which are reflected in the goals and tasks of the university, in the ways of fulfilling those tasks, and in the rules of functioning.²

In discussing the crisis of the university one may have in mind economic and developmental issues, as well as cultural questions, focusing on the goals and values of the institution, but also the context of its functioning in the social space.

Since the Middle Ages, universities in Europe have played a key role in shaping the continent's culture, identity and innovations. This development has not been continuous; one might say that the university was accompanied by crisis from the very beginning of its existence. The development of universities has been interrupted by political events, especially wars, crises of knowledge creation and education, and indeed by newly emerging needs of civilisation.³ A persistent and commonly repeated myth is the narrative of the uniform continuity and survival of the medieval concept of the university, or the treatment of the institution as a monolith, whereas in fact it has undergone permanent changes. After the Reformation, following the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, there was a crop of Protestant academies concentrated on training pastors, but a new Catholic structure of Jesuit colleges also emerged. Further institutional changes occurred when the early modern period gave way to the Age of Enlightenment, making it necessary to build a completely new structure of the institution of knowledge. On one hand, there was a need for independent and research-oriented institutions, like the scientific academies. A similar process occurred in the United States, where the universities underwent de-secularisation processes, changing both their goals and their structure. With the Industrial Revolution, there was an increasing tendency for knowledge and its institutions to be treated as part of a country's potential. Thus, the programme of the "Napoleonic university" emerged, focused primarily on practice and entirely controlled by the state. By contrast, in Prussia a plan was put forward for a new Berlin University, an original conception of the philologist, philosopher and politician Wilhelm von Humboldt. However, this does not exhaust the list of European efforts to find a formula for an institution of knowledge. In the nineteenth century in Ireland, John Henry Newman created a completely new concept of a university with Trinity College in Dublin, publishing its founding principles in the book *The Idea of a University*. At the same time, however, under the pressure of burgeoning industry, new institutions were established in England, such as King's College in 1829, which was a response to the need for education in practical subjects, including medicine and economics. Changes occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, as higher education was made available to the masses, and specialised vocational education was introduced. Contemporary transformation remains a sepa-

² E. Wnuk-Lipińska, Kryzys uniwersytetu jako instytucji edukacyjnej w krajach Europy Zachodniej, *Nauka i Szkolnictwo Wyższe* no. 10, 1997, p. 15.

³ See W. Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University of Europe*, Cambridge 2004.

rate issue; this includes the impact of corporate processes, by which universities come to resemble businesses.

The above outline shows us not only that higher education institutions were not a monolith that was broken at the start of the modern era, but also that they were subject to deep structural and functional changes as they adapted to contemporary social, cultural and political conditions. Currently, in relation to the discussion on the shape of the university, many authors – but politicians also – are asking whether one of the oldest and most dignified institutions of the Western world is in a state of crisis, or whether it is undergoing another transformation, as it has in the past. If this is the case, what would a university crisis mean today, and are the current transformations and dilemmas related to these institutions merely a new incarnation of an old debate?

The modern aspect of the question of the university in crisis touches on economic matters. Universities are becoming increasingly expensive, and in European systems the responsibility for funding them rests with the state. Marek Kwiek states that universities, which constitute part of countries' budget portfolio as well as part of the welfare state agenda, are directly subject to the crisis processes impacting individual states:

The consequences of the global financial crisis may be a kind of "stress test" for the entire structure of the welfare state in Europe, and the state itself may become a victim of the financial crisis. A similar logic applies to European higher education.⁴

Thus, the principal crisis narrative now concerns not so much ideological issues or the university's goals, but is reduced to economic matters. It is hard to ignore the financial perspective, and the correlation between universities' funding and their quality can be observed, for example, in the published international rankings. Universities cannot be treated as institutions isolated from the system; on the contrary, they are regulated financially by the current economic situation.

It is noteworthy that the debate about the university crisis in Europe has already been ongoing for several decades.⁵ After the fall of communism in 1989, the problems which had been discussed in the West also emerged in the countries of the former Eastern bloc. Diagnoses recur, for example in relation to the problems concerning mass education. However, the modern crisis is different from the historical ones. In a conversation between Jacek Woźniakowski and René Rémond, two types of crisis are identified:

⁴ M. Kwiek, Reformy uniwersytetów europejskich. Państwo dobrobytu jako brakujący kontekst badań polityki publicznej, *Człowiek i Społeczeństwo* XXXIX, 2015, p. 184.

⁵ It should be noted that the crisis of the university is the subject of debate in both Europe and the United States, which may indicate awareness of such a crisis among the universities of the Western world; cf. B. Readings, *University in Ruins*, Cambridge–London 1996; D. S. Preston, *The University of Crisis*, Amsterdam 2002.

[...] one may claim that in most countries university education is in a state of crisis. Of course, it should also be added what type of crisis is meant, since there are crises resulting from stagnation and those that accompany transformations. In most countries, universities have been through a period of internal upheaval, which has become a direct stimulus triggering reflection on the reasons for their existence, on their functions and goals. This kind of crisis of awareness, which is a rather common phenomenon, seems relatively new to me. I ask myself whether past generations experienced anything similar.⁶

The quoted extract includes the significant remark that the modern university crisis is not so much a result of stagnation, but rather – in Rémond's words – a crisis of awareness, concerning the university's goals and its place in society. Of course, we should bear in mind the specific French context, where after 1968 there was a major transformation of higher education structures, universities became socially engaged and available to the masses, and simultaneously the classical concept of the university was rejected. However, Rémond's diagnosis not only relates to the political circumstances of fifty years ago, but describes a crisis existing today, reflected in the consistently weak position of universities among the policy priorities of European countries.

The issues relating to this crisis lead to reflection on the Humboldtian programme. Historically, it was proposed as an answer to the contemporary university crisis and indeed brought about a renewal of the institution. This is evidenced not only by the innovative curriculum based on Humboldt's ideas, but also by the persistence of the Berlin programme for over two hundred years. Moreover, the Humboldtian university has become a modern reference point for higher education policy in many countries, a perspective also adopted by Rémond:

Essentially, universities did not re-adopt an active role until after the French Revolution. [...] In the case of Germany it took until 1810, the time of Humboldt and the Berlin University. In France it actually took even longer, as the revival of universities occurred only near the end of the 19th century.⁷

What was it, then, that made Humboldt's proposal attractive?

THE MEANING OF THE HUMBOLDTIAN MODEL OF THE UNIVERSITY

Humboldt's vision of the university became popular all over Europe, not due to the functions that it performed in Prussia – strengthening the cultural role of the state – but because of its effectiveness in terms of research and education, and its clear organisational structure. The Humboldtian programme spread beyond Germany, and even beyond Europe. Apart from Germany, it has influenced the formation of universities in the West, including in Austria, Switzerland and Norway, but also in countries

⁶ J. Woźniakowski in conversation with Professor R. Rémond, *Znak* 6 (288), 1978, p. 807.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 807.

such as Poland and the Czech Republic.⁸ In the nineteenth century it played an important role in shaping research institutions in the United States, such as Johns Hopkins University. Thorsten Nybom listed the following as characteristics of Wilhelm von Humboldt's university:

1. Unity of research and education.
2. The holistic nature of knowledge – a New Humanism.
3. The primacy of research – education is directed by research.
4. A national culture dominated by higher education and *Bildung*.
5. Promotion of higher education, science and *Bildung* as principal duties of the state.⁹

Humboldt's idea would not have succeeded if it had concerned only the organisation of the university, without including an original understanding of the process of scientific discovery. The first item on Nybom's list is the most important feature for understanding the idea in its entirety. Karol Sauerland described this relationship as follows:

A watchword is the unity of science and education (*Einheit von Lehre und Wissenschaft*). The adoption of this assumption implies the adoption of another: that research cannot be conducted in science academies where science is the sole activity, but needs to be moved to the universities. Another positive effect of this, in Humboldt's view, is that science becomes more independent of the state.¹⁰

The unification of knowledge and education (understood in a broad sense, to include the development of character) stems from the humanist tradition, whereby working with a student involves not the mechanical transfer of knowledge, but a joint process of discovery, in which the student's role is to become familiar with methods and resources and make creative efforts to discover the reality. This approach was attractive because of the significant intellectual autonomy of the professor and the student, whose education – *Bildung* – is left above all to free choice and is delimited by the portfolio of the master's own achievements. This process was called *Lehrfreiheit* or *Lernfreiheit*. *Bildung* was an integral part of a liberal education, in which important roles were played by the individual, their intellectual background, charisma, as well as civic virtues, which would emerge along with the educational process. This concept was echoed not only in the West, but also in Poland.¹¹ In this context, education is more than just pure knowledge: it leads to the shaping of a citizen. This touches on two issues: the place of the university within the state, and its autonomy.

⁸ Kazimierz Twardowski, in his 1933 lecture *O dostojęństwie uniwersytetu* ("On the dignity of the university"), also alludes, through the metaphor of a lighthouse illuminating the shore, to the ideal already established in the Humboldtian model.

⁹ T. Nybom, *The Humboldt Legacy: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the European University*, *Higher Education Policy* 16, 2003, p. 144.

¹⁰ K. Sauerland, *Idea uniwersytetu – aktualność tradycji Humboldta?*, *Nauka i Szkolnictwo Wyższe* 2, 2006, p. 90.

¹¹ See K. Wrońska, *Liberal education w Polsce. Między kształceniem ogólnym a edukacją liberalną*, *Pedagogia Christiana* 1/33, 2014.

When Humboldt, who was not only a philologist and philosopher, but also a Prussian official, was planning his university, he included the promotion of Prussian culture among its tasks. For this reason, philosophy played a primary role, and the linguistic sciences were also afforded a high position. Although the national role of the university is absent from the modern interpretation of the programme, it cannot be entirely ignored. In funding scientific research, the state expects support in the form of a cultural agenda, which builds the country's potential. In many countries, emphasis is placed on the local language, and institutional actions are taken on that basis (for example "civilisation centres" for international students). The university's autonomy is expressed in research projects, methodology, and forms of working with students. It does not mean that the university is to be separated from the state; on the contrary, in strategic and management tasks the Humboldt university is subordinate to the state and forms part of its agenda.

An interesting issue is that of secularisation as it appears in Humboldt's programme. Theology as a historical discipline is present among the sciences, which would have been unthinkable at the French universities. Its foundation was related to the activity of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a key figure not only for hermeneutics, but also for the creation of a liberal theology, which found a new place in the enlightened world of ideas. In his version, Humboldt succeeded on the one hand in including a re-evaluation of the religious school (known as the divinity school in the Protestant world), and at the same time in finding a new space for the presence of religion within the university.

We may indicate the following factors as contributing to the acceptance of Humboldt's programme in Europe:

- it was designed as an innovative research institution that played a part in the development of a modern nation state, for which science and education were of strategic importance;
- it was an effective *modus operandi* for producing knowledge in an institution where knowledge was autonomous, congruent with Enlightenment ideals, and in line with culturally accepted social functions;
- Humboldt's programme offered education based on knowledge that was objective and independent of ideology and religion (*Bildung*) – it became socially acceptable and politically desirable, but above all it was effective in educating the elites and shaping qualified personnel to serve the state, and following the opening of universities to the masses, in passing on knowledge and skills;
- the assumption of the university's autonomy (more precisely, the autonomy of scholars in creating knowledge) was compatible with liberal ideals, under which the freedom of pursuing knowledge became one of the principal values of the Western world.

The question emerges: in what way might the Humboldtian university serve as a remedy for the modern crisis? Do the real political and economic conditions permit a return to such a classical programme? It may be suggested that Humboldt's proposition, as a historically innovative institution, but also one that cultivates independence

in research and teaching, is to be treated as a contrast to the university in crisis, in a contemporary as well as a historical sense. The durability of Humboldt's ideas certainly gives them an advantage over newer proposals that are less proven in management practice, for example, the programme of an enterprise university, reconstructing its organisation to resemble that of a business.

Another important asset of this programme is its holistic vision of education and research as equally important responsibilities of the university. A crisis would mean submission to pressure resulting from current policy, the lack of a long-term vision for education, but also the absence of a clear role for the university in the broader strategy and policy of the state. To demonstrate the programme's potential for enabling modernisation, in the next section we present selected processes, referred to for the moment as processes of "de-Humboldtisation" of the university. Should they be seen as a deepening of the crisis, or should they be treated as an inspiration for seeking new solutions which might lead to the next organisational formula for higher education?

PROCESSES OF DE-HUMBOLDTISATION

Accepting that the Humboldt programme achieved dominance in Europe, we should ask whether we are currently witnessing its deconstruction or only a rebuilding, and what the transformations of this programme might involve. Some selected processes are described below.

We may assume that a fundamental problem of the modern university is to determine the meaning of its autonomy. Sarah Guri-Rosenblit has said that the mechanism of a university's autonomy is put to the test by the system of funding. She perceives a paradox in this regard: on one hand, universities lose autonomy due to unequal funding by the state, but on the other, they gain autonomy by having their own funds at their disposal:

[...] Governments encourage universities to use alternative sources of funding. [...] In this sense, they promote institutional autonomy, indicating new goals and new clients for universities, which in the longer term may lead to a weakening of bonds between a university and its local environment.¹²

In other words, the search for independent sources of funding leads the university towards a business system, to the selling of particular services, and to limitations on the free choice of research problems, educational pathways, etc. Another aspect of such a change is that academics are required to acquire new competences, such as management abilities and even the skills typical of government officials. Above all, this means the need to spend a large amount of time on activities that are only indirectly related to the research process. Thus, a process occurs which we

¹² S. Guri-Rosenblit, *Konsekwencje i wyzwania stojące przed poszerzeniem dostępu do studiów wyższych*, in: C. Kościelniak, J. Makowski (eds.), *Wolność, równość, uniwersytet*, Warsaw 2011, p. 62.

may call “indirect de-autonomisation”. This process does not restrict freedom of choice in research, but adds procedures and financial challenges, thereby changing the structure of the research process, and limiting possibilities of freely planning educational pathways.

The funding of a university’s research and educational processes from sources other than the state is a “de-Humboldtising” step. In the Berlin proposal, the state plays the principal funding role, while the state-maintained university receives in return the time, freedom and security necessary to conduct long-term research.

The second aspect of the “de-Humboldtisation” process relates to education. *Bildung* is based on a liberal education, and this was one of the main roles of the university. Market pressure leads to the dilemma of whether to provide education in depth in a chosen field, or general education with emphasis on erudition. Today, the first approach is dominant, which results in reduced demand for the humanities. In other words, educating in depth leads to the gradual elimination of the humanities, for example through a reduction in the number of such subjects.¹³ What matters here is not only the change in topics studied, but the holistic nature of the education process, in which the humanities, as well as mathematics, were focused on developing the capacity for abstract and critical thought. The opposite approach is represented by the shift towards education focused on developing skills, closely related to the student’s future career. While it is not surprising that universities respond to market demand, a side effect is the erosion of general education, which completely changes the structure of the institution, not only academically, but also organisationally.¹⁴

Higher education is receiving two contradictory messages. First, there is the pressure from the European Commission, for example, indicating priority areas of knowledge and the need to build strong connections between these and the economy. On the other hand, there is demand from the market for the teaching of so-called soft skills, including cultural competences, which encourage the search for methods of general education and the need to develop critical thinking skills. For Peter Mayo, the need for specialisation is not a local problem, but a global trend:

[...] Globalisation has brought a noticeable increase in demand for products made by highly qualified people [...]. This forces countries to spend money on the education of a better educated and flexible work force, with the aim of attracting investment [...], and also remaining competitive in the context of the global economy. As a result we can observe the expansion of higher education.¹⁵

¹³ This is not an exclusively European trend. The example is given of the United States, where the humanities are treated as a support for entrepreneurial goals; see M. Baurelin, *Why are Humanities Deteriorating*, *First Things*, August 2015.

¹⁴ An example is the increasing influence of non-academic circles, chiefly business, on the activities of universities; for instance, in the United States, university boards made up largely of business representatives.

¹⁵ P. Mayo, *Globalizacja, demokracja i rynek szkolnictwa wyższego*, in: C. Kościelniak, J. Makowski (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 140–141.

It could therefore be said that a specific innovative type of education, adapted to the needs of the economy, is on an upward trend, to the disadvantage of “classical” courses, which are becoming marginalised. This entails a reformulation not only of the scope of education, but also of the methods used, which may have less and less in common with Humboldt’s *Bildung*, where humanities played a central role in shaping the personality. Peter Mayo’s remark is important because it points to the transformation of Humboldt’s goal, to educate the future elites, into a new goal of developing competences. Jerzy Axer makes a diagnosis of the contemporary defence of the ideal of education:

[...] The changes that occur in the contemporary world lead to the creation of a society that is better informed rather than more aware. If the university is needed for anything in the world of the future, it is to prevent such degeneration. The university must thus make every possible effort to oppose efforts to transform it into some kind of vocational school. This is certainly the case in the whole sphere of humanist knowledge. The university will retain its identity only if it is able to withstand the process of replacing education with training. It will retain its identity only if it preserves its ability to take a critical view of temporary trends.¹⁶

In this meaning the university plays the role not only of a knowledge-building institution, but also of an institution of interpretation and critical thought, which is how its socially important function is expressed.

The third form of de-Humboldtisation is the contemporary division of the university by specialisation. This results from the need for change in the management of increasingly specialised scientific processes and the diversified needs of tertiary education. What Humboldt understood as the university as a whole is nowadays subject to a division into teaching universities and research universities. The meaning of the latter may vary; however, we can list at least three characteristics: (1) The research university is defined by its own portfolio of research in selected areas, which means abandoning holistic education and focusing on teaching those elements. (2) The research university becomes separated from mass education; moreover, it does not treat education as its priority, but focuses on a narrow education that is needed for research. (3) The university’s activity becomes strongly bound up with the seeking of external funding for specialised research projects.

The above description is confirmed by James Duderstadt. He indicates, among others, the following elements of support for research universities: partnership with business, a strategic programme of state funding, and a reduction in bureaucratic regulations.¹⁷ Although he approaches this from an American viewpoint, such an understanding of the research university is becoming increasingly strong in Europe, and is certainly the next step in the move away from Humboldt’s programme. Universities

¹⁶ J. Axer, *Autonomia uniwersytetu i innowacyjność*, *Nauka* 2, 2010, p. 8.

¹⁷ J. Duderstadt, *Research universities and the Future of America*, in: J. Duderstadt, L. Weber, *Preparing Universities for an Era of Change*, London 2014.

are turning into specialised research centres, further and further removed from institutions concentrated on social goals.

To recapitulate, the processes of de-Humboldtisation can be described in the following terms:

- processes whereby universities lose their autonomy due to the imposition of non-academic scientific tasks and the need to seek additional, private sources of funding;
- reduction of the role of the humanities in the education process and a departure from the liberal education represented by *Bildung* in favour of a professional education;
- erosion of the concept of the university as a holistic entity in favour of a division into “research” and “teaching” universities.

CURRENT CHALLENGES AND THE HUMBOLDTIAN PROGRAMME

The last part of the article will describe selected challenges faced by the modern university on a European and global scale. In this context, the question arises of whether the Humboldtian programme can answer these challenges.

Further expansion of mass education

Mass education represented a key change in higher education in the twentieth century. Today we can speak not even of mass education, but of universal education, since in some countries almost a half of secondary school graduates pursue further academic education. In the interview mentioned above, René Rémond spoke about the crisis, which arose with the “rapid increase of the number of students”.¹⁸ However, he added that this is not the cause, but the effect, which means that the cause may be a change in the cultural perception of the university as an institution opening the way to prosperity through mass knowledge. Consequently, in mass education much less attention is paid to research and *Bildung*, and greater emphasis is placed on vocational education and the process of “producing knowledge” that will be useful. Currently, however, the next stage is taking place, leading from mass education to universal education, which encompasses the majority of the population. According to OECD statistics for 2015, in Italy 27% of the population aged 24–34 has completed higher education, while in Austria it is 38.6%, in Spain 41% and in Sweden 46%.¹⁹ This means that higher education is no longer only for the elite.

European universities have been responding to the challenges of mass education for several decades. One of these challenges is the creation of a network of public

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, note 4, p. 808.

¹⁹ See <https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.htm#indicator-chart> (accessed 14 July 2017).

vocational colleges. This happened first in the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland); a similar solution was implemented in Poland in 1997. The establishment of these colleges has brought about the separation of vocational and academic institutions, as well as the specialisation of professional knowledge, particularly that of a technical nature. However, this solution has undergone subsequent political and cultural transformations. Universities have started to educate at vocational and non-academic levels, while higher vocational colleges have begun to lobby for a change in higher education policy that would enable the institutionalisation of their academic aspirations.²⁰ It can be argued that the trend for professional education has become a major challenge in Europe. However, on looking more closely at the economic environment, one may doubt whether these institutions effectively contribute to solving local problems. Alain Betrez writes that in France “many former universities were divided into smaller ones in 1970 [...] and small regional universities have been established in towns with no academic tradition, often under pressure from local politicians”.²¹

While the problem posed to the classically understood university by mass education is ending as the birth rate decreases, in the longer term there arises the problem of the utilitarianisation of higher education, which reduces it to a response to market demand, transforming it into an advanced form of vocational education. While mass education posed a threat to the Humboldtian dimension of the university, utilitarianisation is an equally serious challenge, because of the reduction of the role of liberal education, but also because of the transformation of the role of the scientist, which has moved closer to the role of an expert in a narrow field of knowledge rather than that of a scholar.

Bureaucracy

Another problem is the expansion of administration, and the increase in its role at universities. It should be noted that bureaucracy creates not only procedural barriers, but also obstacles in the form of meta-bureaucracy. This is a specific language and organisational culture, in which the writing of an application requires one not only to create the document, but also to learn the linguistic and organisational code necessary for its preparation. An example of the inefficiency of European bureaucracy in the shaping of research processes is the European Commission’s project for a European Institute of Technology (EIT), which was intended as an imitation of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in more than just its name. The institution did not demonstrate effectiveness in research, and after seven years of its existence it underwent

²⁰ A similar phenomenon occurred in Poland at an accelerated pace. The national higher vocational schools established following the local government reforms often developed in the direction of academic rather than vocational education, becoming transformed into academies.

²¹ A. Betrez, *Can the French System support competitive Research Universities?*, in: J. Axer, *op. cit.*, note 15, p. 157.

reform. An audit revealed problems that could have been foreseen: excessive employment in administration, and central management from Brussels.²² This project, which aimed to create an institution that would design innovations, became *de facto* a symbol of bureaucratic incapacity and anti-innovation – in fact the antithesis of its prototype, MIT. This can be held up as an example of incapacity resulting from the use of bureaucratic procedures. Bureaucracy is increasingly changing the identity of universities: this concerns not only changes in the institution, but also the aforementioned changes in the work of an academic, for whom reporting and management tasks come to take up almost as much time as creating knowledge or working with students. A professor no longer only lectures and conducts research, but also organises tender procedures, prepares competition documents, keeps accounts, writes reports, signs contracts, negotiates projects with external partners, and the like.

In Humboldt's programme the university is linked to the state – also administratively and financially – and therefore bureaucracy is present in the system to some extent. The problem is keeping the right proportion; the excessive growth of bureaucracy transforms the university into a corporation, which means that the financial dimension becomes the main driver of operations, and the university no longer receives the simple state funding that Humboldt's proposal assumed.

Global challenges

The last point to consider is the challenges faced by European universities due to global competition. It may be asked whether Humboldt's programme remains competitive. Global challenges are among some of the most important in the processes of transformation of European higher education, if only because the internationalisation of educational and research processes is becoming the key motor in the development of universities. In other words, a university's potential is measured by its position and participation in internationalisation and in the global market for education and research. The global balance of the influence of particular universities is changing. The United States remains the leader, but new competitors are emerging in Asia, especially in China. We should mention at least two processes that relate to Europe: (1) The ineffectiveness of implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, which aims to improve the position and innovativeness of European universities. This is caused by excessive bureaucracy, and means that the effect on the global position of European universities has been negligible. (2) The appearance of new competitors in global higher education policy, changing the map of university potential. The new scientific diplomacy, especially from the People's Republic of China, and that country's effective pursuit of the goal of seeing Chinese universities join the group of the largest players, pose

²² F. Simon, *Audit shines light on EU's attempt to mimic America's celebrated MIT*, 2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/innovation-industry/news/audit-shines-light-on-eus-failed-attempt-to-mimic-americas-celebrated-mit/> (accessed 14 July 2017).

a challenge to the universities of the European Union. The Chinese success is not connected with any university programme, Humboldtian or otherwise.

Changes in global competitiveness are revealed by rankings. In some cases, the problem is the weak presence of European universities in the “international powerhouse” ranking. This is a prognostic ranking, indicating the institutions with the greatest future potential. In this ranking the Swiss ETH (*Eidgenössische Technische Hochschulen*) is placed third, University College London ranks sixth, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) is in only 17th position, while KU Leuven is 28th. Among European countries, only Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium have universities or colleges included in the ranking. The list contains Chinese universities: Peking University and two Hong Kong institutions. The ranking includes no universities based on the Humboldt programme, whereas it is relatively new research institutions that dominate.²³

Only a decade ago, India had similar aspirations. Andre Beteille points out that Indian universities have to deal with the issue of the caste system, which resulted in exclusivity in education and turned out to be the greatest barrier in university expansion.²⁴ China, on the other hand, has managed to overcome its caste problem, or more broadly, barriers to access to higher education – not only social, but sometimes geographical (the unavailability of universities in certain regions) – by a decision made at central level on opening up to mass education in 1999. This decision proved a milestone in the development of universities in that country. Since then, China has seen the greatest transformation in the history of higher education worldwide: the number of students is increasing by 10% every five years, and the country currently has around 16 million students. At the same time, the government’s aspiration was to reject the “copy–paste” culture and to invest in its own, innovative form of education. Undoubtedly, China is very consistent in implementing this strategy. It should be noted that in the area of higher education the BRICS format is becoming less and less effective for China, as for Chinese universities it is their counterparts in Europe and the United States that are becoming increasingly functional partners. A comparison of two rankings reveals the Chinese expansion clearly. The BRICS & Emerging Economies University Ranking puts Peking University in first place, Tsinghua University (also in Beijing) in second, the University of Science and Technology in China in fifth, Shanghai’s Fudan University in sixth, Jiao Tong University (also in Shanghai) in seventh, Zhejiang University in ninth, and the National Taiwan University in tenth. Chinese institutions make up the majority of those included in this ranking.²⁵

²³ See E. Bothwell, Which universities could challenge the higher education elite?, *Times Higher Education*, 2017, <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/which-universities-could-challenge-higher-education-elite> (accessed 25 January 2018).

²⁴ A. Beteille, *Universities at the Crossroads*, Oxford 2012, p. 24.

²⁵ B. Moshinsky, The 22 universities outside the developed world, *Business Insider*, 14 February 2017, see: <http://www.businessinsider.com/times-higher-education-ranking-of-the-best-universities-in-emerging-markets-2017-2?IR=T> (accessed 14 July 2017).

The powerhouse and BRICS rankings demonstrate the pace of the development of Chinese higher education, which aims above all to become a third force in the global higher education race, alongside the United States and Europe. It is possible that this scenario will come about within two decades. Thus, on the map showing the two dominant university powers, a third – China – may soon appear.²⁶

The competitiveness of universities does not depend only on economically measurable collaboration, but also on the system of education and its quality. However, the possibility of contemporary adaptation of Humboldtian solutions is conditioned by intellectual and institutional categories. It should be noted that knowledge creation requires not only financial input, but also the right cultural conditions. Universities are not corporations, but communities, and research teams pursue not only technocratic goals. A scientist is still seen not as a “producer” but as a “creator”, not as a “book-keeper” but as an “innovator”. The scientist’s tasks are still not of a political nature, although universities perform an active role in processes of social change. In other words, there is no way to build a knowledge institution based only on professional knowledge and a simplified mechanism for passing it on; the impossibility of implementing such a simplified structure is demonstrated by the best research universities, where important roles are played by cultural issues and values, such as scholarly communities, research collaboration, the social goals of research, as well as its ethics – not just good practices, but also an awareness of good development as a goal of science. It may be questioned whether the reduction of science to the production and mechanics of knowledge will make it possible to create long-term models for the passing on of that knowledge, to build knowledge institutions that will attract new generations of students in the future. One may see here the renewed growth in importance of Humboldt’s proposal, which enables the two elements to be combined: the academy as a community of academics and students, but also the role of the university as an institution cultivating independent and critical thought.

On a global level, however, one more problem arises: the cultural translation of the university not only into the language of new needs (primarily technological), but also that of organisational cultures, particularly in East Asia. In other words, is it possible to adapt Humboldt’s programme to the challenges of an East Asian university? Apart from organisational culture, there is also the issue of culture as a common good produced by the university, its humanising role, its contribution to human development, and its offering of a space for dialogue and axiological exchange of ideas. It may be asked to what extent the universities of East Asia are interested in adopting such a cultural agenda, which is an inseparable part of the role of the university as an institution. We shall merely draw attention to that issue here, as a full analysis would require a separate study. Nonetheless, the question of a global proposal for universi-

²⁶ China is indirectly assisted in the competitive race by the weakness of Russia, which due to sanctions has been deprived of the conditions for global competitiveness, leading in practice to a slowing of development. China’s competitiveness is also supported by the New Silk Road project, which is linked to the future development of scientific hubs.

ties and the role of Humboldt's ideas in its creation is one that needs to be asked, particularly in the context of the cultural mission of universities. Knowledge should not, as a matter of principle, be separated from ethical reflection and from cultural needs.

SUMMARY

In summary, it needs to be asked whether the European Humboldtian university is in a state of crisis or of transformation. There is no unambiguous answer to this question, and different conclusions may be reached in different areas. Certainly in terms of effectiveness, universities find themselves in crisis: the growth of bureaucracy, but also EU instruments such as the National Qualifications Framework, have not proved adequate to construct mechanisms ensuring competitiveness. On the other hand, the maintenance of an average level of spending of approximately 1.5% of GDP on this sector in Europe gives grounds for guarded optimism.

Certainly, this university programme represents an answer to a crisis of a cultural nature. The crisis would involve attempts to replace the university as a community by some form of corporatism, and to define relations exclusively in economic terms. It might also take the form of a research corporation, focused only on research, to the exclusion of teaching; or else concentrate on education alone, kept separate from the research context. Both solutions, considered separately, represent a departure from the programme of the Humboldtian university, and it would seem that maintaining a balance between these two goals of the university – research and education – will make it possible to maintain its functions in terms of both internal organisation and contacts with the outside.

Finally, it may be asked whether in the light of global transformations in higher education Humboldt's programme is still needed, and whether it is possible to establish, for example, a new European university that would represent a further modification of that programme. This is not a new question – such efforts have been made for several decades. The Magna Charta Universitatum, signed in the late 1980s, fulfilled its function: it provided a political impulse to take action to standardise the activities of universities, especially teaching, and led to the development over 30 years of collaboration between individual institutions and national systems, which marks some kind of return to the communication between universities that existed in the Middle Ages. The establishment of a community system of education in accordance with the Bologna Process (although copied from the American system) has led to the unification of universities in the teaching dimension. There is now a need, however, for a new social contract with the universities, providing for a higher educational system at the level of a united Europe, but also at global level, particularly in the context of the development of universities in East Asia.

In spite of the crisis of the Humboldtian system, it still offers development potential not only for higher education, but also for society. An undoubted strength of Wilhelm von Humboldt's programme is its balance between the effectiveness of research

– particularly important for research into new technologies – and the humanisation of social life and the reflectiveness that is needed on a global scale. The attractiveness of this proposal also lies in the cultural and social mission of the university. An important aspect is the strong sense of autonomy felt in many European academic cultures, for which a place is provided in the Humboldtian scheme. It is also reflected in the ethical and social dimensions – universities are places not only for research, but also for the cultivation of independent and critical thought, which is an irrevocable part of their mission.

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Keywords: universities in Europe, Humboldtian university, higher education policy

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to present the problem of the crisis of the university in the context of the current relevance of the Humboldtian model. The strength of the model developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt consists in a balance between research effectiveness, which is crucial for research on new technologies, and the humanisation of social life and the cultivation of critical thought in a global dimension. The attractiveness of this proposal also lies in the cultural and social mission of the university. Many European academic cultures are characterised by a strong sense of autonomy, and there is room for this too in the Humboldtian model.

The article begins with a description of the crisis of the university, and goes on to address the question of the significance of Humboldt's proposal for our times. The author analyses the process of "de-Humboldtisation" of the university and examines selected challenges that universities must face, such as mass education, bureaucracy and globalisation

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HISTORICAL MYTH AS A BASIS FOR RESTORATION CLAIMS

COMMENTS ON STANISŁAW HUBERT'S CONCEPT OF *POSTLIMINIUM* IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CENTENARY OF THE END OF THE GREAT WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The centenary of the ending of the Great War in 1918 also recalls the establishment of a new order in most of Central Europe. This is an opportunity to reflect broadly both on history itself, and on historiography, as a part of human culture which shapes our perception of the past. It is also an opportunity to reflect critically on the relationships between law, political systems and history, where history is understood not as a simple set of facts or description of processes, but as the space and context in which legal discourse is conducted, moreover with claims for its universalism. The aim and scope of this article exclude broader discussion on whether there exists a 'juristic method' which might support experts in solving their dilemmas. Those familiar with the subject have pointed out that this is a fundamental question which has concerned lawyers since Roman times. From the perspective of legal history, in the 19th and 20th centuries the philosophy and theories of law offered several competing positions.¹ The most radical stance has been that jurisprudence as a domain of human knowledge and culture lacks characteristics of the classical 'scientific' approach used to examine and discover the world.² The midway position has argued that jurisprudence relies on methodological heteronomy, meaning that it is a science if it uses the methods of recognised sciences, but it is not in other cases.³ The other extreme stance has been that jurisprudence enjoys methodological autonomy, meaning that it has its own methodology and 'scientific' criteria.⁴

This reminder of the methodological dispute concerning the methods used in legal discourse and argumentation is of key importance for the presentation of the subject of this article – an example of the use of myths (historical myths in this case) to justify and argue for restitution claims based on law and referring to that law's past. It

¹ For a broader view of the problem, see e.g. Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek, *Metody prawnicze*, Kraków, 2004, in particular Chapter I, pp. 11–37.

² *Ibidem*, p. 11ff.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 13ff.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 24–31.

is only in a situation where the methodological dilemmas of ‘scientific’ ontology in terms of nineteenth-century legal positivism are deliberately neglected, or scientific methods are consciously mixed with journalistic discourse, that claims referring to some unverifiable mythology can be made and used as a basis for real and practical claims. Another objective of this paper, while it does not aim to judge the legitimacy of the claims or the rightness of the parties involved, is to demonstrate certain shallow and weak points of the legal reasoning used by some recognised jurists in the past. Interestingly, such patterns of reasoning are still used today by some lawyers when advancing claims motivated by politics or simply by good will.

Stanisław Hubert (1905–1983) was an outstanding Polish lawyer and expert in international law.⁵ In 1937, his extensive work titled *Rozbiory i odrodzenie Rzeczypospolitej. Zagadnienia prawa międzynarodowego* [The partitions and rebirth of the Republic of Poland. Issues in international law] was published in Lwów (Lviv) in the Biblioteka Prawa Politycznego i Prawa Narodów [Library of Political Law and Law of Nations] series, whose editor-in-chief was Ludwik Ehrlich. In the first part of his work, Hubert presented his thesis that in the law of nations (now international law) there exists a concept of *ius postliminii*, which is both a theoretical construct and a legal principle.⁶ He referred in this regard to his earlier works on the subject.⁷ He pointed out that *ius postliminii* had its roots in Roman law and had re-emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in disputes concerning nationality. He argued that in the legal doctrine this principle was followed until the eighteenth century, and that in practice it continued to be applied later, although it was not referred to by name. According to Hubert this principle is the basis for the restitution of state authority. He argued that *ius postliminii* in legal theory and in international practice are two variants

⁵ Stanisław Hubert was born on 23 May 1905 in Wadowice (then in Austrian Galicia). He was a student of Ludwik Ehrlich and graduated in law from Jan Kazimierz University in Lwów (Lviv). After WWII, when Poland’s borders were moved far to the west, the traditions of Jan Kazimierz University were preserved at the University of Wrocław, which was established in place of the University of Breslau after the German inhabitants of Breslau/Wrocław had been expelled following the establishment of Germany’s new eastern border. Like many academics from Lwów, after WWII Hubert worked mainly for the University of Wrocław. In 1970–1976 he was a judge at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

⁶ *Ius postliminii* (*postliminium*) is the doctrine of Roman law that persons captured by the enemy were, on their return, deemed to revert to their original status, on the fiction that no capture had occurred. The doctrine has been adopted in international law as a rule whereby persons, property and territory tend to revert to their former condition on the withdrawal of enemy control. In other words, *the right of postliminy is the right or claim of a person who had been restored to the possession of a thing, or to a former condition, to be considered as though he had never been deprived of it. Dig. 49, 15, 5; 3 Bl. Comm. 107, 210. In international law, the right by which property taken by an enemy, and recaptured or rescued from him by the fellow subjects or allies of the original owner, is restored to the latter upon certain terms. 1 Kent, Comm. 108.* <https://dictionary.thelaw.com/jus-postliminii/>. The *factio legis Corneliae* distinguished between *postliminium in bello* and *postliminium in pace*.

⁷ Stanisław Hubert, *Przywrócenie władzy państwowej (Ius postliminii). Rozwój doktryny w teorii i praktyce prawa narodów do początku XIX wieku*. 1936, BPPN (Biblioteka Prawa Politycznego i Prawa Narodów), Vol. VII, *Zasady restytucji państwowości w zastosowaniu do republiki genewskiej w r. 1814-1815*, Rocznik Prawa i Ekonomii 1932, pp. 73–99.

of the same principles of the law of nations derived from ancient Roman law.⁸ At this point it needs to be said that Hubert intentionally created the first of the myths which he later evoked many times. An argument referring to the ‘ancient and eternal nature’ of legal principles is clearly an eristic device which is often and eagerly used, similarly to references to principles of Roman law. What is notable is his convenient neglect of the context in which these ancient principles, derived from Roman law, were intended to apply. Hubert completely ignored the issue of the ‘reception’ of Roman law in Europe and many other matters, and this turns his argumentation into a historical (historiographic) myth rather than a real point of reference. It should be remembered that in the 1930s, when Hubert’s works were published, the state of research and perception of the cultural role of Roman law in European legal culture were very different than today. In the seventeenth century, Roman law and its principles were viewed as *ratio scripta* (written reason) related to the doctrine of natural law; in other words, a grounded rational order and not a formally binding legal order. Understandably, the principles of twentieth-century international law were originally shaped within the Western European legal culture and political space, from where they gradually spread to Eastern Europe and further. In addition, it should be remembered that Western Europe was part of the Roman Empire, and references to a Roman law which hypothetically has never ‘died’ or has been evoked again since the end of the Middle Ages have a very different context there than in Central and Eastern Europe. For the latter regions, Roman law was a foreign concept and an external legal system which arrived at a late stage. Furthermore, while considering the place of Roman law in European legal culture, careful distinctions are made between Roman law as a legal system of the Roman state from the Republic until the fall of the Empire in the West, and Roman law as part of the *ius commune* developed by the glossators and Italian legal scholars. (With regard to the former, it should be noted that Polish historiography refers to the Western Roman Empire and its symbolic end date of 476 AD, when Romulus Augustulus abdicated, whereas Justinian’s codification of Roman law was issued later, in 529 to 534.) Both legal traditions are separate from *usus modernus pandectarum* (the modern application of the Pandects), which is the basis for the reception of the law in the lands associated with the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century. There is also the nineteenth-century historical school of law established by Friedrich Carl von Savigny and the Pandectists. All of this is encapsulated under the euphemistic name of Roman law. The question is: to which of these traditions was Hubert referring? There are also other grounds to express reservations. The Roman *ius postliminii* was principally an institution of private (civil) law, which referred to the rights of natural persons as we understand them today. Consequently, its application and adaptation to public legal relations and international law give rise to numerous objections. The efforts and dilemmas of jurists today demonstrate how complicated a matter this is. Attempts to identify a common core of ancient and present institutions have been made for centuries. There is the danger of presentism on the one hand and of unjustifiable

⁸ S. Hubert, *Rozbiory i odrodzenie...*, pp. 3–4.

historicism on the other, and both are the concern of researchers today.⁹ Summing up this part of my comments, it is impossible to state that Hubert was not right in his reasoning and claims. This is not the issue with his argumentation. Possibly his theses might be defended, provided that the reservations mentioned above are taken into consideration. The problem is that Hubert made a great many simplifications and disregarded contexts relevant to the cases being considered (despite having the best intentions). Consequently he created a myth which formed the cornerstone of his further argumentation. One of his basic simplifications was his use of the cluster of ideas around *ius postliminii* as a theoretical and scientific concept (which suggests its ‘ancient’ and Roman origin) corresponding to the principles of restitution in the practice of international law.

In the later part of his work, Hubert carefully discusses the opinions of proponents and opponents of the *ius postliminii* principle in international relations. Those who opposed citing *ius postliminii* often opted for a principle of restitution, but derived it from other rules and principles without referring to the construct of *ius postliminii* originating in Roman law.¹⁰ Hubert then pointed out that the partitions of Poland were condemned in the jurisprudence of international law (except, of course, by lawyers serving the partitioning powers). This refers in particular to public and scholarly opinion in Western Europe.¹¹ He noted, however, that even outstanding experts like G. F. Martens, who condemned the partitions, acknowledged that they had happened. This remark is important because Hubert, following the footsteps of his master Ludwik Ehrlich, created another myth, or in this case rather a highly debatable position: that the condemnation of Poland’s partitions and their inconsistency with the then binding and respected principles of international law, and moreover the assessment of the partitioning acts and treaties as ‘illegal’ and ‘flawed’, meant that they bore no legal consequences, and should thus be viewed as null and void. It should be noted that such arguments were not advanced even by the jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who thoroughly condemned the partitions of Poland. It follows that Hubert (and Ehrlich) overlooked the distinction between the legal evaluation of factual events (the partitioning acts and the takeover of jurisdiction in the ‘former’ lands of the Polish *res publica* by the partitioning powers) and the facts themselves. In his argumentation here, Hubert even departed from the rules of the Roman *postliminium*, which provided that on a person’s return his rights were restored, but did not provide restitution of factual states of affairs (e.g. possession) or even of certain rights based on facts (e.g. marriage), which were not restored and were considered expired. The point is that it is impossible to equate a judgement that the partitions were illegal and

⁹ See comments by Maciej Mikuła on the traps of legal positivism in research on past law, in *Prawo miejskie magdeburskie (Ius municipale magdeburgense) w Polsce XIV-pocz. XVI w.*, Kraków, 2018, pp. 20–25.

¹⁰ For example: William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, Ed. by A. Pearce Higgins, New York, 1924.

¹¹ S. Hubert, *Rozbiory...*, pp. 74–78, where he refers to Phillimore, Westlake, Calvo, Halleck, Hersey and others.

contradicted international law with a statement that they had not happened and had not existed. Hubert compares the state of ‘nonexistence’ of a sovereign state (being a continuation of the Polish *res publica*) in the nineteenth century to the short periods of occupation of countries such as the Swiss cantons and the Republic of Genoa, but does not comment on the fact that in the first case the occupation lasted for over 123 years, and in the second the periods in question lasted for less than two decades. What Hubert is proposing here is an obvious myth. History, including the history of law, is unfortunately a science of facts (some being uncomfortable and upsetting) – it is not concerned with the construction of a fiction saying that certain events did not happen.

To escape this dilemma, Hubert created his third myth. This was a historical myth concerning the existence of substitute statehood institutions in the nineteenth century, interchangeable with those existing at times when Poland was an independent state. Such a historical myth is of course justifiable, provided that its political and historical context is clearly outlined, and it serves to describe events in the Polish lands at that time. What is controversial is an attempt to ‘dress’ this myth to imply the historical existence of a statehood. According to Hubert, substitute statehood institutions included the Duchy of Warsaw, Congress Poland up to the deposition of Tsar Nicholas I as king of Poland in 1831 by the Polish parliament, and the Free City of Cracow. He also identified sovereign statehood institutions in the short-lived General Confederation of the Kingdom of Poland (established by Napoleon on the eve of his campaign in Russia, and lasting from 1812 to 1813), and the period of the Kingdom of Poland during the November Uprising (1830–1831) between the deposition of Nicholas I and the fall of Warsaw.

As an intellectual construct, this concept is very interesting. Notably, it is the main textbook narrative about Poland’s nineteenth-century history. However, in the light of the history of constitutional law and jurisprudence in general, including legal doctrine and case law, Hubert’s argumentation is so grossly simplified, and the wishful thinking necessary to create a coherent concept is so elaborate, that its critical review exceeds the scope of this paper. Interestingly, Hubert carefully refers to the statements made in parliamentary debates during the November Uprising that there was and would be no “return to former relations”, namely to the late eighteenth century, even though only 35 years had then passed since the Third Partition of Poland (1795). Even though at the time of the November Uprising, the Polish parliament and government viewed themselves as the continuation of the former *res publica*, there were at least two circumstances which cast a pall over Hubert’s argumentation and demonstrate that it was developed in the 1930s, a hundred years after the events he wished to interpret and evaluate. The first striking circumstance is his total neglect of the state structure and the relationship between the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Until its fall, the *res publica* was not only a multi-denominational, multi-ethnic and multilingual state, but formally it was still the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, with a number of separate legal and political institutions. The legal and political relationship between the two constituents was highly complex. The issue is not that when discussing the existence and restitution of Polish

statehood Hubert could not describe this relationship, but that he totally ignores it as if it no longer had any relevance, even though he is describing the situation in the first half of the nineteenth century. He thus creates another of his many myths: that of the uniformity and unity of the Kingdom of Poland which he identifies with *Res Publica Poloniae*. It is easy to guess the reasons behind Hubert's position. It was needed to create another, fifth myth, which is that the Republic of Poland reconstructed in 1918 was not only the revived Commonwealth of the Crown and Lithuania, which had ceased to exist in 1795 due to the partitions, but also the only eligible continuation of the former Polish *res publica* with its old rights and entitlements. Consequently, all forms of statehood and aspirations of the peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania are viewed as ungrounded and absolutely rejected. Again, the issue is not that Hubert questions the legitimacy of, for example, Lithuania's aspirations to its own statehood and whether Lithuania in 1918 could also claim to be the revived *res publica*. The issue is that he completely ignored such matters. It is difficult to accept that Hubert, an outstanding lawyer, did not understand the relevance and complexity of the situation, as elsewhere he discusses the details of international legal doctrine and compares the histories of Genoa and Switzerland with that of Poland. His decision appears to be intentional, because he was constructing his argumentation in the late 1930s. His deliberate omissions served to create a myth which excluded everybody else from aspiring to continue the traditions of the former Polish–Lithuanian state.¹² This exclusion refers in particular to nations and communities other than Poles living in the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939). Only the Polish Republic, and no one else, enjoyed the legitimate right to invoke the *postliminium* principle and make claims for restitution.

In the last part of his work, Hubert rather clearly sets out his position that the doctrine of the continuation of Polish statehood was effectively presented and approved both in Poland (Polish legislation, then in the Constitution of 1921, including its preamble) and in international relations. This is not a historical myth, but an actual proposal to treat the Polish Republic of 1918 not as a new state but as a continuation of the old Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Interestingly, Hubert criticises the authorities of independent Poland for not voicing strongly enough the argument of the legal continuity of the old and new Republic of Poland.¹³ This criticism is surprising, because both at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), in the Treaty of Versailles¹⁴ and in other diplomatic notes¹⁵ and treaties (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye¹⁶) the 'restitution' of Polish statehood, and the status of the Second Polish Republic as a 'resur-

¹² Whether or not the independence aspirations of Ukrainians and Lithuanians in 1918 referred to the myth of the old *res publica* is another story. Probably they did not. Nevertheless, such aspirations existed. At the same time Hubert insisted that his restitution doctrine was based on formal and legal criteria and not on national ambitions.

¹³ S. Hubert, *Rozbiory...*, p. 202, p. 226.

¹⁴ Treaty of Versailles, Article 87.

¹⁵ British diplomatic note in *Monitor Polski*, 1919 (paper issue), poz. 157 – fragments in: S. Hubert, *Rozbiory...*, pp. 240–241..

¹⁶ Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Article 91.

rected' Poland and not a completely new state, formed a common thread. For purely 'technical' reasons (over a hundred years had passed since the fall of Poland as a state and the liquidation of its legal system) Polish legislation could not restore the legal order of the eighteenth century and the old political system. However, declaratively, the continuity and continuation were frequently and eagerly emphasised. A symbolic manifestation of this was the preamble to the March Constitution (1921). In international relations, maintaining this position was obviously not easy and was often viewed as awkward, which Hubert understood and excused. However, even in this case, it needs to be underlined that what Hubert was arguing for was at best a legal construct and an attempt to turn a historical myth into reality by means of legislation.

In conclusion, then, Stanisław Hubert's objective was to attempt to develop arguments apparently in line with an objective analysis of international law and with reference to an analysis of historical facts and legal developments in the past. However, this attempt was not truly based on historical facts, but on a set of historical myths which he purposefully and consciously created. His aim was to demonstrate the continuum between the Polish *res publica* that had fallen in the eighteenth century, and the Second Polish Republic created in 1918. His interpretation and approach sidelined potential competitors that aspired to the same continuity and traditions. One cannot ignore the numerous simplifications and the impression that certain arguments were 'stretched'. Facts and arguments were presented selectively, and uncomfortable circumstances were deliberately overlooked. Consequently it is not surprising that Hubert's argumentation failed to gain widespread support outside Poland. It is another matter that his reasoning has been uncritically followed in Polish textbooks; these, however, do not serve to teach the history of law and international relations, but are an attempt at historical storytelling (self-narrative), and for such a purpose this approach is perhaps acceptable.

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ABSTRACT

Stanisław Hubert's study titled "The Partitions and Rebirth of the Republic of Poland" (Rozbiory i odrodzenie Rzeczypospolitej) appeared in print in 1937 in Lwów (Lviv). The author, born in Wadowice and a pupil of Ludwik Ehrlich, referred to the ius postliminii principle, originating in Roman law, as a concept justifying and underlying the principle of restitution applicable in the law of nations (today known as international law), and argued for its application in the interpretation of matters related to the rebuilding of the Republic of Poland in 1918. This article contains a critical analysis of Hubert's main propositions and arguments. Although his book did not resonate loudly in the mainstream of international jurisprudence in Poland, some of the themes discussed in it appeared in propaganda campaigns justifying Poland's claims relevant to its regained independence,

and also in assessments of past events, especially the history of the Polish lands in the 19th century. Propagandistic arguments of the kind used by Hubert can also be found in statehood discourse in other Central European countries. The main aim of the article is to show that the arguments presented by Hubert were largely grounded in historical myths selected to appear as indisputable 'hard' facts. Hubert's major propositions are identified and are critically assessed from the perspective of the study of the history of law in the 21st century. This approach makes it possible to demonstrate which of Hubert's propositions have stood the test of time and which can be regarded as mere propagandistic discourse.

DARIUSZ JEZIORNY
Łódź

A TARNISHED REPUTATION? AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS ON ANTI-JEWISH INCIDENTS IN REBORN POLAND

The emerging economic and financial domination of the United States at the beginning of the 20th century was doubtless strengthened by victory in WWI and the debts of the victorious European powers held by American banks in the second phase of the war. After the defeat of Germany, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the revolution in Russia, the US became the most powerful country in the global economy, and, as a result, the most important shaper of public opinion. This happened also due to the popularity of President Woodrow Wilson, who arrived in Europe as the person pointing the way toward a lasting peace after the experiences of a terrible war. The role played by the developing media market, however, should not be forgotten. American newspapers were beginning to play an ever greater role in the creation of the image of the US and of other countries as well. It was the press that formed the views of the citizens who read it and took part in elections. The policies of the American government, and often those of powerful financial institutions or business enterprises, was indirectly dependent on the positions they published. They even affected the governments and societies of other countries since the articles appearing in the pages of American newspapers were published or at least cited in different parts of the world and "The New York Times" began being sold in the British Isles in 1919.

The considerations cited above are sufficient reason to follow the image of Poland during the process of its rebirth after over 100 years of partitions as presented in selected American newspapers. The world public was informed 100 years ago of an entire series of anti-Jewish incidents reaching the level (in some cases) of pogroms. The goal of this article is to outline the extent to which anti-Semitic violence was covered by US newspapers and to determine which incidents were written about and which were not. It will be necessary to examine the sources of information utilised by the American press and to determine whether they were objective. This fact doubtless influenced the image of the reborn Poland in the US and other parts of the world and therefore, had an effect on the support which the governments of the victorious powers were able to extend to Polish demands at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Similarly, information on the reaction of Jews in the US to the reports that were arriving will also be important. This concerns questions of whether or not they believed the reports or protested in some way

and how newspapers covered this. It will certainly be important to establish whether or not Jewish organizations contacted the Polish government or Polish organizations in the United States. Also important is whether the leaders of these organizations were listened to and whether American newspapers published their views. Finally, it will be necessary to reflect on when anti-Semitic incidents in the newly reborn Poland were reported on, whether at the time or afterwards and whether at particular times reports of this type intensified or not and if so, then at what times.

This set of research questions would seem to be very broad and could form the basis of a much longer monograph, even if the period examined is limited to the first year of the independent Republic of Poland, beginning in November of 1918. For this reason, only two important newspapers appearing on the East Coast will be analysed (a cursory search of “The Wall Street Journal” brought about negative results as it published no articles on Jews in Poland at all).

The first is “The New York Times”, a daily published in New York since 1851, which had acquired significantly greater popularity in the 1890s when Adolph S. Ochs became the majority stockholder and introduced many innovations. For its comprehensive coverage of WWI, it received its first Pulitzer Prize. The paper’s increased importance translated into larger print runs as well as distribution in the United Kingdom.¹

The second newspaper analysed here is “The Boston Globe”, which had been published since 1872. It was the private undertaking of a group of businessmen in the state capital of Massachusetts. While it enjoyed its greatest sales within Boston it was far more than a local newspaper and belonged to the most influential in the entire United States. One important factor that doubtless influenced its contents was its being published by Boston Irish Catholics.²

Even given the problematic nature of this paper’s scope, it is worth seeing whether anti-Semitic incidents in Poland were being written about. The answer to that question is affirmative. Taking both newspapers together it was possible to find many stories, mostly short items from news services, presenting happenings in the reborn Poland connected with the persecution of Jews. Among the headlines, the topics that most stand out concern “massacres of Jews in Poland and Galicia”. In this case it should be noted which events were written about. Just after the end of military operations, Galicia emerged as a regional villain. Many times, the distinction was made that it was in the western part of this Hapsburg province that brutal treatment of Jews occurred, which was doubtless a burden for Poland. According to reports, there was an increase in anti-Semitic occurrences beginning 1 November, but only rarely were details on what exactly happened given. The information was very general, for example “numerous robberies and murder”, material losses “estimated to be millions of dollars” or “massacre of Jewish men, women and children by the Polish population” who were apparently helped by “Polish legionnaires”. The Polish government was charged with being passive, which meant that the Jewish population was completely defenceless.

¹ For more, see: www.nytc.com/who-we-are/culture/our-history/ (accessed 31 August 2019).

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Boston_Globe (accessed 31 August 2019).

More specific information was given on the topic of an incident in Chrzanów where nine people paid for the attack with their lives. Other names that occurred were Dombrowa (sic!) and Jaworzno. The effect of the attacks, it was reported, was that thousands of Jewish families found themselves with no roof over their heads.³ Pogroms in Galicia were reported on as early as spring of 1918 while the war was still being fought. As a result of attacks in Kraków, one man was killed and 21 people were seriously injured. Six days later, it was reported that there were 20 people injured.⁴ On 4 July 1918, in turn, reports of Jewish stores being looted in Jarosław were published. One detail given on this occasion was a lack of interest in the attacks on the part of the government.⁵ It was difficult, however, to blame the Polish government for this last fact. This was happening while Galicia was still under the rule of the Hapsburgs, enemies of the United States during the war and it was in their interest to cover up this troublesome fact.

In the first weeks after the end of the war, there were articles in American newspapers about ongoing anti-Semitic agitation in Polish newspapers announcing, for example, that Jews were Bolshevik agitators. This supposedly resulted in street attacks against Jews in Warsaw and the destruction of their stores.

What is interesting is that reports on the Warsaw pogrom were tied to the spontaneous process of disarming the German military on the streets of the Polish capital. This was said to accompany the arrest of German soldiers and civilians as well. The information was embellished with the commentary that if the reports turned out to be true “it would point to a serious situation, because forces of violence and disorder [are] already threatening the life of every population between the Rhine and the Volga”. The reputation of the Bolsheviks was such at the time that this doubtless had to discredit the emerging seeds of Polish power over the Vistula. It could also lead to the logical conclusion that perhaps it would be better to allow Germany to maintain control over the situation in an uncertain area since otherwise no one would be able to hold back the threats against the lives and property of millions of everyday people.⁶ Reports also reached the US of six Jews being killed by Polish legionnaires in Siedlce.⁷

³ *Jews Raise Troops to Prevent Pogroms. Organize in Austria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Following Outbreaks*, “The New York Times” (hereinafter NYT) 20 November 1918, p. 3; J. Grande, *Wholesale Massacre of Jews in Poland. Slaying and Plundering in Warsaw and Galicia*, NYT 28 November 1918, p. 3; *Starts ‘Star’ Fund for Jewish Drive*, NYT 14 December 1918, p. 17.

⁴ *A Pogrom in Galicia*, NYT 21 April 1918, p. 3; *Hiding Facts of Pogrom. Austrian Censorship Suppressed Reports from Cracow*, NYT 27 April 1918, p. 3.

⁵ *Austria Curbs Styrian Mutiny. Anti-Jewish Riots in Galicia*, NYT 4 July 1918, p. 1.

⁶ *Anti-Semitic Riots Start in East Europe. Jewish Societies Here Petition President Wilson to Prevent Threatened Massacres*, NYT 15 November 1918, p. 2; *Germans in Warsaw Disarmed. Reports of Pogrom There*, NYT 16 November 1918, p. 3 (source of quote); J. Grande, *op. cit.*, p. 3; *Polish Troops in Control at Warsaw*, “The Boston Globe” (hereinafter BG) 15 November 1918, p. 5; *Three Killed in Arrest of Bolsheviks in Warsaw*, BG 22 January 1919, p. 5.

⁷ *Jews Raise Troops to Prevent Pogroms. Organize in Austria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Following Outbreaks*, NYT 20 November 1918, p. 3; *Anti-Semitic Riots in Galicia and Poland*, BG 15 November 1918.

However, among the attacks against Jews in the lands of the reborn Polish state the one that had the greatest echo was the pogrom in Polish Lwów (now Ukrainian Lviv). A necessary reminder here is that after the final expulsion of the army of the West Ukrainian People's Republic by Polish units from Friday to Sunday (21-23 November 1918) there was a series of robberies and murders along with the destruction of property in the Jewish quarter. To the present day, historians have not been able to establish who the guilty parties were or how complete the destruction was although the deaths of 55 Jews are ascribed to persons wearing Polish uniforms. Later, attempts were made to explain, with references to the open support of Jews for the Ukrainian side, which, however, could not justify the revenge of this type.⁸ News of the events also reached the US. They reported many victims among the Jewish population as well as the destruction of a large part of the city. Civilians made up a majority of those injured, because there were robberies and women were raped along with "the ghetto (being) laid in ruins", cases of arson of over 600 buildings as well as the machine gunning of those trying to escape. The attacks were said to be met with indifference by Polish military leaders. According to another version, there were only arson attacks against synagogues, in which many Jews had taken shelter. Later reports made even stronger charges against the Polish side, giving horrifying statistics. According to them, there were over 500 confirmed examples of anti-Semitic actions undertaken by patrols led by Polish officers and over 2,000 incidents by regular soldiers with no oversight by leaders. The names of 18 officers and 72 regulars involved in the Lwów pogrom were reportedly established. In addition, losses were estimated at 100 million Austro-Hungarian crowns not counting the burnt synagogue.

This number doubtless made an impression, but taking into account the catastrophically falling value of that currency, no one was able to realistically estimate how much that actually was.⁹ A month after the pogrom, reports appeared in the American press about the arrest of four important Zionist activists in Lwów (even their names were given) in order to prevent them from submitting a report on the pogrom at the Paris Peace Conference. The official reason was reportedly to turn them into hostages in order to help ensure humane treatment of Polish prisoners of war captured by the Ukrainian side. If that were true however, it would have compromised the Polish side even more.¹⁰

⁸ For more, see: J. Tomaszewski, *Lwów, 22 listopada 1918 r.*, "Przegląd Historyczny" vol. LXXV, 1984, issue 2, pp. 279-285.

⁹ *Says Poles Fired Ghetto. German Version of Massacre of Jews by Troops in Lemberg*, NYT 29 November 1918, p. 20; *Jews Murdered in Lemberg Pogrom. Hundreds Burned to Death in a Synagogue or Shot in Fight. 600 Houses Burned*, NYT 30 November 1918, p. 3; *To Investigate Pogroms. Allied Officers in Lemberg. Vienna Jews Appeal to President Wilson*, NYT 2 December 1918; *Jews Clamor to Come Here. Starving Thousands in Poland Want to Join Relatives*, NYT 22 March 1919, p. 2; *Uncle Dudley, Poland's Peril*, BG 28 May 1919, p. 14.

¹⁰ *To Present Aims of Jews at Versailles. Committee of Nine Named at Philadelphia. Commission Named to Look into Situation in Poland*, BG 19 December 1918, p. 3; *Masaryk Protects Jews. Cancel Bohemian Order for Their Deportation*, NYT 22 December 1918, p. 5.

Reports of a pogrom in Poznań, which was said to be initiated by young Poles against Jews in the new year took on a particular character. As a consequence of these excesses, there were reportedly 30 killed and many injured. This act was even more worthy of condemnation since it involved artillery fire into a synagogue full of people praying, as reported by “Berliner Tageblatt” newspaper. “The New York Times” repeated after the Berlin daily that the German population in the capital of Wielkopolska was treated similarly. Members were attacked and robbed on the streets of the city, private homes and stores were broken into during robberies. It should not be forgotten that all these supposed Polish “crimes” were said to occur while German forces were in retreat during the Wielkopolska Uprising, which had begun after a visit by Ignacy Paderewski. It was precisely in these circumstances that the news of barbaric Polish behaviour circled the world. In this context, an editorial appeared, modelled after one in the German “Lokal-Anzeiger”, claiming that the situation was unusually difficult since 800 thousand Germans had been left to the mercy of Poland and the Peace Conference.¹¹ All of these accounts were fictional, concocted with the goal of obtaining support for the idea of leaving Wielkopolska within the borders of Germany.

It must be admitted that in light of current findings of the literature, American newspapers did not present especially precise information on the topic of anti-Jewish attacks in Polish lands during the first months of its independent existence. British publications, on the other hand, at least placed more exact information in their reports.¹² More news on the topic of anti-Jewish excesses in Poland arrived across the Atlantic after a few months. They were very imprecise and betrayed the low level of awareness that American journalists had of the situation and geography of Central and Eastern Europe. Among other accounts, information was given on a pogrom in Proskurów in which 5,000 Jews were said to have died as well as pogroms in Berdyczów and Żytomierz where “hundreds of Jews were killed”. At that time these towns were under Ukrainian control, nevertheless guilt was ascribed to “Polish anti-Semits”.¹³ A similar case took place on 22 May 1919 in Poryck in the area of Wołyń (now Volhynia, Ukraine) in which 18 Jewish persons were killed.¹⁴

Other accusations made against Poles were however more accurate. There appeared mentions of pogroms in Oświęcim, Kalisz, Dąbrowa, Pińczów, Busko, Wieluń, Rzeszów, Strzyżów, Częstochowa as well as many other towns and villages whose real names, given obvious spelling mistakes, cannot be determined. The twisting of Slavic place and personal names was, after all, a kind of tradition in American

¹¹ *Germans Put Posen under Martial Law. Berlin Asserts Pogroms by Poles Occurred There and Thirty Jews Were Killed*, NYT 2 January 1919, p. 3; *Pleads for Check to Reds*, NYT 7 January 1919, p. 9.

¹² For details, see: D. Jeziorny, *Co wiedzieli Brytyjczycy? Relacje o pogromach Żydów w Polsce z lat 1918-1919 nad Tamizą*, [in:] *Pogromy Żydów na ziemiach polskich w XIX-XX wieku*, v. III: *Historiografia, polityka, recepcja społeczna (do 1939 roku)*, eds. K. Kijek, A. Markowski, K. Zieliński, Warszawa 2019, pp. 229–255.

¹³ *Thousands of Jews Slain in Pogroms. Wholesale Slaughter in Ukraine Reported*, BG 24 March 1919.

¹⁴ *More Pogroms Reported in Towns of Poland*, BG 7 June 1919, p. 5.

newspapers. The towns mentioned were no doubt in areas governed at the time from Warsaw. In most cases there were only mentions of Jews being mistreated, attacked, robbed of having their property destroyed or even killed. Except for these very general reports it was difficult to establish the particulars apart from accusations that the Polish government and the police forces were indifferent to or even took part in the attacks. Even specific dates for the events described are missing. An exception was the case of Częstochowa where nine Jews were reported killed.¹⁵

Against this background information from the front in the Polish-Bolshevik conflict toward the end of March in 1919 stands out. The successful Polish offensive in the area of contemporary Belarus and Lithuania led to the occupation of cities such as Pińsk and Vilnius where the percentage of the Jewish population was considerable (in Pińsk 22,000 out of a total population of 26,000). Immediately after the Polish units entered the city, they were said to carry out pogroms. In Pińsk, the reason for a mass execution of 56 Jews (actually 43 were shot), in reports received by "The Boston Globe", was non-payment by the Jewish community of a 100,000 mark contribution demanded by the Polish military authorities. Religious motives were also present in explanations, that it was revenge for the crucifixion of Christ. Such calls came from the Polish press, the whole of which was accused of anti-Semitism. Similar explanations with several additional details (on the public flogging of three Jewish women as well as the closing of a synagogue) was given by "The New York Times" a few days earlier, so it can be quite probably surmised that the information published in New York was republished in Boston.¹⁶ Another article in the Boston daily published toward the end of May 1919 spoke of 100 Jews killed in Pińsk and repeated the explanations presented by the Jewish side both through diplomatic channels and in the press. According to this version, Jews gathered to decide how to distribute charitable contributions from the USA before the Passover holiday. During this meeting, Polish soldiers burst in and arrested those gathered and then some of them were shot in the marketplace without any type of trial.¹⁷ Other figures given by "The New York Times" in the middle of May lowered the number of those executed, apparently for supporting the Bolsheviks, to 36 persons. The goal of the execution was said to be to frighten the local population and force them to submit to Polish military authorities.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Jews Clamor to Come Here. Starving Thousands in Poland Want to Join Relatives*, NYT 22 March 1919, p. 2; *Pogroms on Polish Border. Many Jews Said to Have Been Wounded. Shops and Homes Looted*, NYT 2 April 1919, p. 3; *Tell Washington of Jewish Massacres. Report Several Thousand Killed in Prozkurov*, BG 27 May 1919, p. 4; *Offer Evidence of Pogroms in Poland. Jewish Committee Takes Issue with Paderewski. Gives Dates, Places and Names and Says Polish Troops Took Part*, BG 3 June 1919, p. 13; *More Pogroms Reported in Towns of Poland*, BG 7 June 1919, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Boston Jews Learn of Pinsk Pogrom. Cable States 56 Hebrews Were Killed There. Polish Press Inciting Masses to Atrocities*, BG 8 May 1919, p. 2; *Reports Pogrom at Pinsk. Central Zionist Office Hears 56 Jews Were Killed*, NYT 2 May 1919, p. 12.

¹⁷ *Tell Washington of Jewish Massacres. Report Several Thousand Killed in Prozkurov*, BG 27 May 1919, p. 4. Cf. J. Tomaszewski, *Pińsk, Saturday 5th April 1919*, "Polin" Vol. I, 1985, pp. 227-251.

¹⁸ *36 Jewish Youths Shot. Wrongly Accused at Pinsk of Being Reds. Investigatory Report*, NYT 15 May 1919, p. 3.

Even greater interest was raised by the events in Wilno (now Vilnius in Lithuania). From reports presented in American newspapers it seemed that Polish soldiers after occupying the train station in the historic Lithuanian capital, began plundering Jewish homes and stores that were closed for the Sabbath. After finally expelling the Russian army from the city on 22 April, killings of Jews began while others were arrested, tortured and held for ransom. According to some sources, 54 or 55 people were said to have been killed during anti-Jewish attacks from the 19th to the 22nd of April, while some published articles claimed that as many as 1,500 people perished. In addition, from two to five thousand Jews were supposedly exiled to Lida (now in Belarus). Those remaining in Wilno were forbidden from selling food, even bread. This was reported to have lasted for eight weeks. Taking into account the facts that the article appeared in "The New York Times" on May 20, and Polish forces had taken Wilno a month earlier it is clear that the information was false or at least strongly exaggerated. It was not strange, however, that the sketchy number of victims and course of events spoke to the imagination of the readers of a newspaper available in the entire United States as well as Great Britain.¹⁹

All things considered, after following the information available to American citizens on the question of anti-Semitic events in the Polish lands, it must be noted that there were many news items devoted to them although in the light of today's knowledge a conclusion that suggests itself is that the most widely distributed American newspapers did not give the full story. British readers had, in this regard, access to many more reports. Another question that should be asked is the source of the information. Stories from news agencies have the advantage that they can be replied to because at the beginning of each story there is a note on its origin. Therefore, it can be stated with full certainty that most of the information on anti-Jewish pogroms and less drastic attacks were sent from neutral European countries, mainly Denmark and Sweden, although there was no shortage of dispatches from the Netherlands. The World Zionist Organization had information offices in the capitals of all three of these countries which had been neutral during First World War. Just after the end of the war the most active of these was the Copenhagen office directed by Professor David Simonsen. It was from here that the largest number of news stories on anti-Semitic excesses in Poland reached the US and other *Entente* powers. It is worth noting in this context that the Copenhagen office frequently received reports on the ill treatment of Jews from Berlin (both from the German press as well as other unnamed sources) as well as from Lithuania. Both neighbouring countries, being in conflict with Poland over issues such as disputed territories, for obvious reasons had an interest in tarnishing the image of the reborn Polish Republic. The source of information for the Zionist offices in Stockholm and the Hague were also German. The knowledge of newspaper

¹⁹ *Offer Evidence of Pogroms in Poland. Jewish Committee Takes Issue with Paderewski. Gives Dates, Places and Names and Says Polish Troops Took Part*, BG 3 June 1919, p. 13; *Lithuanians Send to Paris Evidence of Vilna Pogrom*, BG 8 June 1919, p. 2; *Tells Plight of Jews. Many Starving and Ravaged by Typhus, Miss Loewenstein Cables*, NYT 20 May 1919, p. 22.

editors in the US was augmented at times by reports directly from Berlin and Vienna by American correspondents who had reached there. Those sources could also not be named objective. Next in line were stories obtained in London where locally important Zionists painted an unusually critical picture of Poland. This mainly concerns the report of Israel Cohen personally researching cases of pogroms in Poland.²⁰ Only later did the first American journalists appear in Warsaw. In effect, a not very flattering picture had been painted of Poland. It was particularly difficult in the first post-war months to verify by other sources.

Passing over the fact that Polish people to a large degree themselves had worked to create an unfavourable image, leading to anti-Jewish excesses which the forces of law and order could not prevent,²¹ attention must be paid to reports that were significantly exaggerated such as those described in American newspapers. It is worth touching upon a dozen or so examples in order to illustrate the above point. Within the context of the pogrom in Lwów, “The Boston Globe” wrote “thousands of people burned alive, many more pillaged and deprived of shelter and food”. This had happened “to a people whose only fault is the fact of its existence”.²² Similar data on the scale of human victims could also be found in “The New York Times”. This information,

²⁰ D. Jeziorny, *Co wiedzieli Brytyjczycy ...*

²¹ There has been as yet no comprehensive and objective treatment of the topic of anti-Semitic incidents in the first months of Poland's existence after WWI. In addition to the examination of press reports, memoirs and diplomatic documents it would be necessary to conduct painstaking analyses of court records from that time, if they have been preserved, and these, as might be expected, were scattered. Academic work so far on this material, including the most recent findings has not been entirely satisfactory. It is worth indicating the following publications: A. V. Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland. War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914-1920*, Alabama 2005, pp. 72-91 (detailed analysis only on the topic of the Lwów pogrom from November 1918); Cf. F. Golczewski, *Polnisch-jüdische Beziehungen 1881-1922. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Osteuropa*, Wiesbaden 1981, pp. 181-264 (many pogroms and anti-Jewish riots have been researched based on press sources, diaries as well as a rich collection of archived materials; the weakness of the work is its being based exclusively on materials created by Jewish sources which did not influence the objectivity of the interpretation); W. Stankiewicz, *Konflikty społeczne na wsi polskiej 1918-1920*, Warszawa 1963, pp. 159-165 (not especially detailed comments, adversely affected by a class-based treatment of the subject); D. Jeziorny, *Londyn wobec ochrony mniejszości żydowskich w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej (1918-1919)*, Łódź 2016, pp. 25-29 (facts based primarily on press accounts are given); D. Konstantynów, *Pogromy i inne akty przemocy fizycznej wobec Żydów w zwierniadle rysunków z prasy polskiej (1919-1939)*, [in:] *Pogromy Żydów na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX wieku*, v. I: *Literatura i sztuka*, ed. S. Buryła, Warszawa 2018, pp. 321-331 (the contents of the articles are given by the title); G. Krzywiec, *Komitet Narodowy Polski wobec kolektywnej przemocy antysemitycznej. Przyczynek do dziejów antysemityzmu nacjonalistycznego na ziemiach polskich (1917-1919)*, [in:] *Przemoc antyżydowska i konteksty akcji pogromowych na ziemiach polskich w XX wieku*, eds. K. Zieliński & K. Kijek, Lublin 2016, pp. 89-121 (the text does not examine pogroms but rather attempts to defend KNP against accusations in its ongoing political activities); K. Zieliński, *Stosunki polsko-żydowskie na ziemiach Królestwa Polskiego w czasie pierwszej wojny światowej*, Lublin 2005, pp. 402-413 (interesting findings based on archive materials, but understandably they do not extend beyond December, 1918); Id., *The Anti-Semitic Riots on the Territories of the Kingdom of Poland at the Beginning of Independence*, “Studia Żydowskie. Almanach”, R. III, 2013, issue 3, pp. 87-94 (a narrower thematic range than the monograph above).

²² *Protest Massacres of Jews in Poland*, BG 12 December 1918, p. 16.

obtained from a correspondent of “Berliner Tageblatt” (who apparently escaped from Lwów on 24 November), vividly presented bodies of Jews lying in the streets, “the streets were filled with the charred bodies of murdered Jews, many of whom, in the frenzy of despair, had leaped from the burning buildings, which were surrounded by Polish troops”. They were said to have shot those fleeing which seemed like a true slaughter.²³ The number of 1100 killed was added to the number given by the London Zionists. Other data claimed that several thousand people were killed. This information arrived in London via Berlin and Copenhagen.²⁴ Another report which came to “The New York Times” from Berlin through the Hague contained a picture of Lwów after this “wildest destruction”. Only “heaps of smoking debris” remained of the ghetto. Among the rubble was said to lie “more than a thousand Jewish men, women and children” or as is described in another part of the same article “innumerable bodies”.

It was also claimed that not only did the authorities do nothing to stop the massacre, but soldiers were given permission to plunder and officers actively participated in this. The rape and defenestration of young girls was common. After being robbed, houses were burned together with their inhabitants inside and those attempting to flee would be shot.²⁵

Even before the Lwów pogrom there was information that Jewish losses after massacres in Galician locales were “estimated to be millions of dollars”.²⁶ Thousands of Jews were “being killed and tortured”²⁷. There were “horrors exceeding the Russian pogroms [sic!] or Turkish massacres of the Armenians”.²⁸ Also taking place were “robberies and murder – not even possible to bury corpses”. No one was protecting the Jews from the hostility of the Poles.²⁹ Reports of plundered Jewish homes and stores as well as the burning of what was left were repeated. In effect, it was claimed that many families were “maltreated, left without shelter, food and clothing”. The dramatic nature of the picture presented was increased with claims of “mothers with new-born babies taken from bed and laid on bare earth” since beds and sheets were being taken by the attackers.³⁰

²³ *Says Poles Fired Ghetto. German Version of Massacre of Jews by Troops in Lemberg*, NYT 29 November 1918, p. 20.

²⁴ *Jews Murdered in Lemberg Pogrom. Hundreds Burned to Death in a Synagogue or Shot in Flight. 600 Houses Burned*, NYT 30 November 1918, p. 3. It should be added that “The Boston Globe” also published figures of 600 Jews killed in Lwów, see Uncle Dudley, *op. cit.*, BG 28 May 1919, p. 14. The author using a pseudonym repeats a version of the systematic burning of Jewish homes and the shooting of those fleeing.

²⁵ *Charges Officials Aided Pogroms. German Correspondent in Lemberg Says They Encouraged Killing Jews. Ghetto Was Laid in Ruins. Looting by Polish Officers and Soldiers Widespread in Three Days of Slaughter*, NYT 2 December 1918, p. 3.

²⁶ *Jews Raise Troops to Prevent Pogroms*, NYT 20 November 1918, p. 3.

²⁷ *Stirred by Failure to Protect Jews*, BG 21 February 1919, p. 5.

²⁸ J. Grande, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁹ *Starts ‘Star’ Fund for Jewish Drive*, NYT 14 December 1918, p. 17.

³⁰ *Jewish Drive Nets \$1,800,000 in 2 Days. Cable Message Telling of Massacres in Galicia*, NYT 10 December 1918, p. 8.

A new wave of reports on anti-Semitic pogroms in areas under Warsaw's jurisdiction brought new exaggerated information. Murders committed against "thousands of Jewish men and women are being slaughtered in a most cruel manner" were written about. Often leading these robberies and killings, according to the reports, were officers. Data concerning 2,806 attacks of soldiers against Jews was given. From this, 494 attacks were said to be directed by officers. The goal of these events was supposed to encourage surviving Jews to emigrate from Poland which was an ideal promoted by "Anton [sic!] Dmovsky". Since he was Poland's representative at the Peace Conference in Paris, the support by the Warsaw leadership for bloody reprisals against Jews must have been put forth.³¹ Yet, the accusation that the Polish government not only did nothing to stop massacres, referred to as the "butchery of Jews" was repeated.³² In addition, in many smaller towns the local authorities were said to incite local populations to anti-Semitic actions. This meant no less than that the Jewish population in Poland was faring worse than anywhere else.³³

As can be seen, much tremendously exaggerated information on the topic of anti-Jewish riots in the reborn Poland was printed in American newspapers. In the summaries, the authors of the texts counted 110 or even 120 pogroms that occurred in lands subject to the Polish government in the first six months of independence.³⁴ The worst aspect of this vision of Poland was that for the bulk of public the message received was that these attacks were either supported by or at the very least tolerated by the Polish authorities both civil and military.

However, apart from reporting on manifestations of anti-Semitism with varying levels of objectivity, there were also many messages in American newspapers on the reactions of Jewish organizations in the US. This caused an increase in the number of press releases indirectly regarding Poland. The most common form of American Jewish expression was organising public protests. These took different forms but were usually large meetings, rallies and marches ending with speeches by Jewish leaders invited by the organisers. As an example, on 2 December 1918 the *Jewish People's Relief Committee* organized such a protest in Boston against "massacres of the Jewry in Poland".³⁵ Another meeting of this kind took place in the Boston Symphony Hall on 11 December. Massachusetts governor elect Archibald Coolidge and other prominent state officials promised to attend.³⁶ As it turned out, Coolidge did not appear at the meeting and only the newly elected mayor of Boston, Walter L. Collins, was in attendance delivering a speech among the other invited guests.³⁷

³¹ *Protest Against Polish Massacres*, BG 23 May 1919, p. 6.

³² *Protest Polish Pogroms in Cables to President*, BG 25 May 1919, p. 6.

³³ *Give Names of 54 Jews Massacred in Poland*, BG 27 May 1919, p. 4.

³⁴ Uncle Dudley, *op. cit.*, BG 28 May 1919, p. 14; *Boston Protest Against Massacres of Jews in Poland Voiced by 28,000 Persons at Two Meetings*, BG 29 May 1919, p. 3.

³⁵ *New England Jews to Protest Massacres*, BG 4 December 1918, p. 6.

³⁶ *Jewish Massacred Protest Meeting Put off to Dec 11*, BG 6 December 1918, p. 8.

³⁷ *Protest Massacres of Jews in Poland. Plea Sent President by 2000 Boston Citizens. Radio Message Asks Guarantee Against Atrocities*, BG 12 December 1918, p. 16.

Jewish organisations, however, showed great initiative in staging mass meetings in May of 1919 when reports appeared in newspapers of pogroms in April after the Polish-Bolshevik front moved eastward (Pińsk, Lida, Wilno). It seems that one more form of Jewish American engagement needs to be considered. Beginning 1 May 1919, the New States Commission began operations at the Paris Peace Conference. Its goal was to work on clauses of treaties that would be signed by the new states arising or expanding their borders in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁸ The organisation of large-scale rallies became part of the process of influencing the decisions made by the great powers. President Thomas W. Wilson, who was representing the US in Paris, doubtless realized the determination of his co-citizens of Jewish ancestry. From 2 May 1919 preparations began in New York for a massive demonstration of 500 thousand people.³⁹ Assembling such a large gathering in that metropolis was feasible given that about 1.5 million Jews were living there at the time.⁴⁰

A meeting of several hundred thousand people did take place in New York on 21 May 1919. In order to make sure that the assembled crowd would be as impressive as possible, many Jews did not go to work or send their children to school that day. Apart from a funeral procession in which participants wore black, there were various spontaneous marches as well as a mass assembly in Madison Square Garden, which could accommodate 15 thousand people, and which was full. This meeting was the culmination of the entire day and the leading figures of the Jewish community in New York spoke, including Jacob Schiff, Oscar Straus, Abram Elkus, Rabbi Nathan Friedman and Stephen Wise.⁴¹ Charles Evan Hughes, a former Supreme Court Justice also appeared. All the speakers delivered emotional speeches. Reports from the rally were featured on the first page of "The New York Times", while large fragments of speeches appeared on page 5. The greatest attention was paid to the words of Hughes as a non-Jew. He stressed the meanings of the words democracy and freedom that American soldiers, including Jews, had fought for during the Great War. Since religious and race-based persecution was, in his opinion, well documented and totally opposed to the most important American values. The Jewish question, according to him, had become the most urgent issue that needed to be addressed in the world at the time.⁴²

Similar (though held on a much smaller scale) events took place in other American cities including Boston where about 15 thousand people gathered. The leading organiser of this meeting was the Union of American Hebrew Congregations made

³⁸ On the topic of the New States Commission, see D. Jeziorny, *Londyn wobec...*, chap. V.

³⁹ *Jews Here to Protest. Mass Demonstrations Against Massacres in Poland and Galicia*, NYT 2 May 1919, p. 12.

⁴⁰ G. Cohen, *The Jews in the Making of America*, Boston 1924, p. 362. In comparison, there were about 77.5 thousand Jews in Boston.

⁴¹ More on these persons in *ibid.*, pp. 224, 226, 235.

⁴² *Call on Nations to Protect Jews. Massacres in Poland Stir Madison Square Garden Meeting to Earnest Protest. Hughes Urges Justice. Declares Outrages a Betrayal of the Causes for Which America Fought*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 1, 5; *Jews Denounce Pogrom Policies*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 11.

up of 200 congregations in 177 cities of the US and Canada. Speeches were also given by illustrious persons including the influential leader of the Jewish Masonic Lodge B'nai B'rith, Simon Wolf. He underlined the necessity of granting Jews in all countries equal rights without regard to race or religion. Also appearing were the former Republican governor of Massachusetts Samuel McCall as well as Boston mayor Andrew J. Peters.⁴³

Similar mass memorial and political gatherings were organized on 25 June 1919, that is at the time when the final provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were being negotiated including obligations by Poland to protect the rights of minorities.⁴⁴ While it is possible to describe this in detail it suffices to note that it followed a similar pattern to the observances of the previous month. Conclusions can be drawn on the basis of both campaigns about the way Jewish organizations in the US prepared large-scale protests. Characteristic features included:

- gatherings of large numbers of people, spectacular enough that newspapers could not fail to notice;
- speaking invitations to well-known figures in the American Jewish community as well as arranging the participation of as many representatives of central or local authorities as possible;⁴⁵
- resolutions passed by acclamation and addressed to President Wilson and often to other governments of the victorious powers or directly to the Peace Conference.⁴⁶

⁴³ *Jews Ask Wilson to End Persecutions. Cable Resolution Calling on the Peace Conference at Once to Aid Victims in Poland. Voice Faith in America. Council Also Votes to Uphold Results of the Recent Centenary of Its Founder, Dr. Wise*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 5; *Israel Seeking No National Homeland*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 4; *Boston Protest Against Massacres of Jews in Poland Voiced by 28,000 Persons at Two Meetings*, BG 29 May 1919, p. 3.

⁴⁴ *Jews Protest Against Massacres in Poland*, BG 26 June 1919, p. 11.

⁴⁵ *House Order Asks Action to Help Jews in Poland*, BG 21 May 1919, p. 2; *Ask Wilson Protest Against Massacres. Resolution Adopted by Malden Jews*, BG 19 May 1919, p. 4; *Israel Seeking No National Homeland*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 4; *Jews Denounce Pogrom Policies*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 11; *Protest Against Polish Massacres. Prominent Jews Address House Rules Committee. Order Expressing 'Abhorrence' of Crimes Favored*, BG 23 May 1919, p. 4; *Boston Protest Against Massacres of Jews in Poland Voiced by 28,000 Persons at Two Meetings*, BG 29 May 1919, p. 3; *Protest Against Jewish Massacres before House*, BG 3 June 1919, p. 13; *Call on Nations to Protect Jews. Massacres in Poland Stir Madison Square Garden Meeting to Earnest Protest. Hughes Urges Justice. Declares Outrages a Betrayal of the Causes for Which America Fought*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 1.

⁴⁶ J. Grande, *op. cit.*, p. 3; *8,000 Here Demand Justice for Jews in Poland. Slaying and Plundering Jews. Great Meeting Passes Resolutions Calling for Action by the Peace Conference. Schiff Assails Dmowski. Declares Head of Polish Committee Glorified Boycott of Jews. Wants Protection Guarantees*, NYT 12 December 1918, p. 5; *Jews Here to Protest. Mass Demonstrations Against Massacres in Poland and Galicia*, NYT 2 May 1919, p. 12; *Jews Ask Wilson to End Persecutions. Cable Resolution Calling on the Peace Conference at Once to Aid Victims in Poland. Voice Faith in America. Council Also Votes to Uphold Results of the Recent Centenary of Its Founder, Dr. Wise*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 5; *Call on Nations to Protect Jews. Massacres in Poland Stir Madison Square Garden Meeting to Earnest Protest. Hughes Urges Justice. Declares Outrages a Betrayal of the Causes for Which America Fought*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 1; *Jews Denounce Pogrom Policies*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 11; *Appeal to Wilson to End Jewish*

All these declarations were similar. They expressed objections toward “massacres against Jews in Poland, Galicia and Rumania”. The three countries were mentioned together without mention of the fact that Galicia was at that time part of Poland and anti-Semitic attacks had not been carried out in Romania to a similar degree as in Poland. Nonetheless, the pre-war act of stripping Jews of citizenship by the Romanian government was so strongly remembered by their American brothers,⁴⁷ that the country was included among those carrying out pogroms after the war. A second element appearing in the resolutions emerging from the mass meetings were demands that Jews be given legal protection, and this was so successful that the governments of the countries mentioned were not able to follow the pre-war Romanian practice. The goal was to guarantee Jews full civil, political and religious rights leading to full legal equality. There were often references in the declarations to Americans of Jewish origin fighting on the front lines of WWI, which was conducted under slogans of bringing justice, freedom and democracy to the world. Many of the 60 thousand Jews recruited had perished in the war. A failure to assure legal equality for their brothers in Eastern and Central Europe would mean that they had died in vain. These types of arguments in the resolutions that were sent to Wilson doubtless were a source of pressure on him. He was, after all, a moralist in his rhetoric known well beyond the US for invoking the highest moral values.⁴⁸ As can be seen, the protests against anti-Semitic attacks were closely connected with demands for international legal guarantees for Jews all over the world and especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In practical terms, both matters were inseparable, and one never appeared without the other.

Although the demand for equality before the law was very general, a specific legal concept could be found behind it. This was expressed during the American Jewish Congress held 15-18 December in Philadelphia. The full list of Jewish demands appeared in the press just once, and then in relation to the Philadelphia gathering. There were seven points:

Massacres, BG 27 May 1919, p. 3; *Boston Protest Against Massacres of Jews in Poland Voiced by 28,000 Persons at Two Meetings*, BG 29 May 1919, p. 3.

⁴⁷ For details, see: J. Parkes, *The Emergency of the Jewish Problem. 1878-1939*, London–New York–Toronto 1946, pp. 91-92, 95-103; B. Bouffał, *Ochrona mniejszości w prawie narodów*, Warszawa 1928, pp. 145-148.

⁴⁸ *Jews Murdered in Lemberg Pogrom. Hundreds Burned to Death in a Synagogue or Shot in Flight. 600 Houses Burned*, NYT 30 November 1918, p. 3; *Ask Protection for Jews*, NYT 1 December 1918, p. 11; *8,000 Here Demand Justice for Jews in Poland. Slaying and Plundering Jews. Great Meeting Passes Resolutions Calling for Action by the Peace Conference. Schiff Assails Dmowski. Declares Head of Polish Committee Glorified Boycott of Jews. Wants Protection Guarantees*, NYT 12 December 1918, p. 5; *Jewish Delegates Sail*, NYT 16 February 1919, p. 7; *Protest Massacres of Jews in Poland. Plea Sent President by 2000 Boston Citizens. Radio Message Asks Guarantee Against Atrocities*, BG 12 December 1918, p. 16; *Jewish Congress Voices Its Hopes*, BG 16 December 1918, p. 6; *League for Jewish State, Says Wilson. Approves Establishment in Palestine*, BG 3 March 1919, p. 1; *Israel Seeking No National Homeland*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 4; *Jews Denounce Pogrom Policies*, BG 22 May 1919, p. 11; *Boston Protest Against Massacres of Jews in Poland Voiced by 28,000 Persons at Two Meetings*, BG 29 May 1919, p. 3.

- 1) granting citizenship to all who were living in the area of a given country before 1 August 1914 (this was especially important if they had had to flee during the war);
- 2) a ten-year moratorium on laws placing restrictions on the ability of refugees to return and settle as full citizens;
- 3) equal civil, political and religious rights for all people regardless of their race or creed (with no new laws changing this in the future);
- 4) legally guaranteed representation of minorities in government;
- 5) autonomous councils for minority community, religious, educational, charitable and other institutions;
- 6) a prohibition on the introduction of restrictions against minority languages (for example language tests);
- 7) freedom to celebrate the Sabbath and to conduct secular affairs by Jews on Sunday; they should also be freed from official duties on the Sabbath.⁴⁹

As results from the points listed above, the demand for legal equality was in practice broadened by elements treating Jews as a separate minority, as indicated by points 4 and 5. Proportional representation in government as well as the right to manage their own institutions were demands taken from the concept of national cultural autonomy, that is they extend beyond the liberal recognition of equality of all citizens, including those belonging to minorities. These were propagated by Zionists and in Poland also by the Jewish People's Party (*Folkspartei*) and the General Jewish Labour Bund.⁵⁰ It was with this program that the American Jewish Congress sent its delegates to Paris in order to present it at the Peace Conference. The delegation was made up of nine members representing different political factions of Jews living in the US. Most of the group were however Zionists. They were led by the newly elected president of the American Jewish Congress, the Chicago Judge Julian Mack. Alongside him, the Zionist Organization of America was represented by its secretary, Jacob de Haas from New York, Lieutenant Harry Cutler of Providence, Rhode Island as well as Rabbi Stephen Wise of New York. The delegation was completed by New York lawyer Louis Marshall (president of the American Jewish Committee and vice-chairman of the delegation), the Philadelphia Rabbi Bernard L. Levinthal (an orthodox rabbi connected with *Mizrachi*, the religious wing of the Zionist movement), Dr. Joseph Barondess (New York leader of the labour movement), Dr. Nachman Syrkin (New York activist of the *Poale Zion*, Workers of Zion) and the radical author Morris Winchevsky (representing the Jewish Social-

⁴⁹ *Jews Going to Paris with Bill of Rights. Philadelphia Congress Drafts Guarantees to Be Incorporated in Peace Treaty. Names of Nine Candidates. Louis Marshall and Stephen Wise among Those Who Will Present Demand at Versailles*, NYT 19 December 1919, p. 8.

⁵⁰ More on programs for solving the Jewish issue can be found in J. Żyndul, *Państwo w państwie? Autonomia narodowo-kulturalna w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XX wieku*, Warsaw 2000, pp. 20-45; A. Haffka, *Żydowskie ugrupowania polityczne w Polsce*, "Sprawy Narodowościowe" vol. IV, 1930, pp. 347-354, 357-358, 361-362.

ist Federation).⁵¹ American Jews then wanted the Jewish question in Poland to be publicised in Paris during the Peace Conference and this doubtless had a negative influence on the image of the reborn country.

The fact that the attitude of American Jewish organizations toward Poland had been far from friendly at that time can be noticed in various official appearances by leaders of the diaspora in the United States. In his speech of 22 May 1919 Jacob H. Schiff, a well-known philanthropist and member of the board of directors of the bank Kuhn, Loeb & Co. demanded that Poland not be recognized as being worthy of belonging to the League of Nations created in Paris or to the family of free nations until the government stopped pogroms and guaranteed equal rights to Jews living in Poland.⁵² This was, after all, not the first statement of this kind. Attempts to make diplomatic recognition of the Polish Republic dependent on guarantees of equal rights to Jews had appeared at the beginning of 1919, that is before the formal recognition of Poland by the American government. However, when that occurred, there were demands made to the American government to withdraw from this declaration.⁵³

The demands of the internationally guaranteed minority clauses were contrary to the interests of the reborn Poland and they brought about analyses in which Jews ascribed reasons for the explosion of anti-Semitic attitudes that were unfavourable for the Polish Republic. Above all, they condemned anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish propaganda appearing in the Polish press,⁵⁴ which undoubtedly was present.⁵⁵ The argument that there was a Polish tradition of persecuting Jews was repeated. Poles were said to have always “hated” Jews and wanted “revenge” against them. Anti-Semitism was called a “chronic disease of Polish life”. The residents of the Polish lands had revealed themselves to be “the greatest, most intense and most degenerate enemies of Israel”. Due to years of hatred for other nationalities, which many Polish politicians made use of, it was claimed that Jewish girls were being raped, Jewish children were being mur-

⁵¹ *To Present Aims of Jews at Versailles. Committee of Nine Named at Philadelphia*, BG 19 December 1919, p. 3.

⁵² *Call on Nations to Protect Jews. Massacres in Poland Stir Madison Square Garden Meeting to Earnest Protest. Hughes Urges Justice. Declares Outrages a Betrayal of the Causes for Which America Fought*, NYT 22 May 1919, pp. 1, 5.

⁵³ *Rabbi Levi Speaks on the Peace Congress and Jews*, BG 19 January 1919, p. 3; *H. B. Swope, Stirred by Failure to Protect Jews. Charges at Paris Against US Jewish Congress*, BG 21 February 1919, p. 5; *Ask Wilson Protest Against Massacres. Resolution Adopted by Malden Jews*, BG 19 May 1919, p. 4; *Protest Against Polish Massacres. Prominent Jews Address House Rules Committee. Order Expressing ‘Abhorrence’ of Crimes Favored*, BG 23 May 1919, p. 4; *Appeal to Wilson to End Jewish Massacres*, BG 27 May 1919, p. 3.

⁵⁴ *Anti-Jewish Agitation in Poland*, NYT 17 June 1918, p. 13; *Anti-Semitic Riots Start in Eastern Europe. Jewish Societies Here Petition President Wilson to Prevent Threatened Massacres*, NYT 15 November 1919, p. 2; *Protest Against Polish Massacres. Prominent Jews Address House Rules Committee. Order Expressing ‘Abhorrence’ of Crimes Favored*, BG 23 May 1919, p. 4.

⁵⁵ For more, see: J. B. Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other. The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present*, Lincoln-London 2006; M. Domagalska, *Zatrute ziarno: proza antysemitcka na lamach „Roli” (1883-1912)*, Warsaw 2015.

dered, and Jewish blood was “flowing like water”. Poland, according to these claims, was “drowning in Jewish blood”.⁵⁶ Such radical descriptions of the nature of Polish people, despite not appearing in the pages of “The New York Times” or “The Boston Globe” were circulating in the court of US public opinion, broadly understood. From the publication dates of the texts cited, it can be seen that they appeared before Poland had regained its independence and anti-Semitic attacks had become a fact.

One reason for Jewish antipathy toward Poland could very well have been the economic boycott announced by Roman Dmowski in 1912, which Jewish people felt to be very harmful. This aspect was touched upon in both the newspapers surveyed here. This issue was raised by Jewish leaders, including Rabbi Stephen Wise, Jacob Schiff and Louis Marshall. According to them, the boycott was among “the darkest pages in the annals of Jewish history” because “it brought more misery and suffering to hundreds of thousands of Jews than even these very pogroms have brought to them”. Although this last sentence might be surprising, Jewish leaders were correct in that it had been organized by Roman Dmowski and his party.⁵⁷

Among the motives of Polish anti-Semitic actions, alongside economic factors and the struggle for social position, somewhat less often mentioned were religious prejudice or the “reactionary” nature of part of the political elite who wanted to rebuild the pre-partition power of Poland.⁵⁸ This last argument, raised by Dr. Isaac Hurwitz, above all expressed disapproval toward the territorial aspirations of the rebuilt Polish Republic. The creation of a powerful Polish state whose residents had persecuted Jews for years, was decisively rejected by Hurwitz. What is interesting is that similar arguments were used by the infamous All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (the first Soviet secret police, popularly known as the *Cheka*). On 2 July 1918 a communication from Moscow appeared in “The New York Times” that on former Russian lands not subject to Bolshevik authority anti-Jewish propaganda was being spread along with threats of pogroms. In commentary it was added that “anti-Semitic propaganda is a fa-

⁵⁶ *Protest Massacres of Jews in Poland. Plea Sent President by 2000 Boston Citizens. Radio Message Asks Guarantee Against Atrocities*, BG 12 December 1918, p. 16; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa (hereinafter AAN), Komitet Narodowy Polski, file 159, p. 89, *Polish Falsehoods*, “The Jewish Journal” 18 December 1918; *ibid.*, file 159, pp. 87-89, J. Worrsmann, *A Pure Innocent Polish People*, “The Day” 11 October 1918 and *The Day of Terror in Cracow*, “The Wahrheit” 28 December 1918; *ibid.*, file 160, p. 2, B. Satt, *The Polish Pogroms*, “Freie Arbeit Stimme” 3 January 1919; AAN, Archiwum Polityczne Ignacego Paderewskiego, file 675, p. 9, From the American Jewish Chronicle, 1 November 1918.

⁵⁷ *See Hope for Jews in New Poland. But New York Co-Religionists Want More Details of German Plans*, NYT 19 November 1916; *8,000 Here Demand Justice for Jews in Poland. Slaying and Plundering Jews. Great Meeting Passes Resolutions Calling for Action by the Peace Conference. Schiff Assails Dmowski. Declares Head of Polish Committee Glorified Boycott of Jews. Wants Protection Guarantees*, NYT 12 December 1918, p. 5; *New Poland*, NYT 2 February 1919, pp. 66, 69; *To Ask Conference to Free All Jews. Louis Marshall Heads Mission to Present Claims to Peace Delegates. Want Rights Guaranteed. Will Demand Emancipation of 7,000,000 Oppressed for Centuries in Eastern Europe*, NYT 10 March 1919, p. 11.

⁵⁸ *Charges Poles with Oppressing Jews. Dr. Hurwitz Opposed Baltic, Black Sea Program*, BG 27 January 1919, p. 4.

favorite method of reactionaries who are trying to create disorder by inciting one part of the population against the other". For its part, the *Cheka* promised to halt agitation against any nationality and to punish attempts to initiate it.⁵⁹ It would be an extreme exaggeration to equate Hurwitz's words with *Cheka* propaganda. However, the Soviet system of coercion which identified all opponents of the Bolshevik regime, including Poland, with reactionaries certainly benefitted from reports denouncing Poles.

In this context, the question of the ability of Polish people to defend themselves from the accusations made against them appears. It should be stated at once that both "The New York Times" and "The Boston Globe" found space to present the position of the Polish side. Those most often presenting themselves in the name of Poland were the director of the Polish Information Bureau W. O. Górski and the leader of the Polish National Department (Polski Wydział Narodowy) Jan Smulski. In addition, the world class pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski frequently weighed in as he was living in the United States until taking on the function of Prime Minister of the Polish government and principal Polish delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. The first reaction of the representatives of the Polish minority in the US was to insist that all press reports of pogroms had their source in Berlin and were thus untrue. A defeated Germany undoubtedly had an interest in sabotaging the reborn Polish state through false denunciations. The rise of a strong Poland would mean an end to the German *Drang nach Osten* (Drive to the East). Anti-Polish intrigue was, after all, a historic tradition. Górski cited the actions of Frederick the Great, who wanted to provoke a conflict between Catholics and Lutherans in Toruń in order to justify sending his army into the city to pacify the tense situation. This same German *modus operandi*, according to him, was taking place in Galicia where the goal was to incite conflict between Poles and other nationalities. Smulski simply claimed that an improvement of the lot of the Jews could only happen after the creation of a "strong independent Polish state". A republic with a large enough territory could become "land and opportunity for all". Another argument frequently raised by Poles was the state of permanent war waged against Ukrainians and the Bolsheviks, the latter of which were often Jews. It was not then possible to be surprised that this aroused the enmity of everyday people toward the enemies of the reborn country.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Warns Against Pogroms. Bolshevist Commission Says Reactionaries Foment Anti-Semitism*, NYT 2 July 1918, p. 3.

⁶⁰ *Paderewski Denies It. Replies to Charges That Polish Committee Is Not Democratic*, NYT 18 November 1918, p. 14; *Poles Deny Pogroms. Assert That Stories of Jewish Massacres Are Meant to Harm Nation*, NYT 29 November 1918, p. 20; *Poles in Lemberg. Reports of Outrages Attributed to German Enemies*, NYT 2 December 1918, p. 12; H. Williams, *Pilsudski Dictator in Russian Poland. Prompt Action Taken Against Bolsheviks. Pogroms to Be Investigated*, NYT 3 December 1918, p. 4; *Commissioners from This Country to Be Accompanied by Jewish Representatives*, NYT 8 December 1918, p. 2; *Poles Deny Pogrom Story. Jews in Switzerland Also Denounce German Reports as False*, NYT 9 December 1918, p. 3; *Anti-Semitic Riots Start in East Europe. Jewish Societies Here Petition President Wilson to Prevent Threatened Massacres*, NYT 15 November 1918, p. 2; *Polish Version of Posen Riots*, NYT 2 January 1919, p. 3; *5000 March. Polish Day. Patriots Fill the Two Halls. Celebrate Rebirth of Free*

Apart from German provocations, another reason for possible Polish antipathy toward Jews was their behaviour on Polish lands during the Great War. Jews at that time were active in supplying food to the German army. This undertaking brought them great financial profits while Poles felt taken advantage of. In addition, the vilification of Poles in the preceding years did nothing to increase mutual trust. The accusation was also made that the Jewish population was not enthusiastic about the idea of a Polish state – if they accepted Polish nationality and Polish interests then they would certainly be treated well.⁶¹ Jews were also accused of excessive aspirations. They wanted to receive concessions on the basis of their nationality as well as religion. Apart from having their own schools, they were also attempting to create their own parliament and court system independent of the national government. The accusation that they were building “a state within the state” was often raised by governments forced to accept obligations to protect the rights of minorities. They were a counter argument against the Zionist demands for introducing national autonomy. It should be admitted that the Peace Conference regarded that type of explanation as legitimate.⁶²

The above arguments, although appearing to be valid, were inconsistent. On the one hand they insisted that there had been no pogroms or anti-Semitic riots and reports reaching the west were only the creation of German propaganda. They did admit, however, the existence of some problems caused by something besides hatred of Jews. The second type of explanation required raising the topic of the complicated social and economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The weakening of the existing authorities was shown, connected with the chaos on lands inhabited by mixed nationality populations. This situation was aggravated by war, hunger and the poverty of most residents, robberies committed by criminals fleeing prison (as in the Lwów pogrom) the withdrawal of the German army and the return home of prisoners of war.⁶³ They did not ignore the problems existing in the country and tried to explain them in various ways, showing the complicated conditions of life in Poland.

The best method of verifying whether pogroms were taking place in the reborn country would be to send a mixed Polish-Jewish commission as quickly as possible to the area to determine the veracity of the reports. This idea, proposed to Jewish organizations at the beginning of December 1918, that is directly after reports of the Lwów pogrom reached the US, existed in several versions. The balanced composition, with equal numbers of Poles and Jews was however controversial. The matter was discussed at the American Jewish Congress and the idea was even accepted. Over

Nation, BG 27 January 1919, pp. 1, 3; *Paderewski Denies Pogroms in Poland*, BG 29 December 1918, p. 10; *Denies That Poland Is Slaying Jews*, NYT 23 May 1919, p. 2.

⁶¹ *Report Pogroms Much Exaggerated. Statements in Warsaw That Feeling Is Caused by Resistance to National Movement*, NYT 17 December 1918, p. 5.

⁶² *Jewish Question as It Affects Poland. Political not Religious, Says Prof. Tutermilch*, BG 22 December 1918, p. 3; *Recognize Poland Tarnowski Urges. Demands of the Jews Denounced*, NYT 22 December 1918, p. 3.

⁶³ *Polish Council Distressed at Excesses in Galicia*, BG 1 December 1918, p. 14; J. Morgan, *The Strange Hiatus on the Old Eastern Front*, BG 5 January 1919, p. 40.

time, however, it was forgotten, and no Polish-Jewish body travelled to Poland. Louis Marshall spoke with scepticism on this matter, claiming the truth of the reports of pogroms without any further verification.⁶⁴

The idea of sending a commission to Poland that could ascertain the truth of reports of pogroms was returned to again during meetings at the Peace Conference at the beginning of June 1919. Prime Minister Paderewski, seeing the finalisation of the work of the New States Commission asked President Wilson to send people who could be trusted to produce an objective report. He justified this request with the claim that Eastern Europe had been cut off from the victorious powers by defeated enemy states so very little was actually known. The news coming from the region had been tainted by propaganda from Poland's enemies especially Germany. British, French and American diplomats present in Poland did not write anything about anti-Jewish pogroms. Paderewski claimed that the country he represented was "the outpost in the defence of Europe and the world from the Bolshevik armies and their unspeakable wickedness and barbarity". During the fighting all nations in the borderlands suffered and Jews made up a large percentage in those areas. The Polish prime minister did not fail on this occasion to present his version of the events in Wilno, where the execution of all Red Army staff for the atrocities they had committed during the occupation of the city was described as a pogrom. Almost all of the staff members were Jewish. The Wilno case was an additional argument for examining the circumstances by a US sent commission.⁶⁵

The President of the United States reacted positively to Paderewski's request and named Henry Morgenthau as the leader of a mission to research the facts concerning pogroms in Poland. Morgenthau as a former American ambassador to Turkey and simultaneously a key figure in Reform Judaism in the US, was, however, only nominated on 20 June,⁶⁶ so he travelled to Poland in the summer of 1919, that is directly after the signing by Warsaw of minority obligations. His report, finished by the end of the year, claimed that information about supposed pogroms, as published in the American press, was exaggerated.⁶⁷ Given the realities of international politics of the time, however, this was information that changed nothing. The Treaty of Versailles, including the minority guarantees, had been ratified and set to enter into force in January of 1920.

⁶⁴ *Poles and Jews in Joint Pogrom Probe*, BG 9 December 1918, p. 4; *Commissaries from This Country to Be Accompanied by Jewish Representatives*, NYT 8 December 1918, p. 2; *Poles Deny Pogrom Story. Jews in Switzerland Also Denounce German Reports as False*, NYT 9 December 1918, p. 3; *To Present Aims of Jews at Versailles. Commission Named to Look into Situation in Poland*, BG 19 December 1918, p. 3; *Jews Going to Paris with Bill of Rights. Philadelphia Congress Drafts Guarantees to Be Incorporated in Peace Treaty. Names of Nine Candidates. Louis Marshall and Stephen Wise Among Those Who Will Present Demand at Versailles*, NYT 19 December 1919, p. 8.

⁶⁵ *Paderewski Asks American Inquiry. Denies Jews in Poland Are Victims of Pogroms. Wants Wilson to Name Commission to Ascertain Facts*, BG 2 June 1919, p. 12.

⁶⁶ *Inquiry on Pogroms Ordered by Wilson. Morgenthau Chairman. Six Others to Be Appointed. Action Follows Request by the Polish and Lithuanian Governments*, BG 21 June 1919, p. 6.

⁶⁷ *Pogroms Investigators Planning Their Report*, BG 30 November 1919, p. 20.

Summarising the steps taken by the Polish side in the United States, it is worth pointing out that the forms of action did not differ greatly from those used by the Jews. Polish politicians wrote open letters to the editors of the most widely read newspapers, they gave interviews, appeared at large public gatherings, which were covered by the press, they invited federal and local government representatives to these events, requested references from persons of impeccable reputation (they managed, for example, to convince Archbishop of Boston William O'Connell, who was of Irish ancestry to their cause) and finally issued open resolutions to President Thomas W. Wilson. In these, they requested that the President defend the good name of Polish citizens in the United States from abuse, that he work to defuse racial hostilities between Poles and Jews living in the same country and that he not allow his fellow citizens the disloyalty of appealing to other governments.⁶⁸ The Poles also made use of the fact that the US Ambassador to Poland, Hugh Gibson, had not confirmed reports of anti-Semitic pogroms in the Polish Republic. This caused him to have problems from the Jewish side, which also made it into the press and did not help the image of the Jews.⁶⁹ The one important difference in Polish and Jewish actions in the US was the question of scale. The Polish gathering in Boston was attended by six thousand participants. The Jewish organisations were much more dynamic, which translated into greater media presence, an example of which are the newspapers described.

When it comes to the different methods used by both camps competing for the sympathy of the American public, it is worth asking whether the campaign was conducted at equal levels of intensity during the time discussed or there were more and less heated moments. From the press clippings analysed, it is very clear that the greatest levels of Jewish activity took place in the first two months following the end of World War I (November and December of 1918 to the first days of January 1919). Later, however, after a few months of inactivity, the highest level of the Jewish public protests occurred in May and June of 1919. At that same time, the Polish side took up counteractions. Not

⁶⁸ *Polish Mass Meeting to Be in Symphony Hall*, BG 7 June 1919, p. 5; *Killing Jews by Poles Denied. Mass Meeting Speakers Call Tales Propaganda. Congressman Kleczko Speaks. Inquiry by Wilson Asked*, BG 9 June 1919, pp. 1, 3; *Smulski Defends Poland. Head of Bureau Here Charges 'Abuse' and Misrepresentation*, NYT 22 May 1919, p. 5; *Denies That Poland is Slaying Jews, Spokesman Here of the Nation Declares Bolsheviki Were Killed at Pinsk. Statement Is Disputed*, NYT 23 May 1919, p. 2; *Send Protest to Wilson. Smulski Asks President to Check Anti-Polish Demonstrations*, NYT 23 May 1919, p. 2.

⁶⁹ *Anti-American Plot Stirs Poland. Story That U.S. Champions Jews Against Poles*, BG 11 June 1919, p. 6; *Awaits U.S. Report on Killing of Jews. Hearing by House Delayed 'In Interest of Justice'. Stories of Massacres in Poland Sent Out by German-Owned Paper*, BG 11 June 1919, p. 16; *Senate Committee Takes Up Nominations Today*, BG 25 June 1919, p. 15; *Gibson Attacked by Jews in Poland. Recall of U.S. Minister Sought. Message Says*, BG 19 July 1919, p. 14. Pressures exerted on Gibson are confirmed in the literature. Louis Brandeis, the unquestioned leader of American Zionists, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and also a close friend of Wilson during a short visit in Paris met with various politicians, including Gibson. He supposedly threatened the diplomat that if he did not cease his anti-Jewish writing, he would not receive a recommendation to fill the function of American representative in Poland. See L. Baker, *Brandeis and Frankfurter. A Dual Biography*, New York 1984, pp. 173-174; A. T. Mason, *Brandeis. A Free Man's Life*, New York 1946, p. 456.

having access to the sources of the Jewish leaders' conclusions, and only having the contents of the American press to hand, it is only possible to form preliminary conclusions on the reasons for this state of affairs without being certain as to the validity of the answers. The actions of the Jews in the first period could have had the goal of creating a disadvantageous climate around Poland and Romania in order to demand that the great powers guarantee protections and legal equality for the Jewish minorities in both countries. The first weeks after the war were characterised by a lack of diplomatic or military representatives by the Great Powers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The messages sent by press agencies via Copenhagen, Stockholm and the Hague were then almost impossible to verify. When the first officers of the Entente Powers appeared in Poland, information on pogroms decidedly decreased, especially that they did not share the opinion that anti-Semitic pogroms were taking place in the Polish lands. The second phase depended on recounting anti-Jewish attacks to a lesser degree. It concentrated on showing the reactions of the American public to reports of pogroms. In effect, newspapers wrote about Jewish protests, resolutions and demands and perhaps about counterarguments from the Polish side. It is important in this context to note that this was happening during the period of the most heated negotiations at the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and the New States Commission. It would then seem that the goal in this case was to exert social pressure on the decision makers in order to incorporate the points worked out in December 1918 at the Philadelphia meeting of the American Jewish Conference into the peace treaties.

From the above-mentioned considerations, it can be concluded that the question of anti-Semitic riots in Poland, which clearly did take place in the first year of independence, were not only frequently covered in American newspapers but it is possible to reconstruct their frequency. Using the example of two opinion-making newspapers appearing on the East Coast, it can be seen that the subject of "Jewish massacres" won great interest. "The Boston Globe" devoted around 60 press agency releases or articles to it. "The New York Times" published about 100 texts on the subject. Not all cases of the persecution of Jews were written about, in fact the majority received no coverage. The greatest amount of space, for understandable reasons, was devoted to the pogrom in Lwów as well as protests against occurrences in Pińsk and Wilno. What is interesting is that nothing was written about Lida, where the number of victims approached those of Wilno or Pińsk. Short wire service articles were devoted to smaller scale events only rarely giving any precise figures and with obviously error-filled names, which in many cases makes it impossible to identify locations. They also displayed a lack of basic knowledge of geography which resulted in Poles being blamed for some pogroms committed by Ukrainians. The basic requirement of journalists to check the validity of information in the texts was lacking. Geographic names were often mutilated by the sources that American newspapers took their information from. These were usually German or Viennese with an anti-Polish attitude. The conflict of interests between Germany and the reborn Poland was obvious. Throwing off the yoke

of occupation, disarming Germans in the capital and other cities, military conflict on the future of the Wielkopolska region and also the desire to govern Silesia and Pomerania were the most important issues. The German goal in denouncing Poland and damaging its reputation in the west was to obtain better conditions in peacetime. German information was dispersed by sources in neutral countries. In the case of the Jewish question, these were Zionist information bureaus in Copenhagen, Stockholm and the Hague. These also appeared to be interested in publicising the Jewish question with the goal of winning internationally guaranteed rights for their coreligionists. The conflicts between Poland and Germany as well as between Jewish and Polish organisations operating in America were undoubtedly rooted in conflicting political interests. American Jewish organisations preferred to publicise the issue often through gross exaggeration rather than try to find solutions through direct contact with the government in Warsaw. The unsuccessful discussions during Roman Dmowski's visit in September and October of 1918 did not engender optimism.⁷⁰ Instead they chose the road of indirect pressure through the governments of the victorious Great Powers.

Undoubtedly, this all had a disastrous effect on Poland's international image. The American public started to regard Poles as "anti-Semits". As the number of anti-Semitic attacks grew and Jewish organisations in the US organised new protests, Poland appeared to be a country where the most important American values of freedom, equality before the law and justice were unknown. It seems that allowing barbaric excesses disqualified Poles as candidates for governing in their own country. Pogroms or the persecution of minorities which the government incited or at best case passively observed did not inspire sympathy for either the nation or its territorial ambitions. This finally led to Poland being forced to accept the "Minority Treaty". Its conditions compelled the Polish government to respect the basic rights of those belonging to language, religious or racial minorities. Its observance was to be controlled by the incipient League of Nations. Through this organisation the Great Powers could involve themselves in Polish domestic affairs even though it did not include the most far-reaching demands for cultural and national autonomy.

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Keywords: Polish independence, image of Poland, Jews in Poland, anti-Jewish riots, American press

ABSTRACT

During the very first weeks of Poland's independence the Polish government had to face a series of anti-Jewish incidents on areas under its jurisdiction. This article seeks to ascertain whether the Jewish question in Poland was covered in the American press, which after WWI was becoming

⁷⁰ J. Lerski, *Dmowski, Paderewski and American Jews. A Documentary Compilation*, "Polin" Vol. II, 1986, pp. 95-116.

increasingly influential across the world as a result of the USA's economic and financial power. The author describes which riots were reported in the American press and how objective the accounts were. Attention is paid to the reactions of Jewish and Polish organisations in the United States, to reports from Poland, and to descriptions given in the American press. The final important question dealt with in the article is the timeline of coverage of anti-Jewish incidents in Poland. Addressing these issues makes it possible to discuss the interesting problem of the creation of the image of the reborn Poland across the Atlantic. Image abroad is an important issue for every country, but for the newly independent Poland, which was establishing its borders and sovereign existence after a war that had ruined its economic base, this was an issue that could determine the country's future destiny as the United States and other Entente powers had a decisive voice at the Peace Conference in Paris.

KRZYSZTOF SIWEK
Wrocław

ANTHONY J. DREXEL BIDDLE ON POLAND'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN 1937–1939

The aim of this article is to present the views of Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle,¹ the United States ambassador in Warsaw, on the international position of the Second Polish Republic and its foreign policy in the period from the beginning of his diplomatic service in Poland in 1937 until August 1939. It serves to show the ambassador's particular interest in Polish affairs, his acute evaluation of the Polish 'balance of power policy'² and his view on our country's role in the circumstances of an emerging European conflict. Therefore, it is not the author's intention to present a complete picture of Polish–American relations or Polish foreign policy in the period under consideration. It should be borne in mind, however, that Biddle – in contrast to the diplomatic representatives of France and Great Britain – was evaluating Polish foreign policy as a representative of a power that was formally neutral towards the European conflicts. Finally, it should be emphasised that Biddle's commentaries are one of the most significant sources of knowledge about the policy pursued by Polish foreign minister Józef Beck.³

The rich collection of the papers of the US ambassador to Poland in 1937–1939, including analyses of the international position of the Second Polish Republic and the foreign policy pursued by Beck, although long acknowledged by researchers in

¹ Anthony J. Drexel Biddle (1896–1961) was born in Philadelphia into an old and wealthy family with long-established influence in Pennsylvania. After serving in the US army in France in 1917–1918, he became involved in industrial and investment activities. He did not receive higher education, but as an affluent man, at the same time sociable and sincere, he easily established relations with businessmen and politicians. In the early 1930s, his wealth and popularity allowed him to engage in political activity in support of the Democrats and the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although not a professional diplomat, in 1935 he was appointed US plenipotentiary in Norway, and after two years was transferred to Warsaw. In September 1939 he departed for Romania together with the Polish government, going on to France. Until the end of 1943 he remained an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Polish government in exile. He died in 1961 as the US ambassador to Spain. B. Grzeleński, *Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec zagrożenia Czechosłowacji i Polski. 12 maja 1938 – 1 września 1939*, Warsaw 1995, pp. 62–66.

² For more see: M. Kornat, *Polityka równowagi w latach 1934–1939. Polska między Wschodem a Zachodem*, Kraków 2007, pp. 21–59.

³ Anna M. Cienciała wrote appreciatively of the importance of Biddle's documents in an edition of Józef Beck's memoirs titled *Wspomnienia o polskiej polityce zagranicznej, 1926–1939*, Kraków–Warsaw 2015, pp. 38–39, 44–46.

the United States,⁴ has not yet received sufficient interest from Polish scholars.⁵ To date, historians have not undertaken research into the views of this American diplomat concerning Poland's dramatic international position in 1937-1939. A closer examination of the archive materials left by Biddle may be a starting point for a re-evaluation of the period of history preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, which was critical to the fate of our country. This article is based on the US ambassador's documents, mostly unknown in Poland, held by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park.⁶

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle began his service as US ambassador to Poland in May 1937, during the period later called by minister Beck's secretary, Paweł Starzeński, the 'last year of peace' in Europe.⁷ Biddle's transfer from the diplomatic mission in Oslo to Warsaw was not coincidental. It reflected the growing importance of Poland for the United States' policy in Europe, at a time when Great Britain and France were starting along the path of appeasement towards the Third Reich.⁸ During this time the United States adopted many legal restrictions on the sending of weapons to countries at war, which was meant to protect it from becoming embroiled in the European conflict.⁹ In a telegram to the new American ambassador, President Franklin De-

⁴ Noteworthy is the collection of documents titled *Poland and the Coming of the Second World War. Diplomatic Papers of A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland, 1937-1939*, ed. P.V. Cannistraro, E.D. Wynot, T.P. Kovaleff, Columbus 1976.

⁵ Fragments of ambassador Biddle's documents published in the US were used by B. Grzeloński (*Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec zagrożenia Czechosłowacji i Polski*). Parts of 'Biddle's Report' including his journal from the evacuation of the US embassy and the Polish government following the Nazi and Soviet aggression against Poland in September 1939 were edited and published by Jerzy Jaruzelski (*Pierwsze dni września. Z raportu ambasadora USA w Warszawie, Kronika Warszawy* 1982, no. 2; *Wrzesień 1939 r., Kronika Warszawy* 1984, no. 1). In fact, the same parts of the 'Report' were later published by Bogdan Grzeloński (*Opuszczając Polskę. Notatki Drexel-Biddle'a z września 1939 r., [in:] Dyplomaci USA, 1919-1939*, Pułtusk 2004). Biddle's journal was also included in the study *Wrzesień 1939 r. w relacjach dyplomatów*, ed. A. Skrzypek, Warsaw 1989. This, however, amounts to only a fraction of the materials left by the ambassador. In most Polish studies on Polish-American relations, Biddle's documents have been used only to a marginal degree.

⁶ Historical Society of Pennsylvania (hereafter: HSP); Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter: FDRL).

⁷ For more see: P. Starzeński, *Trzy lata z Beckiem*, Warsaw 1991, pp. 31-61. On the critical significance of the year 1937 for the Polish 'balance of power policy' see M. Kornat, *Spór o polską rację stanu w roku 1937*, [in:] *Geopolityka i zasady. Studia z dziejów polskiej myśli politycznej*, ed. J. Kloczkowski, Kraków 2009, pp. 45-73.

⁸ The absence of reaction from France, hitherto Poland's main ally, to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland by Nazi Germany in March 1936 undermined the system of alliances of Central and Eastern European countries with Paris. Despite Beck's assurances of respect for the Polish alliance commitments, the French government made its actions dependent on the stance of Great Britain, which considered it necessary to reach an understanding with Germany. For more see: M.K. Kamiński, M.J. Zacharias, *Polityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1918-1939*, Warsaw 1998, pp. 186-188.

⁹ Also significant for the new US assessment of the European situation were Japan's aggression against China in July 1937, and the moves towards a rapprochement between Berlin, Rome and To-

lano Roosevelt acknowledged that he appreciated 'the difficult situation of Poland',¹⁰ which was constantly forced to strike a balance between an aggressive Germany and the USSR. It was precisely due to Poland's special location 'in the cross-currents of various conflicting ideologies' that Biddle called Poland and the Central European countries 'barometers of the estimated degree of Britain's and France's desire and ability to "deliver" in terms of Article 16 of the League Covenant'.¹¹ That article referred to the commitment to mutual defence in case of aggression. Given Polish diplomacy's undermined confidence in the alliance with France, the US administration wanted to discourage the Polish government from establishing closer ties with Berlin. According to Roosevelt, this 'would be regarded by the democratic nations as [Poland's] yielding to Germany'.¹² It should be added that Biddle's appointment took place after the death of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in 1935, during a time of significant political transformations in Poland related to the establishment of the Camp of National Unity and the strengthening of the position of Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz.¹³ Thus, the US ambassador faced the task of persuading Poland to maintain permanent relations with the Western democracies and of reinforcing Warsaw's determination to oppose the expansion of Hitler's Germany.

It should be emphasised here that American diplomacy did not regard Poland as being capable on its own of acting as a counterweight to the power of Germany or the USSR in this part of Europe. President Roosevelt saw no possibility of halting the expansion of Nazi Germany without cooperation with the Soviet Union under a British–French–Soviet alignment.¹⁴ At the same time he regretted the inability of the 'small states' of Europe to reach a compromise based on the development of free trade, which the great powers were expected to ensure.¹⁵ Therefore, Roosevelt's lack of confidence in Poland boded ill for Polish–American cooperation in building European security.¹⁶ Another indication of this was the dispatch sent by the Director of the

kyo. A. Mania, *Department of State, 1789-1939. Pierwsze 150 lat udziału w polityce zagranicznej USA*, Kraków 2011, pp. 225–235.

¹⁰ FDRL, PSF Box 46, Roosevelt to Biddle, November 10, 1937.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, Biddle to Roosevelt, Warsaw, January 13, 1938.

¹² After the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936, Roosevelt for some time favoured the establishment of an international blockade of Germany by France, Britain, Italy, Poland and the Little Entente. These plans, however, were opposed by the State Department and by some presidential advisors, who regarded the German actions as justified. P. Grudziński, *Przyszłość Europy w koncepcjach Franklina D. Roosevelta (1933-1945)*, Wrocław 1980, pp. 59–60.

¹³ Biddle devoted much space in his analyses for Washington to Polish internal affairs, discussing the relations between President Mościcki and Marshal Śmigły-Rydz, and also the independent position of minister Beck. In the background of political affairs, he always raised the issue of Polish–Jewish relations. HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 100, Folder 2, Biddle, *Domestic political*, 1937 [no date].

¹⁴ A. Mania, *Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1933-1941*, Warsaw 1987, pp. 162–183.

¹⁵ P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

¹⁶ Cf. B. Winid, *W cieniu Kapitoli. Dyplomacja polska wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, 1919-1939*, Warsaw 1991, pp. 202–206.

State Department's Division of Eastern European Affairs, Robert Kelley, to Biddle shortly after his arrival in Warsaw in mid-May 1937, warning against undue optimism in relation to Poland. Although Kelley's anti-communist views might have led one to expect some understanding for Poland's situation, he wrote that 'Poles are very sensitive with regard to their status in the family of nations'.¹⁷ In his view, Poland considered itself 'a great power' in foreign policy regardless of its real potential, and wanted to be treated as the equal of France, Britain, Germany or the United States, even at the cost of limiting its 'economic progress'. It is also characteristic that John Cudahy, Biddle's predecessor as US ambassador in Warsaw, saw Poland as a backward country, devoid of economic policy and even doomed to collapse within the next ten years.¹⁸ In spite of this, the Western democracies feared that the difficult situation might force Poland to seek an understanding with Germany, which would give Hitler an opportunity to strike in the west. For this reason, the new US ambassador, despite having no real impact on shaping his country's foreign policy, was now expected to give at least a declaration of understanding of Polish political interests.

From the beginning of his diplomatic service in Warsaw, Biddle was enthusiastic about the prospect of deepening Polish-American relations. This optimism, and his unusual level of diplomatic activity, distinguished the Philadelphian millionaire from other foreign diplomats in Poland. In an interview for *Nowy Świat*, a Polish-language newspaper based in New York, he said that his aim was to 'familiarize [himself] with Polish life not only in the larger towns, but also in the surrounding country',¹⁹ which induced him to travel frequently to various parts of the country. Most often, however, he held meetings with members of the Polish political elite and aristocracy. According to Starzeński, special 'ties of mutual friendship' existed between Biddle and Polish foreign minister Józef Beck, whose views on the Polish *raison d'État* and Poland's international position were often profoundly shared by the ambassador.²⁰ In his opinion, Polish foreign policy was guided mostly by the country's national interest, which was to sustain the 'balance of power' without favouring any European power, such as Germany or France.²¹ While other diplomats were suspicious of Polish foreign

¹⁷ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 98, Folder 12, Kelley to Biddle, May 14, 1937, Norway, Poland 1935–1937.

¹⁸ Comparing the economic potential of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the context of Roosevelt's suggested alliance between the two countries, Cudahy saw the second as a 'strong country with resources and economic development', which had a 'bright future' ahead. Unfortunately, such a coalition was, in his opinion, a 'complete fantasy' due to 'bad blood' between the Poles and Czechs. FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Cudahy to Roosevelt, Warsaw, February 6, 1937.

¹⁹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 99, Folder 5, *Interview with Ambassador Drexel Biddle*, "The Polish Morning World (Nowy Świat)", February 5, 1939.

²⁰ Beck himself did not write much in his memoirs about his dealings with Biddle, but he referred to him as his 'great American friend' with whom he shared his most crucial thoughts on Poland's international position. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 134–135.

²¹ In the same interview Biddle praised the 'great progress' of Poles in the area of economic development, represented by the Central Industrial Region, which 'will give many people work'. *Interview with Ambassador Drexel Biddle*.

policy, Biddle was, according to Starzeński, 'the only one who found understanding for it'.²² He also rebuffed the defamatory accusations against Poland from the American press regarding 'Polish anti-semitism', saying that the 'Jewish Question' stemmed only from economic difficulties and was not racially motivated.²³ Thus, the American ambassador's attitude allowed him quickly to win the trust not only of Beck, but also of President Ignacy Mościcki and Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, as Beck himself reported. They especially valued Biddle's ability to effectively 'shed light on various situations' and explain the US government's point of view.²⁴ On the other hand, between the American ambassador and Beck 'there was a sort of silent agreement that if necessary it would be possible to commit a necessary indiscretion through him'.²⁵

From the first weeks of his diplomatic service in Warsaw, in his correspondence with President Roosevelt and the State Department, Biddle devoted most space to the Polish foreign policy of maintaining a safe position of balance between Germany and the Soviet Union, while at the same time seeking closer relations with the Western European democracies – France and Britain.²⁶ He was interested in the attempts made by Beck since 1936 to build a 'cordon sanitaire' of neutral countries around Poland, which was meant to prevent conflict between Berlin and Moscow.²⁷ From talks with diplomats of the countries of the region, Biddle concluded that, despite Poland's serious territorial disputes with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would be possible to bring the Scandinavian countries, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Yugoslavia round to the Polish idea. It was the result of Beck's pessimistic opinion about the chances of bringing Prague and Vienna out of the German sphere of influence, given the complete passivity of the League of Nations.²⁸ In a surge of enthusiasm for the Polish 'Third Europe' initiative, Biddle even suggested, in a telegram to the State Department, that the member states 'create economic possibilities and opportunities for trade and commerce [...] by partial lifting of trade barriers',²⁹ which would certainly also suit American interests. However, the ambassador's illusive hopes were dispelled in

²² P. Starzeński, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²³ Biddle pointed out that on average every third Polish town was dominated by Jews, and up to 70% of trade was in their hands. The Polish government was thus trying to 'create a Polish middle class' by enabling peasants to live in towns in the place of Jews. Polish-Jewish relations were at the time one of the obstacles to Poland's obtaining financial and material help from the United States. HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 100, Folder 1, Biddle, *Jewish Question*, July 1937; B. Winid, *op. cit.*, pp. 222–223.

²⁴ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 99, Folder 6, Bullitt to Biddle, Paris, September 14, 1937.

²⁵ P. Starzeński, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁶ For more on the 'Third Europe' concept, also referred to by the name Intermarium, according to minister Beck in 1937–1938 see: M. Kornat, *Polityka równowagi ...*, pp. 307–346.

²⁷ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 102, Folder 8, Biddle to Secstate, *Poland's interest in establishing a block of neutral states between the Soviet Union and Germany; Conversation with the Estonian Minister to Poland*, June 1937.

²⁸ Beck pointed out in particular the League of Nations' failure to understand the 'danger of the process of the German dynamic heading outwards', while the League's attention 'revolved around topics distant from the concerns of Europe'. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 178.

²⁹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 102, Folder 8, Biddle to Secstate, *Poland's interest*.

July 1937, when he heard from the foreign ministers of Norway, Sweden and Finland that Beck 'still entertained a dream' in making plans for Poland to play the leading role among the Baltic countries.³⁰ Biddle also became aware of the seriousness of the dispute between Poland and Lithuania over control of Vilnius,³¹ and of speculations about Polish plans to split the Little Entente together with Romania, which only increased the atmosphere of distrust towards Warsaw. This was one of the first lessons of Central European diplomacy which the American ambassador quickly learnt at his Warsaw post. Fortunately, Biddle was capable of admitting to Starzeński that he 'did not yet grasp everything' in Polish foreign policy, but he was becoming familiar with the complex problems of Poland by 'dropping by for whisky and a chat' at the office of the minister's secretary.³²

Biddle's view on the intentions of Nazi Germany towards Poland evolved as the US embassy obtained information on the overall German strategy in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Berlin's demands against Warsaw that arose out of it. He had no doubt that the main direction of the Third Reich's expansion would be Poland and the eastern part of the continent, not the countries of Southern Europe. As early as 1936, as ambassador in Oslo, he had remarked, citing a 'reliable observer', that the most convenient way for Hitler to 'drive a wedge into Central Europe' would be to make an 'Austro-German pact' or to take control of Austria through a plebiscite.³³ This course of action would not require the use of force, and would effectively weaken French dominance in Central Europe in favour of Germany. It should be mentioned that while negotiating the Polish-German Declaration of Protection of the Rights of National Minorities in November 1937, deputy foreign minister Jan Szembek was told by Hermann Göring in Berlin about the convergent goals of Poland and Germany regarding the USSR, because 'we do not like Russia or the Czechs'.³⁴ An assurance was also given that the Third Reich would support Poland in case of 'any difficulties on our [Poland's] Eastern border', which suited Berlin's attempts to bring Poland into the anti-Comintern pact. Biddle was thus sensitive to this approach of 'peaceful penetration' of Germany's eastern neighbours, with which various 'protective alliances' had been concluded. Towards the end of 1937, he noted in his private documents the position of Göring as presented to Szembek. The then Prime Minister of Prussia and Luftwaffe commander-in-chief said that Germany had 'no desire for territory in Europe unless inhabited by Germans'.³⁵ Göring reportedly acknowledged that the German side was satisfied with Poland's respect for the principles of the non-aggression

³⁰ HSP, Biddle Papers, Biddle, *Draft*, July 13, 1937.

³¹ Hans Markus, asked by Biddle about Latvian and Estonian support for Poland in the event of Polish-Lithuanian armed conflict, stated that 'we would not take any action' in favour of Poland, because Poles would protect themselves against an attempted Lithuanian takeover of Vilnius. HSP, Biddle Papers, Biddle, *Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Hans Markus, Estonian Minister in Warsaw*, June 27, 1937.

³² P. Starzeński, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³³ HSP, Biddle Papers, Biddle, *Commentaries on Central Europe*, Memorandum, July 22, 1936.

³⁴ M. Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie, 1933-1938*, Poznań 1965, pp. 325-327.

³⁵ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 107, Folder 1, Biddle, *Miscellaneous Notes*, December 1937.

declaration of 1934, and denied Polish suspicions of Germany's intent to take over territory in the Ukraine. Such a plan would require 'Poland's conquest and inevitable subsequent conflagration'.³⁶ Similarly reassuring was the statement of the President of the *Reichsbank* Hjalmar Schacht, noted by Biddle, that the 'Corridor' would be left in Poland's hands provided Danzig was incorporated into East Prussia and 'some sort of bridge' was built between Prussia and the rest of Germany.³⁷ Biddle was not naive enough to believe in the sincerity of these declarations, because he knew that by seeking to break relations between Poland and France, Germany wanted to secure its own hegemony in Eastern Europe.

In this situation Biddle paid particular attention to Polish-French relations, noting Warsaw's efforts to revitalise the already weakened defensive alliance with Paris. At that time Beck was aware that the leadership of the Western powers' foreign policy was moving from Paris to London, which weakened the importance of the French obligations towards Poland in the absence of 'active British help'.³⁸ Consequently, the matter of bilateral relations was raised by Beck in a diplomatic note to the French government of 27 August 1937 in the context of the talks taking place about a 'Western pact' between the governments of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Belgium. Beck pointed out the need to include the Franco-Polish alliance treaty and the 1934 German-Polish non-aggression pact in the system of European security.³⁹ In the opinion of the American ambassador, however, it would be difficult for Beck to gain approval from Paris for the Polish proposals, due to France's intentions to include Czechoslovakia in the agreement, which would arouse expected German objections. The efforts of Polish diplomats to make their country part of the Western pact were rejected in Paris, London and Berlin, which pursued a common course of eliminating Poland from the negotiations.⁴⁰ However, in Biddle's view the problem of Poland's participation in the pact resulted above all from the unfriendly relations between Warsaw and Prague, which stemmed from the dispute over the Zaolzie region and from Polish memories of hostile Czechoslovakian gestures towards Poland during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. The ambassador was aware that in the eyes of Polish diplomacy Czechoslovakia was seen as an 'arm that might become either Soviet or German', and of the two evils 'Poland would prefer the lesser: Germany'.⁴¹ Biddle concluded

³⁶ The statements of German dignitaries cited by Biddle probably come from conversations conducted by Szembek in Berlin in early November 1937. It should be mentioned, however, that according to a note of the Polish deputy minister, Göring did not deny the plan of taking control of the Ukraine, while encouraging Poland to act against the USSR together with Germany, because 'we should have a window on the Black Sea'. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

³⁷ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 107, Folder 1, Biddle, *Miscellaneous Notes*.

³⁸ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 185.

³⁹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 99, Folder 5, J. Beck, *Aide Memoire*, August 27, 1937.

⁴⁰ In a conversation about the Western pact with the German foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath in July 1937, the Polish ambassador in Berlin Józef Lipski noticed a dangerous tendency for 'the pact in the west to be isolated from the problems in the east'. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

⁴¹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 100, Folder 2, Biddle to Hull, 1937 [no date].

from talks with Polish government representatives that in case of German aggression against Czechoslovakia 'Poland would not lift a finger' in the latter's defence, wishing to gain time to prepare to defend itself.

Furthermore, William Bullitt, the US ambassador in Paris, mentioned in a telegram to Biddle another obstacle to Polish–French cooperation, namely Beck's suspicions that French policy was subordinated to the Soviet Union's interests.⁴² Beck saw pressure from the Kremlin persuading the left-wing French government to 'submit to Moscow's demands in general policy' in those areas that were not subject to the British Foreign Office.⁴³ From the Polish point of view this state of affairs would call into question the sense of maintaining an alliance with France. The balance of power policy, dictated by the Polish national interest, excluded the possibility of cooperation between Poland and the USSR, which would threaten the security or territorial integrity of the Second Polish Republic. Biddle understood the argument of the late Marshal Józef Piłsudski that 'if Russian troops were allowed passage into Poland' as part of possible 'allied cooperation' against Germany, that would mean the permanent occupation of at least the Eastern part of Polish territory by Moscow.⁴⁴ For this reason, the US ambassador did not see a place for Poland in any format of the Four-Power Pact that assumed cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In this atmosphere of increasing Polish uncertainty regarding the alliance commitments of Paris, Biddle observed attentively the visit of French foreign minister Yvon Delbos to Warsaw in early December 1937. Because his journey to Poland was part of a tour of Central European countries that were seeking France's support, the US ambassador was confident that Delbos planned to encourage those countries to support a policy of appeasement towards Germany.⁴⁵ The Polish government, in turn, desired an assurance of support from France in case of German aggression. Although Biddle gave a positive assessment of the Poles' readiness to fulfil the alliance commitments to France in case of the outbreak of a German–French war, he was much more sceptical of the willingness of Paris to defend Polish sovereignty. He believed that Poland was fully entitled to expect such a commitment from France, because a German attack

⁴² *Ibidem*, Bullitt to Biddle, Paris, September 14, 1937, HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 99, Folder 6.

⁴³ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia* ..., p. 185.

⁴⁴ According to Biddle, even the British minister responsible for League of Nations affairs, Anthony Eden, understood the Polish standpoint regarding the USSR, following a conversation with Piłsudski in 1935 about the proposed Eastern pact. Earlier Eden is said to have criticised Polish foreign policy precisely for its anti-Soviet course. HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 100, Folder 2, Biddle, Memorandum, September 3, 1937.

⁴⁵ Minister Delbos' trip to Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade and Prague was a result of earlier arrangements between the heads of governments of Britain (Neville Chamberlain) and France (Camille Chautemps), based in turn on the results of an informal conversation between Lord Edward Halifax and Adolf Hitler in November 1937. The Anglo-French position was based on, among others, acknowledgement of 'German goals in colonial policy', a reform of the League of Nations enabling Germany's return to that organisation, and the granting of autonomy to the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia in return for Berlin's respecting the 'territorial integrity of Central and Eastern European countries'. *Ibidem*, Biddle, Draft, November 30, 1937; *Oś Londyn i Paryż*, *Gazeta Lwowska*, no. 278, 7 December 1937.

on Poland was 'perhaps a shade less unlikely'.⁴⁶ Beck emphasised Polish expectations towards France, telling Delbos of the need for 'reciprocal cooperation' between the allies and for 'greatest tolerance upon [Poland's] problems', which should be solved by means of 'decisions reached in common'.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in the American ambassador's assessment, the only concession made by the French minister was the promise to give Poland a 'proper place in any negotiations directed towards the conclusion of a new Western security pact'.⁴⁸ Delbos emphasised that Polish-French relations were 'not exclusive' and should be made part of the League of Nations format, striving for a general 'appeasement' between all countries 'who desire peace'.⁴⁹ France, while superficially rebuilding bilateral relations with Poland, in reality held to the belief that territorial changes in Central and Eastern Europe were the way to European peace.⁵⁰ From the US embassy's perspective, there was no doubt that Warsaw and Paris had divergent interests in essential matters, namely those concerning relations with Germany and the USSR.

According to Biddle, Delbos' visit ultimately ended in utter failure, because Beck consistently refused to accede to the French-Soviet cooperation, which might become a seedbed of conflict between Berlin and Paris.⁵¹ In such circumstances, he believed, France could not count on support from Poland, which saw neutrality in German-Soviet relations as the best guarantee of security. For the same reason, Beck also rejected a French proposal of mediation in the dispute with Czechoslovakia over the rights of the Polish minority in Zaolzie. Biddle repeated Beck's view that the mediation of Paris would give privileged status only to the German minority in Czechoslovakia, and so Poles preferred to 'regulate this family quarrel on a bilateral basis'.⁵² Nevertheless, Biddle expected that in order to gain time, Beck would convey to France his 'urgent desire for Poland to have an important foot-hold'⁵³ in the planned Western European security system.

In the context of the international security of the Second Polish Republic, ambassador Biddle emphasised the role of Poland's relations with Britain, maintaining that Anglo-French policy towards the Central and Eastern European countries was coordinated.⁵⁴ Before coming to Poland, Delbos is said to have received authorisation

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, Biddle, *Delbos* [no date, 1937].

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, J. Beck, *M. Joseph Beck's Speech*, December 1937.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, Biddle, *Delbos* [no date, 1937].

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, Y. Delbos, *M. Delbos' Speech*, December 1937.

⁵⁰ M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-364.

⁵¹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 101, Folder 6, Biddle, *Delbos* [no date, 1937].

⁵² The US ambassador pointed to French diplomatic concern about the tense relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which prevented the inclusion of both countries in the appeasement policy. The French side also expressed hope that Warsaw would not join the Anti-Comintern Pact. *Ibidem*, Biddle, Embassy of the United States of America, Warsaw, December 8, 1937.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, Biddle, Harvest of Main Points Covered Friday and Saturday's Conversations, Memorandum, December 6, 1937.

⁵⁴ A common Anglo-French policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was established during the visit of Prime Minister Camille Chautemps and minister Delbos to London in late November 1937. Both

from the British government to represent the United Kingdom as a country 'equally interested in Eastern and Central European problems'.⁵⁵ According to information that Biddle obtained in mid-1937 from the Estonian minister plenipotentiary in Warsaw, Britain was interested in Beck's initiative to establish a 'cordon sanitaire' separating Germany and the USSR.⁵⁶ British support for the cordon idea was said to result from a reluctance to defend Czechoslovakia in cooperation with the Soviet Union, which indicated that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was 'prepared to drop' the Soviets⁵⁷ in plans for a future system of security in Europe. However, at the same time Biddle heard voices of concern from Polish diplomats, who expressed a belief that Chamberlain's appeasement policy towards Germany was only a 'play for time' which might provoke Hitler to accelerate aggression against Poland.⁵⁸ At least from the time of the Halifax–Hitler meeting, British policy was oriented towards directing Germany's attention eastwards, which encouraged Germany to draw up plans for acquiring *Lebensraum*.⁵⁹

Beck's trip to Berlin in January 1938, not long after Delbos' Warsaw visit, did not surprise the American ambassador. On the contrary, he believed that Polish diplomacy was trying to use every opportunity to engage in talks with the German government 'not only because of his desire to discuss the Danzig problem',⁶⁰ but also because of the need to balance relations with France. Therefore, in his assessment this action of Beck's was 'typical of his usual political maneuvers' and at the same time could trigger negative press commentary from the French left. The Poles, not seeing any will on the part of the Western powers to oppose German expansion, decided to accept plans for the annexation of Austria by the Third Reich. It should be noted that Hitler, counting on at least the friendly passivity of Warsaw, took advantage of the Polish concerns, first assuring Beck of the 'inviolability of direct and indirect Polish interests' and then

sides accepted the results of the informal talks between Lord Edward Halifax and Hitler, according to which the British side was to agree to the annexation of Austria by the Third Reich and to the resolution of the Danzig and Czechoslovakian questions according to the German interest. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 360–361.

⁵⁵ At the same time, Biddle pointed out serious differences between Britain and France regarding colonial policy, as London had no intention of relinquishing its possessions to Germany under the appeasement policy, whereas it had nothing against concessions by France in that sphere. HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 107, Folder 1, Biddle, *Ambassador's Notes*, December 23, 1937.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, Box 102, Folder 8, Biddle, *Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Hans Markus, Estonian Minister in Warsaw*, June 27, 1937.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, *Harvest of Main Points Covered Friday and Saturday's Conversations*, Memorandum, December 6, 1937.

⁵⁸ According to Biddle, high officials of the British embassy in Warsaw confirmed that 'Britain was not treating Germany's conditions seriously [...] because every day of peace served to strengthen the British defensive capabilities'. *Ibidem*, Biddle, *Points in Perspective. A cross-section of opinion among official and unofficial observers here*, Warsaw, December 6, 1937.

⁵⁹ For more on the plans for German expansion according to the so-called Hossbach protocol see M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 367–374.

⁶⁰ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 102, Folder 2, *Regarding Minister Beck's Recent Berlin Visit*, Memorandum, January 18, 1938.

exhibiting a 'hostile attitude to any Russia, not only a communist one'.⁶¹ However in exchange for acquiescing in Austria's takeover by Germany, Beck did not gain any concession in Berlin, apart from Göring's coquettish remarks about the secondary importance of the Danzig problem.⁶²

Thus, Biddle had greater understanding for the visit of the Polish foreign minister to Rome in March 1938. He conveyed to the State Department Beck's view that 'the Rome-Berlin axis is artificial' in the absence of real opposition from the League of Nations towards the policy of either country.⁶³ This created some chance of weakening the German position. Poland, in his judgement, wanted to sound out Italy's views on the German penetration in Austria, in the Sudeten German communities, and in other Central European countries which might have been included in Beck's planned 'cordon sanitaire'. Indeed, although Mussolini did not see a possibility of containing German expansion in Central Europe, or of breaking his alliance with Hitler, in his discussions with Beck he did not hide his concern about the situation in Austria.⁶⁴ For the same reason, foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano indicated to Beck that he was interested in 'close relations' between Rome, Warsaw, Budapest and Belgrade. In Biddle's view, Beck was counting on Mussolini's support for Poland's inclusion 'as a 5th power' in the peace agreement then being negotiated between Germany, France, Britain and Italy.⁶⁵

Biddle realised that the March 1938 annexation of Austria by the Third Reich – which he had foreseen at least two years previously – opened the way for Hitler not only to take over Czechoslovakia, but in practice to dominate the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁶ He now expected to see German diversionary operations, with the active participation of the German minority, in favour of incorporating the Sudetenland into the Reich. This would result in the gradual breakup of the Czechoslovakian state. It must be acknowledged that Beck's demand for autonomy for the Polish population in Czechoslovakia was the result of a certain coordination of Polish-German policy.⁶⁷ It cannot be denied either that Germany tried to use against Prague not only its own national group, but also the political ambitions of Slovak autonomists, the Hungarian minority, and Poles in Zaolzie.⁶⁸ It should be made clear that at that time Biddle was already well-informed about Warsaw's readiness to stand independently in defence of the rights of Poles in Zaolzie. According to Beck, the Polish side had no intention of breaking up Czechoslovakia, but in the face of the Western

⁶¹ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia* ..., p. 186.

⁶² M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–377.

⁶³ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 102, Folder 2, Biddle, *Regarding Polish Foreign Minister Beck's Current Rome Visit*, Memorandum, March 8, 1938.

⁶⁴ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia* ..., p. 189.

⁶⁵ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 107, Folder 3, Biddle, *Regarding Polish Foreign Minister Beck's Current Rome Visit*.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, Biddle, *A German inspired inside job*, Memorandum, March 9, 1938.

⁶⁷ For more see: M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 392–401, 437–441.

⁶⁸ H. Batowski, *Austria i Sudety, 1919-1938*, Poznań 1968, pp. 235–236.

powers' non-involvement it expected 'simply equal status for our interests as long as the government in Prague makes concessions in favour of others'.⁶⁹ The US ambassador did not explicitly justify these Polish demands against Prague. Undoubtedly, the stance of the Polish foreign ministry, based on the delusive belief that Hitler was interested in a southerly direction of expansion, weakened Czechoslovakia and suited German interests.⁷⁰ However, Biddle acknowledged that Czechoslovakia's fulfilment of Berlin's conditions regarding the Czechoslovakian Germans would encourage Poland to use the Zaolzie issue 'at least temporarily, to block Germany's immediate further advance through Czechoslovakia'.⁷¹ Considering the minimal chances of Beck's implementing his project of a 'neutral zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea', Biddle expected great caution on Poland's part, so as not to provoke Germany by openly 'cutting across Germany's drive to penetrate the Danubian valley'.⁷² Only the attainment of military readiness by Britain and France would enable Poland to adopt openly a 'counter policy vis-à-vis German power'.

Meanwhile the question of Czechoslovakia, which was coming under growing international pressure, worried Roosevelt's administration, which also suspected Poland of cooperation with Germany's expansionist policy.⁷³ However, the American government did not have a clear plan of action for the European crisis. On the one hand Roosevelt regretted that Chamberlain was pursuing peace by 'selling' Czechoslovakia, but on the other he himself refused openly to condemn the German aggression, so as not to provoke 'useless' resistance on the part of the Czechs.⁷⁴ Biddle thus tried to explain to Roosevelt that the Polish government's motives in the matter of Zaolzie were essentially defensive and anti-German in character. In his view, Beck's demands regarding the rights of the Polish minority in Cieszyn Silesia were a pre-emptive manoeuvre 'before Germany might have time to absorb the whole of Czechoslovakia'.⁷⁵ A particular goal was 'resuming direct touch between Poland and Hungary', which

⁶⁹ The negative influence of France on Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia and with Germany was evidenced, in Beck's view, by the 'biased [French] arbitration' in the delimitation of the Polish–Czechoslovakian border and by Paris' striving to 'relieve the Czechs by souring Polish–German relations'. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 196–197.

⁷⁰ Henryk Batowski wrote of Beck's inconsistency and incomprehension of the German threat resulting from the annexation of Austria and the weakening of Czechoslovakia. He also evaluated the Polish–Hungarian cooperation in this regard as short-sighted, together with the Polish minority's demand for autonomy in late March 1938 simultaneously with the demands of the German Sudeten Party. He also regarded Poland's support for Slovak nationalism in 1938 as harmful to Poland's security. H. Batowski, *Austria i Sudety*, pp. 251–255.

⁷¹ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 107, Folder 3, Biddle, *A German inspired inside job*.

⁷² FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle to Roosevelt, Warsaw, April 10, 1938.

⁷³ *Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 18.

⁷⁴ The passive approach of Roosevelt's administration towards Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied by an opportunism linked to the President's own belief that the US should not engage in any peace initiatives that did not guarantee permanent success in the form of general disarmament and the liberalisation of trade. P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–64.

⁷⁵ FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, *Energy of Poland's activities in connection with Polish minority in Czechoslovakia*, Warsaw, April 7, 1938.

'could be brought about only through a corridor in Czechoslovakia'. According to Biddle, this was the only way for Poland to build a 'cordon sanitaire'.

The Czechoslovakian crisis had another dimension, about which Biddle wrote with concern. Namely, it enabled the Germans to achieve 'contact with the Polish-Ukrainian minority through the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia', thereby opening the way for German influence in all of the Ukraine.⁷⁶ Hence a scenario was possible in which the Ukrainian population would be 'incited' to rise against Poland, consequently leading to the breakup of the Polish Republic. Because Biddle considered the Ukraine to be the prime direction of Germany's eastern expansion, the Ukrainian question in the context of Polish-German relations aroused increasing interest on his part. This was also related to his belief, formed following a journey to the eastern part of Lesser Poland, bordering the USSR, in August 1938, that the region would fulfil an important defensive function for Poland in a possible conflict not only with Germany, but also with the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ At a meeting with deputy minister Szembek in June 1938, the US ambassador admitted that in the face of the possible liquidation of Czechoslovakia, Moscow might be forced to establish relations with the West or with Germany at Poland's expense.⁷⁸

Taking advantage of the temporary calming of the political atmosphere in Central Europe, in summer 1938 ambassador Biddle prepared a comprehensive report for President Roosevelt and the State Department concerning Poland's position in the face of German expansion to the east. He once again tried to present to his government (and indirectly also to the British and French governments) the rational motives that directed Beck's policy towards Germany. In his view, the Polish government was convinced that 'Britain and France have let down Czechoslovakia'. Given the previous commitments given to Prague by those countries, this did not 'serve to inspire Poland's confidence in Anglo-French assistance'.⁷⁹ At the Anglo-French conference in London in April 1938, the two Western governments had decided to persuade Prague to make any concessions that might prevent German armed aggression.⁸⁰ To Beck's dissatisfaction, instead of giving real support to Czechoslovakia's resistance, London

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁷ Summing up his 'inspection trip' to Galicia, Biddle pointed out that the system of dams being constructed on the Strypa and Seret rivers could be opened in the case of Soviet invasion and 'flood an area of 200 km length and 20 km width'. Furthermore, this area was very swampy, which hindered the use of motorised and armoured troops in favour of cavalry and infantry. This state of affairs, according to Biddle, would force the USSR to avoid Poland and to use Romanian territory in case of any Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. *Ibidem*, Biddle to Roosevelt, *Further observations on secret "flooding system" aimed at serving as defense line from Pinsk Marshes to Dniester River*, Warsaw, August 12, 1938.

⁷⁸ J. Szembek, *Diariusz i teki J. Szembeka (1935-1945)*, vol. IV, ed. J. Zaráński, London 1972, pp. 184-185.

⁷⁹ Beck confided to Biddle in 1938 that he believed that 'France made a great tactical mistake in not marching against Germany after Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland' in 1936. FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle, *Outline of Salient Features of Poland's Present Role in the Continental Political Arena*, Warsaw, June 19, 1938.

⁸⁰ H. Batowski, *Austria i Sudety ...*, pp. 266-268.

sent Lord Runciman to Prague, who ‘changed the domestic policy issue of [the German minority in] Czechoslovakia into an international matter’.⁸¹ Nevertheless, Biddle was still told by the Polish minister that London and Paris should be induced to ‘share in any burden of responsibility which the states of Eastern and Central Europe might incur’ in case of the constitution of a ‘Baltic–Black Sea Axis aimed at cutting across Germany’s envisaged eastward drive’.⁸² These views were contradicted by the Polish foreign ministry’s disapproval of the troop mobilisation ordered by Prague in May 1938 and Beck’s refusal to join the appeal for peace made by the British and French ambassadors in Berlin.⁸³ However, in Biddle’s assessment, Polish–Czechoslovakian cooperation could provide an ‘effective resistance’ only on condition that ‘British and French forces simultaneously engaged the Germans on the German Western front’. In that case, as foreign minister Beck had assured the American ambassador, ‘Poland would march not on Czechoslovakia but against Germany’.⁸⁴

Unfortunately, in Biddle’s assessment, French diplomacy was already demonstrating a ‘persistent hatred for Beck’, accusing him of being ‘pro-German’, while having no understanding of the Polish policy of ‘active neutrality’.⁸⁵ Another obstacle to Polish–French cooperation was the fact that France ‘eclipsed’ evaluation of the Soviet ‘unlimited threat to peace’, which in the Polish view was manifested in a ‘[Soviet] wrecking policy aimed at preventing Western European appeasement and pacification for fear of the Soviets’ potential isolation’. The Polish foreign minister was convinced that Moscow did not intend to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia’s defence, but it had begun to ‘allude’ to the need of marching through the eastern part of Lesser Poland.⁸⁶ From his talks with Beck, Biddle learned of Stalin’s ‘efforts to keep open the Czechoslovak wound in the heart of Europe’⁸⁷ to enable an efficient takeover of the continent. In this situation, Biddle emphasised that Poland could not be expected to ‘stick out its chin’ prematurely in the form of any independent action against Hitler ‘in advance of an actual Anglo-French clash of arms with Germany’.⁸⁸ This did not in any way mean that Poles were not willing to face up to potential aggression – quite the opposite, because Beck ‘would even welcome the opportunity of throwing the Polish forces on the side of Anglo-French forceful action’. However, Biddle warned that a ‘complete and almost instantaneous change of the picture’ in this part of Europe depended on Anglo-

⁸¹ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 198.

⁸² FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle, *Streamline Observations on Various Aspects of Complex Effect of Hitler’s Expansion Program*, Warsaw, June 19, 1938.

⁸³ H. Batowski, *Austria i Sudety ...*, pp. 278–288.

⁸⁴ FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle, *Streamline Observations*.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ Demonstrative gestures of support for Czechoslovakia by the USSR were, according to Beck, mainly of propaganda significance, serving to aggravate the conflict and undermine France’s credibility in Central and Eastern Europe. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 199.

⁸⁷ FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle, *Minister Beck’s Views as of June 19, 1938 on Czechoslovak Situation*, Warsaw, June 19, 1938.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, Biddle, *Outline of Salient Features*.

French military action against Germany. Only under that condition would he 'look for Poland to strike out vigorously, and even eagerly, on the side of Britain and France'.

Biddle, who was aware of Poland's difficult position, noted in a 1938 report that the existential threat to the Polish state from Germany concerned not so much Danzig as the south-eastern regions of the country and the Ukrainian question. Although Biddle wrote about the 'deep-lying apprehension here over the potential threat of Germany vis-à-vis Upper Silesia, the Corridor and Danzig', he shared Beck's view that for the moment Hitler 'welcomed a strong Poland to serve as a buffer' between Germany and the USSR.⁸⁹ For this reason, Biddle attentively observed Nazi Germany's long-term plans for expansion to the east, including in the Ukraine, which was a priority issue for Poland's retention of its sovereignty and for its defensive plans.⁹⁰ According to the report of a 'competent informant' from Polish government circles, who contacted the US ambassador, Czechoslovakia might become a 'German arrow' enabling an 'ultimate infiltration of the Ukraine'⁹¹ by Berlin on both the Polish and the Soviet sides. Under German hegemony, the Ukraine would thus become an 'instrument of pressure against Poland', which would then be surrounded by Germany from three sides. Based on his talks with Beck, Biddle came to the conclusion that 'Germany would attack Poland, not as the objective, but as the means of reaching Germany's envisaged Ukrainian objective'.⁹² Against such a serious threat, Beck once again tried to persuade his American interlocutor to mobilise the British and French governments to take military action on the Western front in case of German aggression against Poland.

At this point, it should be asked whether Polish diplomats expected help from the United States in such circumstances. This issue was raised in July 1938 in a face-to-face conversation with the American ambassador by Michał Łubieński, Beck's chief of staff, who enquired about Washington's position regarding the export of arms to Germany in case of a war in Europe.⁹³ Although President Roosevelt was planning at that time to organise an international peace conference, he saw it as involving only the leaders of major powers, such as Chamberlain, Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler.⁹⁴ Furthermore, Roosevelt's administration, limited by the Neutrality Acts, could not impact

⁸⁹ The permanent neutralisation of the USSR was to be guaranteed by the 'weakness of state structures in that country' leading to a 'military revolution skillfully supported from outside' by Germany, whose role would be to 'restore order in Russia'. *Ibidem*, Biddle, *Streamline Observations*.

⁹⁰ Biddle's unidentified informant in the Polish foreign ministry mentioned a well-known book by Adolf Bocheński titled *Między Niemcami a Rosją* (*Between Germany and Russia*), but acknowledged that it was not an official interpretation of the Polish government's policy. It nonetheless contained 'interesting observations' indicating that Poland, in case of a German occupation of the Ukraine, might be forced to occupy territory in Belarus so as to avoid total encirclement. *Ibidem*.

⁹¹ Beck is reported to have told the US ambassador that any collaboration in the 'Ukrainian project' by Poland would be against its national interests, as it would mean becoming subordinate to Germany, a fact that would not be compensated for by 'territorial gains' in Soviet Ukraine. *Ibidem*.

⁹² *Ibidem*.

⁹³ From 1935 the US Congress extended the neutrality laws, limiting the president's foreign policy mandate. P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 68–69.

the situation in Europe without simultaneous political, economic and military engagement. Therefore, Biddle gave Łubieński a somewhat evasive answer, referring to the USA's 'right to independent and uncommitted judgement' of the situation in Europe, which translated into an 'unwillingness to make advance commitments'.⁹⁵ Although he did not rule out the participation of the United States in a future conflict, he simultaneously implied that – contrary to Beck's opinion – 'war was not inevitable'. Thus, the American ambassador found himself in the extremely awkward situation of trying to explain the inactivity of the US authorities to the Poles, although he was well aware of the seriousness of the circumstances that required aid to be given to Poland by the Western powers. However, Roosevelt's administration did not usually treat Biddle's alarmist reports seriously, because it believed that Poland's arguments against Germany were not backed up by any economic and military potential capable of resisting aggression by the Third Reich.⁹⁶ Because of this, Beck's morally and politically correct standpoint was usually ignored in Washington.

Nonetheless, the reports sent from Warsaw to Washington by Biddle may have had some impact on the reaction of Roosevelt's administration, especially in the face of repeated aggravation of the Czechoslovakian situation in the late summer of 1938. Signalling a change in the United States' position regarding the growing international crisis in Europe, Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced on 16 August that the Axis countries 'could not count us out in pressing their plans for conquest'.⁹⁷ Not long after this, following the September talks between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Hitler, President Roosevelt sent a message to Berlin calling for a peaceful solution of the issue of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. However, at the same time he ordered his ambassador in Poland to convey to foreign minister Beck a corresponding warning against putting pressure on Prague.⁹⁸ These parallel notes indicate that Roosevelt indeed treated Germany and Poland as joint aggressors against Czechoslovakia.⁹⁹ However, his calculated concern for the fate of the latter country quickly gave way to fears of the possibility of resistance by Prague, which might have provoked the outbreak of a war in which the US could be obliged to assist its European allies. To prevent this, Roosevelt came out in favour of breaking the Western commitments to Czechoslovakia, supporting the resolutions of the Munich Conference at a critical moment.¹⁰⁰ Therefore the demands of Germany, unlike those of Poland, found understanding in the West. It should be noted that a few days earlier, on 23 September, a Soviet note had

⁹⁵ FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle to Roosevelt, *Memorandum of substance of my recent conversation with a high ranking Polish official*, Warsaw, July 28, 1938.

⁹⁶ B. Grzełowski, *Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych ...*, pp. 163–164.

⁹⁷ *Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 22.

⁹⁸ B.W. Winid, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁹⁹ Washington's suspicions were somewhat justified in the light of the August talks between Polish ambassador in Berlin Józef Lipski and Göring, as well as Beck's attempts to have the Polish demands included in the 'general program for the solution of the Sudeten issue' by the European powers. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 434–436, 443.

¹⁰⁰ P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

arrived in Warsaw threatening Poland with consequences in case of 'any aggressive actions on [Poland's] part' against Prague.¹⁰¹ Hence, this unfavourable international atmosphere placed Poland in a complex situation – Biddle's earlier explanations of the Polish position over Zaolzie were not taken into consideration by the State Department and President Roosevelt.

Biddle saw the consequences of the Munich Agreement of 30 September for Poland and the rest of Europe in a very pessimistic light. In his judgement, Anglo-French acceptance of the partitioning of Czechoslovakia by Hitler meant 'Britain's and France's evacuation of eastern and central Europe'.¹⁰² In this situation, he 'found it difficult to foresee any development which in final resort will not imply a variable degree of German hegemony over the various individual states east and southeast of Berlin'. These would now be the subject of a 'trade offensive' by the Third Reich, leading to adjustment of their economic structures to German needs.¹⁰³ The coordination between Poland and Germany of action against Czechoslovakia appeared unquestionable, but at the same time dictated by the Western 'policy of appeasement'.¹⁰⁴ For this reason, Biddle counted Poland among the countries 'rapidly falling in line with Berlin's orientation' and simultaneously still looking for some way out from 'becoming the potential victims of "peaceful settlements" between the major powers'. Biddle's conviction that Britain and France would 'exert efforts towards making peace with the dictators' made it understandable that 'Warsaw deeply regrets'¹⁰⁵ the situation with regard to its two dubious allies. For this reason, the efforts of the US ambassador, undertaken as early as 30 September, to have President Roosevelt organise an international conference to regulate the demands of Poland and Hungary against Prague, ultimately failed due to the objections of Secretary of State Cordell Hull.¹⁰⁶ Instead, Beck received an explicit appeal from Roosevelt for 'avoiding the use

¹⁰¹ The note referred to, among other things, the possible invalidation of the Polish–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1932. In response, the Polish government suggested that Polish–Czechoslovakian relations had nothing to do with Polish–Soviet relations and could not justify terminating the pact. See J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 200–201; M.K. Kamiński, M.J. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

¹⁰² FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle to Roosevelt, Warsaw, November 5, 1938.

¹⁰³ According to confidential information the ambassador received from 'inner Nazi circles', Germany in its eastern policy 'did not want to follow the ruined path of Napoleon, because modern Germany has learnt many things that are clear to the contemporary world, such as laws of economy and regulated population expansion'. This new 'path' was supposed to include even 'organisation of an industrial structure by Germany for its own needs, in countries that lacked one', which would receive technical and material support in exchange for supplies of food and other products to Germany. Biddle attributed the above promises to 'German arrogance and intoxication with power', which closed the eyes of the Nazis to the resistance of most countries to such conditions. *Ibidem*, Biddle to Roosevelt, Warsaw, November 5, 1938.

¹⁰⁴ M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 484–486.

¹⁰⁵ FDRL, PSF, Box 46, Biddle to Roosevelt, Warsaw, November 5, 1938.

¹⁰⁶ The suggestion of a conference under Roosevelt's auspices is reported to have come from Beck, but it was critically assessed by Biddle, who correctly suspected that the US President would not be interested. Roosevelt had strongly criticised Polish actions in respect of Zaolzie, comparing them to a situation where 'a big boy knocked down a little one and a third boy came over and kicked the little one in the stomach'. B. Grzełofski, *Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych ...*, pp. 161–162.

of force'¹⁰⁷ against Czechoslovakia. This resulted from the naive expectations of the American President that the decisions of Munich would open a path to change 'all the unsatisfactory borders on a rational basis'.¹⁰⁸

The occupation of Zaolzie by Polish troops on 2 October 1938 meant, in Biddle's assessment, that at no time did Beck believe 'that either France or England would march for Czechoslovakia or that Czechoslovakia would fight Germany single-handed'.¹⁰⁹ At the same time it should be noted that Beck considered the possibility of aiding Czechoslovakia, until Prague accepted the German conditions.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the Polish side rejected a procedure proposed by the British government to regulate the dispute over Cieszyn Silesia on the basis of Anglo-French guarantees, because the Munich Agreement deprived Beck of any influence on Germany's policy towards Poland.¹¹¹ Hence, the US ambassador showed understanding for the arguments of the Polish foreign minister, who in the period preceding the Munich conference had resisted Anglo-French pressure to join a common front against Germany, as this would mean Warsaw's participation in 'having "let down" Czechoslovakia'.¹¹² According to Beck, the Munich Agreement was 'the first concrete version of the Four-Power Pact' consisting in 'neglecting the most elementary rules of respect for the sovereignty of countries and the integrity of their territories'.¹¹³ The Polish demands were completely ignored by the European powers. Because of this, Beck did not want to commit Poland to supporting 'a four-power conference to the exclusion of Poland' as was planned by Chamberlain, because Poland might 'become the victim of "peaceful settlements"' between the powers.¹¹⁴ The Western democracies' practice of using Poland in the role of an eastern point of pressure on the Third Reich as part of the 'appeasement policy' indicated that Warsaw was being used as an instrument in the policy of Britain and France. Biddle's personal view on the matter of the incorporation of Zaolzie into Poland tended to present it as a measure aimed against the German plans for expansion to the east. In the face of the bankruptcy of the Western allies' obligations to Poland, there was

¹⁰⁷ *Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁸ P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–65.

¹⁰⁹ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, Warsaw, December 7, 1938.

¹¹⁰ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 204.

¹¹¹ According to Marian Wojciechowski, after sending the Polish ultimatum to Prague on 30 September, minister Beck and ambassador Lipski sought to obtain a declaration from Germany regarding Berlin's intentions in the event of an outbreak of conflict between Poland and the USSR, which was supposed also to indicate the importance of relations with Warsaw to the Third Reich. Ribbentrop's response, however, indicated only conditional support for Poland against the Soviets; and this also precluded the possibility of peacefully resolving the Polish–German problems. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 484–495.

¹¹² FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, Warsaw, December 7, 1938.

¹¹³ J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 202.

¹¹⁴ Beck reminded Biddle in a conversation that Poland had not participated in the Anglo-French discussions in which approval had been given for the German demands for cession of Sudeten territory. FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, Warsaw, December 7, 1938.

a 'necessity of "showing" Germany they [Poles] were willing to fight for what they considered their rightful objectives'.¹¹⁵

As the American ambassador had anticipated, after a temporary quietening of the tensions over Poland's southern borders, Hitler's Germany challenged the Polish 'balance of power policy'. In a review of the events that led to the outbreak of war, Biddle first drew attention to the conversation of 24 October 1938 between the Polish ambassador in Berlin Józef Lipski and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The ambassador was aware that Ribbentrop had brought up the 'necessity of an early settlement of the Danzig problem, and the question of facilitating communications, in terms of an autostrada [motorway], between the Reich and East Prussia'.¹¹⁶ Lipski rejected the German demand that Danzig should be incorporated into the Reich, referring to matters 'of an internal policy nature'.¹¹⁷ In Biddle's assessment, however, the Polish government was ready to accept some German demands, assuming that the transport link anticipated by Berlin would not have extraterritorial status. In this situation the American diplomat even had the impression that 'Minister Beck and his associates were inclined to prefer a non-extra-territorial autostrada [...] as affording better opportunity to guard against these [German espionage] activities' and at the same time enable a permanent resolution of the Danzig issue. While discussing this question with Beck a few days later, however, Biddle confirmed his earlier suspicions that Germany regarded the issue of the Corridor 'more as a strategic factor, than one facilitating communications'.¹¹⁸ Germany transformed the Polish compromise proposals by demanding the annexation of Danzig and the extraterritoriality of the motorway, which would reduce Poland to the status of a vassal of the Reich.

Biddle's conviction that Berlin's demands concerned not only the 'corridor', but were aimed at Poland as a whole, was strengthened by German attempts to destabilise Poland's south-eastern borderland. These became visible after the failure of Beck's mission in Bucharest in October 1938, where he unsuccessfully tried to convince the Romanian government to take joint control over Carpathian Ruthenia together with Hungary,¹¹⁹ because the region was becoming a 'centre for Ukrainian

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁶ Biddle, *Pivotal Events, Factors and Forces which led to War*, [in:] *Poland and the Coming ...*, pp. 42–43.

¹¹⁷ According to German sources, the Reich's leaders expected Poland to accept the German conditions regarding Danzig and the 'Pomeranian corridor' in exchange for guarantees of the inviolability of Poland's borders. M. Wojciechowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 520–530.

¹¹⁸ During a meeting with Ribbentrop in Warsaw in January 1939, Beck advised him to forget about the extraterritorial status demanded by Germany for the motorway to East Prussia. *Ibidem*, J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 218.

¹¹⁹ From October 1938 an autonomous government of Carpathian Ruthenia was in place, but its territory was reduced by Hungarian acquisitions under the First Vienna Award, agreed on 2 November by representatives of the governments of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the autonomous authorities of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. For more see: P. Kołakowski, M. Jarnecki, „*Ukraiński Piemont*”. *Ruś Zakarpacka w okresie autonomii, 1938-1939*, Kraków 2017, pp. 137–152.

subversion'.¹²⁰ It should be noted that the Ukrainian problem was at that time also being discussed broadly by the military attaché at the US embassy, William H. Colbern. He drew attention to the activity of 'professional irredentists' in Carpathian Ruthenia, collaborating with Germany, who demanded the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.¹²¹ For this reason, in a long telegram to Secretary of State Hull in December 1938, Biddle devoted most space to the project of building a 'Greater Ukraine' under German patronage, as a future 'scene for [...] anti-Soviet, anti-Polish and anti-Rumanian activities'.¹²² Such a step would greatly restrict Poland's defence capabilities and weaken its international position. Hence, when in December the representatives of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance in the Polish parliament demanded territorial autonomy for the Ukrainian minority in Eastern Lesser Poland,¹²³ Biddle viewed the move as being inspired by Germany. Other evidence of Germany's attempts to use the Ukrainian minority against Poland included 'Berlin-inspired radio broadcasts in the Ukrainian language from Prague, Vienna and Leipzig' and the 'Danzig Nazis' reported establishment of a political course for Ukrainians'.¹²⁴ Biddle suspected that the 'Czechoslovakian scenario' could now be

¹²⁰ The Polish foreign minister, who expected Bucharest's cooperation against Czechoslovakia, was treated disdainfully by Romanian foreign minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, who, according to Beck, spoke 'thoughtless phrases' and 'various nonsense' about the obligations of the Little Entente and France to Czechoslovakia. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 209–210. On the other hand, Beck's trip to Romania gave Germany an excuse to treat the issue of the shared Polish–Hungarian border as a concession to Poland, and to make demands of their own against Warsaw. H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie. Jesień 1938 - wiosna 1939*, Warsaw 1962, pp. 144–145.

¹²¹ Colbern's anxiety was aroused by the activity of the so-called Carpathian Sich, which functioned legally in Czechoslovakia from July 1938 and was trained by Germans based on the standards of the SS. He also mentioned Andriej Malnyk and Jacob Makochin as Ukrainian activists 'working for German pay'. The latter was known to him because until 1921 he had served in the United States Marine Corps, but had been dismissed and deported to Romania for subversive activity. He was later convicted in Poland on the same grounds, and he eventually left for Berlin and Prague. H.W. Colbern, *Komentarze o aktualnych wydarzeniach, 12 stycznia 1939*, [in:] *Polska. Styczeń-sierpień 1939 r. Analizy i prognozy*, ed. B. Grzełowski, Warsaw 1986, pp. 20–21.

¹²² FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Observations on Various Aspects of the Current Press "Play Up" of the "Greater Ukraine"*, Warsaw, December 15, 1938.

¹²³ The seriousness of the situation, according to Biddle, resulted from the fact that Carpathian Ruthenia was the 'centre of anti-Polish activity and a constant threat to peace and security in Eastern Galicia and in the whole country'. He was also concerned by the broad territorial demands of the autonomous Ukrainians, which included the Tarnopol, Stanisławów, Lwów and Volhynian Voivodeships, part of Polesie Voivodeship and even fragments of the Białystok, Lublin and Kraków Voivodeships. *Ibidem*, Biddle to Hull, *Observations on Various Aspects of the Demand of the Ukrainian Minority*, Warsaw, December 10, 1938.

¹²⁴ Some Polish politicians, including the Head of the Eastern Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Kobyłański, as well as Władysław Studnicki, supported the idea of cooperation with Germany with the aim of establishing a Ukrainian state on Soviet Ukrainian territory. The plan was illusory, however, in view of the fact that the main centres of Ukrainian nationalism, with programmes that were directed against Poland, were located in Eastern Lesser Poland. Cf. R. Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930-1939*, Lublin 2003, pp. 190–227.

used against the multinational Polish state, because Hitler did not yet want to engage in open military aggression. A much more advantageous solution for Germany would be to partition Poland into a few parts, including 'annexation of the Corridor, Danzig and Upper Silesia to the Reich',¹²⁵ while the Lithuanians would receive Vilnius in exchange for supporting the German policy, alongside 'incitement of rebellion in the Ukrainian minority with an aim to joining it up with Ruthenia'. The creation of a chain of 'small, subjugated states' was to provide a buffer separating the Third Reich from the Soviet Union. Biddle believed that Hitler was preparing to 'thrust at' the Soviets, but in order to do so he had to achieve 'complete ascendancy over the area between Germany's eastern and the Soviet's western frontier'.

In these circumstances, Biddle told Roosevelt and Hull that Beck 'entertains no illusions as to Poland's potential benefits from collaboration with Germany'.¹²⁶ During the December talks between the Polish foreign minister and German ambassador Hans Adolf von Moltke, he also observed that Beck did not believe in potential joint action with Berlin against the USSR.¹²⁷ Beck reportedly pressured the German diplomat to present his government's plans regarding Moscow. At the same time, Biddle was trying to probe the Soviet position towards Poland. In a conversation with Łubieński in late November 1938, he argued that the Polish assessment of the USSR's potential was incorrect, and suggested the possibility of German-Soviet rapprochement.¹²⁸ In mid-December 1938 he reported to Szembek his discussion with 'a representative of authoritative Soviet circles', whom he had tried to persuade that 'Russia should look for support in Poland and the United States'¹²⁹ instead of Germany. Thus, Biddle made it clear to Washington that a Polish-German political alliance, although impossible in these conditions, might be imposed on Warsaw in case of lack of support from France and Britain.¹³⁰ It is possible that Biddle's aim in informing Polish diplomats about the unsuccessful initiatives towards German-Soviet cooperation was to persuade Warsaw to take a tougher line against Germany.¹³¹

During that time Roosevelt noted the harm done by the Munich agreements, acknowledging that the first line of defence for the United States consisted of small European countries such as Poland, which should be guaranteed 'further existence as

¹²⁵ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, *Opinion of Turkish Ambassador and discussions with passing Nazi agents*, Warsaw, December 22, 1938.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, *Observations on Various Aspects of Poland's Position*, Warsaw, December 22, 1938.

¹²⁷ Cf. H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, p. 153.

¹²⁸ M. Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku wobec paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow*, Warsaw 2002, p. 248.

¹²⁹ Biddle considered the economic condition of the USSR to be miserable and in need of Western technical aid. Moreover, in discussions with Szembek he emphasised the 'omnipotent Jewish influence, which must lead to pogroms in Russia', thus disqualifying the USSR as a potential ally of the West. J. Szembek, *Diariusz i teki ...*, p. 389.

¹³⁰ Biddle told Szembek that after the Munich Agreement 'England wishes to move the cyclone of German aggression and impetus away from the West'; thus he believed that 'England was somehow pushing Germany toward confrontation with the Soviets'. *Ibidem*.

¹³¹ M. Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku ...*, p. 256.

independent countries and economic entities'.¹³² Counting on an agreement with the Soviet Union against Germany, and fearing that Poland might turn towards Berlin, Roosevelt announced to Congress on 4 January 1939 that the United States was ready to provide financial support for countries threatened with aggression.¹³³ This cooled German ambitions ahead of the meeting between Beck and Hitler in Obersalzberg, planned for the following day. Beck discussed this meeting and its outcomes with Biddle shortly after his return to Warsaw. The Polish foreign minister said that the words of the US President had 'caused mental and moral "jitters" in Berlin', and that Hitler 'was not only furious but also extremely worried'.¹³⁴

Roosevelt's declaration undoubtedly assisted Beck in toughening the Polish stance during his January visit to Germany. Beck recorded that following his negative response regarding Danzig and the transport link through Pomerania, Hitler 'backed down, this time without making [...] definitive demands'.¹³⁵ Biddle thus recorded that after the talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Beck seemed 'fairly well satisfied and under no apparent tension', because Hitler 'was more conciliatory than aggressive' and despite his successes in Austria and Czechoslovakia he had 'respect for Poland'.¹³⁶ This related 'both to the Danzig and the Ukrainian issues', in which the German leader 'desired Poland's friendship'.

In reality Beck was seriously concerned by Ribbentrop's repeated demand for the annexation of Danzig, although he did not mention this to the British and French ambassadors, Howard Kennard and Léon Noël.¹³⁷ Biddle must have been better informed, because he believed that Germany would be pressuring for 'the inclusion of a right of way across the Corridor as part of a Danzig settlement'. In his view, a demand for a 'combined rail and motor way within a mutually recognized neutral zone [and] elimination of customs and passport control' was now to be expected. Biddle was interested in this topic to the extent that at the start of January he discussed it with Carl Jakob Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig, who was making unsuccessful efforts to settle peacefully the dispute over the city's affiliation. Biddle was told by Burckhardt that Germany had rejected the Polish proposal 'to consider a somewhat independent status for Danzig', wishing 'to leave the question open'.¹³⁸

¹³² Roosevelt's change of thinking was motivated by the belief that the further expansion of Germany, Italy and Japan threatened the United States' commercial and maritime power, and thus weakened the still depressed American economy. P. Grudziński, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–67.

¹³³ B. Winid, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹³⁴ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Substance of my several conversations with Minister Beck*, Warsaw, January 13, 1939.

¹³⁵ Beck's long-term conclusions from the talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop were more pessimistic, because they indicated the secondary importance of Danzig and the 'corridor', which were merely an excuse for a German strike against Poland. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 217–218.

¹³⁶ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Substance of my several conversations*.

¹³⁷ H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, pp. 225–229.

¹³⁸ Biddle, *Substance of conversations with League High Commissioner Burckhardt during his New Year's visit to Warsaw*, January 5, 1939, [in:] *Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 297.

Biddle's pessimism was confirmed by Ribbentrop during his visit to Warsaw in late January. He said that the Polish-German problems 'should be negotiated quietly in neighborly spirit' and at the same time scornfully urged Beck to give up Poland's access to the Baltic, because 'the Black Sea is also a sea'.¹³⁹ In this situation Biddle knew that from the Polish perspective 'the Germans were still seeking too much', suggesting that Poland take part in actions directed against the USSR at the expense of its own vital interests. Colbern also did not believe in the scenario of a Polish-German alliance, because the attainment of German goals in the Soviet Union would result in 'demands for the return of Silesia, the Poznań region and the corridor, and autonomy or independence for the Polish Ukraine', which would undermine the viability of the Polish state.¹⁴⁰ However, the Polish foreign minister told Biddle that Hitler, being aware of Polish anxiety about the USSR, was trying to persuade him that 'Ukraine figured merely as a part of [...] future treatment of Russia as a whole', on a basis that was 'distinctly anti-Russian, not merely anti-Soviet and anti-Communist'.¹⁴¹ Doubting the sincerity of these declarations, Colbern pointed out that the military mission conducted by the Germans in Chust in Carpathian Ruthenia¹⁴² was constantly 'instructing Ukrainian volunteers, gendarmes and policemen', while Ukrainian organisations were 'receiving money and arms from Germany'.¹⁴³ Despite this, Beck misleadingly signalled to Biddle a positive impression, implying that 'Hitler still did not want war' and 'Poland might expect no surprises' from the German side, because 'all matters bearing on Polish-German relations were negotiable'.¹⁴⁴ The American ambassador had no illusions regarding the real intentions of Hitler towards Poland, saying that the talks between German dignitaries and Beck were intended to 'create an atmosphere of friendly Polish-German relations' addressed to the Western powers.¹⁴⁵

The entry of German troops into Prague on 15 March 1939 dispelled, in Biddle's opinion, 'what was left of the Polish government's trust' regarding Berlin's intentions, and moreover the collapse of the 'Munich system' ended Western support for German expansion. It became obvious that the policy of the Third Reich, which was now going beyond the declared goal of integration of the German nation, 'presaged the possibil-

¹³⁹ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Minister Beck's further disclosures regarding Ribbentrop's Warsaw visit*, Warsaw, February 15, 1939; J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 218.

¹⁴⁰ H.W. Colbern, *Komentarze o aktualnych wydarzeniach, 12 stycznia 1939 ...*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁴¹ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Substance of my several conversations...*

¹⁴² Although Poland expected that the Hungarian occupation of Carpathian Ruthenia in consultation with Warsaw would stop the German expansion, paradoxically a shared Polish-Hungarian border was created as a result of an agreement between Budapest and Berlin on 11 March 1939, which was aimed against Polish interests. H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, pp. 189-196.

¹⁴³ H.W. Colbern, *Komentarze o aktualnych wydarzeniach, 12 stycznia 1939 ...*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁴ During one of Biddle's many meetings with Beck in that period, the latter is reported to have said that 'Hitler would turn his main attention from the pursuance of his major objectives in the East to the West' in connection with a 'major play for colonies'. FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Hull, *Minister Beck's further disclosures*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

ity of unlimited adventures in Eastern and Central Europe'.¹⁴⁶ Not long afterwards, on 21 March, Biddle received from the Polish government a list of German demands that Poland had received orally from Ribbentrop. Essentially, these were the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich and the building of an extraterritorial connection between Germany and East Prussia.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted that the US ambassador was the first foreign diplomat in Warsaw to be told exactly what Germany's demands were.¹⁴⁸ In a conversation with Beck a few days after Berlin had made those demands, Biddle learnt that the Polish side was pursuing an 'amicable solution of outstanding Polish-German differences', which would involve 'offering to the citizens of the Reich all possible facilities for them to travel in transit across Polish territory'.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Polish government made a proposal to Berlin for 'a guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate entity of the Free City of Danzig', with the preservation of Polish rights and interests in the city. Despite the apparent compliance of the Polish side, during the meetings between Biddle and Beck that took place until July 1939, the US ambassador learned what was the line that Poland was not prepared to cross, namely 'any arbitrary alteration in the political status of Danzig as a Free State' violating Polish rights, and the 'surrender [of] sovereignty over the territory through which the transit roads would pass'.¹⁵⁰

In the face of political pressure from the Reich, ambassador Biddle wrote to Roosevelt in early April 1939 that 'efficiency in the rearmament programs of Britain, France, Poland and other participants of the proposed anti-aggression front' was 'the only means of preventing a conflagration' in Europe, which he expected to break out 'between now and November'.¹⁵¹ He thus appealed to Washington not only to show 'firmness and solidarity', but also to provide 'emergency accommodation in terms of equipment and financial credits [for] smaller powers'. He was pleased by the declaration of British Prime Minister Chamberlain on 31 March, promising assistance for Poland in case of a threat to its independence.¹⁵² At the same time, he noted an intensification of German pressure on Warsaw through exacerbation of the atmosphere in Danzig and incitement of the Ukrainian minority in Poland.¹⁵³ He was thus content to observe Beck's satisfaction on his return from London, resulting from 'the seriousness and earnestness both of Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax', which

¹⁴⁶ Biddle, *Pivotal Events*, p. 46.

¹⁴⁷ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 106, Folder 2, *Reports on Events Leading to War (1940)*.

¹⁴⁸ Since Beck wished to obtain the Foreign Office's preliminary approval for a bilateral deal with London without the participation of the USSR, ambassador Howard Kennard was informed about the German demands by Szembek only on 29 March. The French ambassador Léon Noël was also not officially informed. H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, p. 280.

¹⁴⁹ Biddle, *Pivotal Events*, pp. 47–48.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 66.

¹⁵¹ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt, Memorandum No. 1, Warsaw, April 7, 1939.

¹⁵² British aid was to be given under the condition of Poland's armed resistance to German (not Soviet) aggression. Moreover, when speaking of independence, Chamberlain did not have in mind a guarantee of Poland's territorial integrity. H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, p. 282.

¹⁵³ Biddle, *Pivotal Events*, pp. 49–50.

led to the issuing on 6 April of a Polish–British declaration of mutual assistance in case of aggression. The British government's acceptance of a 'public alliance' with Warsaw might be, in Beck's view, the last effective preventive measure for Poland, although it threatened the already tense relations with Germany.¹⁵⁴ Biddle did not conceal from Secretary of State Hull his surprise that 'Hitler did not instantly strike out against Poland on the heels of Chamberlain's declaration', although he attributed this to 'alternative tactics' of Germany aimed at 'inspiring relaxation amongst the political circles throughout Europe'.¹⁵⁵ He expected a consistent campaign from Hitler, involving 'fomenting revolutions within Poland, Rumania as well as Russia', which would finally enable him to take over the Ukraine's raw materials, and consequently lead to 'divorcing the East from the West of Europe'. Biddle still believed in the 'deterrent effect' of a potential British–French–Polish coalition, by which 'the current grave European situation might be liquidated through diplomacy rather than through war'. However, the cause of peace was not served by Roosevelt's demonstrative gesture of appealing to Germany to undertake to avoid force in disputes with its neighbours, which was exploited in propaganda against Poland by the Nazi authorities.¹⁵⁶

It should be emphasised that at that time Biddle doubted the scenario of an alliance between Hitler and Stalin aimed at Poland.¹⁵⁷ His belief in the inevitability of German aggression against the USSR persuaded him that 'Stalin, if he were in his right senses would be reluctant to engage in any rapprochement with Berlin for fear it might eventually prove his own undoing'.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, aware of the existence of a historically conditioned 'deep sense of distrust' between the Poles and Russians, he viewed Poland's concern about Soviet intentions as justified. He considered Poland an inseparable component of the Western world, being the 'last western window looking east'. Therefore, unlike Moscow, Poland 'could be depended upon to adhere strictly to her obligations'.¹⁵⁹ For this reason, Biddle made clear in a conversation with Szembek in June 1939 that 'the Western countries should sideline Moscow and rely on Poland'.¹⁶⁰ Similar views were held by those at the top of the Polish foreign

¹⁵⁴ With regard to an alliance with Britain, Beck was concerned about, among other things, the principle of reciprocity that extended Polish security guarantees to Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, as well as obliging Poland to support Romania's claims against Hungary. The issues were regulated in a secret protocol to the Anglo-Polish mutual support agreement of 25 August 1939. J. Beck, *Wspomnienia...*, pp. 223–224.

¹⁵⁵ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt, Memorandum No. 1, Warsaw, April 7, 1939.

¹⁵⁶ H. Batowski, *Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie ...*, pp. 295–296.

¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, after Poland's defeat in the September Campaign, he admitted that the Soviet–German alliance was 'logical', because the rapprochement of the national socialist and communist ideologies would enable a joint 'occupation of Central and Eastern Europe' and 'the evolution of Nazism in a direction closer to Stalinism and safer for Moscow'. Biddle, *The Russian Aspect, [in:] Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 187.

¹⁵⁸ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt, Memorandum No. 2, Warsaw, April 7, 1939.

¹⁵⁹ Biddle, *The Russian Aspect, [in:] Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 183.

¹⁶⁰ In the same conversation Biddle criticised Anglo-French policy towards the USSR, because in his view the Soviets 'want to bring about a war between the capitalist countries in order to then take advantage of the turmoil'. J. Szembek, *Diariusz i teki*, p. 624.

ministry, who believed that the Polish–German conflict and the division of influence between Berlin and Moscow in Central and Eastern Europe would serve primarily the position of the USSR, which had been isolated since the break-up of Czechoslovakia.¹⁶¹ It is worth noting that, according to Beck, the justified Polish distrust towards Moscow did not exclude mutually beneficial cooperation enabling Poland to import raw materials from the USSR. For this reason, at a meeting with the Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar Vladimir Potemkin on 10 May, Beck ‘categorically denied’ the rumours of planned Polish–German action against Moscow.¹⁶² He did not suspect that the Soviet assurances of ‘friendliness’ towards Poland in case of an external threat served to exacerbate the Polish–German conflict, which was to Moscow’s benefit.¹⁶³ Biddle, being aware of the aggressive intentions of Moscow, also remained convinced that the antagonism between Germany and the USSR was persistent. However, in contrast to his own government, this did not cause him to see Moscow as a potential ally in the European ‘anti-aggression front’. Biddle took a negative view of the USSR’s military potential, saying that it ‘should be considered more as a potential means of taking the weight off Britain [...] and France [...] than as an effective striking force’.¹⁶⁴ Above all, he did not see Moscow as having the will to engage in fighting against Nazi Germany, which corresponded with the erroneous view of the Polish government that Moscow would remain neutral in case of a Polish–German war.¹⁶⁵

As tensions between Poland and Germany grew, indicating the inevitability of the outbreak of war in Europe, in Biddle’s telegrams to Washington he increasingly identified with Polish national interests. After Hitler renounced the Polish–German Non-Aggression Pact on 28 April, Biddle referred empathetically to Beck’s parliamentary speech of 5 May 1939. He was convinced of Hitler’s ultimate ‘failure to tempt Beck’ with proposals of cooperation against the USSR, which resulted in German demands regarding Danzig and Pomerania.¹⁶⁶ In this situation Biddle defended Poland’s right to reject the German demands, which aimed to ‘discredit Poland as a potential eastern European partner in the eyes of London and Paris’ and also ‘in the eyes of the Polish people’. He nonetheless feared Moscow’s attitude in these circumstances, especially because he thought Poland had neglected its relations with the USSR. He perfectly understood the aversion of Poles to allowing the Soviet army even ‘one foot onto Polish territory’, but he considered ‘whether in the event of a German invasion, Poland

¹⁶¹ M. Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku ...*, p. 357.

¹⁶² According to Anna Cienciála, during talks between an Anglo-French mission and the Soviets in Moscow in August 1939, French general Joseph Doumenc gave approval, on behalf of the French government, for the passage of Soviet troops through Eastern Lesser Poland and the Vilnius region in case of the outbreak of war, and Beck was not informed of this. For more see: J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, pp. 227–231; M. Kornat, *Polityka równowagi ...*, pp. 445–448; M.K. Kamiński, M.J. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–268.

¹⁶³ M.K. Kamiński, M.J. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–259.

¹⁶⁴ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt, Memorandum, Warsaw, April 19, 1939.

¹⁶⁵ M. Kornat, *Polityka równowagi ...*, pp. 441–445.

¹⁶⁶ FDRL, PSF, Box 47, Biddle to Roosevelt, Memorandum, Warsaw, May 6, 1939.

might not be inclined to accept help from the Devil himself'.¹⁶⁷ A similarly dark scenario was anticipated by Colbern, who wrote that Warsaw could either 'remain alone with a very uncertain hope for Anglo-French help' or else 'attempt to form a block with Russia, the Baltic countries and Rumania'.¹⁶⁸ However, Biddle was aware at that time that the alliance between Poland and Britain, which induced Hitler to compromise with the Soviets, also served Stalin's imperial intentions in Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁹ It should be noted here that although the contents of the secret protocol to the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August 1939 were known to the State Department, for unknown reasons they were not passed on to Warsaw.¹⁷⁰ Because the reversal of the scenario – fatal to Poland – of German and Soviet aggression now depended only on the stance of the Western powers, the more damning for them is the assessment of some historians that Poland, given knowledge about the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, might have ultimately reached a settlement with the Third Reich.¹⁷¹

Nevertheless, in Biddle's view, the signing of the Polish-British alliance on 25 August as a response to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact¹⁷² led Germany to 'refrain from renewing marching orders' for its attack on Poland, which had been planned for the following day. Biddle judged that Hitler was no longer interested in a compromise with Warsaw, but hoped 'for a detachment of Britain from Poland'.¹⁷³ In late August

¹⁶⁷ Beck told Biddle about his meeting with Soviet ambassador Nikolai Sharonov on 24 August, when the latter is reported to have said that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 'did not change relations between Moscow and Warsaw'. *Ibidem*, Biddle to Roosevelt and Hull, Warsaw, August 25, 1939; Biddle, *The Russian Aspect*, [in:] *Poland and the Coming ...*, p. 185.

¹⁶⁸ In May 1939 Colbern 'personally doubted' the possibility of a German-Soviet alliance 'aimed at the dissolution of Poland', and for this reason believed that 'Poland renounced her participation in the Anglo-French negotiations with the USSR'. H.W. Colbern, *Komentarze o aktualnych wydarzeniach, 11 maja 1939*, p. 52.

¹⁶⁹ It is now known that Roosevelt's administration was informed on 24 August 1939 about the details of the secret protocol to the Soviet-German pact that provided for the partitioning of Polish territory. This was done through Hans von Herwath, the personal clerk of the German ambassador in Moscow, who apparently conveyed the information personally to Charles Bohlen, secretary at the US embassy. For more see: A. Mania, *Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych ...*, p. 183; B. Grzełoński, *Dyplomaci USA ...*, pp. 104-105.

¹⁷⁰ In a letter of 24 August, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle glibed at the suggestion of the ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, that it was necessary to persuade Poland to make concessions to Germany in the light of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Berle admitted: 'I do not really know how one could formulate a categorical demand to the Poles—in view of the fact that your murder has already been decided, we kindly ask... etc.'. B. Grzełoński, *Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych ...*, p. 197.

¹⁷¹ M. Kornat, *Polityka równowagi ...*, p. 452.

¹⁷² The ambassador saw the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August as a German 'instrument of pressure on Great Britain and France with the aim of inclining them toward peaceful conditions in the West'. On the other hand, he had no illusions regarding Soviet imperial ambitions, saying that the simultaneous negotiations conducted by Stalin with the West and Germany 'smacked of a deliberate attempt to foment a European conflict' on Moscow's part. Biddle, *The Russian Aspect*, p. 189.

¹⁷³ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 106, Folder 3, Biddle, *Pivotal events, factors and forces which led to war*.

he told Szembek about the German intention to drive Poland to a position in which the Poles 'would break and attack [Germany] first'.¹⁷⁴ Minister Beck expressed the same view at that time, saying that in order to 'avoid the localisation' of a Polish–German conflict, Poland should be included 'in the framework of a grand coalition war'.¹⁷⁵ Biddle, writing *ex post* about the causes of the outbreak of war in Europe, claimed that Germany had suffered a political defeat even before the start of aggression against Poland, because it had not succeeded in preventing escalation of the local conflict with Poland to the level of a European war. However, it should be noted that in the calculations regarding the Western powers' policy towards Germany and the USSR, Polish diplomats made a serious mistake in continuing to believe that Poland had a major role in Europe. In the eyes of the West, the target partner was Soviet Russia, and Poland was only a 'substitute ally'.¹⁷⁶ Ambassador Biddle, despite his sympathy for the Poles, did not have any influence on this position of the Western democracies.

Poland's unbending attitude in the face of the progressive expansion of Nazi Germany impressed the US ambassador, because he believed that it would be of great significance for the course of the upcoming war and for the future international order in Europe. Biddle saw Poland's foreign policy as a 'barometer of the mood and capacity of England and France to resist [German aggression] by force'.¹⁷⁷ It must be acknowledged that by identifying with minister Beck's view of the particularly difficult position of Poland between Germany and the USSR, he confirmed to some degree the Polish will to resist Nazi expansion. Unfortunately, Biddle's views and suggestions regarding the crucial international role of Poland for the security of the Western democracies met much less understanding in Washington than Warsaw might have expected.¹⁷⁸ We may assume that these opinions of the US ambassador on the Polish 'balance of power policy' – sometimes over-optimistic, although otherwise correct – served to consolidate the illusive hopes of Poles for the permanence of the West's alliance commitments. It should be noted that, according to some historians, Polish diplomats in 1939 did not believe that the United States could help improve the situation in Europe, which spoiled the chances of bilateral economic and political cooperation.¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, the creditable efforts of ambassador Biddle to gain support for Poland's interests were not received positively in the West, where

¹⁷⁴ J. Szembek, *Diariusz i teki ...*, p. 697.

¹⁷⁵ The American military attaché William Colbern 'sincerely admired the confidence with which [the Poles] dealt with this situation', and thus he did not expect a repeat of the Czechoslovakian scenario. He believed that in the absence of a British diplomatic initiative, the Polish army would 'accelerate the war, expecting it to go beyond a local range'. H.W. Colbern, *Komentarze o aktualnych wydarzeniach, 11 maja 1939*, pp. 55–56; J. Beck, *Wspomnienia ...*, p. 226.

¹⁷⁶ M. Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku ...*, p. 353.

¹⁷⁷ HSP, Biddle Papers, Box 106, Folder 3, Biddle, *Pivotal events*.

¹⁷⁸ B. Winid, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹⁷⁹ Negotiations on a trade agreement conducted by trade and industry minister Antoni Roman in the United States in May 1939 ended in failure. He was in New York for the opening of a Polish exhibition pavilion at the World's Fair. Earlier, in October 1938, Poland had officially recognised the independence of Manchukuo, which clearly collided with US interests in the Far East. *Ibidem*, pp. 221–225.

Poland was not seen as a sufficiently reliable and strong partner. However, unlike the majority of Western diplomats, Biddle treated Poland as a significant power, not only respecting, but also sharing the Polish point of view on the problems of Europe and Poland, linked to the country's difficult position between East and West. At the same time he emphasised the threats to the Polish state that stemmed from the expansion of Nazi Germany and the imperial ambitions of Stalin, as well as the Ukrainian projects supported by Berlin. He thus had no doubt that the German–Soviet aggression against Poland left the West in an incomparably worse position than before September 1939. For this reason, Biddle had acknowledged in one of his conversations with Jan Szembek in April 1939 that ‘Poland stands guard over Europe’, and so ‘if Europe is able to free itself from totalitarian dictatorships, it will be thanks to Poland’.¹⁸⁰

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to present the views of Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, the United States' ambassador in Warsaw, concerning the international situation of the Second Polish Republic from 1937 to 1939. It presents a topic scarcely represented in Polish historiography, showing the perspective of the American ambassador on the role of Poland in Europe and revealing his assessment of the 'balance of power' policy pursued by minister Józef Beck in the period preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Biddle generally shared the Polish perspective on the threat originating from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, while emphasising the crucial role of Poland in further political and military developments in Europe. Accordingly, he supported the Polish will to resist the upcoming German aggression, since in his eyes Warsaw's attitude served as a kind of 'barometer' of British and French readiness to contain German expansion. Although Biddle's position in the late 1930s could not influence the policies of the United States and European powers towards Poland, it sheds an interesting light on Polish foreign policy and its reception by the Western powers, contributing to a better understanding of this decisive period of Poland's history.

¹⁸⁰ J. Szembek, *Diariusz i teki ...*, p. 574.

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**SEPTEMBER 1939 AND THE ELITES
OF THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC
IN THE DIARY *OUR JOURNEY* BY EWELINA ZALESKA**

Ewelina Zaleska's diary titled *Our Journey* (*Nasza podróż*) forms part of the August Zaleski Collection (coll. 424/4) held at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London.¹ This journal, written on her journey from Warsaw – or in fact from the Psarskie estate in Greater Poland – to Bucharest, has not previously been published.²

These are not the only notes written by Zaleska that have survived. In addition to *Our Journey*, her papers also contain incomplete notes on important events in her husband's life, for instance, his meetings in the years 1926–1932 and 1939–1941 while he was minister of foreign affairs, or incidents that occurred between 1947 and 1972 when he was president of the Republic of Poland in exile.³ Moreover, the Zaleski Collection at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University in Palo Alto includes family correspondence written by him and his wife, as well as Ewelina Zaleska's diaries and notes for the period from 1940 to 1970.⁴

Ewelina Zaleska's diary *Our Journey* sheds a new and interesting light on the behaviour of some prominent figures (Sławoj Felicjan Składkowski, Edward Śmigły-Rydz) in September 1939, and confirms its negative reception by the Polish public. It complements and challenges, in an interesting manner, the picture of events that emerges from the memoirs of Polish diplomats,⁵ government officials,⁶ or members of

¹ The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London (henceforth PISM), August Zaleski Collection, coll. 424/4.

² It is mentioned, though only with regard to August Zaleski's journey from Bucharest to Paris, by Piotr Wandycz, *Z Piłsudskim i Sikorskim. August Zaleski minister spraw zagranicznych w latach 1926-1932 i 1939-1941*, Warsaw 1999, pp. 160–161.

³ They were used, among others, in: A. Zaleski, *Wspomnienia*, edited by K. Kania, K. Kloc, P.M. Żukowski, Warsaw 2017.

⁴ Hoover Institution Archives, August Zaleski papers 1919-1981.

⁵ For example, J. Beck, *Wspomnienia o polskiej polityce zagranicznej 1926-1939*, edited by A.M. Cienciała, Warsaw–Cracow 2015; J. Szembek, *Diariusz. Wrzesień-grudzień 1939*, edited by B. Grzełoński, Warsaw 1989.

⁶ See, for instance: W.T. Drymmer, *W służbie Polsce. Wspomnienia żołnierza i państwowca z lat 1914-1947*, Warsaw–Cracow 2014; J. Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, edited by K. Pomian, Warsaw 1994.

the diplomatic corps of other states⁷ who resided in Poland at the time and were then evacuated along with the Polish government.

Ewelina Zaleska, *née* Komorowska of the Dołęga coat of arms, was born in Tiflis (now Tbilisi) on 25 December 1888.⁸ She married August Zaleski in May 1920, shortly before he took up a position at the embassy in Athens.⁹ As wife of the foreign minister, Zaleska was remembered by, for example, the French ambassador (1926–1935) Jules Laroche as an organiser of parties and a companion to her husband.¹⁰ Later, as wife of the president of the Republic of Poland in exile in London, she was not well-regarded by at least some members of the émigré community: she was accused of being vain and haughty, and above all of having a negative influence on her husband, whose behaviour was criticised at that time.¹¹ She died on 25 June 1981 at Gordon Hospital in London.¹² Following a donation from her estate in 1983, Harvard University instituted the August Zaleski Memorial Lectures in Modern Polish History.¹³

In the diary presented below, Ewelina Zaleska describes first her journey to Warsaw, and then the journey she made together with her husband, which finally took them to Bucharest. *Our Journey* ends with the Zaleskis' departure from Romania. The author decided to copy one paragraph referring to their stay in Paris, and we have deliberately left this intact. Later notes from Paris and then London, describing events in August Zaleski's life as seen from Ewelina's perspective, were written by hand and then typed up, which indicates that she intended to record her memoirs and perhaps even publish them.

In titling these notes *Our Journey*, with the subtitle *Warsaw–Romania 1939*, she most likely wanted to emphasise the unity of experience between the spouses, but not among other dignitaries and their families heading in the same direction. It is worth noting here that Ewelina Zaleska took a sensitive view of public reactions to the behaviour of fleeing officials, and eagerly described them on the pages of her journal. Her point of view can be considered a valuable one. At the time of his departure, Zaleski was not a member of the government, and so he – and his wife as well –

⁷ See, for instance: L. Noël, *Agresja niemiecka na Polskę*, edited by S. Zabięło, Warsaw 1966; *Wrzesień 1939 r. w relacjach dyplomatów: Józefa Becka, Jana Szembeka, Anthony'ego Drexel-Biddle'a, Leona Noëla i innych*, edited by A. Skrzypek, Warsaw 1989.

⁸ PISM, August Zaleski Collection, coll. 424/1; see also: <http://www.sejm-wielki.pl/s/cmentarze.php?grob=211507>, accessed 12 February 2018. Elsewhere in the same collection Ewelina Zaleska's date of birth is given incorrectly as 18 December 1896. The date was recalled from memory; it appears on the births and deaths registration certified by Mariusz Bolesław Hrynkiwicz-Moczulski. PISM, August Zaleski Collection, coll. 424/4.

⁹ P. Wandycz, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ J. Laroche, *Polska lat 1926-1935. Wspomnienia ambasadora francuskiego*, translated and edited by S. Zabięło, Warsaw 1966, p. 52.

¹¹ P. Ziętara, *Misja ostatniej szansy: próba zjednoczenia polskiej emigracji politycznej przez gen. Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego w latach 1952-1956*, Warsaw 1995, p. 132.

¹² PISM, August Zaleski Collection, coll. 424/4, bp.

¹³ <https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/study-groups/the-august-zaleski-memorial-lecture-in-modern-polish-history>, accessed 20 Aug 2018.

looked at government decisions simultaneously from both outside and inside, having had years of diplomatic experience. Undoubtedly, the fact of having been ousted from office in 1932 also contributed to the subjectivity of their opinions.

The notes written by Zaleska and reflecting her point of view can be listed alongside the memoirs of other wives of Polish diplomats and politicians.¹⁴ Besides describing key events in political history and the widely discussed actions of high-ranking politicians and military leaders, they also tell us about the dilemmas and quandaries faced by the main characters, the author and her husband, as they left their homeland. Zaleska does not exaggerate or embellish the events that she describes, nor does she explain her husband's decision to leave Poland. Let us only recall that August Zaleski did not hold any government position at that time. Just before the outbreak of the Second World War, he was chairman of the supervisory board of Bank Handlowy (Commercial Bank), and president of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce. Beyond doubt, this affects the evaluation of Zaleski's behaviour: he cannot be accused of having fled the country while still in office. Moreover, the diary clearly points to the fact that he left Poland at the behest of Stefan Starzyński, the mayor of Warsaw. Then, after meeting Roger Raczyński, the Polish ambassador in Bucharest, he and his wife left Romania on 22 September 1939 and journeyed to Paris, where on 30 September Zaleski became minister of foreign affairs for the second time.

While she was still in Warsaw, Zaleska looked with a critical eye at the government's actions, recording in her diary the lack of information and continued silence of the authorities. She uses the term 'exodus' (*egzoda*) when referring to the departure from Poland of the president and senior government officials. She writes of the "fleeing Government" and "fleeing officials", whereas the term 'evacuation' used in government circles does not appear in her notes even once.¹⁵

The diary presented here also includes passages on social history, as Zaleska devoted much space to describing everyday life. In her diary, she quite faithfully depicts the problems that were multiplying in the early days of September, such as the shortage of petrol and accommodation, as well as the threat of bombing. She tells us about the attitudes of Polish society at the onset of the German occupation: from the numerous examples of kindness that she experienced from strangers, to actions aimed at combating the bribery that was so evident at the time of crisis.

The social picture given by the diary also includes the spouses' circle of friends, which emerges when one reads *Our Journey*. The people with whom the Zaleskis have contact are mainly members of the landed gentry, just like them. On their way, they also meet people associated with the successive stages in Zaleski's professional career: diplomats and government officials, and people related to his position on the

¹⁴ For example, J. Beck, *Kiedy bylam ekscelencją*, Warsaw 1990; H. Paderewska, *Memoirs 1910-1920*, edited by M. Sikiński, Hoover Institution Press 2015; M. Bartel, *Pamiętnik Marii Bartłowej, Zeszyty Historyczne* 1987, no. 81, pp. 34–65.

¹⁵ See, for instance: the section entitled *Akcja dyplomatyczna w warunkach ewakuacji*, in: J. Beck, *op. cit.*, pp. 248–252.

Council of the Bank of Poland. Significantly, when they were leaving the country, their fate was most closely linked to that of the Falter family,¹⁶ who were not associated with government circles.

Our Journey was originally written by hand, and was only later typed up. As the number of the page being copied was noted in the margin, we know that the 26 pages of typescript on which the present edition is based correspond to 106 pages of manuscript. The document contains handwritten corrections, mostly of typing errors, and occasional crossings-out and other adjustments – where these are significant, we indicate them in the footnotes. Parenthetical remarks marked with slashes in the typescript have also been preserved.

Zaleska's recollections were written in the form of a diary, which initially she used to update every day. In due course, however, the subtitles showing the date became less and less frequent, and the entries became longer. Also the very nature of the notes points to the fact that the entries were made contemporaneously, sometimes comprising events occurring over a span of several days. The author did not edit her text later, not even to delete information that was sometimes repeated. However, one remark, namely the mention of the death of Major Dr Witold Kępiński at Katyń, seems to refer to a later period than September 1939.

We have made an effort to identify all of the persons mentioned in *Our Journey*. Unfortunately, this was not possible in quite a number of cases. We can only guess that a certain name refers to a servant, and another to a distant friend. Such characters often appear as collective figures in Zaleska's narrative, and although interesting, they serve as little more than a background to her story. The full names of well-known historical figures appearing for the first time in the text are added in square brackets; other editorial comments also appear in square brackets.

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29 August 1939

Zet¹⁷ is to come from Warsaw tomorrow for a very long weekend.

30 August [1939]

The phone wakes me up. 7:30 in the morning. Kamiński¹⁸ from the yard calls: general mobilisation; the army have taken all the horses, leaving only a few driving ones. People went to the station to go to their regiments, others went there to see them off. I dashed to the yard. This is a huge yard, paved with cobblestone, soaked in sunshine. Incredible silence. Kamiński, long, thin, even more stooped, leaning heavily on his gnarled stick, stands in the middle of the yard. He stands there, pet-

¹⁶ See footnote 56.

¹⁷ August Zaleski of the Lubicz coat of arms (1883–1972). Ewelina Zaleska used to call her husband “Zet” (the Polish name for the letter Z), not only in these notes. According to Jan Lechoń, this followed “the style of Josephine, who would address Napoleon as ‘Bonaparte’”. J. Lechoń, *Dziennik 2: 1 stycznia 1951–31 grudnia 1952*, Warsaw 1992, p. 229.

¹⁸ Probably one of the estate administrators.

rified. He repeats what he has said on the phone. I go back to the house. I ask to be put through to Warsaw /to Zet/ and Myszków /to Ela/¹⁹ and I wait. Hours pass by. This waiting seems hopeless. War. It all seems a nightmare from which there is no awakening.

At last, Myszków about 12 o'clock. Ela says that the same thing is happening up there. Zbinio²⁰ was ordered by the Government to send all his cattle to the east, but he was given only one van where there is enough room for only a part of his breeding barn. The rest must be driven there. Zbinio says that cows can go no more than eight kilometres and they are doomed to perish anyway. He sends the van to Fr[anciszek] Krasiński²¹ who lives on the other side of the Bug. Ela sends the children with Cela by the 2:00 *train bleu*²² to Warsaw, to Jurek. She asks me to go with them. I don't have a car. I can't leave.

Warsaw /Zet/, at last.

Zet says that the situation is very bad. That he sent Stefan²³ with a car at 5 in the morning to fetch me, so that I could come back at once.²⁴ That Stefan and the car should already be here. But neither Stefan nor the car is here.

I decide that if Stefan and the car are not here by 2 o'clock, I will try to get to Poznań by our local train and from there to Warsaw. It'll be a long ordeal, but somehow things will work out. I send Michał and Józef /the cook and servant/ to the station to join their regiments. I have the horses got ready for 2 o'clock. I take Władzia²⁵ and her two suitcases. Stanisław²⁶ stays behind, his wife is in hospital in Śrem with pneumonia.

The train is still here. But there is such a crowd of accompanying people that there is no way you could squeeze through. People in the train are packed like sardines, everyone excited and tipsy. Noise, rows. What am I supposed to do? I stand there helpless. There is no way you could get on the train. And suddenly I see Stefan drive up. I go back home. I have to take something with me and make some decisions.

Stanisław and I go to the park. The young deer found during the harvest must be set free. Stanisław had been bottle-feeding them. We opened the gate – they raced off to the groves.

I go home again. One would like to take so many things, and nothing will be taken. The beloved trees cannot be taken.

I phone Ela once again. This time I'm put through in an instant. It crossed my mind that I could tell Zbinio that because I would pass by [Stanisław] Jasiukowicz's estate,²⁷ I could ask him if he could take some of the cows. Because he is Zbinio's good friend. Zbinio was very pleased.

It's hard to leave. I take Stanisław, too. We have to go and fetch Stanisław's wife from the hospital in Śrem.

We release a stork which did not fly away in autumn because of a broken wing and wintered in a basement in a pink sweater and on a large amount of straw in the house. What will become of it?

¹⁹ Helena Żółkowska, *née* Komorowska of the Dołęga coat of arms (1893–1974), Ewelina Zaleska's sister.

²⁰ Zbigniew Żółtowski of the Ogończyk coat of arms (1888–?), administrator of Myszków in Greater Poland, Ewelina Zaleska's brother-in-law.

²¹ Mostly likely Franciszek Krasiński (1887–1973), the last pre-war owner of the Sterdyń estate (Sterdynia) near the river Bug.

²² A reference to a dark blue luxury train which operated in Western Europe.

²³ Most likely Mr and Mrs Zaleski's driver.

²⁴ Zaleski meant his wife's return from the Psarskie estate, where she was staying at the time, to Warsaw.

²⁵ Most likely a housekeeper or maid.

²⁶ Most likely a head groom.

²⁷ Stanisław Jasiukowicz of the Jasińczyk coat of arms (1882–1946), the owner of the Chodów estate near Kutno and member of parliament associated with the National Democracy movement.

I call the country administrator. [Marian] Podhorodeński²⁸ says that his wife is at her sister's in Warsaw, that she is sick, that she has a fever of 40 degrees and he can no longer get in touch with her. I promise him that I will contact them and let him know one way or another.

But all this is a kind of suffering that you can't comprehend.

We lock the house. The keys /we give/ to Kamiński and we leave...

I collect Stanisław's wife from the hospital. I tuck her up with cushions. Maybe she won't get worse. We leave Śrem behind us. How sad...

We still have a long way to go. Heat, dust... We suffocate in the car but I'm afraid to open the windows in case Stanisław's wife catches a chill. She still has a fever. The road is empty, not a living soul around. No cars, horses or people. At about 5 o'clock I get to Chodów.²⁹ There can be no mistake. A big board displaying the name. The manor house, built of brick, almost on the road, along with the outbuildings, surrounded by a high brick wall. I drive through the gate. Stefan goes to ask whether the owners are at home and if I can see them.

Mr and Mrs Jasiukowicz are very polite, but certainly very surprised. Immediately I apologise to them for troubling [them] although I do not know them, but I did so at the request of my brother-in-law, Żółtowski, and I tell them about the mobilisation and the government orders, etc. and about the matter of Zbinio and his cattle. Jasiukowicz says that, naturally, he has a lot of room in his barn and can willingly take Zbinio's cows, but that they are very surprised by this mobilisation thing because they have not heard anything and that nothing of that sort is going on here. Isn't it perhaps exaggerated? I can feel that they do not really believe me. I've got the feeling that although they are being nice to me, they think I'm crazy... Tea is served. An elderly lady, a very nice aunt, tells me that she is indebted to Zet because he helped her in some tricky matter at the bank.³⁰

So strong is their sense of disbelief that I am beginning to wonder myself whether I'm exaggerating; but this too will end. I thank them kindly and say that I will let Zbinio know. I say goodbye and off we go. We are already in Warsaw at dusk.

Zet is waiting for me. He says that the situation is most serious. He is very depressed. People know nothing. [He says] that he phoned the Rydzs,³¹ but they are already gone. They left on 29 [August] in the morning and nobody knows where for. They took all their belongings, including the furniture.

I call Podhorodeński's sister, it is much better /addendum: she is much better, only 37.2/ but I cannot get through to him any longer. Miraculously, I am put through to Ela. I tell her about Jasiukowicz and ask her to call Podhorodeński to let him know that his wife is much better, that she's down to 37.2.

On the radio, Teofilek³² casts slurs on Poland...

The Government remains silent. No statements have been issued. The foreign ministry says nothing either.

And danger is looming on the horizon. A sense of some horrible disaster. And the Government still does not say anything. The public are calm. They are waiting in this peace or dread...

Our doctor is on holiday. Stanisław's wife still has a fever. I call the Red Cross. Doctor Zembzuski promises that he will come right away. I wait for him.

²⁸ Marian Podhorodeński, Śrem county administrator.

²⁹ Incorrectly given as Chyrów in the original text.

³⁰ Zaleski was chairman of the supervisory board of Bank Handlowy in Warsaw.

³¹ Edward Śmigły-Rydz (1886–1941) and Marta Rydz, *née* Thomas (1895–1951), whose first husband was Michał Zaleski, a relative of August Zaleski. Śmigły-Rydz was Marshal of Poland, Inspector General of the Armed Forces, and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the September campaign of 1939.

³² Refers to a radio station or the Nazi presenter Hans Hamman, who used that medium to spread German propaganda.

Zet says that war is hanging by a thread. It is not clear why the government stopped the mobilisation. Apparently at the behest of the English.

The doctor came. A friendly man. I entrust Stanisław's wife to his care. I ask him to come every day. Teofilek goes on and on about Poland and the Poles...

31 August 1939

I go to Aunt Karola. She is very ill. Cela and the children arrive in the afternoon. She quarrelled with Henia, took the children and came to us. I expect it is safer in the countryside, but what can I say?

The doctor comes in the afternoon. I ask him to get a nurse for Aunt Karola. He promises to send the best one he has, the most trusted one, whom he has known for years. Stanisław's wife is somewhat better.

The mood is terrible. What are we waiting for? Nobody knows anything. The atmosphere is tense. My mouth is dry with anxiety. Zet is very depressed. The Germans were mocking our suspended mobilisation. /The whole last sentence is hardly legible/

1 September 1939

Six o'clock in the morning and the aeroplanes fly over our heads. War, so it seems. But the Government says nothing.

Zet goes to the bank. German aeroplanes are over our heads from time to time. Because of Cela and the children, my heart is in my throat.

Zet has breakfast at the hunting club. He met [Henry] Martin,³³ a Swiss envoy, there. He says that because of the German aeroplanes he phoned [Józef] Beck³⁴ at eight in the morning to ask if this was war. Mrs [Jadwiga] Beck³⁵ answers the phone and says that her husband has gone to the Castle to see the President³⁶ but he said that there would be no war, that these were only manoeuvres to scare us.

A few bombs are dropped on Warsaw. The public are remarkable. Calm. The people of Warsaw are magnificent.

The Government is still silent...³⁷

2 September 1939

More bombs. Nothing from the Government. At last, the army responds. A few bombs were dropped on Warsaw somewhere near us. I took the children to the hallway because there are no windows there.

The people of Warsaw are surprised. They did not know anything about the mobilisation in the Poznań region or about the possibility of war at all. The Government has not prepared the public for that. But they are wonderful, they are behaving superbly. There are mutterings against the Government, but apart from that the attitude is magnificent.

The Government still tells the public nothing.

There is news that the Germans have crossed the border along the whole front. [Edward] Śmigły-Rydz³⁸ spouts some clichés that Westerplatte is to fight till the very end.

³³ Henri Martin, Swiss envoy in Warsaw from 18 March 1938.

³⁴ Józef Beck (1894–1944), Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1932–1939.

³⁵ Jadwiga Beck, *née* Salkowska (Burhardt-Bukacka by her first marriage) (1896–1974), second wife of Józef Beck.

³⁶ Ignacy Mościcki (1867–1946) was President of Poland at that time. He held office from 1926 to 1939.

³⁷ President Ignacy Mościcki's address was to be posted in the capital on 1 September 1939. F.S. Składkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³⁸ The name was erroneously written "Rydz-Śmigły" in the typescript. The error has been consistently corrected in the passages to follow.

3 September 1939

I ask to be woken at 5, because at 6 the Germans start their air raids. Józef says that an anti-aircraft company is stationed in the Ujazdów Park. He went there and they told him that they had not been sent any food since yesterday noon.

I go downstairs. The park gate is locked. Guards. I ask them to send for the officer. The officer came. I asked whether they needed anything. He tells me that they have not eaten since yesterday noon. There is food, but there is no transport. He said that they would be happy if they could get some tea.

Władzia says that there is a small grocery shop round the corner on Chopin Street. We went there. The cart drove up just then bringing heaps of loaves of bread and a pile of sausages. I couldn't buy everything because the owner asked to leave something for his regular customers. A bag of sugar and a few pounds of tea. How many times we had to go back and forth to carry it all! Down-to-earth Władzia advises cutting the bread into thick slices, buttering them and putting thickly sliced sausage on top. Piles of those sandwiches were put on big wooden trays. We brewed tea in enamelled jugs normally used for hot water. The bag of sugar was taken immediately. Józef and Władzia carry that and empty trays are filled at once, as are the jugs. We had to hurry so that they would have all that before 6 o'clock, because at 6 the raids began. They said that they had all received food and there had been enough for everybody. How happy they were.

A raid begins. The bombs fall here and there. The public are calm. There is no panic. The Government remains silent. Nobody knows what is going on, except that the Germans are flying and there are bombs. No announcements. The public have a heroic attitude. They ask where the Commander-in-Chief is, what the President is doing.

Zet is depressed but calm and composed as always. There is nobody to get information from. Some news, from whom I don't know, that [Michał] Grażyński³⁹ has escaped from Katowice and is minister of propaganda. But he gives no statement. Józef, the servant, left – and did not come back...

4 September 1939

As usual, the air raids begin at 6 in the morning. Somehow people are not scared. The people of Warsaw are wonderful!

A ring before noon. I can hear someone in Zet's library talking through tears. Who – I do not know. In a minute, the phone rings. I answer it. Mrs [Olga] Strasburger⁴⁰ asks if her husband is at Zet's. I say I don't know, but there is someone here. Reassured, she hangs up.

Indeed, it was [Henryk] Strasburger⁴¹ sobbing in Zet's room. He cannot get petrol⁴² to leave Warsaw, he cannot get a pass. The last hope is Zet, that Zet will help him, because his wife told him not to come home until he got one.

Zet phones [Władysław Romuald] Jaroszewicz⁴³ and asks him for petrol and a pass. I know that he got both, because they left Warsaw that day thanks to Zet. I find out that our neighbours, the Heiman-Jareckis,⁴⁴ also left Warsaw this morning.

The news spreads that the Government is leaving Warsaw. But all this without any official announcements, on the sly.

³⁹ Michał Grażyński (1890–1965), governor of Silesia in 1926–1939.

⁴⁰ Olga Strasburger, *née* Dunin (1902–1970), wife of Henryk Strasburger.

⁴¹ Henryk Leon Strasburger (1877–1951), politician and diplomat, General Commissioner of the Polish Republic in the Free City of Danzig (1924–1932), one of the presidents of the Lewiatan organisation.

⁴² The word *petrol* is used in the Polish text, interchangeably with the now usual *benzyna*.

⁴³ Władysław Romuald Jaroszewicz (1887–1947), Government Commissioner for Warsaw from 1926.

⁴⁴ Aleksander Heiman-Jarecki (1896–1966), president of the Polish Textile Industry Association, active in the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government, senator; and his wife Bronisława, *née* Koyałowicz.

I go to Aunt Karola. The nurse tells me that Aunt is very disappointed with her nephews, because one of them did not answer her call, and when she called the other the mother-in-law answered and said she and the minister had been ordered to go east at 6 in the morning – I do not know where – and didn't even say goodbye, because other ministries were also leaving but this was supposed to be kept secret from the public.

I ask Zet what we should do. Zet says that he is not going to leave. The whole exodus⁴⁵ of the Government taking place in secret!

It turns out that almost all the ministries with almost their whole staff were to leave in secret on the 4th at 6 in the morning. The Becks and the foreign ministry officials were the first to leave – not all of them – mainly Beck's military men /and/ *dwójkarze*⁴⁶ led by [Wiktor Tomir] Drymmer.⁴⁷

Apparently, on the road out of Warsaw there is such a traffic jam that the cars are waiting for hours and cannot move! There are people who abandon their cars and go back home because they are afraid that they will not be able to move. They are no doubt afraid of air raids, too.

What next?

Zbinio and his wife arrive by car. He is already in uniform but cannot find out where his regiment is. They take the children, Cela and a few things and set off for the Rulikowskis⁴⁸ in the Lublin area.

Zet is in touch with [Roman] Knoll.⁴⁹ We find out that Jaroszewicz is still here. That [Stefan] Starzyński⁵⁰ – the mayor of the city – is left as the sole guardian of Warsaw.

Nobody knows whether anyone from the Government has stayed behind. In any case, the Government provides no news.

Śmigły-Rydz on the radio at "Westerplatte". Given that we are not leaving, Władzia says we should stock up on supplies. I give her *carte blanche*⁵¹ to do this.

The news that the Government and President have left spreads through Warsaw. There is contempt and disgust for the Government among the public at large.

Warsaw and all of Poland seem to be left at the mercy of Providence, with no Government, no authority, no police. The Commander-in-Chief has long vanished. There is hatred and contempt for the Government among the public at large.

People who have cars are leaving – private people. There is no sense of panic, but the mood is tense.

Radkowska⁵² /?/ calls me and asks if we are leaving. I say no. Miss /?/ Róża⁵³ phones – the same question. I say no.

Jaroszewicz urges Zet to leave Warsaw. Zet does not want to leave either Warsaw or Poland. Besides, where to go? Zet wants to stay in Warsaw.

One of our friends gets in touch with Mr Krzyżanowski.⁵⁴ Krzyżanowski invites Zet to come to his estate in Wołyń, near Włodzimierz. It is twenty something kilometres from Włodzimierz.

⁴⁵ The rare and archaic Polish term *egzoda* is used.

⁴⁶ Officers of Section II (the intelligence section) in the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

⁴⁷ Wiktor Tomir Drymmer (1896–1975), director of the Personnel Department (from 1931) and Consular Department (from 1933) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He conducted the ministry's evacuation to Romania in September 1939.

⁴⁸ Probably Maria Rulikowska (1888–1951) and Zygmunt Rulikowski (1874–1960), the owners of Mełgiew Podzamcze in the Lublin region.

⁴⁹ Roman Knoll (1888–1942), Polish lawyer and diplomat, envoy in Berlin in 1928–1930, later associated with the Front Morges movement.

⁵⁰ Stefan Starzyński (1893–1939), politician, mayor of Warsaw 1934–1939, killed by the Germans.

⁵¹ The French term appears in the original text.

⁵² No further details known.

⁵³ No further details known.

⁵⁴ Tadeusz Krzyżanowski, member of the board of the Polish Educational Society in Wołyń.

Starzyński, the mayor of the city, asks Zet to leave Warsaw, saying that it will be one load off his back.

In the evening, an officer takes our car and Stefan, to drive to some military centre. The car was not returned. It was smashed into pieces. Stefan came back ill, with a fever. The idea of going to Krzyżanowski in Wołyń was dropped.

6 September 1939

At noon Zet calls from the bank. He says that Starzyński *insists*⁵⁵ that Zet should leave Warsaw. That Falter⁵⁶ came to him and suggested going to Wołyń together, because he had a car and the chauffeur had joined the army, while Zet had a chauffeur but his car was smashed. Pressed by Starzyński, Zet agreed and said that we must go tonight. We cannot take much with us, because there will be seven of us including the Falters and the chauffeur.

In the afternoon, while searching for Cz. K.,⁵⁷ who has also left, I came to Królewska Street at the corner of Saski Square. There happened to be a raid. I and a few other people who were in the street hid in a doorway. In fact without any rush or panic. I admired the people of Warsaw. The raid was short. Coming out of the doorway I saw a magnificent convertible Cadillac, and in it next to the chauffeur was Sławoj [Felicjan] Składkowski.⁵⁸ He was driving very slowly and looking around in all directions with his military policeman's eyes. It was clear that he was driving slowly on purpose so that people would see he was in Warsaw.

– Later, I found out that Sławoj left Warsaw that evening.⁵⁹ –

The decision to leave was a tough one. To leave the house and the servants in the hands of Providence. They had a lot of supplies. Władzia had organised that really well.

I absent-mindedly packed my suitcase. I only knew that I had to take Zet's things. I was completely depressed. I went to Aunt Karola to say goodbye. I knew that she was in the care of a very kind soul and Jurek, who did not want to leave. Zet's family portraits, his mum's beautiful carpet / the next sentence is illegible/⁶⁰

Now farewell to Warsaw. Like to Psarskie earlier. Constant farewells, and as if forever. I felt like a mannequin that moved and did not take what it really needed but chose things randomly. The servants are given money. It is hard for me to leave them at such a moment. Professor Głębocki⁶¹ stays as a guardian too.

6 o'clock in the afternoon, addendum.

Zet was at Knoll's in the afternoon to say goodbye and tell him that we are leaving. Knoll broke an ear off a green terracotta donkey which he had at home and gave it to Zet, saying that if Zet had a chance to send an order, he should give this donkey's ear to the messenger so that he would know it was Zet's man.

Somehow every object in the house sticks more in the memory. Farewell to each thing. Zet's family portraits, mementos of his mother, her beautiful carpets. Always goodbyes...

It was not until 10 in the evening that we got into the car. We were supposed to start from Kazimierz, where Falter's daughters went on the foreign ministry bus with a cousin who was a clerk.

⁵⁵ A Polish version of the English verb *insist* was used in the original text.

⁵⁶ Alfred Falter (1880–1954), industrialist, entrepreneur, vice-chairman of the Council of Bank Handlowy.

⁵⁷ Probably Kazimierz Czapiński (1882–1941), activist and member of parliament representing the Polish Socialist Party (PPS).

⁵⁸ Sławoj Felicjan Składkowski (1885–1962), soldier of the Polish Legions, Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs in 1936–1939.

⁵⁹ He left Warsaw at around 2 o'clock the following night.

⁶⁰ A margin note indicates that this refers to Ewelina Zaleska's mother, Julia Komorowska, *née* Stolzenwald.

⁶¹ Perhaps Jerzy Głębocki, junior assistant in the department of political law at the Catholic University of Lublin.

Leaving Warsaw was terrible. As if one was undergoing a terrible operation whose outcome was unknown. I looked at Zet. Composed as always, he shows no emotions. And yet the decision was hard.

The road out of Warsaw was not as clogged as on the previous days. Those who had cars had left a long time ago and the roads were empty.

A feeling of great emptiness, just like in the yard in Psarskie, but there is some struggle in this emptiness...

We reached Kazimierz in the morning. Tired, short of sleep, and worried.

There were a few cars and a bus on a big, very bumpy square. It was the exodus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that is, its junior officials. It was led by Drymmer. It was a sad sight.

He was kind enough to give us a few litres of petrol. Immediately we drove off in the direction of Lublin. That's what our journey to Włodzimierz was like. We took Mrs Falter.⁶² The car was packed. Zet, Wanda and I on a bench seat, the girls on tip-up seats.⁶³ Falter next to the chauffeur.

The fires in Lublin were over – there was only some smoke here and there. But there is a terrible chaos.

We all looked tired and dirty, only Zet was in shape as usual. We met Tadzio Twardowski⁶⁴ on the street. He was in uniform and was looking for his regiment. He said that Zbinio and his wife were with the Rulikowskis in the country, and the widow of Kazimierz Lubomirski⁶⁵ was there too with her children and son-in-law.

Lublin seemed wrecked. We had a cup of tea, which was not easy to get, in a large hall of some collapsed hotel. There were no vacancies in the hotels and there wasn't even anywhere to wash. In the end we got something to eat, but in general the city was in chaos, people were harassed⁶⁶ and life was out of control. There was no place to spend the night or even rest. We had to travel onward.

7 September /?/ [1939]

We left Lublin late in the afternoon. Flat, monotonous. Lublin was ruined. Hopelessly sad. Roads lined with trees. The sun shines for the Germans. It makes their invasion of Poland easier.

From time to time you can hear the roar of aeroplanes, German ones of course. Ours are nowhere to be seen. Lublin did not fight. The Germans prowl as they wish.

We approach a turn. There is a mountain or, say, a hill on one side of the road. At this turn at the bottom of the hill, Drymmer's whole convoy is standing. There is an air raid somewhere nearby. They are probably standing there because the hill may give them cover.

Zet says not to stop. We pass them by. The road is lined with trees, only a patch of sky above us. Somewhere nearby, right in front of us, we hear the roar of approaching planes. Zet says that we should go fast. Stefan speeds up. A German plane flies low over our heads, so low that I can see the faces of both pilots. But we passed each other at such speed that they did not manage to bomb us. We are already far from their reach. We drive normally again, and the Germans can be heard again. Falter says that if there is a raid we need to get out of the car and hide among potato plants – in the nearest field. We try to do this, but only Wanda, the girls and I. Zet stays in the car. They flew over and did not bomb us. We drive on.

We drive all night. We reach Włodzimierz very early in the morning, at 5 o'clock.

The sun is shining. Wonderful autumn. A curse.

[9 September 1939]

It seems to be the 9th of September already. I am losing track of time.

⁶² Wanda Falter, *née* Krasuska, Alfred Falter's wife.

⁶³ Here: a folding seat.

⁶⁴ Tadeusz Twardowski, no further details known.

⁶⁵ Teresa, *née* Wodzicka of the Leliwa coat of arms (1883–1948), widow of Kazimierz Lubomirski of the Drużyna coat of arms.

⁶⁶ The non-standard Polish *zcharasowani* appears in the original text.

There is an extraordinary great silence in Włodzimierz. We immediately bump into two home guards⁶⁷ with armbands. One of them is a civilian, he seems to be an official in the county administrator's office, the other one a Jew. Both are very polite. We told them that we want to go to Mr Krzyżanowski's estate and we would like to call him first. Waiting for the call, both of the gentlemen told us that they advised against going to Mr Krzyżanowski, because it is 23 kilometres along a sandy road, and if we run out of petrol we will not get any there.

This sounds discouraging. We get the call. Mr Krzyżanowski says that in the meantime so many escapees have arrived that he has only one small room left. In such circumstances, the question of going to Mr Krzyżanowski is dropped, since there are seven of us.

We went, or rather we were taken by the two gentlemen, to a café where we might eat something. The café is full. They can give us eggs and tea. They are extremely polite, the café is clean and full of light. That's something at least.

We decided that we must stay in Włodzimierz and winter here. These two gentlemen with armbands who have accompanied us say that there is a house that can be rented. It is an elderly lady with a small house. She lives in one apartment and rents the other.

It's a small wooden house. The apartment has three rooms and a kitchen. We take /those/ three rooms and kitchen. We in one room, the Falters in the second, the girls in the third, Stefan in the kitchen. Anyway, we will not be cooking, the café is nearby. We are at the edge of town, the garden at the back is overgrown with tall grass, access at the end with the key to ...! At the front the road separates us from a field.

Wanda and I are going to buy couches, wash bowls, water jugs, etc., because there is no furniture except for a few kitchen chairs.

Because the gentlemen with the armbands promise us some German bombing, Stefan puts the car under the trees so that it cannot be seen from above. There is an air raid early in the afternoon. A few cars belonging to some escapees were struck at the junction with the road to Łuck and everybody in them was killed.

In the afternoon, 17 coffins were transported down the road in front of our house, which separates us from the field.

Thus passed our first day in Włodzimierz. And Mrs Badeni⁶⁸ and the Skrzyńskis⁶⁹, whom she had personally driven from Kraków, came to see us. Because they had been told that Zet was here, so they came to ask what we would do next. They have been put up in the school.

Zet and I went for a walk near the house, and we turned into an alley. All of a sudden, a German plane started to circle very high above our heads, slowly over and over again. We walked into a garden. There were defence ditches there. A gentleman came out and suddenly, I felt a terrible panic. "If you are scared, Miss, go into these defence ditches!" – very sharply. Zet replied to him: "You're a doctor and you should know that one's nerves can be frayed after so many sleepless nights." The doctor went quiet.

One more day in Włodzimierz. The next day, when we were standing on the porch, an official from the county administrator's office came and told Zet that we couldn't stay here because everything had been requisitioned for the general staff of Śmigły-Rydz, who himself will reside on [Krzysztof] Chodkiewicz's⁷⁰ estate four kilometres [away], and the rest will stay here. But because it is Zet, they will make an exception and he can stay 24 hours longer.

⁶⁷ The English term is used in the original text. It refers to various military formations created in emergency situations from reserve forces.

⁶⁸ Jadwiga Badeni, *née* Plater-Zyberk (1884–1963), wife of Stanisław Henryk Badeni of the Bończa coat of arms (1877–1943), lawyer and patron of arts associated with the Jagiellonian University.

⁶⁹ Andrzej Skrzyński (1885–?) and Maria Skrzyńska (1896–1961) of the Zaremba coat of arms.

⁷⁰ Krzysztof Chodkiewicz of the Kościeszka coat of arms (1912–1978), the last pre-war owner of the Młynów estate.

What are we waiting for?! We decide that it is not worth waiting. We will leave tonight. But you need a pass to get to Łuck. I went to the county administrator's office with Zet. The county administrator is forbidden to see people in his office. There is an order that he should see everyone waiting together in the waiting room. It is a matter of bribery.⁷¹ The waiting room [is] a large, empty room with bare walls, bare windows, and Vienna chairs by the walls. We wait /for/ him in the waiting room along with a dozen other people. The administrator turns up and approaches each of us in turn. – A strange order because of bribery. – We talk standing up.

We get a pass. On returning to our little porch, we find Mrs Badeni and the Skrzyńskis there. They came to ask what to do because they had also been told to leave immediately. Zet advises them to go and get passes, but after giving it some thought they say they will be better off if they go back to Kraków.

Wanda F[alter] says that we are all dirty, creased, her husband with his shirt undone because it is hot, and Minister Zaleski clean, shaven, in great form, neither tired nor depressed.

At two in the morning we started off for Łuck. Falter got enough petrol from "his people". It was a long way, we passed some convoys which were either crawling along or standing motionless.

Tree-lined roads protected us from the German aircraft. In case of an air raid, we were advised to get out of the car and hide in a potato field. We did that once, but Zet stayed with Stefan in the car.

It was a dark night when we arrived in Łuck, and the city was completely dark too. We stopped at a square. Not a living soul could be seen, but a male voice could be heard: a policeman or a night watchman or a man with an armband.⁷² We asked where we could spend the night. He said that everything was full, there were no vacancies anywhere, but after a while [he added] that perhaps at the school, although there were a lot of refugees there too, there might be some room. He escorted our car to the school. To the first floor, to a large school room: a terrible sight. Three rows of people lying side by side across the room, close together, so packed that there was not even a passage between them to the next room. Some of them were covered with blankets, others with coats, clearly so tired that no one even moved.

The windows were shut. Stale air and stench.

We went back to the porch. Zet asked: "What's this building opposite?" A big building, quite dark. "It's the bank of Poland" – was the answer. Let's go to the caretaker then. The caretaker let us in because Zet and Falter were members of the Council of the Bank of Poland, and after some negotiations he said that there was nothing to sleep on, but he took us to the meeting room. In the centre there was a table, a few chairs and a beautiful desk. That's all. But we needed some sleep. We were extremely tired. Each of us found a bit of space, and laid down on a coat with a sweater for a pillow. When I woke up, it was already daylight and the sun was out. Falter was sitting in his corner eating. I asked in a whisper where the food had come from – he pointed to the desk. There was a pile of supplies there. Loaves of bread, lots of sausages and butter and many other things.

After that night, Zet looked *impeccable*.⁷³

We saw a fairly large hotel and it turned out that there was a room – a very small room – vacant. A bed, a washbasin, a wardrobe. The Falters also found something for themselves. After freshening up, we left. Right at the hotel [we saw] [Franciszek] Paschalski⁷⁴ accompanied by a provincial governor. They were walking together, they were dirty, and Zet even gave them a key to our room so that they could wash. Paschalski said that he would not go any further and would return to Warsaw. Zet went to the governor's building to see the governor and get some news. But there he was told

⁷¹ Handwritten on the typescript, above a crossed-out remark: "illegible note".

⁷² See footnote 67.

⁷³ The French word appears in the original text.

⁷⁴ Franciszek Julian Maria Aleksander Paschalski of the Sas coat of arms (1889–1940), lawyer, social activist and politician associated with the Sanation movement.

that the governor [Andrzej] Hauke-Nowak⁷⁵ would not start work until 6 o'clock, he is so afraid of bombing – he is in the shelter. It can't be helped. A lot of people want to know what's going on so they wait by the governor's building.

The whole Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already left, only Mirosław Arciszewski⁷⁶ has stayed behind and is working. Zet tells me to go to his office and get a petrol ration coupon from him. In a makeshift office, in a waiting room, I meet [Władysław] Raczekiewicz.⁷⁷ He apologised that he couldn't let me go in before him, as he was in a hurry because they were sending him abroad – he is the president of Światpol /the worldwide organisation of Poles/⁷⁸ and he is to engage in activity there. He simply had to get a passport for foreign travel. He was in there for a really short time.

Arciszewski was very nervous and angry. He was complaining, he was kind of bitter. He was outraged at the Government and hurled insults at the Government and at everything. I got the petrol coupon. I went back to the hotel. Zet told me that he had found out that Sławoj Składkowski was in Łuck and he would go to see him. He left. The bombing began. He was at Sławoj's when it started. He told him: "We have to do something, General. We can't just keep driving straight ahead. Let's do something." The general replied: "I can't do anything, but you go to Tarnopol. Śmigły-Rydz will be there tomorrow and you can have a talk with him."

We went to a restaurant. A restaurant in the open air, lots of tables, crowded with people. We sit at a table. [Leon] Rożałowski,⁷⁹ the county administrator and Mrs Rydz-Śmigły's brother-in-law, is alone without his wife, he's got nothing with him but a huge Alsatian. He does not know where his wife is. Our administrator Podchoroński says that the last news he has had from his wife is what I passed to him through the Szamotoły administrator.⁸⁰

Many familiar faces. Everyone is concerned and kind of embarrassed. From a distance, I can see [Frank] Savery⁸¹ and [Richard] Kimens.⁸² They virtually ignore us, but the local people are magnificent. The waitresses are polite. Kindness radiates from the locals. Courtesy and goodwill towards these escapees, there is no sense of fear. There are no air raids. We find out that a bomb broke a window in the bishop's house where [Bogusław] Miedziński⁸³ had been put up. Someone was hurt, someone was in shock.

The Red Cross convoy moves along the main street in Łuck. Walking on the pavement next to one of the ambulances is Dr [Witold] Kępiński⁸⁴ (the ophthalmologist). He is barely recognisable. I know him from the "lantern balls",⁸⁵ he was cheerful, jovial, good-humoured, and now he is very slim, ascetic looking, tragically serious and sad. He looks very tired, both physically and morally.

⁷⁵ Aleksander Hauke-Nowak (1896–1956), governor in Wołyń in the years 1938–1939, and earlier in Łódź (1933–1938).

⁷⁶ Mirosław Arciszewski (1892–1963), diplomat, deputy undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938–1939.

⁷⁷ Władysław Raczekiewicz (1885–1947), last governor of the Polish province of Pomerania, President of the Republic of Poland in Exile from 30 September 1939.

⁷⁸ Światpol – The World Union of Poles from Abroad. Raczekiewicz was its president from 1934.

⁷⁹ Leon Rożałowski, county administrator of Płock (1936–1939), earlier of Sierpc (1932–1936).

⁸⁰ Previously crossed out: "illegible name". Adam Narajewski was the Szamotoły county administrator at that time.

⁸¹ The name is written by hand (incorrectly spelt "Severy") in the typescript over *Sewerski*, which is crossed out. Frank Savery, British consul and then Consul General in Warsaw.

⁸² Richard Kimens, British diplomat, former consul and commercial attaché in Warsaw.

⁸³ Bogusław Miedziński (1891–1972), politician and journalist, long-standing member of parliament, Speaker of the Senate in 1938–1939.

⁸⁴ Dr Witold Kępiński of the Nesobia coat of arms (1884–1940), chairman of the Warsaw-based "Latarnia" Polish Society for Aiding Blind War Victims.

⁸⁵ An annual ball held at the Warsaw Merchants' Hall (Resursa Kupiecka).

He says that the ambulances are so full of the injured that there is no room for the doctors, they walk alongside.

He looked as if he sensed what was to come. He was killed at Katyń...

A terrible hopelessness. You could not imagine. Nothing can be done here.

It's muggy in the evening. We leave for Tarnopol. It's dark, hard to drive. Military vehicles and sleeping soldiers along the way. Stefan drives very carefully. A large open vehicle passes us at a crazy speed just where there is the greatest number of lorries and you can barely move. Stefan says that it is Sławoj Składkowski in his Cadillac.

At last, tired and hungry, we arrive in Tarnopol. It is noon. We found the governor's office. The governor⁸⁶ was standing on the porch in front of the house. His car was parked next to the pavement. Zet got out of the car and approached him. The governor asked: What have you come here to do?

– I'm supposed to meet Marshal Śmigły-Rydz.

– Śmigły-Rydz is long gone. I'm just leaving too. The Germans are 12 kilometres from here. You should go to Krzemieniec, the government and Śmigły-Rydz are there.

There's no other way out. We get back in the car and off to Krzemieniec.

We drive all day and all night. Military convoys along the road again. We are tired. We have travelled for so many nights.

We do not reach Krzemieniec until 5 in the morning. The town is deserted. We found someone who told us that it had been a market day yesterday. The market was full of people. The Germans bombed the crowded marketplace. Lots of dead.

Someone we met said that the government was in Krzemieniec Collegium.⁸⁷ On the main street we meet Mrs Norton,⁸⁸ who seeing Zet on the other side of the road ran up to him and gave him a medal, and said that she had kept it for him. Zet went to the Collegium, the foreign ministry was supposed to be there, and I went to the county administrator's house to get a petrol coupon. The county administrator was very polite and told me where there was petrol, but I should not tell anyone. I went with Stefan as the administrator had advised. Right at the end of the road outside the town there is a gorge, very green, very [...].⁸⁹ In this gorge, at the bottom of the hill, camouflaged with greener, there were two huge petrol tanks. We got our petrol.

Leaving the gorge, on the main road I saw two pilots standing helplessly in the middle of the road. I asked what they were doing. They said that they had flown here and could not fly any further because they had no petrol. I revealed the county administrator's secret and told them where to go for petrol, and so they went. I hope that they got some and flew on further.

I came back and met up with Zet. He said that he had been to the Collegium. At the Collegium, he found out that all the senior officials and dignitaries, led by Beck, had left for the Romanian border. Only a handful of minor officials, who were busy packing some scattered documents, had stayed behind. He had not been made very welcome.

On his way back he had met the Brazilian ambassador,⁹⁰ who was pleased to see him and told him that the Soviet ambassador,⁹¹ with his whole family and a truck with his things and all the staff, had set off towards the Russian border. He had been to Beck and told him that. Beck replied that he knew, since the Soviet ambassador had told him that he was going where there was a phone because he wanted to talk to Moscow. The Brazilian ambassador told him that in order to talk on the phone

⁸⁶ Tomasz Malicki was the Tarnopol governor at that time.

⁸⁷ The famous Krzemieniec Lyceum, formerly a middle school, located in the buildings of a former Jesuit college in Krzemieniec.

⁸⁸ Lady Noel 'Peter' Norton, wife of Sir Clifford Norton, British consul in Warsaw.

⁸⁹ A gap in the typescript.

⁹⁰ Joaquim Eulálio do Nascimento e Silva, envoy to Warsaw from 1 June 1939.

⁹¹ Nikolai Sharonov (1901–?), Soviet ambassador in Warsaw from 2 June 1939.

you did not need to go with your family, boxes and staff, but he did not convince Beck and Beck did not react to that.⁹²

We were very tired, short of sleep because of the sleepless nights in the car, and we could not even get food anywhere. Everything was hopeless, there was no choice, you had to go further. Here, “further” meant Zaleszczyki.

/Pages 80 and 81 are a repeat of pages 77 and 78 – continued:⁹³/

The road was empty. After some time, we drove past a little café on the edge of the road. Our gentlemen said that we had to stop and we might get something to eat. The small café was full of soldiers. We were given something to eat. Suddenly, one of the officers who were there came to our table – he recognised Zet from a photograph – and said: “Minister, please go abroad to save Poland.” This was touching, it showed confidence in Zet, but what could he do?

Stefan faced a difficult situation while waiting for us in front of the café. A fairly large group of people gathered from somewhere, and thinking it was a government car and the fleeing Government, they wanted to smash the car. Stefan persuaded them with difficulty that it was a private car and private people who were travelling in it. When we left the café, they were all standing there. We were told that the President and Jaroszewicz had passed through a long time ago.

We drove on. It was not too far to Zaleszczyki. There was a wonderful afternoon sun. The road was completely empty. Apparently, everyone had already gone. We arrived in Zaleszczyki late in the afternoon.

I was so tired that I don’t even know how we got a room from the secretary of the county administrator. They were worried. Large government lorries were parked in the yard.

The next day I went looking for shops. The suitcases were full of Zet’s things. I had next to nothing. I came across quite a decent shop and found what suited me. When I was buying something, two ladies came in. They were fat, dressed in very decent black or navy blue outfits, in gorgeous hats. They came to the counter and ordered something very insistently. I asked them to let me finish. They replied that they must be given precedence. Intrigued, I asked why. One of them said: “Because we are carrying Polish treasure.” I asked: what treasure? The reply was: “Polish children”. I asked whether from a school or an orphanage. She looked at me with contempt, haughtiness and pride: “No, our own children!” I started to laugh for the first time during this long journey. The ladies were so large and so comical!

Ditches and trenches had been dug in case of bombing in the main square of the town among the trees.

The day passed peacefully. The county administrator’s secretary showed us beds in the dining room. We went to bed early. I slept like a log, but woke with a terrible headache at 5 in the morning. The kitchen was near. I heard the housekeeper quietly bustle around the kitchen. I got up and went to the kitchen and asked if there were any pills for my headache. I was barely conscious because of the pain. She said the lady always kept some pills on the bedside table. I asked her not to wake the county administrator’s wife; she said that she was a sound sleeper and she would fetch me a pill.

I stood with my hands resting on the table, my head was hurting so much, and suddenly the administrator’s wife appeared next to me in the same pose and said in a quiet voice so that the servant would not hear: “It’s very bad. You should leave at once. I don’t know what will happen to us but you should go.” My head got better after taking the pill. I went to wake up Zet and repeated the words of the lady of the house. At 7:30 I went out looking for the Falters and Stefan. At the gate I met Falter, who was coming to us to tell us the same thing. From Zaleszczyki there was only Romania. Zet took our passports and those of the Falters and went to the office where [Constantin]

⁹² According to Beck’s own notes, he spoke to Sharonov on 11 September and the ambassador left the day after. Sharanov declared that he would return the next day or a week later, depending on the outcome of his phone call. J. Beck, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–254.

⁹³ The number of the page copied from the manuscript was written in the margins.

Constantinescu,⁹⁴ the Romanian embassy secretary from Warsaw and a very good acquaintance, was working. Of course he gave us visas, but used the occasion to tell Zet about a problem he had had. He said that the governor [Alfred] Biłyk⁹⁵ – I do not know him – had come to him and requested a visa for Marshal Rydz-Śmigły's wife and for himself and a maid and someone else. He gave them visas and *laissez-passez*⁹⁶ as are given to all holders of diplomatic passports. Biłyk came back half an hour later and said that Mrs Rydz-Śmigły could not accept such a piece of paper because it must not say "persons travelling with her" but "Entourage" – she is travelling with her Entourage. Constantinescu replied that they always write as he had, and that he could not change it. The incident was over. It would seem that at a time when Poland is falling apart, there are people who think about such little things!

Meanwhile, Falter got petrol and we could go. It was already after 11. We were on the bridge at the time the Bolsheviks were entering Poland – Romania was on the other side.

What a terrible moment it was for us to leave Poland. Everything had collapsed. We drove in silence. Zet said nothing, but I thought that he must have gone through terrible moments.

We had no difficulty at the Romanian border. We made an inventory of our belongings and had them sealed so as to be sure that there would be no more searches.

It was already dark when we reached Czerniowce. We went to a garage – empty! I sat on the car door sill and felt that fate had treated me despicably. This may have been one of the most terrible moments in my life.

Once in Czerniowce we went to the consulate. The consul⁹⁷ was wearing black glasses. He was a stranger, not particularly polite or helpful.

Someone said that we could stay the night in a hotel. But it was not a hotel, but some kind of inn, very primitive and old-fashioned. But it was better than nothing.

18 September 1939

After sleeping somehow, on 18 September we went to Bucharest. Here the hotel⁹⁸ was a genuine one. Olga Romer⁹⁹ came. De Bondi,¹⁰⁰ who came out of nowhere, told me that he loved me like a mother, despite being my age. Someone, I can't remember who, reported an incident involving Mrs Rydz-Śmigły. There was a stylish café packed with Polish officers and Mrs Rydz-Śmigły came there, dolled up, with perfect make-up, in a wonderful fur coat, smiling and cheerful. People started to whisper, and after a while one of the officers went to her table and said that he would advise her to leave because the public began to mutter when they saw her and she might encounter some unpleasantness.

[Helena] Sołtanówna¹⁰¹, who seemed to be the guest of the Raczyńskis¹⁰², told me about a second incident. She went to the embassy courtyard, there were two large trucks¹⁰³ there, and two soldiers were asleep sitting next to them. She was very interested what was in the trucks. Taking advan-

⁹⁴ Constantin Atta Constantinescu (the Polish phonetic spelling Konstantinesku appears in the typescript).

⁹⁵ Alfred Biłyk (1889–1939), provincial governor in Lwów (Lviv) in 1937–1939.

⁹⁶ French for "pass", incorrectly spelt *laissez passez* in the typescript.

⁹⁷ Tadeusz Buynowski (1895–1943), diplomat, consul in Czerniowce (then Cernăuți in Romania, now Chernivtsi in Ukraine) in 1939–1940.

⁹⁸ The Athenee Palace.

⁹⁹ Olga Romer, *née* Militineau, widow of Karol Adam Romer (1885–1938), head of the protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1928–1938.

¹⁰⁰ No further details known.

¹⁰¹ Probably Helena Sołtan.

¹⁰² Roger Raczyński (1889–1945) and Helena Raczyńska, *née* Rohozińska of the Leliwa coat of arms (1892–1966). Roger was then the Polish ambassador in Romania (1938–1940).

¹⁰³ The old-fashioned Polish word *kamiona* is used.

tage of the fact that the soldiers, probably tired after a long journey, were fast asleep, she could look to see what they were carrying. These were brand new military trucks. There was furniture, carpets, trunks, wardrobes, curtains and even *?! brise-bize*¹⁰⁴ inside. Old cardboard boxes with old hats. She laughed, because there were even *brise-bize!!!*¹⁰⁵ I don't know whether there were chamber pots. This was Śmigły-Rydz's entire home.

That day, ambassador [Roger] Raczyński, French ambassador [Leon] Noël¹⁰⁶ and British ambassador [Howard] Kennard¹⁰⁷ came to the hotel to see Zet – they asked Zet to leave soon.

First of all, Raczyński said that they could talk in the bathroom because the bathroom was the only place that was not bugged, so the conversation with the ambassadors took place in the bathroom. So they asked Zet to leave as quickly as possible because he might be interned.¹⁰⁸

I don't remember whether it was morning or afternoon the next day that we left on board the *Simplon-express*.¹⁰⁹ [Adrian] Carton de Viard¹¹⁰ was on the same train. He came to Zet to talk. He was in civilian clothes. He said that he had a passport under an assumed name and was travelling as a salesman with a bag full of samples. He told Zet that he had been with Śmigły-Rydz's staff as an English officer since the beginning of the war. He had gone to him in Kutry and said: "Marshal, you must go back to Warsaw. I'll go with you." Śmigły-Rydz said that he would think about it and give him an answer. He gave no answer, but an hour later he crossed the bridge into Romania.

Carton de Viard said that under the circumstances he could do nothing but put on civilian clothes and go to Paris under an assumed name.

Also, [Jan] Szembek¹¹¹ was on the same train. He had not been interned and was travelling with his secretary. When he saw us, he was furious.¹¹² He was quite unable to conceal his rage. He was not

¹⁰⁴ French *brise-bise*, short net curtains.

¹⁰⁵ As in the typescript.

¹⁰⁶ Léon Noël (1888–1987), French ambassador in Warsaw in 1935–1939.

¹⁰⁷ Sir Howard Kennard (1878–1955), British ambassador in Warsaw and ambassador to the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile, 1935–1941.

¹⁰⁸ According to ambassador Roger Raczyński's notes, the meeting took place on 19 September. "On the nineteenth, in the evening I went to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr August Zaleski. [...] I informed Mr Zaleski about my intended trip to Biczaz the following morning with the purpose of persuading President Mościcki to appoint a replacement for Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and to hand in his resignation as quickly as possible. Mr Zaleski agreed without hesitation that this idea was right and most purposeful and asked if I had someone in mind as the most suitable candidate for new president, anticipating that this matter would surface in my conversation with President Mościcki. I replied that I did not know who of the outstanding Poles had managed to cross the border so far, that the name of Ignacy Paderewski had crossed my mind, that unfortunately there was no news of General Sosnkowski, and that I would also consider the long-time Minister of Foreign Affairs, i.e. my interlocutor Mr August Zaleski, among the serious candidates. So regardless of how Mr Zaleski would respond to this idea, I strongly insist that he should speed up his trip to Paris and immediately get in touch with our embassy, where our new administrative centre should be formed. Succumbing to my pressure, Mr Zaleski promised to complete all formalities connected with his departure as quickly as possible". K. Morawski, *Wspólna droga z Rogierem Raczyńskim. Wspomnienia*, Poznań 1998, p. 238.

¹⁰⁹ The departure was on 22 September; however, the Simplon-Express operated between Istanbul and Paris, calling at, among others, Sofia, Belgrade, Venice, Milan and Lausanne, so the Zaleskis must have travelled to Paris on a different train.

¹¹⁰ As in the original text; in fact Adrian Carton de Wiart (1888–1963), British intelligence resident and head of the military mission in Poland.

¹¹¹ Jan Szembek (1881–1945), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1932–1939.

¹¹² Underlined in the typescript.

the well-mannered gentleman anymore, but some kind of savage. I watched him in shock. "Why are you going" etc. – a completely different man. Clearly we had spoiled some plans of his.¹¹³

I sometimes wondered how Szembek could have left the country so easily, quite easily although he was a deputy minister, while other ministers were interned. Is it because he was a civilian, or because he was once our envoy in Romania¹¹⁴ and had connections, or that Raczyński helped him?

We met them [the Szembeks] in Paris. She was always aggressive.¹¹⁵ Anyway, civilian ministers seem to have been allowed to leave quite easily. Zet wanted to help Roman Antoni¹¹⁶ to get out of Romania, but he wrote back that he could leave but Zet would have to find him a prominent position or professorship. Zet said it could only be done if he came and arranged something for himself. He couldn't be a dignitary because he was in a government that was hated by everyone, and as for becoming a professor [...]¹¹⁷

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ABSTRACT

September 1939 and the elites of the Second Polish Republic in the diary Our Journey by Ewelina Zaleska

Ewelina Zaleska, author of the diary presented here, was the wife of August Zaleski, Polish diplomat, minister of foreign affairs (1926–1932, 1939–1941) and Polish president in exile (1947–1972). She wrote Our Journey in September 1939, at the time of the German invasion of Poland that began World War II. She first describes her journey from Psarskie in Greater Poland to Warsaw, where she is reunited with her husband. A few days later they decide to leave the country. In that respect they are similar to the Polish ruling elites, although with one major difference: Zaleski was not in public office at the time, so he cannot be judged in the same way. The diary written by his wife sheds a new light on this controversial decision by Polish officials. Moreover, it is quite informative in its depiction of social life in the first month of the war as well as public reaction to some major events.

¹¹³ Jan Szembek also records this meeting in his diary (dated 23 September): "Mr August Zaleski joined me in the dining car. He attacked everyone in the Government and the regime very violently. He spared no one." In the following paragraphs, he discusses in detail other accusations made by Zaleski and his view that "the government is to blame for everything because of its recklessness and short-sighted policy. Above all, it should have stayed in the country". J. Szembek, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72.

¹¹⁴ From 1927 to 1932.

¹¹⁵ Izabela Maria Izydora Szembek, *née* Skrzyńska of the Zaremba coat of arms (1881–1972), wife of Jan Szembek.

¹¹⁶ Roman Antoni (1892–1951), diplomat, Minister of Industry and Trade in 1936–1939.

¹¹⁷ The text ends here, the sentence is left unfinished.

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ON THE DISPUTE OVER THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF THE CAMP IN OCCUPIED KONSTANTYNÓW NEAR ŁÓDŹ IN 1940–1943

Although it is more than 74 years since the end of the Second World War, its memory remains alive – not only among the generation of those who witnessed it, but among later generations also. This hecatomb, the greatest in the history of the world, of Europe and of Poland, continues to stir controversy and arouse emotions both in academic discourse and in public opinion. A particularly crucial question, which continues to cast shadows on relations between Poland and its western neighbour, is that of the camps – extermination camps, concentration camps, transit camps and others. These camps were unquestionably German; but because most of them were located on occupied Polish territory, and due to the ignorance of some in the media, they are frequently referred to as “Polish camps”.¹ Such phrasings are not ordinary *faux pas* or *lapsus calami*, but are groundless attributions which falsify the truth and which may (and usually do) set off a chain reaction, as happened in a case involving the German public television channel ZDF. Voices were raised in the matter not only by former prisoners, but by many others who had no direct connection – if only because of their age – with the Second World War. News of the “Polish death camps” spread at great

¹ It is useful here to give a brief account of the dispute over the reference to “Polish death camps at Majdanek and Auschwitz”, which began in 2015. On 15 July 2015, the German public television channel ZDF (*Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*) broadcast at www.zdf.de a documentary titled *Verschollene Filmschatze. Befreiung der Konzentrationslager*, in which the aforementioned reference appeared. Karol Tendera, a former prisoner of the German Nazi concentration and extermination camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, took legal action against ZDF, demanding the publication of an apology. In December 2016 the appeal court in Kraków ordered ZDF to apologise to Karol Tendera. According to the court’s judgment, the apology was to appear on the broadcaster’s main page and remain there for 30 days. Although ZDF published an apology, it did not appear in the required place, but at the foot of a page in the documentary/knowledge (*Doku/Wissen*) section, while the main page contained only the headline *Apology to Karol Tendera*, which gave no indication that it concerned such a sensitive matter as a reference to German camps as Polish ones. As the plaintiff considered the judgment not to have been properly carried out, lawyers for the *Patria Nostra* association made an application for proper performance of the judgment, while the executive board of the Poland Together United Right party appealed to the then Polish foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski to respond in the matter. For more see <http://www.tvp.info/28646422/niemiecka-telewizja-zdf-ukryla-przeprosiny-za-polskie-obozy-zagłady> (accessed 8 July 2017). Karol Tendera died on 1st October 2019.

speed, triggering a staunch reaction among Polish public opinion, both online² and, for example, in front of ZDF's London offices, where protesters demanded compliance with a Polish court judgment.

Somewhat overshadowed by such visible protests, other disputes continue over the operation of the German camps in occupied Poland, a fact which confirms that the topic is still a current one. One such dispute concerns the status and character of the camp that operated in occupied Konstantynów, near Łódź, between 1940 and 1943. Although it has been classified as a resettlement, transit or collection camp,³ in the opinion of many people, particularly its former prisoners, it had the characteristics of a concentration camp. The aim of this article is to describe the conditions that existed in the camp, to analyse its legal position, to present the views of academic historians, and to summarise the action taken by former prisoners to have it reclassified as a concentration camp. For this purpose, the former prisoners Jan Kosmowski, Jerzy Mierzwa and Zygmunt Taczkowski formed an initiative group and represented other victims of the camp. Their efforts were taken up by another former prisoner, Marianna Grynia, first on an individual level, and later as chair of the Social Committee for the Building of a Monument to Polish Victims of the German Camp in Konstantynów Łódzki (*Spoleczny Komitet ds. Budowy Pomnika Polskich Ofiar Niemieckiego Obozu w Konstantynowie Łódzkim – SKdsBPPONOWKŁ*). She was sent to the Konstantynów camp at the age of 12, together with the whole of her family, and lost two younger siblings there.

ESTABLISHMENT AND CONDITIONS AT THE CAMP

The German camp in occupied Konstantynów near Łódź was established as early as autumn 1939. It is highly likely that in the initial phase it served as a collection point for ethnic German settlers from the east. It was set up in former buildings of the textile factory of Steinert and the Schweikert brothers, at General-Litzmannstadt-Straße 27.⁴

² For more see <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/telewizja-zdf-usuwa-komentarze-o-niemieckich-obozach-smierci,709141.html> (accessed 8 July 2017).

³ Respectively *Umsiedlungslager*, *Durchgangslager* and *Sammellager*. These names of the camp, as well as *Lager in Konstantinow* or *Konstantinow Lager*, appear – among other places – on officially certified photocopies of prisoners' death certificates issued for the written notification of particular camp commandants in 1940–1943 (Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Łódź, hereafter AINR Łódź, files of an investigation into crimes committed by German state officials from 1940 to 1945 at the resettlement camp in Konstantynów near Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. VII pp. 1318–1400 and vol. VIII pp. 1401–1753). The name *Durchgangslager* also appears on an order of release from the camp (*Entlassungsverfügung*) issued in Łódź on 1 September 1941 by *Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Umwandererzentralstelle Posen Dienststelle Litzmannstadt Lagerinspektion* (AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. VII p. 1244). This order served as a permit of entry to the Generalgouvernement (*Entlassungsverfügung gilt als Einreisegenehmigung in das Generalgouvernement*) for a person previously held at the transit camp in Konstantynów (*bisher Insasse des Durchgangslagers Konstantinow*).

⁴ Now ul. Łódzka 27.

Examining the files of an investigation carried out by the Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes (*Okręgowa Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich – OKBZH*), and later by the Commission for Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation (*Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu – KŚZpNP*) of the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*) in Łódź, lasting from 1967 to 2011, concerning crimes committed by German state officials from 1940 to 1945 at the resettlement camp in Konstantynów near Łódź (S 19.2004.2n), one may come across a report of the leading KŚZpNP expert stating that preparation of the camp “infrastructure” must have taken place around the end of 1939, because the first displaced persons were brought there in January 1940. Moreover, a note from the county branch office of OKBZH in Łódź reveals that from September 1939 until March 1940 Konstantynów served as a transit camp for Germans transported from the Ukraine and the Don region.⁵ Testimony from the witness Stanisław K., who lived in occupied Konstantynów until the end of April 1940, and whose parents owned a farm located behind the Schweikert brothers’ factory (until the farm was confiscated and they were taken away to work in the Reich), as early as November 1939 the Germans removed the weaving machinery from the factory and used its buildings as a camp for German resettles from the Soviet Union.⁶

Lager Konstantinow was subordinate to the Łódź branch of the Central Resettlement Office in Poznań, which had offices in Łódź at Adolf-Hitler-Straße 133.⁷ The full official name of the institution was Chief of Security Police and Security Service Central Resettlement Office in Poznań Branch in Łódź (*Umwandererzentralstelle Posen Dienststelle Litzmannstadt*).⁸ It should be noted that the camp in Konstantynów was the largest camp run by the Łódź branch of the Central Resettlement Office and one of the largest of all of the Nazi resettlement camps.⁹

Prisoners were transported to Konstantynów chiefly from the transit camps located in Łódź at Wiesenstraße 4,¹⁰ later renamed Flottwellstraße (the central transit camp, *Durchgangslager I*¹¹) and at Friedrich-Gossler-Straße 53/55¹² (*Auffanglager, Sammellager*). Prisoners had their valuables confiscated there, being left with only the clothes they were wearing. They were transported to the camp in Konstantynów

⁵ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 119.

⁶ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 154, record of testimony of witness Stanisław K. of 20 May 1971.

⁷ Now ul. Piotrkowska 133.

⁸ *Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Umwandererzentralstelle Posen Dienststelle Litzmannstadt*.

⁹ S. Abramowicz, *Obozy przejściowe i przesiedleńcze*, in: *Obozy hitlerowskie w Łodzi*, ed. A. Głowacki, S. Abramowicz, Łódź 1998, p. 117.

¹⁰ Now ul. Łąkowa 4.

¹¹ This was referred to in the slang of former prisoners as “purgatory”, as prisoners were subjected to especially harsh body searches there. Everything of any value would be confiscated.

¹² Now ul. Kopernika 53/55.

by truck, tram or horse and cart, or else went on foot, covering a distance of around 15 kilometres.

The prisoners of the camp were mainly Poles expelled from the Wartheland.¹³ They included families of several generations with many children. At the camp they underwent selection in terms of usefulness for work. For those deemed suitable for work, the stay at the camp might be only a temporary one – ultimately they were transported for forced labour in the Reich or expelled to the Generalgouvernement. For children and the elderly, however, the camp often became a place of permanent isolation, with the likelihood of death as a result of hunger, the poor hygienic conditions, or physical and psychological oppression by the camp personnel.

The food was “mean and poor”.¹⁴ Opinions are divided as to the number of “meals” provided – some witnesses testified that there were three meals a day, others that there were only two, with no supper.¹⁵ At first a simplified assignment of food was applied: for breakfast, a loaf of bread and a litre of black “coffee” between eight people; for dinner, a litre of soup between eight people. After that, one loaf of bread was to suffice for ten people.¹⁶ Given that the camp contained mostly families with multiple children, it is possible that a loaf of bread was apportioned to a family. Later, food rations were distributed individually. Breakfast was about 125 g of bread per person and black coffee. Dinner was swede, cooked in a stock of – among other things – horse meat,¹⁷ and other soups (about a half or three-quarters of a litre per person) made from waste parts of vegetables, potatoes, nettles, often with groats; for supper there was also black coffee. In 1942, those who worked braiding straw for shoes for Wehrmacht troops fighting in the east also received – once a week – half a kilogram of bread, about 20 grams of margarine and about 100 g of cured meat. Those who did not work received nothing except coffee and bread for breakfast, soup with groats for dinner and coffee for supper – no fat, not even a piece of cheese or preserve.

¹³ For more on expulsions of the Polish population from the Wartheland see M. Rutowska, *Niemieckie wysiedlenia i przesiedlenia ludności na okupowanych ziemiach polskich (1939-1945)*, IZ Policy Papers no. 1 (I), pp. 11–25; idem, *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z Kraju Warty do Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1941*, Poznań 2003; C. Łuczak, *Pod niemieckim jarzmem (Kraj Warty 1939-1945)*, Poznań 1996, pp. 52–57; idem, *Polska i Polacy w drugiej wojnie światowej*, Poznań 1993, pp. 141–146; *Wysiedlenia hitlerowskie na tak zwanych „ziemiach wschodnich” wcielonych do Rzeszy*, Zamość 1972; *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej na tzw. ziemiach wcielonych do Rzeszy 1939-1945*, Documenta Occupationis VIII, Poznań 1969.

¹⁴ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 651, record of testimony of witness Edward S. of 5 December 1978; AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 654, record of testimony of witness Czesław S. of 13 December 1978.

¹⁵ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 107, record of testimony of witness Irena J. of 15 November 1967.

¹⁶ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 9, record of testimony of witness Kazimierz M. of 25 April 1967; AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 11, record of testimony of witness Zofia W. of 25 April 1967.

¹⁷ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 13, record of testimony of witness Janina W. of 25 April 1967. The witness was employed as a cleaner at the time of the establishment of the camp. She worked on the site of the camp for two weeks.

The camp did not have a source of drinking water. For all prisoners there was only one “washroom” with an area of 46 square metres¹⁸ with one long tin trough in which they might wash themselves, although possibilities were limited. The water in the trough was not drinkable, and often there was no water anyway. To maintain a minimum level of hygiene, the prisoners had to manage in any way possible. Krystyna Z. testified that “mum tried to melt snow to wash me and my sister.”¹⁹ The rooms were not suited to accommodate such a large number of people. With average space of only 35–50 cm² per prisoner, the rooms were crowded and the prisoners crushed. At night, to turn over onto one’s other side, one had to first stand up and then lie down in a different position. The aforementioned straw, which quickly became a bug-filled chaff, served as both mattress and blanket. For their entire time at the camp the prisoners wore the same clothes – their own – and possibilities of washing linen and outer clothing were limited. The dirty conditions at the camp led to outbreaks of lice. A stench filled the air, including that of decomposing bodies. Pregnant women gave birth lying on cement or bare floors, and were not assisted by doctors. Mortality among newborns was extremely high. There were epidemics of dysentery, meningitis, diarrhoea and typhus, which claimed mostly children as victims.

Some women were pregnant when they arrived at the camp. Labour took place in the common hall, where several hundred people, including children, were present. Eugenia M., a camp nurse, testified that she delivered babies kneeling on the floor, washing them in a little black coffee, as there was often no water.²⁰

The hospital was not fit for purpose. There was a shortage of beds and medicines. It was staffed by a doctor or paramedic and several nurses, usually recruited from among the female prisoners. Nevertheless, at some times there was only one nurse for several thousand prisoners.²¹ As many as four children might share one bed.²² One witness reported that while in the hospital with diarrhoea, as a girl of five or six, she had been severely beaten by the duty nurses for soiling her bedclothes.²³

Prisoners were bullied, kicked and beaten on an everyday basis. Sometimes the torture resulted in death. If a prisoner escaped from the camp, the whole of his or her family was persecuted.²⁴ Commandant Arthur Schütz displayed particular cruelty. He

¹⁸ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. XVII p. 3292, record of testimony of witness Eugenia M. of 23 May 1967.

¹⁹ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. XIV p. 2742, record of testimony of witness Krystyna Z. of 14 April 2008.

²⁰ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. XVII p. 3292, record of testimony of witness Eugenia M. of 23 May 1967.

²¹ The case of Eugenia M. in: AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. XVII p. 3292, record of testimony of witness Eugenia M. of 23 May 1967.

²² AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 666, record of testimony of witness Bożena P. of 14 December 1978.

²³ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 685, record of testimony of witness Jadwiga Ch. of 14 February 1979.

²⁴ According to testimony given by the witness Irena J. on 15 November 1967 (AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 108), the camp commandant had wished the witness to work for him. In the meantime

was known by the prisoners as “the boxer”, as he had indeed been one before the war. He could beat prisoners until they were spitting out their teeth. He was especially cruel and vulgar – he was continually shouting, and punched or whipped²⁵ without reason. He ordered night-time musters, and abused alcohol, which made him particularly aggressive. He was especially savage towards the elderly, pushing them (including downstairs) and kicking them in the face.²⁶ Nor did he show any mercy to children. One female prisoner, then aged 12, was battered by Schütz for failing to get out of his way.²⁷ The repression and harassment to which prisoners were subjected took various forms. Often they did not represent punishment for any misdeed, but were simply a form of bullying – for example, prisoners were sometimes made to scrub the lime-whitewashed walls with a brick, to carry excrement out in their hands (applied particularly to priests and the elderly) or hold two bricks in their hands high in the air. All in all, the conditions existing at the camp were exceptionally harsh. Besides the aforementioned hardships there was isolation from the outside world – a prohibition on leaving one’s hall or even approaching the windows.

In the summer of 1943, the camp’s function was changed. The Poles imprisoned there were released or sent to the Generalgouvernement. In place of the resettlement camp, on 16 August 1943 in Konstanyń a security police camp was set up for Soviet children considered suitable for Germanisation (known as *Ostjugendverwahrlager der Sicherheitspolizei* or *Jugendschutzlager Litzmannstadt Tuchingen*²⁸). This operated until 19 January 1945, when the town was liberated. The camp personnel then fled, leaving the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian children to their own fate.

ANALYSIS OF THE CAMP’S LEGAL POSITION

According to the letter of the law at the time, the camp in Konstanyń was subordinate to the Central Resettlement Office in Łódź, not to the Central Office for Reich Security (*Reichsicherheitshauptamt*, RSHA), the Central Office for Economy and Administration (*SS-Wirtschaft- und Verwaltungshauptamt*, SS-WVHA) or the office of the inspector of concentration camps (*SS-Führungs- und Aussichtshauptamt*, which

Irena J. learnt that several girls whom the commandant had employed had disappeared in mysterious circumstances. She took fright and decided to escape from the camp. The escape (in late May 1941) was successful, but her father was severely beaten as a reprisal. The parents of Irena J. were released from the camp in autumn 1941, but her father immediately became sick as a consequence of the beating.

²⁵ A type of leather whip known as a *bykowiec* was used.

²⁶ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. III p. 501, record of testimony of witness Ludwika Ź. of 23 November 1978.

²⁷ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 681, record of testimony of witness Czesława Cz. of 14 February 1979.

²⁸ On 18 May 1943, Wartheland governor Arthur Greiser decreed that the town of Konstanyń would be renamed Tuchingen (*Verordnungsblatt des Reichsstatthalters um Warthegau 1943 nr 18 Anordnung über Ortsnamenänderung im Reichsgau Wartheland vom 18 V 1943*). This was from *Tuch*, a German word for cloth.

on 3 March 1942 became part of the SS-WVHA as *Amtsgruppe D – Konzentrationslager*). It was the latter offices that took decisions to deport people to concentration camps and ordered the exploitation of prisoners as a labour force. For this reason, the Konstantynów prisoners were not placed at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities, which is considered a *sine qua non* for the recognition of a place of detention as a concentration camp.

There can also be no doubt that according to its name, this was not a concentration camp, but a transit, resettlement or collection camp – *Durchgangslager*, *Umsiedlungslager*, *Sammellager*, or simply *Lager*, which according to Maria Rutowska also implies the categorisation of a place of detention as a transit camp.²⁹

The matter is also unambiguously settled in Polish law. A prime ministerial order of 20 September 2001 gives official designations of places where Polish citizens or people of Polish nationality were imprisoned. Only the places enumerated in paragraphs 1–18 of section 2 of the order have the status of concentration camps or their subcamps. That list does not include the camp in Konstantynów Łódzki, which the order identifies as an “other place of detention” as defined in Article 4(1) (1) (c) of the Act of 24 January 1991 on military veterans and certain persons being victims of repression in wartime and the post-war period (consolidated text: Dz.U. 2002 no. 42 item 371, as amended), where the detention of children aged up to 14 was exterminatory in nature, and the persons detained were at the disposal of the Nazi security services (section 6 of the order).

SCHOLARLY OPINION

The resettlement camps existing on occupied Polish territory that had been incorporated into the Reich (*eingegliederte Ostgebiete*) are relatively seldom considered by historians. If they are mentioned, it is usually “in the background” and in a fragmentary manner. A great deal more scholarly attention has been devoted to the extermination and concentration camps. This results naturally from many factors, including the scale of the extermination and the consequent number of murdered, as well as the number and availability of preserved sources. The camp in Konstantynów has not yet been the subject of a monographic work. An author of valuable articles and expert analyses concerning the camp is Sławomir Abramowicz.³⁰ Questions relating to the Konstantynów camp have also been addressed by Antoni Galiński³¹ and

²⁹ M. Rutowska, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³⁰ S. Abramowicz, *Obozy przejściowe...; Obóz przesiedleńczy w Konstantynowie Łódzkim*, “Biuletyn Okręgowej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Łodzi – Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej” vol. I, Łódź 1989, pp. 30-40; expert reports collected in the files of the investigation into crimes committed by German state officials from 1940 to 1945 at the resettlement camp in Konstantynów near Łódź (AINR, S 19.2004.2n).

³¹ A. Galiński, *Hitlerowskie więzienia, areszty i obozy w rejencji łódzkiej jako miejsca eksterminacji dzieci i młodzieży* and *Wykaz dzieci-więźniów hitlerowskich obozów przesiedleńczych w Łodzi i w Kon-*

Andrzej Felchner.³² A collection of works on Konstanyńów Łódzki includes an article by Julian Baranowski³³ on the history of the town under German occupation, part of which describes the resettlement camp at ul. Łódzka 27. The camp is also mentioned, though laconically, in works by Czesław Łuczak and Maria Rutowska. In the view of these researchers, the institution that operated in Konstanyńów in 1940–1943 was a resettlement camp. No-one questions the fact that the conditions existing there were extremely harsh, and indeed Abramowicz concludes: “The resettlement camps were not set up as camps serving to physically liquidate the prisoners held there, but in reality in many cases they became such.”³⁴ In discussing historians’ views, mention should be made of a work titled *Analiza zebranych materiałów śledczych, archiwalnych i naukowych ekspertyz dotyczących obozu w Konstanyńowie k. Łodzi* (Analysis of collected investigatory and archival materials and scientific reports concerning the camp in Konstanyńów near Łódź),³⁵ published on 25 January 1989 by five researchers: Professor Edward Serwański,³⁶ Professor Stanisław Nawrocki,³⁷ Dr Marian Olszewski,³⁸ Dr Henryk Zimniak³⁹ and Antoni Galiński.⁴⁰ This analysis, prepared by academic researchers and the chairman and directors of OKBZH in Poznań and Łódź, covers two-and-a-half A4 pages, and its main conclusions concerning the nature of the camp and matters relating to the entitlement of former prisoners to war veteran status are as follows:

- 1) Decisions on placement in the camp in Konstanyńów near Łódź were taken without court judgments by the security authorities (*Sicherheitspolizei, Sipo*), subordinate to the Central Office for Reich Security (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA*) at central level, and to the Gestapo at local level. The camp was overseen and commanded by SS officers;

stantynowie zamordowanych i zmarłych w wyniku eksterminacyjnej polityki okupanta, in: *Zbrodnie hitlerowskie wobec dzieci i młodzieży z Łodzi oraz okręgu łódzkiego*, ed. J. Fijałek, T. Lenczewski, J. Olbryk, R. Rosin, W. Walczak, Łódź 1979, respectively p. 63 and pp. 85-104.

³² A. Felchner, *Los dzieci w obozach wysiedleńczych i przesiedleńczych na terenie Łodzi i okolicy*, in: *Zbrodnie hitlerowskie wobec dzieci i młodzieży...*, pp. 73-83.

³³ J. Baranowski, *Konstanyńów w latach okupacji niemieckiej 1939-1945*, in: *Konstanyńów Łódzki. Dzieje miasta*, ed. Maria Nartonowicz-Kot, Łódź 2006, pp. 211-237.

³⁴ S. Abramowicz, *Obozy przejściowe...*, p. 132.

³⁵ This analysis is contained in the investigation files at AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, and reproduced in M. Grynia, *Wypędzeni. Polskie ofiary niemieckiego obozu w Konstanyńowie Łódzkim*, Warsaw 2013, pp. 277-279.

³⁶ Affiliated to the Institute of Western Affairs in Poznań, in the Department of History of the Nazi Occupation in Poland.

³⁷ Then scientific vice-director of the State Archive in Poznań.

³⁸ Then chair of the Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poznań at the Institute of National Remembrance and Chair of the Historical Commission of the Provincial Executive Board of ZBoWiD in Poznań.

³⁹ Then director of the Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poznań at the Institute of National Remembrance.

⁴⁰ Then director of the Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Łódź at the Institute of National Remembrance.

- 2) Reasons for the placement of Poles in the camp related to political factors, nationality, race, religion or world view, and other factors;
- 3) The camp passed through different phases over time. It began as a resettlement camp, but from April 1941 it took on the increased rigour typical of a concentration camp, becoming a torture facility serving the mass-scale destruction and extermination of Poles, particularly children and the elderly, similarly to the camps in Potulice (Potulitz, Lebrechtsdorf), Żabikowo (*Polizeigefängnis der Sicherheitsgefängnis der Sicherheitspolizei und Arbeitserziehungslager Posen-Lenzingen*), Radogoszcz (*Erweitertes Polizeigefängnis, Radegast*), Fort VII (Poznań), Działdowo (Soldau) and others.

Mention should also be made here of the works of Marianna Grynia titled *Wypędzeni. Lager in Konstantinow* (The expelled. Lager in Konstantinow) (Warsaw 2011) and *Wypędzeni. Polskie ofiary niemieckiego obozu w Konstantynowie Łódzkim* (The expelled. Polish victims of the German camp in Konstantynów Łódzki) (Warsaw 2013). Grynia is a former prisoner of the camp and a historical witness, as well as a researcher into the camp at which she was held. In such cases, reasonable doubts always arise as to the objectivity of the research. Grynia's books largely contain the author's polemics against Polish public institutions concerning the nature of the camp. They are not scientific publications in a strict sense – the choice of sources appears adventitious, and there is an absence of critical apparatus (footnotes, sources of reproduced documents). They nonetheless provide a view of the significance of the dispute over the possible redesignation of the camp, as well as the form and heatedness of the debate, as the works include the author's correspondence both as a private person – a former prisoner – and as chair of the aforementioned Committee. For the purposes of this article, however, it is necessary to separate these two aspects, treating Grynia primarily as a witness of the times and as an enterprising committee chair, whose commitment, energy and efforts led to the raising of a monument to the victims of the Konstantynów camp and the granting of war veterans' rights to those who were imprisoned there as minors.

EFFORTS OF FORMER PRISONERS TO HAVE THE CAMP RECLASSIFIED

A significant watershed in research on the history of the camp in occupied Konstantynów Łódzki was the launch of an investigation by the Łódź Regional Commission for Investigation of Nazi Crimes into crimes committed at that camp by German state officials from 1940 to 1945 (S 19.2004.2n). The investigation was launched by a decision of 24 April 1967 pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Decree of 31 August 1944 on punishment for Fascist and Nazi criminals guilty of the killing and oppression of civilians and POWs.⁴¹ A significant part of the collected evidence consisted of witness testimony, particularly from former prisoners of the camp and contemporary residents

⁴¹ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 5.

of Konstantinów. As testimony was given by more and more witnesses, questions came to be asked among that group of people as to the actual nature of the Konstantinów camp. There was increasing discrepancy and doubt surrounding that issue. The official designation (a resettlement, transit or collection camp) did not always correspond, in the witnesses' eyes, to the reality of the camp. Since the majority of prisoners remained in the camp for several months or for a year or more, it is hard to regard it as a temporary place of incarceration. The testimony also revealed that for many of the inmates the establishment in Konstantinów was a labour camp, while for others – those who did not perform work – it was a type of prison. It was not rare for a single family to include both working and non-working prisoners. Those forced to work at the camp braided such items as the aforementioned straw boots or boot guards. A special workshop was set up at the camp for that purpose. Prisoners worked for 10–12 hours a day, and if they failed to meet their targets they were punished by being placed in dark cells and beaten.

Although the idea of resettlement camps was to hold prisoners temporarily, before they were transported for forced labour in the Reich or to the Generalgouvernement, large numbers of prisoners were required to perform forced labour at the camp itself. It should be recalled that the camp bordered onto the farm of the family K. The farm's owners were expelled from there on 1 May 1940 and taken for forced labour in the Reich. The farm was later taken over by camp commandant Max Huhn. According to documents presented to OKBZH in Łódź by Stanisław K., the papers concerning the takeover of the farm were signed by Huhn.⁴² Prisoners were made to work on "his" farm and on the farms of nearby German landowners. Some of them worked in gardens. Because of the lack of drinking water on the site of the camp, some prisoners worked transporting water by cart, for which purpose they were harnessed to the cart like draught animals. When there was a shortage of adults, children were harnessed to the water cart.⁴³ Prisoners' work also included taking the bodies of those who had been murdered or died at the camp to the town cemetery. Others were made to dig ditches. Some worked on the raising of rabbits, pigs and coypu, and others on tobacco and wicker plantations. Children were also sent to work in the fields; they were not permitted to pick fruit or seek food. Prisoners also carried out work related to the functioning of the camp – transporting water as already mentioned, emptying cesspits, cleaning the camp rooms, burying the dead. Occasionally prisoners were taken to work outside the camp – for example, on the building of shooting ranges in Zgierz and Aleksandrów. The work was carried out under the supervision of Germans, who included Gestapo functionaries.

The crowding of a maximum number of people into a minimum space, the starving of prisoners, their brutal treatment by camp personnel, and – perhaps above all – the disastrous hygienic and sanitary conditions led to disease and death. The prison-

⁴² AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. I p. 155, record of testimony of witness Stanisław K. of 20 May 1971.

⁴³ This is confirmed by testimony given by Jerzy M. on 15 April 1988 (AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. VI p. 1119), who was twice forced to perform such work. He was aged 12 at the time.

ers of Konstantynów thus had an awareness of the omnipresence of death (especially among newborns, infants, children and the elderly).⁴⁴ In the conditions described, people could and did lose their senses.⁴⁵

One can only imagine that the former prisoners' sense of injustice and disenchantment increased over time. Although an investigation was conducted with a view to punishing Nazi criminals, and successive witnesses were examined, the possibilities of communication at that time (by letter and press announcements, or sometimes by telephone), the absence of a central population records database and consequent lack of access to the addresses of potential witnesses, discrepancies in testimony, and the inability of former prisoners to reconstruct some of the details, caused the investigation to drag on for years. Finally, by a decision of 19 January 1981 the investigation was suspended, due to the "existence of a persistent obstacle preventing its continuation".⁴⁶ Successive prisoners seeking support from ZBoWiD (the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy) would receive negative decisions.

It appeared that the aforementioned *Analysis of collected investigatory and archival materials and scientific reports* would make an important contribution to determining the true character of the camp, but in fact it did not prove groundbreaking.

The case of Konstantynów was given new life by the Act of 24 January 1991 on military veterans and certain persons being victims of repression in wartime and the post-war period.⁴⁷ Article 3(2) of the act states that "the periods of combatant or equivalent activity shall include also the time of detention in Nazi prisons, concentration camps and extermination centres, and other places of detention where the conditions were not different from those in concentration camps and the persons detained were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities". Furthermore, in Article 4(1) (1) (a–c) it is laid down that "the regulations of the Act on War Veterans shall also apply to persons who were subject to wartime and post-war repression. Within the meaning of the act, repression shall mean periods of being held:

- 1) for political, national, religious and racial reasons:
 - a) in Nazi prisons, concentration camps and extermination centres,
 - b) in other places of detention where the conditions were not different from those in concentration camps and the persons detained were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities,

⁴⁴ The omnipotence of death, so frequently encountered in the recollections of former prisoners of the former camps, often lives on in them. This exceptional experience is described by Otto Dov Kulka in his book *Pejzaże metropolii śmierci. Rozmyślenia o pamięci i wyobraźni* (Wołowiec 2014). Kulka is an outstanding historian who spent his childhood in Auschwitz concentration camp.

⁴⁵ It is interesting to read the death certificates (*Sterbeurkunde*) issued for the written notification of successive commandants of the camp, as these documents note the illnesses given as the cause(s) of death. Of course, the credibility of such information should not be overstated, and it requires "filtering", but it is interesting to note that, while deaths of concentration camp prisoners were most often ascribed to "heart attack" or "tuberculosis/pneumonia", the death certificates of some prisoners of the Konstantynów camp refer to psychological illnesses such as schizophrenia, acute psychosis and "idiotism with paralysis".

⁴⁶ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/2n, vol. IV p. 711.

⁴⁷ Dz.U. (Polish Journal of Laws) 1991 no. 1 item 75.

- c) in other places of detention where the detention of children under the age of 14 was exterminatory in nature and the persons detained were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities.”

Although the cited extracts from the act support the researchers' conclusion, it remains in contradiction to multiple expert assessments by the Commission for Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation in Łódź, according to which the prisoners of Konstantynów were not at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities, but were subordinated primarily to the Łódź branch of the Central Resettlement Office in Poznań, and secondarily to the Labour Office (*Arbeitsamt*) as workers.

In her efforts to obtain veterans' entitlements for all former prisoners of the camp in Konstantynów, not only those detained while under 14 years old,⁴⁸ Marianna Grynia decided to intervene with the competent authorities, and applied to multiple institutions for the reclassification of the Konstantynów facility from a resettlement to a concentration camp. One such application was made to the Expert Assessments and Studies Department of the Commission for Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw, whose head stated in a response of March 2001 that the Department was not competent to “reclassify the camp in Konstantynów from a resettlement to a concentration camp”.⁴⁹ A further response was given in May 2001 by the Director of the Central Commission for Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation in Warsaw, Witold Kulesza, stating that he could not fulfil the request, namely to “reclassify the resettlement camp in Konstantynów after 1 April 1941 from a resettlement to a concentration camp”, justifying his position by the fact that the prisoners were not subject to the Nazi security authorities, because the camp was subordinate to the Łódź branch of the Central Resettlement Office, and not the Central Office for Reich Security, the Central Office for Economy and Administration or the office of the inspector of concentration camps. It was the latter offices that took decisions to deport people to concentration camps and ordered the exploitation of prisoners as a labour force.⁵⁰

On 20 September 2001 a prime ministerial order was issued giving official designations of places where Polish citizens or people of Polish nationality were imprisoned.⁵¹ This executive instrument, issued pursuant to the Act on War Veterans, enumerated the places of detention whose former prisoners were entitled to receive

⁴⁸ It may be noted that according to the 1991 Act on War Veterans, time spent in ghettos for reasons of nationality or race is classified as repression regardless of age. M. Grynia wrote in her book *Wypędzeni. Lager in Konstantinow* (Warsaw 2011, p. 118): “How is it that ghetto prisoners are granted veterans' rights without age restrictions, while those who were detained in such a horrific camp as *Lager in Konstantinow* were overlooked? How is it possible? We had to fight for veteran status for four years until the entitlements were finally granted, but then only to prisoners aged under 14. People who from 1941 were imprisoned for unlimited periods in strict confinement, who lived on the verge of insanity until 16 August 1943, have been callously treated.”

⁴⁹ M. Grynia, *Wypędzeni. Lager in Konstantinow*, Warsaw 2011, p. 121.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 125.

⁵¹ Dz.U. no. 106 item 1154; 2005 no. 214 item 1801; 2006 no. 227 item 1660.

veterans' rights and prerogatives. The list is very long, but the camp in Konstantynów appears on it only once, in the context of other places of detention as described in Art 4(1) (1), where the detention of children under 14 was exterminatory in nature and the persons detained were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities.⁵² It cannot be overlooked that the wording of this provision implies that those imprisoned at Konstantynów were in fact at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities, or at least that Konstantynów is mentioned in such a context.

A factor that undoubtedly escalated the conflict and engendered a sense of injustice among the Konstantynów prisoners of 1940–1943 was the marked difference in the amounts of compensation paid by the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation to them and to the prisoners of the later camp – the *Ostjugendwehrwahrlager* – established in Konstantynów Łódzki. Under the law establishing the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Foundation,⁵³ passed by the Bundestag on 6 July 2000, concerning payments to former forced and slave labourers of the Reich, the victims of Nazi Germany could apply for compensation. The amount of compensation depended on membership of one of the six categories of repressed persons defined in the law. Prisoners of concentration camps and ghettos and victims of the Holocaust were entitled to the largest amount of 15,000 German marks, equivalent to 30,000 Polish zloty at that time. The second group – the prisoners of penal camps, prisons, educational labour camps and the so-called camps for Poles (*Polenlager*) in Silesia – would receive sums between 5,000 and 12,000 marks (about 10–24,000 zloty). As regards what were formally transit camps, as in the case under discussion, only persons who had been detained under the age of 16 could become “beneficiaries”. It should be noted that for the purpose of the act and for compensation payments, the law enforced a certain standardisation – perhaps unavoidable, considering the logistical aspect of the payments – since originally the amount of compensation did not depend on the number of months for which a person had been subject to repression. Although highly controversial, this became the reality. As a result of the law, former prisoners of the camp in Konstantynów from 1940 to 1943 could apply for compensation from the Foundation only if they had been detained there during their childhood or early adolescence. Those who had been sent to the camp aged over 16 were not included in the scheme, in spite of the repression suffered. It is therefore no surprise that the former prisoners felt harshly treated, especially as many of them had given evidence, with full awareness and legal responsibility for their testimony, that in Konstantynów they had felt as if they were in a concentration, labour or penal camp.⁵⁴ Ultimately, based on a request

⁵² This group included 12 camps: Gniezno, Jabłonowo, Konstantynów Łódzki, Łódź (ul. Hutora 32), Łódź (ul. Kopernika 53/55), Łódź (ul. Łąkowa 4), Łódź (ul. Żeligowskiego 41/43), Młyniewo, Poznań-Główna, Tczew, Zamość, Zwierzyniec.

⁵³ <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/stiftung/gesetz-der-stiftung-evz.html> (accessed 26 January 2018).

⁵⁴ AINR Łódź, S 19/04/Zn, vol. IV p. 663, record of testimony of witness Henryk W. of 14 December 1978; AINR Łódź, S 19/04/Zn, vol. IV p. 668, record of testimony of witness Bożena P. of 14 December 1978; AINR Łódź, S 19/04/Zn, vol. IV p. 682, record of testimony of witness Czesława Cz. of 14 February 1979; and others.

made by the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation to the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Foundation, and its approval under the so-called openness clause, children under the age of 16 held at Konstantynów and fulfilling the condition of “long” imprisonment (more than 6 months), received financial assistance to a sum of 5,000 marks. They were thus included in the second group of repressed persons, along with prisoners of penal camps, prisons, educational labour camps and the Silesian *Polenlager*. Hence the situation of former underage prisoners was improved, but still those who had been sent to Konstantynów when older than 16 were not eligible for compensation from the Foundation. They were also not entitled to veterans’ rights.

Marianna Grynia noted in her arguments that the prisoners of the camp established in Konstantynów on 16 August 1943, which operated until the liberation of the town in January 1945, were eligible for higher compensation⁵⁵ than the Poles held there in 1940–1943. It should be mentioned as an aside that an amendment to the Act on War Veterans was passed on 14 March 2014 and entered into force in April 2014, but it did not make any changes to the matters discussed here. However, on 19 November 2014 a new ministerial order (Dz.U. 2014 item 1564) entered into force, this time under the auspices of the Minister of Employment and Social Policy, giving official designations of places where Polish citizens or people of Polish nationality had been detained. The list of such places was expanded, but there was no change to the status of the camp in Konstantynów.⁵⁶

By a decision of 22 March 2004, the investigation that had been suspended in 1981 was reopened. In 2006 thirteen former underage prisoners of the German camp in Konstantynów Łódzki made an appeal to the Polish President and Prime Minister, as well as to the Veterans and Repressed Persons Office (UdsKiOR), the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites (*Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa* – ROPWiM) and KŚZpNP IPN. This was partly motivated by the activity of Erika Steinbach, under whose leadership the Federation of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen*, BdV) was speaking increasingly loud and aggressively. The former underage prisoners – themselves once expelled from their homes – decided to make a repeated appeal to the authorities in defence of historical truth and with regard to the issue of the reclassification of the camp.

The Social Committee for the Building of a Monument to Polish Victims of the German Camp in Konstantynów Łódzki was established in March 2007. It was

⁵⁵ It should be explained that prisoners of the camp that existed from 16 August 1943 to 19 January 1945 – Soviet children designated for Germanisation – do not have veterans’ rights under Polish law. According to the Act on War Veterans, a condition *sine qua non* for the acquisition of such rights is possession of Polish citizenship currently or at the time of engagement in combat operations or subjection to repression.

⁵⁶ The latest order adds Potulice, Smukała and Toruń to the 12 camps listed in the footnote above. The list of places of detention referred to in Article 4(1)(1)c of the Act thus contains 15 camps in total. For the text of the order, see <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20140001564/O/D20141564.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2018).

chaired by Marianna Grynia, and operated under the auspices of the Association of Heirs of Polish Veterans. The Committee set itself three goals:

- 1) to build a monument commemorating the victims of the camp – this was accomplished on 22 May 2010;
- 2) “to give the Polish prisoners of the German camp in Konstantynów Łódzki the status of a concentration camp”⁵⁷ – although this wording is awkward and ambiguous, it may be assumed that the Committee’s goal was to have the camp’s status changed to that of a concentration camp or the prisoners’ status changed to that of prisoners of a concentration camp;
- 3) to obtain veterans’ rights for all Polish prisoners of the camp in Konstantynów, regardless of their age.

Despite further exchange of correspondence, the previous decision was not changed. The following sentence appears in one of the Committee’s letters to UdsKiOR: “The camp in Konstantynów was never called a resettlement camp, but only *Lager in Konstantinow*, which describes the place where it was located, but not its character.”⁵⁸ This statement, despite its categorical nature, is not accurate. Even a search of the investigation files, particularly the authenticated copies of death certificates issued for written notification of the camp commandants, shows that *Umsiedlungslager*, meaning resettlement camp, was among the names officially used. The perspective of former prisoners, although valuable in research (records of witness testimony contribute significantly to our understanding of everyday life in the camp), is not a complete perspective, because prisoners were at the camp for specific time periods. In such cases, extreme caution is required when making judgements, especially if one is not an unbiased and independent judge, but a party to the dispute, in particular the injured party. Of course, it is difficult to be objective after living through the German occupation, but on some occasions the form of the appeals made, such as that addressed to the country’s highest authorities, and the categorical nature of the claims made therein, leave much to be desired. All the more so because they are made to institutions (such as KŚZpNP IPN) that have a legal duty to prosecute both Nazi and Communist crimes, and hence to work in the interest of the victims of those regimes, not against them. Another argument included in the Committee’s letter relates to the issue of whether the prisoners of the camp in Konstantynów were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities. The letter includes the following passage:

In May a branch of the Resettlement Office was established in Łódź. SS Obernbaumführer [sic] Hermann Krumey became its head. The full name was: Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und der SD [sic] – Umwandererzentralstelle [sic] – Dienststelle Litzmomustadt [sic]. From 1941 the branch was only nominally subordinate to the Poznań Head Office. Herman [sic] Krumey – the head of the Łódź branch – Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD reported directly to the Office of Security in Berlin and from there he received directives regarding the Konstantynów camp, while the Poznań

⁵⁷ M. Grynia, *Wypędzeni. Polskie...*, Warsaw 2013, p. 253 (reproduction of a letter of 8 July 2010 from SKdsBPPONOWKŁ to UdsKiOR).

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 254.

Central Office was only informed about them. Hence the conclusion that this camp was under the strict supervision of the security service (according to Professor Maria Rutowska, a historian at the Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań)⁵⁹ [in fact Rutowska worked not for the INR but for the Institute of Western Affairs].

The cited argument was probably formulated based on a part of Maria Rutowska's habilitation dissertation, which was titled *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z Kraju Warty do Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1941* (Expulsions of the Polish population from the Wartheland to the Generalgouvernement 1939–1941).⁶⁰ Interestingly, this work supplies significant information about the possibility that prisoners of the camps subordinate to the Łódź branch were at the disposal of the Nazi security authorities (RSHA). On the basis of specific documents sent from the RSHA to Hermann Krumey concerning issues related to resettlement camps, this reasoning could be developed and used in the campaign to obtain veterans' rights for all former prisoners of the camp, not only those who were minors.

By a decision of 24 May 2011, the investigation into crimes committed by German state officials from 1940 to 1945 at the resettlement camp in Konstantynów near Łódź was discontinued “due to failure to identify guilty parties and the lack of data sufficiently justifying the suspicion of the commission of certain crimes.”⁶¹

CONCLUSIONS

Analysing the stormy polemics of former prisoners against various institutions, one may conclude that this debate is heavily weighted down with emotions in place of substantial arguments. In their struggle to have the camp reclassified from a resettlement to a concentration camp, the prisoners have used numerous arguments: the need to reflect the reality of the contemporary experience of the camp, entitlement

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ The following relevant passage appears in the book by M. Rutowska, *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z Kraju Warty do Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1941*, Poznań 2003, p. 31: “The full name of the Łódź branch of the UWZ was: ‘Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Umwandererzentralstelle Posen – Dienststelle Litzmannstadt’. It was headed by ‘SS-Obersturmbannführer’ Hermann Krumey, who was also deputy chief of the entire UWZ. In the initial period (from April 1940 to early 1941) the Łódź branch of the Central Resettlement Office was formally and effectively subordinate to the UWZ leadership in Poznań. However, from the first months of 1941 the Łódź office became more and more independent, and Krumey's subordination to Höppner was only nominal. Krumey consulted Berlin directly in all official matters and received instructions from there, of which the Central Resettlement Office in Poznań was merely informed. RSHA also entrusted him with the record-keeping and inspection of all rail transports from the Wartheland, as well as from the Danzig–West Prussia Reichsgau and the Ciechanów and Silesian districts. A central file of all displaced Poles was also kept in Łódź. Krumey's Łódź branch of the central office became a model for similar offices organised in other occupied areas.”

⁶¹ <https://lodz.ipn.gov.pl/pl6/sledztwa/sledztwa/oddzialowa-komisja-w-lo/31454,Sledztwa-zakonczone-wydaniem-postanowienia-o-umorzeniu.html> (accessed 19 January 2017).

to war veterans' rights, and entitlement to greater compensation – more adequate, in their eyes, to what they experienced at the camp. It is hard to ignore the material motives, considering that some of the prisoners are now elderly persons living on very modest pensions. It would be an oversimplification of the issue, however, to reduce it to the matter of veterans' prerogatives and additional compensation from the German government. An important role is also played by the desire for historical justice, for moral expiation and restitution, and for commemoration of the victims. It must be remembered that we are speaking of people who lost everything due to the Nazi occupation: first their homes and property, then their loved ones, and finally their own health. Hence the presumption that the chief catalyst of their actions is a desire to win justice, and to prove that the institution with the innocent sounding name of "resettlement or transit camp" was in fact a place of torment and for the extermination of the young and the elderly. Former prisoners undoubtedly feel not only unjustly treated under the law, but also forgotten by history. The monument to the victims of the camp was raised by the Committee's efforts thanks to the sacrifice and commitment of Marianna Grynia, who raised the necessary funds through action at different levels. It should not be forgotten either that in Polish public debate a kind of competition often arises with Jewish representatives, with the two sides trying to "outbid" each other in terms of harm suffered; notwithstanding, the Poles also endured much. The experiences of the prisoners of the camp in Konstantynów provide further evidence of the suffering of the Polish population during World War II.

In this situation, it would seem justified to seek nuances in contexts. Perhaps the question of the character of the camp in Konstantynów should be viewed not only from the *de jure* perspective that has been discussed hitherto, but also from a *de facto* one. It may be considered whether at a particular time the camp did not have features of a concentration camp in view of the heavy work that prisoners were forced to perform, and which became a factor in their physical destruction. The starvation rations, the poor sanitary conditions, and the bullying and brutal behaviour of the camp personnel became factors of indirect extermination, particularly among minors. It is true that genocide was not the intended purpose of the resettlement camps – the aim was to move displaced persons on to new places, either to the Generalgouvernement or for forced labour in the Reich. Extermination of the population nonetheless became an effect of the actions carried out at the camp by the occupying forces. It is accepted that unconditional labour leading to physical destruction did not apply to all of those held at the camp, but it was a part of the experience of many. Prisoners subjected to forced labour were not isolated cases. In certain periods almost all prisoners were required to work, including minors. Moreover, while in the camp's initial phase those who were healthy and more or less of working age did not remain in the camp longer than days or weeks, there were several groups – minors aged up to 14, the elderly, infirm and incapable of work, particularly at the time when a wave of displacements took place in connection with preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union – that were condemned to remain in the camp for an indefinite period.

Further evidence of the determination of the former prisoners may be found in the inscription on a plaque now displayed in front of the building of the former camp in Konstantinów Łódzki:

“In memory
of the thousands of Poles and many of other nationalities
imprisoned and murdered in the years 1940–1945
in the German concentration camp
located in this building

On the 1050th anniversary of the baptism of Poland
The community of the town of Konstantinów Łódzki
October 2016”

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Keywords: resettlement camp, transit camp, concentration camp, Konstantinów Łódzki, prisoners, war veterans' benefits

ABSTRACT

This article describes and analyses the efforts of former prisoners of the German camp in occupied Konstantinów, near Łódź, to have the institution reclassified from a resettlement camp to a concentration camp. A brief account is given of the history of the camp, its place in the Nazi system of camps, and the conditions that existed there. This is followed by an exposition of the arguments and counterarguments used in disputes between the former prisoners and public institutions. The status of the former prisoners of the Konstantinów camp is examined in the context of the Act on War Veterans and accompanying regulations. The issue of financial compensation paid to victims of Nazi Germany by the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation is also discussed. The article provides an impulse for reflection on the question of the categorisation of transit camps, from both de jure and de facto perspectives.

Photo 1

Plaques displayed in front of the building of the former camp in Konstaktynow Łódzki



Source: author's archives

Photo 2

*The building of the German camp in Konstantynów near Łódź, viewed from ul. Łódzka
(then General-Litzmannstadt-Straße)*



Source: author's archives

KRZYSZTOF ŁAGOJDA
Wrocław

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE POLISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE KŁODZKO REGION AFTER THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

INTRODUCTION

The study is an attempt to reconstruct the process of shaping the Polish civil administration in the Kłodzko region after the end of World War II. The activities of the first representatives of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland and the Local Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry in the region have already been studied, although superficially, and described in the literature on the subject.¹ The chaos of the first months after the war in the Kłodzko lands² can be discussed in many contexts, including military, political or socio-economic ones.³ Given the wealth of source materials, it has been decided to present the beginnings of the Polish administration, the arrival of its members in the Kłodzko lands, stormy relations with the Soviet military commanders, the takeover of individual industrial plants and the relations with the Germans who stayed in Poland or returned to the area after the front had passed. Also, such topics as, for example, the displacement of Germans, the process of Polish people settling down in the region, the development of the apparatus of repression and its activities need to be studied separately but in detail with reference to the history of the Kłodzko lands just after the war.⁴ The sources on which the present study is based were collected in

¹ T. Marczak, *Kłodzko powojenne*, in: *Kłodzko. Dzieje miasta*, R. Gładkiewicz (ed.), Kłodzko 1998, p. 137; M. Ruchniewicz, S. Rosik, P. Wiszewski, *Bystrzyca Kłodzka. Zarys rozwoju miasta na przestrzeni wieków*, Wrocław-Bystrzyca Kłodzka 2007, pp. 241-244; A. Herzig, M. Ruchniewicz, *Dzieje Ziemi Kłodzkiej*, Hamburg-Wrocław 2006, pp. 385-390.

² After the war, until 1954, the Kłodzko region included two counties: Kłodzko and Bystrzyca, which covered the same territory as they did when they belonged to Germany before 1945. They officially became counties in May 1946 pursuant to the "Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 29 May 1946 on temporary division of Recovered Territories". See: *DziennikUstaw*[Journal of Laws] from 1946, No. 28, item 177, p. 329.

³ The first years after the war in Poland are presented in the unique study on social history: M. Zarembo, *Wielka trwoga. Polska 1944-1947. Ludowa reakcja na kryzys*, Kraków 2012.

⁴ With regard to the first topic, limited research referring to the Kłodzko lands is discussed in: T. Szarota, *Osadnictwo miejskie na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945-1948*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków

the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw and the State Archive in Wrocław. In many places the article has been supplemented with the information from the documents held at the Kamieniec Ząbkowicki Branch of the State Archive in Wrocław, the Archive of the Border Guard in Szczecin and the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance.

The text ends within the time frame of the year 1945. The problem lies in determining strict limits as the formation of the Polish administration in the Kłodzko region was a complex process depending on various factors. Both May 1945 when the first government representatives and members of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) arrived in the region and June 1945, when the Soviet commanders officially handed over power to Poles, can be considered the initial turning point. As I will show later, this, however, did not change much in terms of strengthening the position of the Polish administration in the region. The final caesura is September 1945 when the Local Operational Group of the KERM in Lower Silesia was dissolved.

ROUGH BEGINNINGS OF THE POLISH ADMINISTRATION

The loss of the Eastern Borderlands and the change of the eastern border of Poland were the result of the decisions taken during the Big Three Conference in Tehran (November-December 1943) which were in line with the demands of Joseph Stalin. The so-called Curzon line, proposed in 1920 as a demarcation line between Poland and Bolshevik Russia, marked new frontier of post-war Poland in the east (with slight deviations of 5-8 km in favour of Poland). Soon afterwards, the Polish communists renounced the eastern territories. First, on 27 July 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) concluded an agreement on the border with the USSR, and finally, on 16 August 1945, the Provisional Government of National Unity, recognised by all countries in the world as the legitimate government of Poland, approved its final course. It was arranged during the talks in Tehran that Poland would receive lands in the west as compensation at the expense of the defeated Germany. The then unspecified shape of the western border was the subject of a dispute, mainly between Stalin and Winston Churchill during the Yalta conference in February 1945.⁵ Churchill pushed for the border along the Oder and Nysa Kłodzka rivers whereas Stalin tenaciously demanded approval of the border on the Oder and Neisse. In the end, during the Potsdam Conference at the turn of July and August 1945, new leaders of the United States and Great Britain, President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, gave in to Stalin's demands.⁶

1969; E. Kościak, *Osadnictwo wiejskie w południowych powiatach Dolnego Śląska w latach 1945-1949*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk-Łódź 1982.

⁵ K. Kersten, *Jalta w polskiej perspektywie*, London-Warsaw 1989.

⁶ W. T. Kowalski, *Walka dyplomatyczna o miejsce Polski w Europie 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1966.

During the armed conflict and significant progress of the Soviet offensive in January, a still important problem was the defining of mutual relations between the Polish administration and the military power exercised in the territories taken over by the Supreme Command of the Red Army in the form of military headquarters.⁷ The problem of their mutual relations was discussed by the representatives of the State National Council (KRN) on 20 July 1944. On 26 July, PKWN and the USSR concluded an agreement on powers of the Red Army Command and the Polish administration.⁸ On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR issued a statement in which it assured that the military commanders were operating on a temporary basis and the Red Army would not establish their own stable administration in the Polish territories seized by them. Pursuant to the agreement of 26 July, when the hostilities ceased, PKWN was to supervise the creation of civil administration.⁹ A moveable belt covering a range of 60 to 100 km was created near the front line. The Soviets were supposed to hold power within its borders. As the front line moved away, the matters related to the organisation of the administration were to be handed over to the representatives of the Polish government. In fact, however, the Soviets controlled the territories (at least informally) that they had taken over for many months after the war.¹⁰

In his instruction of 23 August 1944, Konstanty Rokossowski, who had been appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union two months earlier, urged that military commanders should maintain proper relationships with the local PKWN authorities.¹¹ Military commanders of the Red Army questioned not only the activities of the representatives of the Polish administrative apparatus, but also their mere presence. Preparatory work for the takeover of the Western and Northern Territories by the Polish administration had already been undertaken in the second half of 1944. However, it was not until 12 March 1945 that the Council of Ministers appointed a committee for drawing up a detailed plan for organising the Polish administration in these areas.¹² Two days later, the decision was made to divide the Western and Northern Lands into four administrative districts and appoint representatives of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland. Stanisław Piaskowski was appointed a representative in Lower

⁷ For more on military command headquarters, see: M. Łach, *Status prawny komendantur wojennych Armii Czerwonej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych Polski 1945 r.*, in: *Ziemie odzyskane pod wojskową administracją radziecką po II wojnie światowej. Materiały z konferencji*, S. Łach (ed.), Słupsk 2000, pp. 85-93.

⁸ A. Magierska, *Ziemie zachodnie i północne w 1945 roku. Kształtowanie się podstaw polityki integracyjnej państwa polskiego*, Warsaw 1978, pp. 17-18, 22.

⁹ J. Hytrek-Hryciuk, „Rosjanie nadchodzą!”. *Ludność niemiecka a żołnierze Armii Radzieckiej (Czerwonej) na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945-1948*, Wrocław 2013, 2nd edition – revised and supplemented, p. 118.

¹⁰ M.L. Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1944-1956*, Warsaw 2000, p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 11-12.

¹² E. Kościak, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Silesia pursuant to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 14 March 1945.¹³ The creation of the Polish civil administration in individual counties was entrusted to the local representatives. They were elected by the Cross-Party Committee who cooperated with the regional representative and was made up of the representatives of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the People's Party. Who would be appointed as a representative depended primarily on the two first and strongest factions.¹⁴ Initially, Lower Silesia was divided into 47 regional districts which included 12 municipal districts which also had their representatives.¹⁵

Kłodzko, Bystrzyca Kłodzka and Nowa Ruda were taken over by the 59th unit of the Red Army on 9 and 10 May, 1945.¹⁶ Just a few days after these events, the representatives who became first county starosts arrived in Kłodzko and Bystrzyca Kłodzka (both cities with the rank of a district).¹⁷ Tadeusz Musiał¹⁸, who was appointed local representative for Kłodzko (district XXIV) arrived in the town along with a group of 16 people probably on 17 May.¹⁹ According to Maria Łabaczuk's findings, Bolesław Twardowski²⁰ also came to Bystrzyca Kłodzka (district XXV) with his

¹³ Stanisław Piaskowski, born 21 April 1901 in Żelechów, son of Antoni and Maria. He graduated from the Law Department at the University of Warsaw. In 1919-1921 he took part in the Polish-Soviet War. During and after the Second World War, he was associated with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). After the war he became deputy of KRN, chairman of the Party District Headquarters of the PPS in Wrocław, Polish government representative in Lower Silesia, Wrocław governor until the end of February 1949. See: the State Archive in Wrocław (hereafter APWr), Governor's Office in Wrocław (hereafter UWW), Human Resources Department, ref. no. 111, personal records of Stanisław Piaskowski.

¹⁴ M. Ruchniewicz, *Lata 1945-1948*, in: *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia historyczna*, ed. W. Wrześniński, Wrocław 2006, p. 630.

¹⁵ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/30, List of districts in Lower Silesia, undated, p. 1.

¹⁶ The Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Wrocław (hereafter AIPN Wr), ref. no. 054/663, The time of liberation of individual cities with reference to the units that liberated them, July 1974, p. 20.

¹⁷ A. Herzig, M. Ruchniewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

¹⁸ Tadeusz Musiał, born 26 June, 1916 in Kielce. He was a holder of a university degree which he had received at the Institute of Economics and Commerce in Kraków. During the occupation, he was a member of the People's Party (SL). After the war he joined the Polish Workers' Party. On 12 May 1945, Stanisław Piaskowski appointed him a representative of the Polish government in the Kłodzko county, where he also took the position of the first starost. He remained in office till 2 July, 1945. See: APWr, UWW, Human Resources Department, ref. no. 99, personal records of Tadeusz Musiał.

¹⁹ R. Sakaluk, *Kłodzko 1945-1947, Rocznik Ziemi Kłodzkiej*, 1964, vol. 6, p. 115. Cf. A. Ropelewski, *Pionierskie lato*, Warsaw 1972, p. 49.

²⁰ Bolesław Twardowski's personal records lack much key information. His personal card is missing, and there is no data on when exactly he took up the position of a representative and starost of Bystrzyca county and which political party he belonged to. Bolesław Twardowski was removed from office by Stanisław Piaskowski on 12 September, 1945. Thus, he held the above-mentioned positions from May to September 1945. On 26 September, the prosecutor of the District Court in Świdnica informed the representative of the Polish government in Lower Silesia about the initiation of criminal proceedings against Bolesław Twardowski and Mieczysław Chiberski (the mayor of Międzyzlesie), who were charged under Article 286 §2 of the Penal Code. On 28 September, as a result of a misunderstanding, Twardowski was appointed mayor of Oława, but on 9 October, Piaskowski revoked his earlier decision. Twardowski hid from law enforcement agencies. On 31 December, 1946, the criminal proceedings were suspended until

group on 17 May.²¹ Until 15 May 1945, the Polish administrative authorities had been established in 25 regional districts in Lower Silesia.²² On 28 May, a conference was held at the Soviet Military Commander's office to discuss how the Polish authorities would take over power. It was attended by the members of the Local Operational Group of KERM, the starost's office and the still active German magistrate.²³ The Soviets agreed for the German civil administration to operate as it was necessary to meet the demands of the public and the German mark was still valid currency in the region. In addition, the population of Kłodzko and Bystrzyca counties was almost 100% German. The Kłodzko lands had belonged to those regions where the number of Germans was higher in 1945 than in 1939 due to people fleeing or being evacuated as the front drew nearer.²⁴ When the Red Army took over these lands, there were around 180,000 permanent residents living here.²⁵ On 1 September 1939, there were about 126,000 Germans in Kłodzko county. At the end of September 1945 this number reached almost 133,000²⁶ and almost 138,000 at the end of 1945.²⁷ In mid-September 1945, about 78,000 Germans lived in Bystrzyca county.²⁸ Thus, in 1945 there were about 215,000 people of German nationality living in the Kłodzko lands.

Lieutenant Colonel Serafin Podstojuk, first military commander of Kłodzko county, formally handed over power to the Polish administration on 3 June 1945.²⁹ This took place after the intervention of Tadeusz Musiał with the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front Marshal of the Soviet Union, Ivan Koniev, who was stationed near Dresden and a simultaneous intervention by Stanisław Piaskowski with the military commander of Kłodzko county.³⁰ At first, however, the Polish authorities meant little and the German magistrate continued to work. According to the report of the Silesian-Dąbrowski Vice Governor Stefan Wengierów dated 14 June 1945 "the Polish

the former representative of the Polish government in Bystrzyca county was apprehended. See: APWr, UWW, Human Resources Department, ref. no. 149, personal records of Bolesław Twardowski.

²¹ M. Łabaczuk, *Bystrzyca Kłodzka w latach 1945-1950. Społeczne i polityczne problemy zasiedlenia i zagospodarowania miasta*, Opole 2004 (typescript of Ph.D. dissertation).

²² APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/30, Report to Edward Ochab's general representative, 15 May 1945, p. 24. See: J. Michalska, *Obejmowanie władzy na Dolnym Śląsku przez polską administrację w 1945 roku, Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka* 1966, no. 4, p. 627.

²³ The Central Archives of Modern Records (hereafter AAN), the Local Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry (hereafter GO KERM), ref. no. 367, General weekly report for 26 May to 9 June 1945, 9 June 1945, p. 1.

²⁴ APWr, UWW, ref. no. VI/28, Field and organisational report, undated, p. 14.

²⁵ M. Ruchniewicz, *Koniec i początek. Lata 1945-1946 w Dusznikach i regionie kłodzkim w zapisach autobiograficznych*, *Rocznik Muzeum Papiernictwa* 2017, vol. XI, p. 73.

²⁶ APWr, UWW, ref. no. VI/362, Note on the displacement of Germans from Kłodzko county, 29 September 1945, p. 4.

²⁷ APWr, UWW, ref. no. IX/59, Settlement list of the population in Kłodzko county, 30 December 1945, p. 12.

²⁸ APWr, UWW, ref. no. IX/10, Report on the course of the settlement process in Bystrzyca county, 15 September 1945, p. 15.

²⁹ E. Kościuk, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³⁰ A. Ropelewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-54.

authorities in the town are extremely weak and represented by a few officials and policemen - in fact, the former German magistrate is still in office".³¹ Therefore, it seems that the handing over of power on 3 June, in fact meant little because the position of the German magistrate was stronger. It can be said that three different bodies, Soviet, German and Polish, were exercising power at the same time, although the latter two were in fact dependent on the first.

According to *The list of rulers and authorities* of Kłodzko after the war compiled by Stefan Mróz, the last German mayor, Johann Knüppel, stepped down only on 20 June 1945 and handed over the office to Mieczysław Dziubdziela, the first Polish mayor.³² However, one may have reasonable doubts with regard to this information. It follows from Andrzej Ropelewski's diary and the contents of the document quoted in it in detail that Mieczysław Dziubdziela began to perform his duties as mayor of Kłodzko on 1 June 1945, so two days before the formal transfer of power by the military commander to the Polish administration.³³ On the other hand, in Tadeusz Musiał's report presented on 11 June 1945 during the first convention of the regional government representatives of the Republic of Poland we read: "The mayor, the German [sic!] – has been removed".³⁴ Nonetheless, three days later, Stefan Wengierów presented a report in which the assessment of the influence of the Polish administration in the town had been clearly critical.

On the basis of those documents that have survived, it is hard to say when the Polish mayor began fully independent work in the city. The date of the handover of power by the Soviet military commander did not necessarily mean that the Polish administration actually exercised that power. Rather, it was a long process whose start date cannot be defined. This generalisation applies to the entire counties of Kłodzko and Bystrzyca and the taking over of power by mayors, village and commune administrators both in towns and villages of the region and not just in their capitals: Kłodzko and Bystrzyca. It is worth mentioning here that the German magistrate in Kudowa-Zdrój (Kłodzko county) was still active in August 1945.³⁵

The representatives of the Polish administration in Bystrzyca Kłodzka faced similar problems. Roman Lewicki, the KERM local representative in Bystrzyca Kłodzka, turned to the military commander who informed him that he had no instructions regar-

³¹ Dok. 165, in: *Niemcy w Polsce 1945-1950. Wybór dokumentów*, vol. 4: *Pomorze Gdańskie i Dolny Śląsk*, selected and edited by I. Eser et al., D. Boćkowski (ed.), Warsaw 2001, p. 275.

³² According to the list, Mieczysław Dziubdziela performed the duties of mayor of Kłodzko from 20 July to 27 January, 1946. The day after his dismissal, he became a county starost in Kłodzko and remained in office till 25 July 1946. Unfortunately, the search for the mayor's and starost's personal file at the Human Resources Department of the Governor's Office in Wrocław and the Archive of the Town Hall in Kłodzko was unsuccessful. S. Mróz, *Wykazy władców i władz. Okres po II wojnie światowej. Starostowie*, in: *Kłodzko. Dzieje miasta...*, p. 225.

³³ A. Ropelewski, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

³⁴ AAN, Ministry of Public Administration (hereafter MAP), ref. no. 2479, Minutes of the first meeting of local Polish government representatives in Lower Silesia, 11 June 1945, p. 14.

³⁵ A. Herzig, M. Ruchniewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

ding the handover of the administrative management over the town into Polish hands. Moreover, the Soviet commander objected to Poles wearing white-and-red armbands, displaying the Polish flag and the presence of representatives of the Polish administration (both civil and industrial) as the official authorities in the county, so as not to provoke incidents in which Germans would be involved. Those who had guns were forced to surrender them.³⁶

After many interventions made by Poles, major Biedrizov who had become a new military commander in the Bystrzyca district on 27 May, went to Dresden to get Marshal Ivan Koniev's permission to hand over power to the Polish authorities. After his return, he invited Roman Lewicki and Bolesław Twardowski to his office and in the presence of the representatives of the German magistrate handed the town over to them. This took place on 6 June 1945 and Stanisław Bednarek became the first mayor.³⁷ He performed his duties for only a month. His successor, Stefan Owczarek, started the process of forming Polish administration in the town.³⁸ Biedrizov insisted that the current German administrative apparatus should remain and be used at work. At the same time, he made it clear that if the Germans were removed from administration [sic!], he would make us [Poles - author's note] responsible for all the matters referred to us.³⁹ And so it was done. This did not stem from the desire to keep German village elders or mayors but it was caused by the shortage of people in the Polish administrative apparatus who could have taken up positions in such a difficult and demanding time. However, this does not seem to be the only reason. Other reports clearly show that Poles had little choice as the military commander refused to remove Germans from the positions they held in the county starost's office or other offices.⁴⁰ The evalu-

³⁶ M. Ruchniewicz, S. Rosik, P. Wiszewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-242.

³⁷ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 252, Report of the representative of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) in Bystrzyca to the management of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, 9 July 1945, p. 4.

³⁸ Stefan Owczarek born 28 August 1901, son of Jakub and Julia. He completed eight years of primary school. There is no other information, for example, about his party affiliation or political activity. He was mayor from 7 July 1945 to 1 March 1948. See: the Kamieniec Żąbkowicki Branch of the State Archives in Wrocław (hereafter APKZ), the Municipal Board in Bystrzyca Kłodzka (hereafter ZMBK), ref. no. 33/13, personal records of Stefan Owczarek. The Municipal Board in Bystrzyca Kłodzka has no personal records of the first mayor, Stanisław Bednarek. It can be assumed that Bednarek's one-month term of office did not abound with important decisions so there was no need to create personal records. Personal records of Stefan Owczarek, who served as mayor for nearly three years, are scant and contain only a personal data form and a few other, less important documents. What we know for sure is that he was politically linked to the Polish Workers' Party. Along with the suspension of Stefan Owczarek on 1 March 1948, an inspection of the Municipal Board was carried out which revealed a number of weaknesses and erroneous decisions of the second mayor of the town. For more on that see: AAN, Ministry for the Recovered Territories (hereafter MZO), ref. no. 1283, Inspection of the Municipal Board in Bystrzyca Kłodzka, 31 March 1948, pp. 20-21.

³⁹ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 252, Report of the representative of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers in Bystrzyca to the management of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, 9 July 1945, p. 4.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, Report no. 1/45, 18 June 1945, p. 8.

ation of the newly appointed representative of the Local Operational Group of KERM in Bystrzyca Kłodzka Piotr Ligenz-Mazurek leaves no doubt as to what role the Polish administration played in Bystrzyca county after the formal takeover of power: "A county starost, a representative of an operational group such as a mayor cannot make a move without consulting the military commander first. The Polish authorities have little say in Bystrzyca and the county. Until now, Poles have been treated as third-class citizens".⁴¹ To have a fuller picture of the living conditions of the Polish administration, one can have a look at an excerpt from the report of the Municipal Committee of the Polish Workers' Party on the situation in Duszniki-Zdrój in the Kłodzko district: "Since the beginning of their service, i.e. for a couple of months, the officials of the Municipal Board have not received their salaries and have threatened to give up their jobs and leave, which would have unpredictable consequences".⁴² The situation in Bystrzyca county was comparable. Those who played an important role in the administration had to struggle with lack of food and inadequate housing. The representative of the Local Operational Group of KERM and his family occupied a single room in a third-rate ex-German hotel. The starost of Bystrzyca county lived in a dilapidated hut on the outskirts of the town and the first mayor stayed in the barracks.⁴³

According to Tadeusz Musiał's report presented at the first meeting of the local representatives of the Polish government, by mid-June only four Poles had become village administrators in the municipalities of Kłodzko county.⁴⁴ With the influx of Polish people, German officials began to be laid off and replaced by Polish ones, irrespective of the education and professional experience of the newly recruited personnel. But this did not happen overnight. At the end of July 1945, only 60% of the villages in Bystrzyca county had Polish commune heads. The German police were dissolved in the county and replaced by the Citizen's Militia (MO).⁴⁵

THE ACTIVITY OF THE DISTRICT OPERATIONAL GROUPS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

In addition to the activity of the Polish government representatives and the formation of the civil administration, special Local Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry operated in Lower Silesia.⁴⁶ Their task – as a temporary body until the creation of the industrial

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁴² APWr, Local Committee of the Polish Socialist Party in Kłodzko (hereafter PK PPS), ref. no. 24, Report for October, 6 November 1945, pp. 159-160.

⁴³ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 252, Report no. 1/45, 18 June 1945, p. 7.

⁴⁴ AAN, MAP, ref. no. 2479, Minutes of the first meeting of local Polish government representatives in Lower Silesia, 11 June 1945, p. 14.

⁴⁵ APWr, UWW, ref. no. 1/32, Situation report of the representative of the Polish Government in Bystrzyca county, 9 August 1945, p. 19.

⁴⁶ Various names can be found in the documents produced by the representatives of the Local Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, for example, a representative

administration – was to take over, secure and re-open industrial plants in the counties taken over from the Germans.⁴⁷ Additionally, the groups were involved in, among other tasks, recruiting industrial professionals, restoring transport connections between counties or even “replacing the absent or inefficient administrative authorities in their typical tasks”.⁴⁸ This was hardly surprising as cases were reported of the representatives of the Polish administration turning up even two or three weeks after the arrival of the KERM groups to these lands and also their qualifications left much to be desired.⁴⁹ In many towns in Lower Silesia members of the Local Operational Groups of KERM were the first representatives of the Polish authorities and, therefore, they handled administrative matters.⁵⁰ In cases where there were no representatives of the Polish administration in a town, military commanders were obliged to appoint an interim head or mayor elected among the supporters of PKWN. Most often, however, they let the Germans stay in office or elected them for these positions.⁵¹

The Provisional Government along with the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry appointed heads of the Operational Groups for the Western and Northern Territories as early as January 1945, when those lands still belonged to the Third Reich. At the same time, groups were set up for each region: Opole Silesia, Western Pomerania, Warmia and Masuria and Lower Silesia. Within the district structures there were Local Groups, which were assigned to individual counties.⁵² The Operational Group for Lower Silesia was formed at the end of April and left Kraków on 19 May. The Local Operational Group for Kłodzko county and its first representative, Jerzy Irowiec, arrived in the city on 26 May 1945. The group’s reports clearly show that the takeover of individual industrial plants in the first weeks after the war was quite a difficult process. On 25 May 1945, Jan Iwański, the representative of the KERM Operational Group in Lower Silesia, appointed Roman Lewicki as a local representative in Bystrzyca Kłodzka. Lewicki and twelve other employees arrived in the city the following day.⁵³

With the permission of the military commander, representatives of the KERM Local Operational Group in Kłodzko were given an office on 31 May, and on 1 June

of the KERM Operational Group in Bystrzyca. In the main text, however, I use either the full name Local Operational Groups or an abbreviated form OGO KERM. There are exceptions such as footnotes where I give the names of the documents after their creators.

⁴⁷ M. Kinstler, *Grupy Operacyjne Komitetu Ekonomicznego Rady Ministrów i Ministerstwa Przemysłu. Dolny Śląsk (kwiecień-wrzesień 1945)*, Wrocław 1987.

⁴⁸ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 246, Report on the operations of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry in Lower Silesia for 11 May to 8 June 1945, 8 June 1945, p. 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

⁵⁰ M. Kinstler, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22, 47.

⁵¹ M. L. Krogulski, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵² M. Kinstler, *op. cit.*, p. 48. The Operational Group in the Lower Silesia region was based on the administrative division contained in Circular no. 29, issued in Kraków on 23 April 1945, AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 245, Circular no. 29 on the administrative division of Lower Silesia, 23 April 1945, pp. 1-2.

⁵³ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 320, Order no. 27, 25 May 1945, p. 7.

they formally began working, making inventories of the industrial plants and seeing clients, even though the city was still under Soviet control.⁵⁴ In Bystrzyca county, Roman Lewicki was given the building which was earlier occupied by the police on 6 June and he began working the following day.⁵⁵

The first and most important task of the Local Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers was to determine the number of industrial plants in the Kłodzko lands. It was not an easy task for several reasons. The most serious of them was the shortage of means of transport. Even in June, the group did not have a car so only carriages and horses were used when visiting surrounding lands.⁵⁶ Until June the KERM Operational Group had reached only 25 municipalities out of 99 making up the county at that time.⁵⁷ In October 1945, the Municipal Committee of the PPS in Duszniki-Zdrój reported to its County Committee the significant difficulties in the organising of new branches of the party in the commune. It was reported that because they did not have a car, a trip by carriage to Zieleniec (then Grunwald), 14 km away, would take them two days.⁵⁸ Government representatives faced a similar problem. A total of 25 cars were borrowed for the representatives in Lower Silesia from the administrative district of Upper Silesia. Only eleven of them, however, could be used and fourteen were being repaired.⁵⁹ The Soviets also contributed to the transport chaos that followed the war. When the Red army had entered Bystrzyca county, it confiscated 80% of all horse-drawn vehicles and 95% of cars belonging to residents in the area.⁶⁰

By 9 June, 172 industrial plants had been inventoried in Kłodzko country, including 72 in Kłodzko alone.⁶¹ A week later this number reached 203.⁶² It was stressed that more people with managerial experience were needed for the plants to start operating. Therefore, in many cases, the KERM Operational Groups representatives appointed Germans as interim managers until the arrival of employees with relevant experience.⁶³ But such

⁵⁴ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 367, General weekly report for 26 May to 9 June 1945, 9 June 1945, p. 1.

⁵⁵ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 317, Report on the state of the county on the day of the arrival 26 May 1945, 9 June 1945, p. 3v.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, Transportation report, undated, p. 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, Technical report for 10-16 June 1945, undated, p. 15.

⁵⁸ APWr, PK PPS, ref. no. 24, Report for October, 6 November 1945, p. 158. When determining German place names, the list of towns and communes in Kłodzko country along with the changes introduced to it on the basis of Monitor Polski (Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland) proved very helpful. I obtained the list by courtesy of Dr Bartosz Grygorcewicz, an employee of the State Archive in Wrocław, Kamieniec Ząbkowicki Branch, to whom I am very grateful.

⁵⁹ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/30, Report to Edward Ochab's general representative, 15 May 1945, p. 24.

⁶⁰ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/32, Situation report of the Polish government representative to Bystrzyca region, 9 August 1945, p. 20.

⁶¹ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 254, Weekly technical report for 26 May to 9 June 1945, 9 June 1945, p. 70.

⁶² *Ibidem*, Technical report for 10-16 June 1945, undated, p. 74.

⁶³ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 367, List of staff needed, 9 June 1945, p. 11.

people were few and far between. The reports clearly show that people who started working for the Local Operational Groups of OGO KERM in Kłodzko and Bystrzyca did not meet the expectations. It was emphasised many times that there were no people who would care for the restoration of industry or the job itself. There were few people experienced and knowledgeable about industry among the members of the operational groups.⁶⁴ The lack of managerial staff was not the only problem when starting the industry in Kłodzko lands. Although Poles took over administrative control in the region in early June, industrial plants, continually plundered by the Soviets, were in their hands in most cases. On 7 September 1945, only 225 of all 761 industrial plants in Kłodzko county were administered by Poles. The rest of them was controlled by the Soviets.⁶⁵ On 15 September 1945, during the session of the Industrial Congress of the Recovered Territories, the Operational Group in Lower Silesia stopped working although it had not completed all their tasks. The documentation and supervision of the agencies was taken over by the local branch of the Ministry of Industry.⁶⁶

RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN POPULATION AND WITH THE SOVIETS

The general attitude of the German population to the arriving Poles and the Polish administration was dependent on several factors. Polish orders aimed at improving the supply situation, or securing property or the situation in the region, were accepted and respected by the Germans. The situation was quite different in the case of enforcement of the policy of displacement, confiscation of property or limitation of rights. Then the Soviet military authorities received numerous complaints regarding Polish actions. Such reactions on the part of the Germans should come as no surprise. However, in the Polish administration's reports, cases were reported of a "humbly servile attitude of the Germans towards representatives of the Red Army".⁶⁷ In some of them it was even stated that the German population saw Red Army soldiers as defenders against the "lawlessness and violence" of the Poles.⁶⁸ This is an astonishing assessment, given the acts perpetrated by the Soviets during the march on Berlin including rapes and murders committed on a massive scale against both Germans and Poles.⁶⁹ The Polish administration explained this in a fairly superficial way, in terms of "flexibility of character, subservience to the strong, and giving of a whole number of favours", as a re-

⁶⁴ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 254, Administrative and political situation, undated, p. 68.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, List of the industrial plants in Kłodzko and Kłodzko county, 7 September 1945, p. 87.

⁶⁶ M. Kinstler, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶⁷ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/30, Report to Edward Ochab's general representative, 15 May 1945, p. 24. For more on the favouring of the German population by Red Army troops in Lower Silesia see: J. Hytrek-Hryciuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-158.

⁶⁸ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/32, Situation report of the Polish government representative to Bystrzyca region, 9 August 1945, p. 19.

⁶⁹ See: M. Białokur, *Zanim wkroczyli na Śląsk. Podgrzewanie nienawiści do Niemców w szeregach Armii Czerwonej w okresie II wojny światowej*, in: *Koniec wojny na Śląsku. Rok 1945. Studia i materiały*, K. Jasiak, K. Kawalec, P. Stanek (eds.), Wrocław-Opole-Warsaw 2018, pp. 111-126.

sult of which “the Germans produced the impression that they had nothing to do with Nazism, and that their attitude to the USSR and its citizens was more than friendly.”⁷⁰

There were also examples of hostile behaviour on the part of Germans against Poles. According to one citizen’s report, in the village of Starków in Krosnowice district, a conversation took place in September 1945 between a German woman and a German postman, reportedly concerning the use of German partisan forces to rid the area of Poles. The event was reported to the Citizens’ Militia by a neighbour who had overheard the conversation. All of the persons involved were arrested. It would appear that the reported event did not in fact represent a conspiracy against the Polish population. Nonetheless, after the end of the war information of this type was treated extremely seriously.⁷¹ Contrary to Polish fears, the German population was not in a position to organise resistance against the new post-war order.

There were cases, however, where persons of German nationality who still performed public functions used their position to express aversion to the Polish population. According to a report of November 1945 by the Borderland Defence Force (WOP), in the village of Danczów (then Tanz, in Lewin district, Kłodzko county), the village elder and his deputy were “spreading anti-Polish propaganda among the German population”. The elder is said to have argued that the Czechs would soon arrive in the region, and the situation of the Germans would be improved.⁷²

The greatest problems in the actions of the Polish administration and in the slow return to normality in everyday life were caused by the Soviets. This was clearly visible in both Kłodzko and Bystrzyca counties, particularly in relation to attempts to start up industrial plants. Even the transfer of enterprises to Polish management did not change the situation. Works that had been taken over by Poles were systematically “invaded” by Red Army groups and heavily plundered. It is unsurprising that the Soviets took a liking to the distilleries, from which they took rectified spirit:

Masses of Red Army officers besieged the building, taking away the whole stock of spirit. My resistance, and the explanation that as of today the distillery had been placed in Polish hands by the Soviet authorities, had no effect, nor did the attitude of my four guards, one of whom was struck and disarmed. The entire quantity of around 150 litres of spirit was formally plundered (...).⁷³

⁷⁰ Quoted after: E. Kaszuba, *Trudny sojusz. Polsko-sowieckie odniesienia w powojennym Wrocławiu*, *Rocznik Wrocławski* 1995, vol. 2, p. 133.

⁷¹ APKZ, Files of Krosnowice district, ref. no. 92, Minutes, 19 September 1945, p. 1.

⁷² Archive of the Border Guard in Szczecin (hereafter ASG), Sudeten Brigade of the Borderland Protection Forces (hereafter SB WOP), ref. no. 274/8, Situation report for 10-20 October 1945, undated, p. 2. The village elder’s words relate to a period in which the award of the Kłodzko region to Poland was not certain. In 1945-1947 Prague claimed the right not only to Cieszyn Silesia, but also to the Kłodzko lands. Well-armed military units appeared there, military equipment was sent, and armed demonstrations were not uncommon. For more, see: P. Pałys, *Czechosłowackie roszczenia graniczne wobec Polski 1945-1947. Racibórz, Głubczyce, Kłodzko*, Opole 2007; M.K. Kamiński, *Polsko-czechosłowackie stosunki polityczne 1945-1948*, Warsaw 1990; T. Marczak, *Granica zachodnia w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1944-1950*, Wrocław 1995, pp. 445-534.

⁷³ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 320, Report no. 1 to Col.Ligenza-Mazurek in Bystrzyca, 25 June 1945, p. 23.

The military commander for Bystrzyca county, Captain Rudnik came to the plundered distillery the following day. However, he had no intention of explaining his troops' actions or promising that the culprits would be held to account. He demanded from the manager who had been the victim of the robbery a further 40 litres of rectified spirit for the Soviet garrison in Bystrzyca. He made it clear that "the Soviet authorities had placed the distillery in Polish hands, but still exercised control over it".⁷⁴

Of course, alcohol was not the only good that fell prey to the Soviets. Jakub Berman, a then prominent member of the Politburo of the Polish Workers' Party, recalled the events of the time in a well-known conversation with Teresa Torńska many years later:

The Soviets treated the Recovered Lands as their own war trophies and believed that the goods found there were not ours, but ex-German, and so their rights to them were indisputable. They formed what were called *trofeyniye komandy*, whose chief task was to help rebuild their own ruined country by bringing back as many trophies as possible. They were particularly successful in this in the first months, when we had not brought the situation under control, and the liberated territories were ruled by Soviet military commanders.⁷⁵

The soldiers' actions were coordinated by the military headquarters. Even before the end of combat action, in February 1945 the Special Committee of the USSR State Defence Committee appointed Maxim Zaharovich Saburov as its representative on the 1st Ukrainian Front, where the scope of military action included Lower Silesia. Saburov was an engineer and economist, and in 1941-1942 had chaired the USSR State Economic Planning Committee (*Gosplan*), and in 1944-1946 had been its deputy chair. He was responsible, among other things, for selecting plants to be dismantled. A committee headed by Saburov would visit a plant, and then send a short telegram to the State Defence Committee describing the plant and its assets. These documents then landed on Stalin's desk.⁷⁶ By 8 June, the Soviets had earmarked almost 830 large plants in Lower Silesia for dismantling, and the number continued to grow day by day.⁷⁷ Many enterprises in the Western and Northern Lands suffered this fate; the scale of the phenomenon and the losses incurred by Polish industry are difficult to estimate.

The same difficulties were experienced in the Kłodzko lands. However, it is possible to identify several plants which were probably plundered on the basis of decisions relating to the dismantling of industry in Lower Silesia. On 20 July 1945, Piotr Ligenza-Mazurek intervened with a Soviet military commander in the matter of the dismantling of the Union match factory in Bystrzyca. The previous day Soviet troops had arrived at the site and threatened to kill the guard if he did not allow their truck through the

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, Report no. 2 to Col. Ligenza-Mazurek in Bystrzyca, 25 June 1945, p. 24.

⁷⁵ T. Torńska, *Oni*, Warsaw 2004, p. 333.

⁷⁶ J. Hytrek-Hryciuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

⁷⁷ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 246, Report on the activities of the Operational Group of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Industry Ministry in Lower Silesia from 11 May to 8 June 1945, 8 June 1945, p. 12.

entrance gate. The gate was broken down, and two cranes were taken from the factory. Ligenza-Mazurek considered the attitude of the military headquarters to be:

not in accordance with the Polish–Soviet agreements and alliance. (...) The intervention of my deputy, Captain Lewicki, with Soviet command brought no effect, as the duty officer at the headquarters, who did visit the site of the match factory to ascertain the fact of the incident, stated that the troops were acting on the order of the headquarters.⁷⁸

This industrial dismantling sometimes had very serious consequences for the organisation of everyday life in Lower Silesia. In August 1945, in spite of the Poles' objections, the Soviets dismantled the power plant in Ścinawka Średnia (then Skałeczno, in Kłodzko county), which not only supplied electricity to Kłodzko and Bystrzyca counties⁷⁹ but was, above all, a source of power for the railways in Wałbrzych, Wrocław and Jelenia Góra. The dismantlement thus led to the paralysis of the public transport system, which was in any case in poor operational state following the war.⁸⁰ Other facilities that fell victim to Soviet plunder included one of Lower Silesia's largest power plants, in Siechnice (then Kraftborn, in Wrocław county), and the modern power plant in Oława, built during World War II. The power plants in Wrocław, Siechnice, Wałbrzych, Ścinawka Średnia, Miłków (then Mölke, in Kłodzko county) and Węglińiec (then Kohlfurt, in Zgorzelec county) were the most important facilities supplying electricity to Lower Silesia.⁸¹ All of the power plants depended in turn on supplies of hard coal and brown coal from the mines in Wałbrzych and NowaRuda.⁸²

Local Operational Groups of KERM appointed an Industrial Guard to protect the sites that had been taken over, but in reality it could do little to keep them secure. These bodies were empowered to appoint suitable guard units to protect facilities. Usually a plant would be guarded by one or a few persons. They were not armed, and their primary task was to inform a KERM representative at appropriate speed about any attempt at robbery. The guarding of post-war assets was hampered by the fact that the guards were often morally corrupt or were seeking opportunities to loot or to make money by other means.⁸³

In most reports by Polish government representatives, relations with military command and the Soviets were described as good or satisfactory. In a report from

⁷⁸ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 320, Notice to the military commander in Bystrzyca Kłodzka, 20 July 1945, pp.105-106.

⁷⁹ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/200, Communiqué to the deputy governor for Lower Silesia, 2 August 1945, p. 42. In the case of the railways in Lower Silesia, after the war out of 3285 km of tracks, 2506 km (more than 75%) were destroyed. See: *Dolny Śląsk*, K. Sosnowski, M. Suchocki (eds.), vol. 1, part 2, Poznań 1948, p. 340.

⁸⁰ AAN, MAP, ref. no. 2474, Note on the importance of Kłodzko and Bystrzyca counties to Poland and in particular to Lower Silesia, 10 July 1945, p. 76.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 75-76.

⁸² AAN, MAP, ref. no. 2394, List of mines in connection with the latter of the Public Administration Ministry, Western Lands Office, 19 September 1945, p. 50.

⁸³ AAN, GO KERM, ref. no. 320, Letter to leaders to KERM Operational Groups in Lower Silesia, 25 June 1945, p. 21.

a representative in Bystrzyca, presented to the first meeting of local representatives in Legnica on 10 June 1945, it was noted that relations with the Soviets were good: “although, when the Soviets took away 2000 head of cattle, those relations worsened significantly.”⁸⁴ In turn, in the village of Krosnowice (then Rankowo, in Kłodzko county) a Soviet sergeant travelling by motorcycle spread news of an order that all cows be handed over to the Red Army.⁸⁵ On 10 June it was reported that there were 40,000 tonnes of grain and 28 tractors in Kłodzko, which were being plundered by the Soviets.⁸⁶ In the harvest season, the deputy governor of Lower Silesia received a communication from Aleksander Barchacz, Polish government representative for Kłodzko county⁸⁷, informing him that the Soviets wished to take the crops from 3000 hectares of land, and aimed to garrison the larger farms to make the task easier.⁸⁸ It has not been established whether the provincial authorities intervened or whether such intervention had any effect. However, given the scale of plunder throughout Lower Silesia, and the overall powerlessness of the Polish administration, it seems doubtful that the Soviets were stopped. This is further evidenced by the fact that in September 1945 Kłodzko county already faced a deficit in grain amounting to 12 tonnes.⁸⁹

Difficult relations with Soviet forces were also reported by the newly formed county-level units of the apparatus of repression in the Kłodzko lands.⁹⁰ In a section report of July 1945 from the Wrocław Voivodeship Office for Public Security (WUBP), we read:

In the other counties, all heads of the PUBP [District Office of Public Security] report that the Soviet authorities are removing repatriates, harvesting grain from their land, confiscating dead animals and livestock, etc. Plunder by Red Army troops is commonplace, and the Soviet Provincial Commands generally do not react to it.⁹¹

⁸⁴ AAN, MAP, ref. no. 2479, Report of individual local representatives in the Lower Silesia administrative area, undated, p. 24.

⁸⁵ APKZ, Files of Krosnowice district, ref. no. 92, Report to the territorial inspector to district XXIV in Kłodzko, 3 September 1945, p. 11.

⁸⁶ APWr, UWW, ref. no. 33, Minutes of first meeting of local Polish government representatives in Lower Silesia, 10 June 1945, p. 14.

⁸⁷ As early as November 1945 Aleksander Barchacz was the victim of repression by the UB. The starost was accused of taking possession of a warehouse which should have been transferred to the office of culture and art. AIPN Wr, ref. no. 053/384, Ten-day report for 10 to 20 November 1945, 30 November 1945, p.121.

⁸⁸ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/200, Communiqué to the deputy governor for Lower Silesia, 2 August 1945, p. 42.

⁸⁹ APWr, UWW, ref. no. 33, Minutes of the fourth meeting of local Polish government representatives in the administrative region of Lower Silesia, 23-24 September 1945, p. 58.

⁹⁰ Considering the range of tasks carried out and the way in which they were performed, I consider it inappropriate to refer to the UB/SB as a “security apparatus”. Hence in this article I use the terms “apparatus/department of repression” and “apparatus/department of terror”.

⁹¹ AIPN Wr, ref. no. 053/384, Ten-day report of the head of WUBP Section V for 10-20 July 1945, p. 137.

The looting reached such a degree that even government representatives began to protect the administration's property, leaving notices with an official stamp behind their car windscreen, on bicycles or on doors of premises, containing information that it was their property. These documents were written in Polish and Russian.⁹²

Red Army soldiers – morally corrupted, notoriously drunk, and desirous of loot and sexual satisfaction – feared only the NKVD and the SMERSH military counter-intelligence organisation, which according to surviving sources was active in such places as Duszniki-Zdrój.⁹³

The Soviet troops made life difficult not only for the Polish administration, but above all for the civilian population. The troops' criminal activity was clearly visible in relation to the newly arrived Polish population, in villages, where intervention from the Security Office (UB), MO or the "rural people's" Polish Army (WP) was not always forthcoming. An example is provided by a serious incident in Stary Waliszów (then Altwaltersdorf, in Bystrzyca county). In August 1945, a WP soldier shot dead two men from the Red Army who were obstructing the unpacking of the luggage of a group of Polish settlers. The Soviets had been called by German residents:

The Soviet soldiers, egged on by the German population, began to overturn the carts where the repatriates' things lay. When a WP officer intervened, one of the Red Army men threw himself at him with gun in hand, and they began fighting in the presence of the Germans. Seeing that he could not match the soldier's physical strength, the WP officer began to flee; then the Soviet let off a shot behind him, probably as a warning. A Polish soldier, seeing his superior in peril, fired a round from a PPSH automatic towards the Soviet soldiers. The round was on target, and both men were killed. The Germans immediately informed the Soviet command once again, and more troops were sent, who arrested the Poles, having beaten them heavily in front of the Germans. On being taken to Soviet military command they were battered so terribly that after they were released from there at the request of the prosecutor and the regimental commander, they were carried to the car totally beaten up.⁹⁴

Various incidents took place also involving troops from WOP. In reports from 1945 several cases were recorded in which, most commonly, WOP soldiers were attacked without cause and without warning by drunken Red Army soldiers.⁹⁵

RELATIONS WITH THE APPARATUS OF REPRESSION

Reports of various kinds indicate that the Soviets had a disrespectful attitude towards the Poles, and mutual relations were not good. Analysis of sources makes clear that the Polish administration had little authority, either with the military command,

⁹² APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/29, Form no. 2, undated, p. 26.

⁹³ *Dok. 165*, in: *Niemcy w Polsce 1945-1950*, p. 275.

⁹⁴ AIPN Wr, ref. no. 053/386, Report no. 2 on the shooting of two Soviet soldiers, 27 August 1945, pp. 169-170.

⁹⁵ See: ASG, SB WOP, ref. no. 274/14, Notification of an extraordinary incident, 4 December 1945, p.10; ASG, SB WOP, ref. no. 274/8, Situation report no. 4 for 1-10 December 1945, undated, p. 5; ASG, SB WOP, ref. no. 295/4, Monthly report of 51 Command from 1 to 30 November 1945, 1 December 1945, p. 6.

among the Germans, or within the Polish apparatus of public “safety”. The local structures of the Ministry of Public Security (MBP), which were being formed in the same period, as well as the Citizens’ Militia formations subordinate to them, not only failed to respect the orders of the first county governors (starosts), but did not inform them about their own actions in the region. This was because the Operational Groups of the MBP reported directly to security minister Stanisław Radkiewicz, and lay outside the jurisdiction of the government representative for the Lower Silesian region, Stanisław Piaskowski.⁹⁶ Cooperation with the apparatus of repression in the matter of security in the region was described in plain terms by Bolesław Twardowski:

In that matter I am not able to provide anything, and that is because neither the commander of the Citizens’ Militia nor the chief of security acknowledges me as a superior authority. They do not wish to accept any orders from me, and do not want to inform me about their actions. I have reported this abnormal situation, which from any point of view is entirely unacceptable and immeasurably harmful to the Polish cause, to the Provincial Governor’s Office on multiple occasions. Unfortunately, the situation still remains as it was.⁹⁷

Later reports show that the situation in Bystrzyca county with regard to cooperation between the administrative authorities and the organs of repression had not improved. This critical opinion of the representative in Bystrzyca concerned above all the MO:

The militia leaves much to be desired. As does safety. The people fear the Militia more than German gangs or the Soviets. In certain matters inquiries are under way. Relations with the security service do not make cooperation possible.⁹⁸

It seems that much depended on the heads of particular county offices, as in the same period it was reported from Kłodzko county quite succinctly: “position with regard to the security authorities very good. Cooperation”.⁹⁹ The situation was similar with the soldiers of the “rural people’s” Polish Army and of the WOP, who were responsible to the minister of national defence.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ T. Balbus, *Organizacja struktur organów bezpieczeństwa na Dolnym Śląsku*, in: *Urząd Bezpieczeństwa na Dolnym Śląsku 1945-1956. Z badań nad organizacją i działalnością aparatu bezpieczeństwa. Studia i materiały IPN*, R. Klementowski, K. Szwałczyk (eds.), Wrocław 2012, p. 22. The MBP Operational Groups were the subject of a degree thesis in 1979 at the Officer’s College in Szczytno, available in the IPN Archives. See: AIPN w Olsztynie (hereafter Ol), ref. no. 106/156, J. Blacha, *Organizacja, skład, zadanie i rola Grup Operacyjnych Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego udających się na Dolny Śląsk w 1945 r.*, (typescript), Szczytno 1979. For pointing out this work and making it available I sincerely thank Dr Witold Bagieński, an employee of the IPN Archive in Warsaw.

⁹⁷ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/32, Situation report of the Polish government representative to the Bystrzyca region, 9 August 1945, p. 19v.

⁹⁸ APWr, UWW, ref. no. I/33, Minutes of the fourth meeting of local Polish government representatives in the administrative region of Lower Silesia, 23-24 September 1945, p. 59.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, Report of individual local representatives in the administrative region of Lower Silesia, undated, p. 35.

¹⁰⁰ AAN, MZO, ref. no. 1282, The state of security in the county, undated, pp. 11-12.

CONCLUSION

In 1945, the Polish civil administration in the Kłodzko lands was faced with numerous difficulties. Problems arose as soon as they arrived in the area. Soviet military command headquarters were extremely reluctant to transfer power to Polish hands, and their attitude to the Polish administration was at best ambivalent. As the sources indisputably show, the Soviets had a much more friendly attitude to the Germans than to the Poles, and almost 100% of the existing population of these lands was German. Since the Germans were forced to place the fruits of the labour of previous generations into foreign hands, it is hardly surprising that relations between the old and incoming populations were not always exemplary. The years of mistreatment of the Poles by the Germans gave the former to understand that there was no place for sympathy towards the latter. Immediately after the war, the local society lacked peace, stability and the building of a relatively normal life in new conditions. In the case of the Western and Northern Territories the situation was undoubtedly worsened by mutual hatred between old and new residents, stereotypes (“all Germans without exception are Nazis and criminals”), uncertainty as to the future of those lands (in the case of the Kłodzko lands incorporation into Czechoslovakia was a very real possibility), continuous migration of populations, and the collapse of the old German administrative structures, but also the ineffectiveness of the Polish administration. At a time of general lawlessness and chaos, the government representatives and the KERM Operational Groups had to accept the independence and total ignorance of the organs of repression, which, being subordinate to the security minister, felt no obligation to submit reports on their activities. The Kłodzko lands were not an exceptional case – similar situations existed in all parts of the Western and Northern Territories.

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Keywords: Kłodzko, Polish administration, government representatives, operational groups, Soviet war command, Germans

ABSTRACT

This article presents in detail the beginnings of the Polish administration in the Kłodzko region just after the end of the Second World War, within the time frame of the year 1945. The article describes events connected with the arrival of representatives of the government of the Republic of Poland and associated groups, as well as the Operational Groups of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry. The author focuses on the development of relations between the Polish administrative apparatus and Soviet war commanders and permanent residents of the Kłodzko lands, describing the attitude of the German population towards the Polish government, as well as the difficulties faced by Poles in the first months after the war. Important topics include the struggle to wrest control of industrial plants in Kłodzko from Soviet hands, as well

as the degree to which they had been plundered. The author hypothesises that despite the formal handover of power by the Soviets in June 1945, Poles did not exercise authority in the areas officially taken over; the act was merely a gesture. The Soviets ruled these areas informally, and nothing happened without their permission. In the article, the author uses the descriptive method with a strict chronology, as well as geographical methods (the specific nature of the Kłodzko region as part of the Western Territories) and partially the comparative method, presenting, among other things, the activities of various groups forming part of the public administration.

ANNA SZCZEPAŃSKA-DUDZIAK
Szczecin

THE US CONSULATE IN POZNAŃ IN THE SHADOW OF COLD WAR RIVALRY (1946-1951)

*Polish policy toward the USA was the clearest “victim”
of the changes that took place in the relations between the two camps.¹*

After the end of World War II, Polish and US diplomats carried out their missions in difficult political conditions, marked by the increasing Cold War rivalry between East and West. The factors affecting the effectiveness of the work of diplomats and consular officials necessarily included both the changing geopolitical situations of Poland and the United States and the varying degrees of competence of the foreign services of both countries. American diplomacy had maintained a continuity of activity and made use of modern methods to influence Polish society. These included providing information, cultural events, charitable activities and scholarship exchanges. One important asset for the diplomatic efforts of the United States was the sympathy of the Polish public toward the country and its representatives residing in a Poland devastated by war.² The situation was very different for the Polish foreign service, which was going through a period of changes, whose consequences included staffing problems and an ever lower level of professionalism. In addition, Polish diplomats were struggling with a difficult financial situation as they assumed control of institutions previously directed by the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile. They also faced hostility from the American public and Polish Americans who were opposed to the then forming monopoly by the communist party.

The research problem addressed in this paper concerns the situation and working conditions of the US Consulate in Poznań. It has not yet been the subject of separate analysis and thus makes a contribution to the broader field of the functioning of the US foreign services in Poland after 1945. Also presented in this study, based on Polish archival sources, are the actions taken by the communist security apparatus toward

¹ J. Łaptos, A. Mania, *Dyplomacja polska wobec zimnowojennego podziału świata (marzec 1947 -grudzień 1955)*, in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 6, 1944/1945-1980, W. Materski, W. Michowicz (ed.), Warsaw 2010, pp. 370-375.

² K. Grafa, *Walka o “serca i umysły”. Znaczenie “dyplomacji kulturalnej” jako narzędzia polityki zagranicznej USA w latach 1945-1961*, “Dzieje Najnowsze” 2009, issue 1, pp. 96-110.

US consular officials in Poznań, which in a fundamental way limited their ability to carry out their duties. The time covered will be the years 1946-1951, the first period of the Poznań consulate's operations³ and an excellent example of the problems affecting US-Polish relations at the time.

US DIPLOMACY IN POLAND DURING A TIME OF COLD WAR TENSIONS

The US Embassy in Warsaw, like the diplomatic institutions of other countries that had been destroyed during the war, began its renewed mission (beginning August 1, 1945) out of several rooms in the hotel Polonia at 45 Aleje Jerozolimskie. The Ambassador, Arthur Bliss Lane, from the time of his nomination in 1944 had been preparing to begin his mission with a carefully selected staff which at first numbered 13 people. This expanded to 16 officials by December of 1945⁴ and to 200 during its first year of operation. Even this was not enough to meet all the needs of the institution and was not enough to guarantee quick responses to the thousands of requests pouring into the embassy, mostly for visas and passports.

Despite the obvious difficulties that American diplomats encountered in Poland (supply shortages, high prices, an unfavourable dollar exchange rate) the United States developed a network of outposts throughout the country. The construction of a series of consulates was foreshadowed in a conversation held when Lane presented Bolesław Bierut, the then President of the State National Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) with his diplomatic credentials (4 August 1945). At that time, the new ambassador proposed the creation of American offices in Poznań, Krakow, Gdańsk and Wrocław⁵ After obtaining the approval of the Polish government, the United States Department of State appointed Joseph F Burton in Gdańsk,⁶ Howard A. Bowman in Poznań, M. Williams Blake in Krakow and Stewart E. McMillin in

³ The American Consulate in Poznań was reactivated in 1959.

⁴ List of US diplomats and consular officers are from *Foreign Service List 1945*, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org>. The full roster of embassy personnel as well as the process of creating US diplomatic mission in Warsaw is also given by A. Mazurkiewicz, *Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec wyborów w Polsce w latach 1947 i 1989*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 46-47ff.

⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian* (hereinafter FRUS), *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe*, Vol. 5: Telegram The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, 6 August 1945, www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments; A. Bliss Lane, *Widziałem Polskę zdradzoną*, Warsaw 2008, pp. 194-200 [English title: *I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People*]. The United States did not agree to the creation of consulates in Szczecin and Wrocław which the Polish government had wanted as part of its drive to obtain recognition of the post WWII western border, see: J. Tyszkiewicz, *Rozbijanie monolitu. Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Polski 1945-1948*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 33.

⁶ For more on the topic of the Gdańsk institution, see: D. Czerwiński, *Działania aparatu bezpieczeństwa Polski Ludowej wobec zachodnich placówek dyplomatycznych w Trójmieście na przełomie lat czterdziestych i pięćdziesiątych (zarys zagadnienia)*, "Śląskie Studia Historyczne", 2013, issue 12, pp. 221-238.

Łódź⁷ as Consuls. The Łódź institution did not actually come into existence due to a lack of personnel.⁸

From the beginning of operations, most of the US Embassy's official activities involved passports for persons who were planning to leave Poland and applying to the embassy for documents to confirm their American citizenship. Former employees of the pre-war consulate general of the US were involved in these cases. However, the effectiveness of the embassy's actions in this area to a great degree depended on decisions made by Polish authorities who were not inclined to allow people to leave the country.⁹ The routine activities of office workers of American institutions included issues related to benefits and economic help as well as finding information concerning relatives living in the US. Over time, the number of cases undertaken by diplomats and American consuls in Poland increased. There were also interventions in the cases of US citizens whose property had been nationalised as well as protests against the slowness of Polish officials to respond, which made it more difficult to settle cases related to property.¹⁰

Social contacts were also developed as these were for American diplomats a source of reliable information on the situation in Poland at the time regarding the repression being carried out by the Soviet NKVD and the Polish security apparatus. The victims of waves of arrests were not only Poles but also included American citizens which, in turn, caused Ambassador Lane to intervene both with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych*, hereinafter MSZ) and the Ministry of Justice.¹¹

The tense relations between the embassy and the Polish government eased somewhat after American loans were extended and almost immediately in April of 1946 Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zygmunt Modzelewski informed the US Embassy of the possibility of visiting detained people as well as initiating procedures that would make it easier to establish American citizenship which gave those being held the hope of freedom.¹²

⁷ Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, hereinafter AMSZ), coll. 6, vol. 38, t. 678, Note from the US Embassy in Warsaw to Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Rzymowski on the appointment of consular officers 16 January 1946; already in August 1945, the MSZ had granted provisional recognition of 10 consular officials in the US Embassy (including C. Burke Elbrick and Edmund J. Dorsz). L. Pastusiak, *Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie 1945-1955*, Toruń 2004, p. 56.

⁸ A. Bliss Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

¹⁰ Consul Edward Symans intervened with the WUBP (the Provincial Office of Public Security) in Poznań in the case of American citizens, Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, hereinafter AIPN) Po 003/411/1, Special report to the head of Department I of the WUBP in Poznań, 31 December 1949.

¹¹ A. Bliss Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-228, 267; According to L. Pastusiak, the ambassador's first intervention took place on October 3, 1945 during a conversation between Lane and Bierut, L. Pastusiak, *Stosunki...*, pp. 129.

¹² A. Bliss Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-228; Among the most notorious incidents involving American citizens was the case of Curtis Dagley, accused of rape and Private Malvin Best who shot an officer of the militia (police) in the town of Sosnowiec. In September of 1946 both were handed over to the American

After the forged People's Referendum (*referendum ludowe*) of 1946 and the parliamentary of 1947 Polish-American relations deteriorated. In Washington, there was an increasing conviction that Poland was becoming ever more dependent on the USSR, which translated into changes in US policy toward Poland. These meant restrictions on financial aid, demands for debts to be paid as well as compensation for the nationalised property of American citizens. The American position on the German question had a non-trivial influence on the worsening mutual relations. It was used in anti-American propaganda by the Polish government as justification for rejecting American aid within the Marshall plan.¹³

A manifestation of this new course by the United States, which slowly stopped treating Poland as an independent actor in international politics, was the ambassadorial nomination of Stanton Griffis (9 July 1947), a businessman connected to the film industry without any political experience.¹⁴ The difficult working conditions for American diplomats as well as the complexity of the problems they encountered during their mission brought about frequent changes in the position of ambassador in subsequent years. In July of 1948 an ambassadorial nomination was received by John Gallman, a diplomat who knew Polish realities as a secretary in the American Embassy in Warsaw (1934) and the pre-war consul in Gdańsk (1935-1938). His return to Poland raised suspicions that he was working with the CIA.¹⁵

In the most heated period of the cold war, the position of US Ambassador in Poland was taken by Joseph Flack (30 November 1950 – 22 April 1955) a career diplomat who had previously served in Costa Rica. At this time, the United States conducted a policy that was based on open hostility toward the communist government in Warsaw while simultaneously building positive relations with Polish society in order to weaken the influence of the USSR.

Flack's term as ambassador coincided with worsening relations between Warsaw and Washington, the effect of which was a reduction in diplomatic personnel, a refusal to organize courier flights for the US Embassy, an accusation of espionage against Herman Field and an unsuccessful attempt at opening a US Consulate in Katowice.¹⁶

authorities and taken to the US. For more on this, see: L. Pastusiak, *Stosunki...*, pp. 129-133; J. Tyszkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹³ M. K. Kamiński, *W obliczu sowieckiego ekspansjonizmu. Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski i Czechosłowacji 1945-1948*, Warsaw 2005, pp. 334-335; K. Michałek, *Mocarstwo. Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki 1945-1992*, Warsaw 1995, pp. 50-53; P. S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland*, Cambridge, London 1980, pp. 331-332.

¹⁴ *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski 1944-1978. Informator*, vol. 3, *Ameryka*, edited by J. Patryas, Warsaw 1979, p. 146; J. Tyszkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-75.

¹⁵ *Foreign Service List*, October 1948, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org>; J. Winiewicz, *Co pamiętam z długiej drogi życia*, Poznań 1985, pp. 443-445; *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski...*, p. 138; J. Łaptos, A. Mania, *op. cit.*, p. 375. For more on the topic of Gallman's mission as well as the incident related to the improper addressing of the credentials of the US Ambassador, see: L. Pastusiak, *Stosunki...*, pp. 410-413; *id.*, *Z tajników archiwów dyplomatycznych (stosunki polsko-amerykańskie 1948-1954)*, Toruń 2002, pp. 36-37.

¹⁶ L. Pastusiak, *Z tajników archiwów...*, p. 43; J. Tyszkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

The final act that closed this period of Polish-American relations was the signing by President Harry Truman of a law which unilaterally ended economic agreements with Poland, the USSR and other communist countries as well as cancelling a trading agreement with Poland signed in 1931.¹⁷

THE AMERICAN CONSULATE IN POZNAŃ

Along with the normalization of post-war urban life, consulates began appearing in Poznań. Apart from the consulates of the USSR and France, in the spring of 1946 the US began consular activities under the direction Howard A. Bowman,¹⁸ supported in his work by Vice-Consul Edward Symans.¹⁹ Several people worked in three rooms (103-105) of the Hotel Continental at 36 Święty Marcin street. Apart from the consular officials mentioned, employees included translator and Secretary Tadeusz Halpert, a secretary with the last name of Frisko and a driver, Leon Przybylski.²⁰

The consular agency carried out routine activities (receiving visitors, helping American citizens as it was the first instance in procedures related to inheritance and property rights) although to a limited degree. Its operations also included the legalisation of documents, including birth certificates. In line with the practice of the US government which treated all of Poland as one consular region (like other Eastern Bloc countries) the Poznań institution did not deal with passport issues as those were taken care of by the embassy in Warsaw.

From the beginning, the consulate's operations brought it into contact with representatives from the business environment, activists from political parties and youth organizations, state officials as well as those working with cultural institutions and universities in Poznań.²¹ The atmosphere was not conducive for developing these types of contacts as an approaching referendum meant political tension was rising

¹⁷ *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski...*, p. 149.

¹⁸ Howard A. Bowman was born on 11 January 1894 and died on 4 March 1971. His postings included stints as Vice-Consul of the US consulate in Gdańsk (1921-1924), Vice-Consul (1924-1929) and then Consul (1929-1931) in Trieste. In the years 1946-1947 he served as Consul in Poznań, www.politicalgraveyard.com.

¹⁹ Edward Alan Symans (Szymański), of Polish extraction, was born on 8 May 1903. He first came to Warsaw in the 1930s, originally as a scholar, then as an American diplomat and from 1936 Vice-Consul in Warsaw. He was a donator to the National Museum in Warsaw. http://www.poles.org/db/s_names/Symans_EA.html (accessed 3 August 2017).

²⁰ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report of the WUBP in Poznań on undertaking surveillance of the US Consulate, codenamed "Zachód" (West). According to the report, the US Consulate began operations on 15 March 1946 and beginning 3 April of that year was located at ul. Rzeczypospolitej 9 (now ul. Nowowiejskiego). In another document, however, the date of 15 April is given, AIPN Po 003/411/1, An analysis of Symans' activity as US Consul in Poznań from 20 August 1950.; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 678, Document confirming the employment of Leon Przybylski in the consulate issued by the US Embassy in Warsaw, 13 December 1946.

²¹ AIPN, Po 003/411/1, Diagram of the US Consul's contacts. Social contacts were developed in Poznań and its surrounds as well as in Wrocław, Szczecin and Gorzów Wielkopolski

and being intensified by the pre-referendum campaign. Constant surveillance of the employees of the American institution as well as those maintaining contact with the consulate brought about social isolation and made carrying out its operations more difficult.

The consulate in Poznań, like other representatives of the US in Poland, was active both during the referendum of June 1946 and during elections to the Sejm in January of 1947, when, during official visits to Środa Wielkopolska, Leszno and Kościan the Consul monitored the process of voting. During the run-up to elections he also had conversations with the representatives of opposition party candidates while collecting information on the situation in Poland.²² Together with the commitment of American diplomats to monitor the referendum and elections, negative feelings grew around US citizens as well as Poles working in diplomatic institutions and consulates. The embassy was isolated by representatives of the government. American citizens were arrested and accused of illegal activities (such as the case mentioned of Malvin Best, accused of killing a Polish militia (police) officer, and the interventions of the ambassador did not bring any result.²³

The problems that appeared in subsequent years in bilateral political relations were also reflected in the working conditions of the consuls. These included limited freedom in carrying out their duties, difficulties in social contacts, increasingly intense propaganda campaigns and surveillance by the security apparatus. These, in turn, resulted in a gradual limitation on the numbers of people employed not only in the embassy but also in consulates in Poland. The worsening state of Polish-American relations as well as the difficult work conditions for diplomats led, within the span of a few months in 1947, to changes in the staff of the US consulates which consisted in moving employees from one institution to another and combining the work of the embassy with that of the consulates. An extreme example of this was the closing, in April 1947, of the US Consulate in Krakow²⁴ as well as the lowering the rank of the

²² AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on initiating the case "Kolumna" (Column), Poznań 14 October 1948.; AIPN Po 003/411/1, WUBP document on Nadelman's contacts during the referendum and elections, 16 March 1950.

²³ On 2 June 1946, Ambassador Lane gave Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Rzymowski a note concerning the intimidation of US Embassy employees, especially citizens of Poland. The escalation of these activities was visible in connection with the trial of the persons accused of the murder of PSL activist Bolesław Ściborek in December of 1945 when Irena Dmochowska, an embassy employee, was arrested and put on trial. For more on the topic of US reactions to the falsified referendum (1946) and the elections in 1947 see: AMSZ, coll. 6, vol. 85, file 1333, pp. 5-7, Memo from the MSZ to the US Embassy in answer to memos from Ambassador A. Bliss Lane from 24 August and 2 September 1946; A. Bliss Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

²⁴ AMSZ, coll. 6, vol. 86, file 1343, p. 1, Memo by the US Embassy in Warsaw announcing the closing of the US Consulate in Krakow effective April 11, 1947 (it was reopened on June 5, 1974 and is still in operation). A different closing date, namely 17 April 1947 is found in a memo on US diplomatic and consular services in the pages of FRUS, *A Guide to the United States History of Recognition, Diplomats odd Consular Relations by Country, since 1776: Poland*; Consul C. Zawadzki was transferred 8 April 1947 from the consulate in Krakow to the US Embassy in Warsaw, in September to Gdańsk and then in

Poznań consulate.²⁵ The practice of combining diplomatic and consular functions by representatives of the US was opposed by the MSZ which did not like the embassy *attachés*' free movement around the country and suspected him of espionage.²⁶ An interesting light on the position of the MSZ and the atmosphere of relations is shed by a memo from 3 March 1950 by an employee of the Diplomatic Protocol of the MSZ which gave information on the practice of diplomats appointed by the US Department of State operating simultaneously in more than one country. One example was a diplomat representing the interests of the United States in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As can be read in the note: "The Americans notify people in several countries at the same time and other ministries can do so for 'known purposes'".²⁷

After Consul Bowman left his post in Poznań, a diplomat of Polish ancestry, Elie Jan Nadelman, took over and managed the consulate from the position of Vice-Consul from May or June until October 1947. After this time he left for Warsaw where together with his position in Poznań he served as Third Secretary of the US Embassy.²⁸ In January of 1948, the Poznań post was taken over by the new Consul, Casimir T. Zawadzki, who also oversaw the consular office in Gdańsk.²⁹ Zawadzki spoke Pol-

November was nominated to the provisional mission in Poznań, AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 679, p. 30, Verbal note from the US Embassy from April 8, 1947; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 679, p. 20, Verbal note from the US Embassy from September 12, 1947; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 679, p. 18, Verbal note from the US Embassy announcing the nomination of C. Zawadzki, the Consul of Gdańsk to the provisional mission in Poznań November 28, 1947; During this period, the Consul General of Gdańsk, Joseph F. Burt, left Poland, AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 679, p. 50, MSZ document from 21 May 1947. Despite the difficult conditions in the following years, the US diplomatic service attempted in 1949 to establish a consulate in Katowice, justifying it on economic grounds and the role of Silesia for business in both countries. During the struggle to set up this institution and while waiting for a response from the MSZ the US Ambassador suggested closing the Polish Consulate in Pittsburgh (closed in 1950) and Detroit as well as the possibility of closing the consulate in Poznań which at this time was functioning only due to embassy employees commuting from Warsaw. FRUS, 1949, *Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union*, Volume 5: Telegram The Ambassador in Poland (Gallman) to the Secretary of State confidential, Warsaw, November 14, 1949, www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus06/d309; J. Tyszkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-78.

²⁵ AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 38, file 679, Verbal note of the US Embassy from April 30, 1947 announcing the creation of a vice-consulate in place of the US Consulate in Poznań effective May 1, 1947.

²⁶ AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, p. 48-51, Memo from the MSZ for S. Skrzyszewski concerning the attaché of the US Embassy; *ibid.*, draft note of the Diplomatic Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw to the US Embassy protesting the linking of diplomatic and consular functions, February 1950.

²⁷ AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, Memo from H. Birecki from 3 March 1950; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 685, Memo from the conversation between director Żebrowski and the embassy adviser, 6 February 1950.

²⁸ AIPN Po, 003/411/1, Report on the investigation of the American Consulate, October 16, 1947. In the report the dates given for his term in the consulate are given as 12 May to October of 1947. American sources give 26 June as the date of Nadelman's nomination, *Foreign Service List*, 1947. <https://catalog.hathitrust.org>.

²⁹ From 1926 Casimir T. Zawadzki was the US Vice-Consul in Munich, in the period 1929-1938, he was the Consul in Berlin. He served as Consul in Belfast during the war and as Vice-Consul in Krakow from 1947: www.politicalgraveyard.com. (accessed 3 August 2017).

ish well, which facilitated contacts with the local authorities and society and became a source of unease for security agents who were convinced that he was overseeing a network of American intelligence agents.

The diplomat who served longest in the Poznań consulate was Edward Symans (earlier named Vice-Consul in Warsaw as well), who worked as Vice-Consul until the end of its existence in 1951.³⁰ The abilities of the consulate to act were, however, ever more limited, which, according to a report by the Provincial Office of Public Security (*Wojewódzki Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego*, hereinafter WUBP), led to Symans' departure from Poznań on 20 December 1948. From that time on, employees from the embassy in Warsaw came to the Poznań consulate twice a week.

The work of the Poznań mission, always staffed with fewer people than the consulate in Gdańsk, concentrated on relations with the local community, promoting American cinema, literature and music and English. The consulate donated books and records for learning English along with various publications to Poznań universities, the Institute for Western Affairs, libraries and youth organizations.³¹ Given the academic nature of Poznań as the seat of several universities and the possibilities of working with students and faculty, there were plans for opening a library but the lack of space in the hotel rooms hindered this idea from being implemented.

One source of dissatisfaction and unease for the WUBP was participation by the mayor of Poznań, the rector of the Academy of Commerce, actors from the Grand Theatre or employees of the local radio station in cultural events organized by the consulate. Media representatives were especially encouraged not to take part in these events or to maintain contacts with Americans, while participants often had their documents checked and were detained; informants were also sought out among them.

Beginning in 1948, the US intensified propaganda and information campaigns directed to countries in the Eastern Bloc (it created the USIS Information Service, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe). In Poznań, activities promoting the US economic system, culture and system of values were conducted by Symans, who, as part of the fight against censorship and restrictions on the sale of American publications, personally carried an information bulletin printed in Polish from the embassy and distributed it (by post or personally) in environments where America especially wanted to be active (young people, students, the intelligentsia).³² The constant surveillance of personnel and visitors to the consulate along with other activities by the

³⁰ AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 680, pp. 54-55, The list of American consuls, vice-consuls and consulate directors in Poland; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 680, pp. 54-55, *Exequatur* for the director of consulate and Vice-Consul Symans, November 27, 1948.

³¹ For more on the topic of press titles distributed by the US Consulate and the methods of their destruction by WUPB workers in Poznań, see: AIPN Po, 003/411/1, Report by WUBP in Poznań to MBP on the course of surveillance, 10 May 1949. The document also describes the increasing isolation of the American institution; AIPN Po 003/411/2, WUBP document to MBP on the destruction of 282 copies of American publications, 15 May 1950.

³² AIPN Po, 003/411/2, Information from WUBP on American literature given by E. Symans, 28 December, 1949.

WUBP resulted in the isolation of the office so that the (already small) chances of carrying out consular functions apart from representation decreased to zero. Finally, the US decided to close it effective 31 August 1951.³³

The decision by the State Department was dictated by the state of Polish-American relations, an expression of which was the reduction of diplomatic personnel as well as the gradual closing of consulates in both countries. For Polish diplomats, the decision by the American administration only confirmed the actual state of affairs, as described by the Polish Ambassador to the US, Jan Winiewicz, to the Central Office of the MSZ. Poland was treated as a single consular region as expressed by the joining of diplomatic and consular functions as well as personnel changes which did not result merely from staffing shortages or the temporary nature of the consular missions.³⁴

Figure 1

Staff of the US Consulate in Poznań during the years 1946-1951

Name	Rank	Date of nomination
Howard A. Bowman	Consul	1 October 1945
Edward A. Symans	Vice-Consul	17 June 1946
E. Jan Nadelman	Vice-Consul (temporary) simultaneously Third Secretary of the US Embassy in Warsaw	24 April 1947
Casimir Anthony Kenswick	Public affairs officer	8 May 1947
Casimir T. Zawadzki	Consul (temporary) simultaneously Consul in Gdańsk (September 5, 1947)	28 September 1947
Edward A. Symans	Vice-Consul (temporary) simultaneously Vice-Consul in Warsaw (25 July 1947)	30 September, 1947 until closure of the consulate.

Source: Compiled from *Foreign Service List 1946-1951*.

³³ AMSZ, coll. 9, vol. 13, file 173, Note from the US Embassy to the MSZ announcing the closure of the consulate in Poznań 1 August 1951. The note indicates that the Poznań branch is to close on 31 August 1951, AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, Note by the MSZ in Warsaw of 10 August 1951 acknowledging the closure of the US Consulate in Poznań as indicated by a note of 1 August 1951; It is probable that Consul Symans had left Poznań earlier, in June of 1951, although the rent for the rooms used by the consulate was still being paid, AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, p. 155, Letter from the Presidium of the Provincial National Council in Poznań, which indicates that local authorities had not been informed on the closure of the consulate.

³⁴ AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, p. 154, Memo from Ambassador Winiewicz from Washington, 17 April 1951; Staff changes also affected the consulate in Gdańsk where on 25 April 1949 Anthony J. Juraska became a non-full time employee; from June of 1949 he went on to serve as director of the consulate located at ul. Grunwaldzka 1 and from 1950 as an attaché of the US Embassy in Poland as well, AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 680, pp. 54-55, List of consuls, vice-consuls and directors of US consulates in Poland; AMSZ, coll. 16, vol. 39, file 681, p. 88, List of US Consulate personnel in Poland, 12 December 1949.

SECURITY APPARATUS ACTIONS TOWARD THE US CONSULATE IN POZNAŃ

The growing wave of terror in Poland and other Eastern Bloc countries aimed at political opponents accused of espionage as well as anti-Western propaganda led to the intimidation of society and the strengthening of the communist monopoly of power. The victims of the campaigns of hunting spies and enemies of the people's government were foreigners, including Western diplomats identified as "American imperialists", saboteurs, spies and revisionists.³⁵ During meetings organized by the Ministry of Public Security (*Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego*, hereinafter MBP) there were ever more persistent calls for the surveillance of foreign consulates as well as exhumation, repatriation, charitable and cultural missions from other countries.³⁶

As Ambassador Lane recalled, beginning at the end of 1945, Polish employees of the US Embassy were summoned and interrogated by the WUBP and through torture and threats of imprisonment were forced to inform and deliver information on the work of the embassy and various diplomats.³⁷ Agents of the secret police even committed direct attacks on American diplomatic and consular offices and their employees ignoring diplomatic and legal norms. In March of 1946, functionaries of the WUBP attempted to break into the hotel room where the American Consul in Poznań, Howard A. Bowman, was staying despite clear signage that the room was a consulate.³⁸ Similar methods were used with the *attaché* of the American Embassy, Aleksander Radomski, when he was in Łódź. Shortly after the opening of the American Consulate in Poznań on April 5, 1946, operation "Zachód" (West) (renamed in June of 1946 "Kolumna" – Column) was initiated. Its goal was the surveillance of consulate employees and it was maintained through the entire time the consulate operated and was reactivated together with the consulate in 1959 with

³⁵ For more on the topic of the functioning of purges and trials among communist operatives in the Eastern Bloc and foreigners as well as accusations of cooperation with American agents, see: H. and K. Field, *Opóźniony odlot. W okowach zimnej wojny*, translated by Monika Auriga, Warsaw 1997 [Eng. *Trapped in the Cold War: The Ordeal of an American Family*, Stanford 1999]; P. Pleskot, *Inwigilacja zachodnich dyplomatów w Warszawie (1956-1989). Schemat instytucjonalny*, in: *Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie 1945-1989. Studia i materiały*, P. Pleskot (ed.), Warsaw 2012, p. 87.

³⁶ Materials from the briefing of directors and deputy directors of WUBP as well as representatives of department V on 29 March 1948, in: *Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944-1956. Taktyka, strategia, metody, część 2 1948-1949*, prepared by A. Paczkowski, Warsaw 1996, pp. 30-36; *Ibid.*, Material from MBP council meetings 23-25 March 1949, p. 119; For more on the topic of western and Israeli diplomats, see: B. Szaynok, *Ambasada Izraela w Warszawie jako obiekt zainteresowania komunistycznych służb specjalnych*, in: *Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie 1945-1989. Studia i materiały*, P. Pleskot (ed.), Warsaw 2012, pp. 82-86; D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, *Robineau, Bassaler i inni. Z dziejów polsko-francuskich stosunków politycznych w latach 1948-1953*, Toruń 2001, pp. 135-140; D. Czerwiński, *op. cit.*, p. 225; E. Gdaniec, *Aresztowania i procesy sądowe brytyjskiego personelu dyplomatycznego i obywateli brytyjskich w Polsce (1947-1956)*, "Dzieje Najnowsze" 2017, issue 3, pp. 99-119.

³⁷ A. Bliss Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

updated techniques and tools.³⁹ One of the most common methods of the security agents was gathering information from persons recruited from the immediate environment of employees of the Poznań consulate – the porter and telephone operator of the Hotel Continental and among residents of the building at ul. Rzeczypospolitej 9 an informant with the codename “Stenia” was recruited. She was to be an intermediary in contacts with the person who cleaned the consulate.⁴⁰ Similar attempts at recruitment were carried out among the social and family circles of consulate employees and their acquaintances often using compromising information about them. This was the tactic taken with the director of the Continental Hotel, Marek Turno, who was blackmailed under the pretence of trading in gold. He was finally arrested and accused of espionage.⁴¹

The pre-war and wartime conduct of employees and persons contacting them was inspected. There were suspicions related to the translator employed by the consulate, Tadeusz Halpert, in relation to the killing of a communist party member during the war. Information relating to this was sought in the archives of the WUBP offices in Kielce and Katowice. The distrust of security agents was aggravated by Halpert’s German ancestry as well as the intervention of Ambassador Lane, thanks to which he was released from custody after the war.⁴²

Agents of the WUBP in Poznań attempted to recruit women who allegedly had intimate contacts with consuls in order to obtain information and compromising material. After Elie Jan Nadelman became consul, the only employees were the secretary Maria Radziwiłł and the chauffeur Leon Przybylski.⁴³ The Consul was subject to surveillance. The agent “Orzeł” (Eagle) reported:

“Consul Nadelman leaves almost every day for Puszczykowo in the company of Aleksandra Rajewska, they go to cake shops or sit in the restaurant of the Hotel Continental. Rajewska appears to be the Consul’s fiancée. The consulate at ul. Rzeczypospolitej 9 has been shut down and operations have been moved to the Hotel Continental...”⁴⁴

³⁹ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on surveillance of the American Consulate, codename “Zachód” 15 April 1946. The report was signed by the director of section III and the head of Department I of the WUBP in Poznań; the change of name of operations conducted against the American Consulate in Poznań is included in another report dated 15 June 1946, AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on the processing of case number one “Zachód”, Poznań, 15 June 1946.

⁴⁰ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on investigation of case no. 1 “Zachód”, WUBP Poznań 30 April 1946; AIPN Po 003/411/2, Analysis of American Consulate operations, the document contains information on the network of agents created around the consulate as well as a description of the activities of informers.

⁴¹ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Special progress report by the WUBP in Poznań of the operation “Column” on espionage for the US, 17 February 1951.

⁴² AIPN Po 003/411/1, Surveillance report for operation no. 1 “Zachód”, Poznań 15 June 1946. Halpert probably stopped working for the consulate in September 1946 and left Poland.

⁴³ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report from the WUBP to the MBP on the surveillance operation of the American Consulate, codename “Kolumna”, 12 June 1947.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

The consulate's contacts with intellectual and academic circles were also inspected:

"For the improved functioning of intelligence work and to obtain positive results, the American Consul seeks out contacts only among the intelligentsia, those persons who are hostile to the democratic system".⁴⁵

The Consul was suspected of facilitating travel by Poles to the US and was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Poland, especially in the pre-election period although Nadelman was not stationed in Poznań at that time.⁴⁶ His interest in oppression against scouts and young scholars drew attention. Those who contacted the consul both at that time and earlier during Bowman's tenure were labelled as reactionaries and informers for the US. This supposed network of agents along with Nadelman's contacts were said to be assumed by his replacement, Zawadzki, who was also the subject of surveillance with the help of informers recruited from the closest circles of the Consul ("Marek" and "Czarnecki"). Zawadzki's travels outside of Poznań were monitored, the identity of personal contacts with the local population was established and information was gathered on the topic of his term in Krakow.⁴⁷ Every visit to the theatre or cinema was observed and meetings with local government figures were analysed, including those with the mayor of Poznań (in the years 1945-1948) Stanisław Sroka. A topic of particular interest of the security service in the context of economic espionage was the contacts between consuls and economic figures.⁴⁸ The director of the Poznań branch of the National Bank of Poland was put under observation as he was suspected of giving the consul confidential information concerning the Polish economy.

All those who contacted consulate employees or who visited the office were observed. Those visiting the consulate, especially students and intellectuals mostly came to see American films or read newspapers or information bulletins which were made available in the improvised waiting area of the hotel room. Security forces were informed by the agent "Marek" when the bulletins were set out so that the security officers could confiscate them.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Security officers sent recruited informers to the consulate. They were or presented themselves as academic researchers, AIPN Po 003/411/2, Report by the informer with the codename "Toga". 29 July 1949.

⁴⁶ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on surveillance of the American Consulate, codename "Kolumna" 18 July 1949.

⁴⁷ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Report on surveillance of the American Consulate, 10 January 1948; *ibid.*, Report no. 1 on WUBP surveillance in Poznań to the head of Section V, Department I MBP in Warsaw, 3 June 1948; This section undertook "diplomatic observation", for more on this topic see: P. Pleskot, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁴⁸ AIPN Po, 003/411/1, Surveillance report AG 1/46 of the American Consulate "Kolumna", 8 March, 1948.

⁴⁹ AIPN Po 003/411/1, List of persons, who in the years 1946-1950 contacted the US Consulate in Poznań, Letter from the WUBP in Poznań to the MBP, 1 March 1950; AIPN Po 003/411/1, Protocol from the interrogation of Leon Przybylski, 14 March 1951; AIPN Po 003/411/1, Protocol from the interroga-

Those who were held for possessing the bulletins or newspapers had their papers checked, were interrogated and threatened.⁵⁰ In the estimation of WUBP agents, these tactics were effective since the consul complained that he was isolated and people, including pre-war acquaintances, avoided contacts with him.⁵¹ Another task of WUBP agents was to gather information on the consul's views on, among other topics, elections or the unification congress of the Polish Workers' Party (*Polska Partia Robotnicza*) and the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) in December 1948. As an example, on the basis of an analysis of a comment by Symans after his visit to the Poznań Zamek (Castle), the conclusion was reached that the Consul was hostile to the Soviet political system (he was said to have referred to it as a police state) and Poland and predicted its inevitable end.⁵²

Although the network of agents surrounding the American Consulate in Poznań grew and by the autumn of 1948 it included, among others, "Marek", "Kasia", "Czarnecki", "44", "Orzeł" (Eagle) and "Wilk" (Wolf) it was still unable to obtain confirmation of the institution being involved in espionage.⁵³ The external monitoring of the consulate was similarly unfruitful. The Division I Chief of the Poznań WUBP negatively evaluated the effects of his subordinates' work, admitting that the operations had not been useful, were only statistical in nature since they only showed who came to the consulate and how many people visited it. It was not possible to establish whether the consul's contacts were of an intelligence nature or to select candidates for counter-intelligence activities.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, despite these facts the security apparatus clung to the theory that the American Consulate in Poznań played the role of a centre of espionage in the region, while each consul based his espionage on "an element made up of parcelled landowners, former factory owners as well as a reactionary element, thus creating a wide net of ideological spies".⁵⁵ It was decided that Division I of the WUBP underestimated the meaning of social contacts for the development of a spy network. Also demands were made for a change in tactics which would consist in undertaking more aggressive actions in order to penetrate the network of the consul's contacts, conducting disinformation activities and even threatening and ab-

tion of Leon Przybylski, 19 March 1951; AIPN Po 003/411/1, Preventive plan for case 1/46 codename "Kolumna", Poznań 28 February 1949.

⁵⁰ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Surveillance report from 23 December 1948; AIPN Po 003/411/1, Surveillance report from May 10.

⁵¹ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Surveillance report from 30 July 1949.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ For more on the topic of network of security agents operating around the US Consulate in Poznań, see: AIPN Po 003/411/1, Characterization of agents informing on the consul.

⁵⁴ AIPN Po 033/41/1, Letter from the head of Section I of the Poznań WUBP concerning the analysis and operational combination to the case "Kolumna" 18 December 1948; Further plans for security operations are outlined in the document AIPN, Po 003/411/1, The goal of the plan to combine operations was to obtain compromising material on Symans, June 21, 1950.

⁵⁵ AIPN Po 003/411/1, Special report from the Poznań WUBP to the MBP on the course of agent surveillance in operation "Kolumna" on espionage for the US, 17 February 1951.

ducting those individuals who did not fulfil the roles assigned to them by the security service. Ultimately these plans were not carried out since the consulate in Poznań was closed down in 1951.

SUMMARY

The US Consulate in Poznań was not a priority from the point of view of American interests, and once deprived of the ability to carry out its mission it served no purpose. Due to the creation of a single consular region in Poland and the subsequent primary role of the American Embassy in Warsaw, no consulate in the country was able to fully function. The purpose and strength of the consulates was decided by the current interests of the US as well as the state of mutual relations. The small staff of the Poznań consulate along with the frequent changes in personnel, simultaneously fulfilling roles in the embassy caused problems with maintaining social contacts which successive officials had to recreate from scratch. The group of people (mostly from intellectual circles) maintaining contact with the consulate was rather small (numbering around 80 people) and progressively shrunk as a result of surveillance and threats by security forces. Apart from the most important function of the American Consulate such as collecting information on the situation in Poland, the highest priorities of the consulate in Poznań included promoting the country, its values, economic system, culture and language. Despite the best efforts of communist propaganda, the activities of the American Foreign Service helped to strengthen a positive image of the United States among the Polish public, for whom the country became a symbol of democracy and freedom.

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ABSTRACT

This article provides an account of the activities undertaken by the US Consulate in Poznań during the years 1946-1951 against the background of Polish-American relations, whose evolution following the Second World War was affected by changes in the international situation and the growing rivalry between the USSR and the US. The article explores two areas. The first of these is the organisation and working conditions of the American foreign service in Poland and the goals that the consulate in Poznań intended to achieve. The second area for consideration is the counterintelligence activities of the Polish state security forces directed at American diplomats over the first period of the consulate's operations. The analysis includes archival sources outlining the work of the diplomats along with surveillance of the consular officials in Poznań. These sources were subjected to the historical research method and system analysis in order to assess the determinants for the US foreign policies. The outcome of the research was the conclusion that the consulate in Poznań was not a priority institution for US interests and simply carried out routine official activities, promoted

the English language and culture and fostered social ties. Deteriorating bilateral relations between Poland and the US, along with an anti-American campaign by the Polish authorities and the actions of the secret police affected the consulate's working conditions resulting in staffing restrictions, difficulties in performing official duties and maintaining social relationships; hence the decision to close down the US Consulate in Poznań on 31 August 1951.

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**THE 1989-1991 WATERSHED IN POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS
AND THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS
OF NAZI CRIMES LIVING IN POLAND
(THE AGREEMENT OF 16 OCTOBER 1991)**

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

One of the important agreements concluded between Poland and Germany in the watershed period of 1989-1991 was the Agreement of 16 October 1991 on Compensation for Victims of Nazi Crimes Living in Poland.¹ This has been thoroughly discussed from a legal perspective, along with the political, ethical and humanitarian importance of measures securing provision for the victims,² which contributed to the shaping of new Polish-German relations after Poland won the status of a free and democratic country and Germany was reunited.³ Also, the structure of the benefits for the victims provided by the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation (*Stiftung "Polnisch-Deutsche Aussöhnung"*, established in November 1991 and registered in February 1992) have been carefully analysed. This concerns both the initial, modest resources of the Foundation transferred by the government of the Federal Republic of

¹ For the Polish text of the Agreement see: *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944-2004*. Vol. II. *Dokumenty* (eds. S. Dębski and W. M. Góralski), Warsaw, 2004, p. 537ff.

² Cf. J. Barcz, *Pomoc dla ofiar prześladowania nazistowskiego (Polsko-niemieckie porozumienie z 16 X 1991)*, *Państwo i Prawo*, 1992, No. 1, p. 49ff.

³ See in particular works by J. Sułek, who was Poland's chief negotiator of the Neighbourliness Treaty and the Border Treaty, and negotiated Poland's participation in the Two Plus Four Conference: J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991-2004 dla poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę w Polsce* (in:) *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944-2004*. Vol. I (ed. W. M. Góralski), Warsaw, 2004, p. 337ff.; J. Sułek, *Polska koncepcja procesu normalizacji stosunków z RFN w 1989 r.* (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie. XX lat polsko-niemieckiego Traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy 1991-2011* (ed. W. M. Góralski), Warsaw, 2011, p. 37ff.; J. Sułek, *Ofensywa polskiej dyplomacji w celu zakończenia polsko-niemieckiego sporu granicznego* (in:) *ibid.*, p. 77ff.; J. Sułek, *Polski wkład do ostatecznego uregulowania pokojowego w odniesieniu do Niemiec. Wspólne przezwyciężenie polsko-niemieckiego sporu granicznego* (in:) *ibid.*, p. 112ff.

Germany under the Agreement of October 1991,⁴ and those resulting from negotiations in 1998-2000.⁵

The aim of this paper is to analyse the negotiations preceding the Agreement of 16 October 1991. This Agreement was overshadowed by the more important Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation (*Vertrag über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit*) signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991, which supplemented the German-Polish Border Treaty of 14 June 1990, and by Poland's participation in the negotiation of the Two Plus Four Treaty (Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany) signed on 12 September 1990. These events have been analysed in depth. However, the negotiations leading to the Agreement of 16 October 1991 have not yet been the subject of significant discussion. Despite the great quantity of publications on Polish-German relations in 1989-1992,⁶ documents concerning these negotiations remain scarce and fragmentary.⁷

The negotiation of the Agreement was in fact a very difficult, complex and extended process. It seems fair to say that it began during Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Poland on 9-14 November 1989, and was completed on 16 October 1991 when diplomatic notes on the Agreement were exchanged, although details concerning the statutes of the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation were not agreed until early 1992. The negotiation of the Agreement took place within the political context of the negotiation of the German-Polish Border Treaty and the Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. In the political context, these two Treaties and the Agreement formed a package which would be fundamental for the process of understanding and reconciliation between the two countries.

The negotiations on German compensation to Polish victims of the Nazi regime were also linked to the Two Plus Four Conference. This led to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, signed on 12 September 1990, which provided for the unification of Germany (3 October 1990). Formally, the former Allied pow-

⁴ Cf. J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991-2004 dla poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę w Polsce* (in:) *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań ...*, p. 357ff.

⁵ Cf. J. Barcz, B. Jałowicki, J. Kranz, *Między pamięcią a odpowiedzialnością. Rokowania w latach 1998-2000 w sprawie świadczeń za pracę przymusową*, Warsaw, 2004; J. Sułek, *Od odszkodowań indywidualnych do pomocy humanitarnej i świadczeń finansowych. Bilans wyplat z Niemiec z lat 1991-2011 dla ofiar nazizmu w Polsce* (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie ...*, p. 552ff.

⁶ For the Polish side, a reliable set of documents is published in: *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne* (ed. W. Borodziej), Warsaw, 2006, and on the website of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where additional diplomatic documentation is gradually disclosed. For the German side see: *Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier Prozess* (eds. H. Möller, I. D. Pautsch, G. Schöllgen, H. Wentker, A. Wirsching), Göttingen, 2015 and additional online documentation: <http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/aktuelles/themen/zusatzdokumente-zur-edition-die-einheit/>

⁷ In this paper I largely refer to previously unpublished diplomatic documents and my own notes which I took as a diplomat involved in all stages of the negotiations on the Agreement, and also during the negotiations of the Border Treaty, the Neighbourliness Treaty, and Poland's participation in the Two Plus Four Conference.

ers of World War II could have returned during the same conference to the issue of “reparations” under the Potsdam formula,⁸ but they were not interested in doing so. Their focus was global and European security, in particular understanding on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR and accession of the reunited Germany to NATO. Various compensation claims, not covered by the Potsdam regulations, were to be bilaterally negotiated by interested countries with the reunited Germany. Poland was already engaged in such negotiations with the FRG, but an important contribution of the Two Plus Four Conference was the decision to eliminate any possible objection to the final status of the Polish-German border (such objections had been voiced by the FRG in the post-war period).⁹

The Polish-German negotiations on compensation for the victims of the Nazi regime in Poland were also very interesting in the context of the diplomatic negotiation techniques used. The negotiations were carried on at various levels, involving heads of national governments, ministers of foreign affairs, government plenipotentiaries, ambassadors and high-ranking civil servants, in Warsaw, Bonn, Moscow, New York and Paris. The political situation was tense because of the huge public interest in the matter. In the 1980s in Poland many associations of victims of the Nazi regime had been established and actively voiced their interests. In Germany, counter claims were made by Germans expelled from their former eastern territories. In 1991, in both countries, parliamentary elections were to be held. In autumn 1991 in Poland, the political landscape changed profoundly. Last but not least, these negotiations concerned huge sums of money, and for this reason they were of great concern to the heads of the Polish and German governments. The negotiations involved not only the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Federal Foreign Office, but also the German Chancellery and the Polish Office of the Council of Ministers.

THE BASELINE

Before 1989, victims of the Nazi regime living in Poland had practically no entitlement to any compensation in accordance with the law of the FRG (for political reasons no compensation claims were addressed to the GDR) and also because of international agreements signed by the FRG. Some compensation (benefits and aid) was given only to victims of pseudo-medical experiments¹⁰ and under certain social security benefits.

⁸ For more on reparations and individual claims in the context of the Potsdam Conference see: J. Barcz, *Odszkodowania wojenne od Niemiec dla Polski po upływie 70 lat od zakończenia II wojny światowej w świetle prawa międzynarodowego*, *Państwo i Prawo*, 2017, No. 11, p. 19ff.

⁹ Cf. J. Barcz, *Sprawa odszkodowań wojennych od Niemiec a Traktat „2+4”*, *Państwo i Prawo*, 2018, p. 3.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Kranz, *Polsko-niemieckie kontrowersje prawne – próba syntezy* (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie ...*, p. 500; K. Ruchniewicz, *Polskie zabiegi o odszkodowania niemieckie 1944/45 – 1975*, Wrocław, 2007.

Poland's political transformation, its emerging democratic system and sovereign foreign policy, whose objective was to join the Western democracies in both the European integration project and NATO, as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapidly progressing unification of Germany, created opportunities to reshape virtually all social and political relations.¹¹ This was also an opportunity to address unfinished matters resulting from World War II. The most important of these were the Polish–German border settlement and compensation to victims of the Nazi regime. In the context of compensation, the most relevant developments were as follows.

Firstly, although in 1953 the Polish government had followed the Soviet Union in waiving all outstanding reparations under the Potsdam formula, the existence of claims of individual victims of the Nazi regime was consistently upheld. As mentioned above, the level of such individual compensation (benefits and aid) was minimal. Undoubtedly, the situation was affected by the post-war political division of Europe, including the establishment of the GDR. West Germany had reservations about compensation payments to “the East”. This was partly legitimised by the low credibility of countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. There was little chance that the payments would be passed to the victims directly, and cases of fraud were identified. In 1989 the situation changed radically. Poland's road to democracy was a fast one. Victims of the Nazi regime established associations which voiced the need for compensation,¹² and their claims met with wide public support.¹³

Secondly, the former barriers which had partly justified the blocking of compensation payments (to Poland among others) disappeared one by one. The FRG adhered to its legal stance according to which Poland's waiver of reparation claims in 1953 included individual compensation claims, and all claims exceeded the (West) German statute of limitations. In effect, the federal government rejected all compensation claims from Poland, both those of the Polish government and those of individuals.¹⁴

¹¹ For a brief overview see W. Borodziej's preface to *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991...*, p. 7ff.

¹² See the report for Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski dated 8 May 1989 published in *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991...*, Document No. 6, pp. 91-92. The report concerns the Association of Polish Victims of the German Third Reich. It notes the principles of cooperation between the Association and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Association's participation in events marking the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II. The Association also announced that compensation claims would be addressed to the GDR. More in: J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991-2004...*, p. 340.

¹³ A symbol of this wide support was the homily given on 15 August 1989 by Józef Glemp, Primate of Poland and cardinal, at the Jasna Góra Monastery in Częstochowa, which is a famous Polish shrine to the Virgin Mary and one of the country's places of pilgrimage. Cf. M. Tomala, *Patrząc na Niemcy. Od wrogości do porozumienia*, Warsaw, 1997, p. 405.

¹⁴ Report of outgoing foreign minister Tadeusz Olechowski of 24 August 1989 for Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Zarys aktualnego stanu stosunków PRL-RFN. Główne problemy [Outline of the current Polish–FRG relations] (in: *Konferencja dwa plus cztery. Aspekty polskie*, eds. M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, G. Sołtysiak, Warsaw, 2016, Document No. 2, p. 25.

This attitude persisted in the first months of Poland's transformation, and was manifested by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's repetitions of the "German legal positions" concerning the Polish-German border and compensation for victims. While preparing for his visit to Poland in November 1989, he held to the assumption that he should not offer any prospects that Polish expectations would be met.¹⁵ This, however, did not mean that the German legal stance was set absolutely in stone. Discussions held in West Germany led to new ideas and legislative solutions. For example, in the early 1980s, aid mechanisms to support some groups of victims not covered by the federal compensation law were introduced. Two dedicated funds were created: a fund for victims of Jewish origin was created in 1980, and in 1981 another fund was created for other victims not covered by the federal compensation law. These were special mechanisms which did not alter the general German stance on compensation for Polish victims.¹⁶

In the mid-1980s, some consensus was reached among the main political parties in the FRG. It concerned more support to the victims of the Nazi regime (also those living in "the East") who were not covered by the federal compensation law. The discussion was initiated by the Greens in late 1985, and was subsequently supported by the SPD. Many legislative initiatives were presented to the Bundestag, and public hearings followed.¹⁷ The initiatives were rejected, but this was the beginning of a compromise. This concerned not so much challenging the German legal stance, but finding a pragmatic solution to enable concrete benefits to be paid to surviving victims.¹⁸

Thirdly, Poland's democratisation and the process of German reunification created an entirely new situation and an opportunity to rethink Polish-German relations in the light of the two countries' common interests, which Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski underlined.¹⁹ For this opportunity to be effectively used, much work was needed. This involved not only a sound political and legislative framework, but also moral and humanitarian reconciliation. Old issues had to be reopened, and this included the question of benefits and aid for victims of the Nazi regime. Awareness of this gradually grew both in Germany and in Poland. Overcoming the differences in legal stances was difficult, and there was no effective way of claiming compensation; thus a promis-

¹⁵ Helmut Kohl: *Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, eds. K. Diekmann, R. G. Reuth, Berlin, 1996, p. 125.

¹⁶ Cf. *Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Wiedergutmachung und Entschädigung für nationalsozialistisches Unrecht sowie über die Lage der Sinti, Roma und verwandter Gruppen*. Deutscher Bundestag – 10. Wahlperiode – Drucksache No. 10/6287, 31 October 1986.

¹⁷ See: *Odszkodowania w Bundestagu dla ofiar faszyzmu (1985-1987)*, ed. J. Barcz, Warsaw, 1989; J. Barcz, *Projekty ustawodawcze w Bundestagu (1985-1987) w sprawie odszkodowań dla ofiar prześladowań faszystowskich, Przegląd Zachodni*, 1989, No. 1, p. 127ff.

¹⁸ See: J. Barcz, *Inicjatywy ustawodawcze „Zielonych” i SPD w sprawie odszkodowań dla ofiar zbrodni hitlerowskich, Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 1990, No. 3, p. 117.

¹⁹ Speech by Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski on 22 February 1990 in Poznań at the 6th German-Polish Forum. J. Barcz, *Dwadzieścia lat stosunków Polski ze zjednoczonymi Niemcami. Budowanie podstaw prawnych*, Warsaw, 2011, p. 63ff.

ing path was to seek a pragmatic solution that would result in concrete benefits being paid to the victims without further delay.²⁰ The Polish government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki wished to meet the expectations of the victims,²¹ and this became part of the Polish negotiation strategy.²²

Fourthly, this strategy had a strong point of reference in the FRG's agreements with eleven West European countries signed at the turn of the 1960s.²³ For the sake of these agreements, differences in legal stances were left aside. Instead, the agreements followed a pragmatic formula, meaning that benefits and aid for the victims were provided to the state involved, which received an agreed lump sum and decided on its distribution among the victims. Luxembourg received DM 18 million, Norway 60 million, Denmark 16 million, Greece 115 million, the Netherlands 125 million, France 400 million, Belgium 80 million, Italy 40 million, Sweden 1 million, the UK 11 million, and Switzerland 10 million – to be divided among victims who were citizens of those countries.²⁴

CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT TO POLAND (9–14 NOVEMBER 1989)

The visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland was of special significance.²⁵ The political situation in Poland was a new one, and in their joint statement of 14 November 1989 Kohl and Mazowiecki expressed their desire to create a new framework for mutual relations. Bilateral agreements were signed building the foundations of a common future for the German and Polish peoples.²⁶ Another reason for the significance of Kohl's visit is the fact that it was interrupted by the fall of the Berlin Wall on the evening of 9 November. Chancellor Kohl interrupted his visit, went to Berlin, and

²⁰ J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991-2004...*, p. 341.

²¹ Cf. Odpowiedź ministra Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego na interpelację poselską w sprawie odszkodowań wojennych, 16 października 1989 [Minister Skubiszewski's response to a parliamentary question about war compensation, 16 October 1989], (in:) *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań...*, Vol. II (eds. S. Dębski, W. M. Góralski), Warsaw, 2004, p. 518ff. On the issue of compensation the Polish government and President Wojciech Jaruzelski were in full agreement. Cf. List Prezydenta Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z dnia 3 listopada 1989 do Prezydenta Richarda von Weizsäckera. *Konferencja dwa plus cztery. Aspekty polskie...*, Document No. 9, p. 67.

²² J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991-2004...*, p. 354.

²³ Texts of these agreements in: *Problem odszkodowań cywilnych za straty i szkody, poniesione wskutek prześladowań ze strony władz III Rzeszy Niemieckiej (1939-1945). Wybór dokumentów, część II*, eds. B. Franczyk, K. Staszko, Warsaw, 1973. Legal analysis: J. Barcz, *Pomoc dla ofiar prześladowania nazistowskiego (Polsko-niemieckie porozumienie z 16 X 1991), Państwo i Prawo*, 1992, No. 1, p. 49ff.

²⁴ For a thorough analysis of these agreements see E. F. de la Croix: *Staatsvertragliche Ergänzungen der Entschädigung* (in:) *Der Werdegang des Entschädigungsrechts unter national- und völkerrechtlichem und politologischem Aspekt*, Munich, 1985, p. 257ff.

²⁵ Cf. J. Sułek, *Polska koncepcja normalizacji stosunków z RFN w 1989 r. ...*, p. 62ff in particular.

²⁶ Cf. *Polska – Niemcy. Na drodze ku porozumieniu i pojednaniu, Zbiór dokumentów związanych z wizytą kanclerza federalnego RFN Helmuta Kohla w Polsce w dniach 9-14 listopada 1989 r.* (ed. J. Barcz), Poznań, 1990.

later returned to Poland. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the first step to Germany's reunification, and this was a highly symbolic event.

The outcomes of this visit included a breakthrough on the compensation issue. For the first time the heads of the two governments reached a preliminary consensus about an actual formula of aid for the victims. The beginning of its implementation was very difficult. Before the negotiations the new Polish plenipotentiary – Mieczysław Pszon, appointed by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki – received a report on earlier negotiations conducted by Ernest Kucza and Horst Teltschik. It was underlined that “because of the strongly negative stance of the FRG on the issue of compensation for Polish victims of the Nazi regime, there is no chance that this postulate will be realised as part of the ‘package’ negotiated, as this would block all negotiations.”²⁷ The suggestion was to propose that the German side make ‘a moral and political gesture’ which would refer to proposals debated in the FRG, or accept some ‘unofficial’ solutions, for example establishing a foundation which would collect funds from various sources and pass the money to the victims.²⁸ After the next round of negotiations (14–16 September), in which Poland was represented by Mieczysław Pszon, the situation remained unchanged. Due to the German stance, the issue of compensation was not to be included in the ‘package’. At the same time, the idea of presenting some morally and politically motivated formula was upheld.²⁹

During Chancellor Kohl's visit, the moral aspect of “compensating Poles who were victims of the Nazi regime during World War II” was also raised by Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was then President of Poland.³⁰ Of crucial importance, however, were the talks between Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in particular their talks on 14 November, the last day of Kohl's visit to Poland (after he returned from Berlin). Kohl repeated his reservations. He emphasised that for him the German legal position remained binding. In 1953 Poland had waived reparations and signed the social security agreement of 9 October 1975 on old-age and work injury provisions. The FRG had already transferred large sums in compensation, and new payments to Poland would open the door to other claims and further payments. Kohl did not consider it financially possible to satisfy the claims of 800,000 victims

²⁷ Uwagi i propozycje w związku z VIII rundą rozmów pełnomocników szefów rządów PRL i RFN, M. Pszona i H. Teltschika (Poufne) (sumujące przebieg rozmów E. Kucza - H. Teltschik, przekazane 11 września 1989 r.) [Confidential. Comments and proposals concerning the 8th round of talks by Polish and German governmental plenipotentiaries Pszon and Teltschik, summarising Kucza and Teltschik's talks (delivered 11 September 1989)], (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991 ...*, Document No. 11, pp. 110-111.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Sprawozdanie z VIII rundy rozmów pełnomocników rządów PRL i RFN (14-16 września 1989 r. w Warszawie) [Report on the 8th round of talks by Polish and German governmental plenipotentiaries held on 14-16 September 1989 in Warsaw] (written by the new plenipotentiary M. Pszon; author's comment). Ibid., Document No. 18, p. 131.

³⁰ Zapis rozmowy prezydenta Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego w kanclerzem federalnym Helmutem Kohlem, Warszawa, 12 listopada 1989 r. *Konferencja dwa plus cztery. Aspekty polskie* (eds. M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, G. Sołtysiak), Warsaw, 2016, Document No. 10, p. 76.

in Poland. However, he did not rule out some aid for those in exceptionally difficult situations (*im Härtebereich*). Kohl took note of Mazowiecki's proposal to create a special foundation to manage compensation or to establish a committee to examine the issue.³¹ Jerzy Sułek, who took notes during these talks, commented that: "the issue of at least partial recognition of Poland's claims for compensation for victims of the Nazi regime has reached the stage of concrete political decisions".³² Chancellor Kohl agreed to meet the expectations of the victims to the extent covered by a nonstandard (pragmatic) formula. Dieter Kastrup, Director General of the German Federal Foreign Office, accompanied the Chancellor and met with representatives of the victims' associations.³³

Consequently, the views sometimes expressed that the issue of compensation was not considered at the time because of the urgency of new credits and debt relief issues are not to be taken seriously.³⁴ Records of the talks clearly demonstrate that a 'pragmatic' solution to aid the victims was considered. It seems that, for Chancellor Kohl, the political and moral relevance of such a (limited) solution was essential to building improved Polish–German relations. The negotiations which followed proved that the German legal stance which the FRG had framed in the post-war years (similarly as in the matter of the German–Polish border) was a hard nut to crack.

The final joint statement of 14 November 1989 referred indirectly to the issue of compensation for the victims. It underlined that both Poland and the FRG would shape their future relations "remembering the tragic and painful pages of history" (section 3) and that in developing the new relations they would "aim at healing the past wounds by understanding and reconciliation" (section 78). Obviously, these statements were

³¹ Notatki Departamentu IV MSZ z rozmów Mazowiecki-Kohl 9, 10 i 14 listopada 1989 r. [Notes by Department IV, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth MSZ) on Mazowiecki and Kohl's talks held on 9, 10 and 14 November 1989], (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991...*, Document No. 27, pp. 169-170.

³² J. Sułek, *Polska koncepcja normalizacji stosunków z RFN w 1989 r.* ..., p. 68.

³³ Ocena wizyty kanclerza RFN Helmuta Kohla w Polsce (9-14 listopada 1989 r.). Materiał do wystąpienia Ministra K. Skubiszewskiego na posiedzeniu Rady Ministrów 20.11.1989 (przygotowany w Departamencie IV MSZ, opracowali J. Sułek, S. Borek, W. Góralski) [Evaluation of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Poland on 9-14 November 1989. Material for Minister Skubiszewski's presentation to the Council of Ministers on 20 November 1989, written by Sułek, Borek and Góralski in Department IV, MSZ]. Author's archive. See also: Notatka rzecznika Zarządu Głównego Stowarzyszenia Polaków Poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę. *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991...*, Document No. 26, p. 156.

³⁴ Such opinions were voiced by various Polish politicians and especially by members of the Association of Polish Victims of the Third Reich. The position of the Polish government was explained to the Association members by B. Kulski, Secretary of State in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following minister Skubiszewski's directions. Cf. Pilna notatka z 3 listopada 1989 r. ministra spraw zagranicznych, K. Skubiszewskiego, dla sekretarza stanu, B. Kulskiego, w sprawie spotkania z Zarządem Głównym Stowarzyszenia Polaków Poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę, (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991...*, Document No. 24, p. 15, and Notatka z 8 listopada 1989 r. ze spotkania sekretarza stanu, B. Kulskiego, z delegacją Zarządu Głównego Stowarzyszenia Polaków Poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę. Ibid. Document No. 25, p. 155.

of a very general nature and allowed for different interpretations. For Germans they referred to the harm done to Germans expatriated from lands that were now Polish. For Poles they pointed to the need to take account of the harm done to victims of the Nazi regime.

THE PRAGMATIC SOLUTION

It was around the start of 1990 when the idea of a ‘pragmatic solution’ began to take shape. At this time political events in Europe resembled an avalanche. Shortly after his visit to Poland Chancellor Kohl presented his 10-point agenda for German reunification. In mid-February 1990 the decision was taken to hold a conference on ‘external factors’ for the reunification of Germany. This was a challenge for the new Polish–German relations.³⁵ It was essential to harmonise Poland’s strategic interests, including good neighbourliness with the reunited Germany, and to mitigate the potential rebirth of old conflicts, including the FRG’s stance questioning the German–Polish border and compensation to Polish victims of the Nazi regime.

Political events were proceeding at a rapid pace, and in this context the three-day visit of Mikołaj Kozakiewicz, the speaker of the Polish parliament (Marshal of the Sejm), to the FRG in mid-December 1989 marked an important new stage. During his visit, with the full consent of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he referred to the Polish World War II losses and recalled that in Poland about 40,000 prisoners of Nazi concentration camps and 800,000 former forced labourers were still living, and the majority had not received any compensation. Finally, he underlined that an ‘honourable’ solution was “the *conditio sine qua non* for future understanding and reconciliation”.³⁶ In the following months Chancellor Kohl referred to Kozakiewicz’s pronouncements as a threat to Germany. This threat was the ‘astronomical’ amount of money to be paid if ‘everybody’ demanded compensation from Germany. (In 2017, these statements were referred to again by the Polish governing Law and Justice party, as a way of underlining the amount of compensation apparently still due to Poland.³⁷) However, the main point of Kozakiewicz’s message was different.

He referred to the talks Prime Minister Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl had held in November, and to Kohl’s arguments of a legal nature which had blocked the issue of compensation payments. Kozakiewicz emphasised that Chancellor Kohl had promised “to give this issue a second thought”. In this context Kozakiewicz pointed to a possible solution based on the establishment of a foundation for victims of the Nazi

³⁵ Cf. J. Sułek, *Polska koncepcja normalizacji stosunków z RFN w 1989 r. ...*, p. 70ff.

³⁶ Cf. M. Tomala, *Patrzyc na Niemcy. Od wrogości do porozumienia*, Warsaw, 1997, p. 406.

³⁷ Nasz wywiad. *Mularczyk o tropach w sprawie reparacji, niemieckiej kontrakcji i konieczności jedności w tej sprawie*, <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/362014-nasz-wywiad-mularczyk-polskie-panstwo-i-jego-instytucje-powinny-prowadzic-jednolita-polityke-w-sprawie-reparacji?strona=1> (accessed 12 October 2017).

crimes. Such a foundation would receive funds from the German state, companies and individuals, and transfer benefits and aid to the victims.³⁸ Kozakiewicz was the first to publicly put forward in precise terms, at a high political level, the Polish idea of a 'pragmatic' solution which could provide benefits to those victims who were still alive.

In spite of Chancellor Kohl's aforementioned 'tactical exploitation' of Kozakiewicz's pronouncements, the Polish idea gradually took shape in discussions with the German side. On 5–8 February 1990, Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski visited the FRG and talked with Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher.³⁹ It was agreed that a dedicated foundation should be established in Poland and distribute funds provided by the FRG among the victims. This was an important decision for further developments, because at the time the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was considering the establishment of a foundation both in Germany and in Poland. The FRG, with its experience of *Globalabkommen* (global agreement), insisted that the distribution of the funds should be the responsibility of a foundation established in Poland. Developments following the subsequent negotiations 1989–2000 proved that the establishment of a dedicated foundation was to be, for the German government too, a convenient mechanism for the collection of contributions from German industry and for maintaining relations with foundations in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to prepare the design of this solution immediately. On 9 March 1990, its Department IV (responsible for political relations with the FRG, among others) asked the Legal and Treaty Department (DPT) to begin working on the statutes of the foundation to be established in Poland.⁴⁰ Department IV summarised in writing the outcomes of Minister Skubiszewski's visit to the FRG relating to compensation for the Nazi regime victims and the statutory objectives of the new foundation. Most importantly, it set out specific details of the 'pragmatic solution' concept. The main conclusions from the negotiations held thus far were presented, and the need to sign an international agreement based on the *Globalabkommen* formula was underlined. Such an agreement was to guarantee that Poland would receive a defined sum of money for the victims. The money was to be distributed by the new foundation (provisionally referred to as the Foundation for Compensation for Nazi Victims) established in Poland. The general mode of operation of the foundation was also specified. It was to act under the auspices of recognised moral authorities, and would be authorised to receive money from foreign governments, concerns, companies and others and to distribute the money received as one-off payments to victims

³⁸ Cf. Sejm-Präsident: Frage der Entschädigung würdig lösen, *Die Welt*, 14 December 1989.

³⁹ Notatka informacyjna o wizycie oficjalnej Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP Prof. K. Skubiszewskiego w RFN, Warszawa, 5 marca 1990 [Information note on Minister Skubiszewski's visit to the FRG, dated 5 March 1990] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 39, p. 217ff.

⁴⁰ Pismo Departamentu IV MSZ do Departamentu Prawo-Traktatowego MSZ z dnia 9 marca 1990 [Letter from Department IV, MSZ, to the MSZ Legal and Treaty Department, 9 March 1990]. Author's archive.

and as charitable aid in severe situations. A particular feature of this concept was the confirmation of the separation of the compensation mechanism from governmental institutions and the desire to guarantee the strong democratic legitimisation of the foundation.

At that time – shortly before the Two Plus Four Conference – the acceptance of a pragmatic approach to aid the victims was extremely important. As mentioned above, the World War II Allied powers did not wish to revive the issue of war reparations (under the Potsdam formula) at that Conference, while other compensation claims were to be bilaterally negotiated by the interested states and the reunited Germany. At this time Poland's formula for the conduct of such negotiations had already been outlined and in general approved by the FRG.⁴¹

THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH REUNITED GERMANY

The essential phase of Germany's confirmation of the existing border between Germany and Poland as binding under international law was concluded as part of the Two Plus Four Treaty signed on 12 September 1990 (entering into force on 15 March 1991). On 3 October 1990 the reunification of the two German states was formally completed. The first round of negotiations between Poland and Germany was held on 30-31 October 1990. At this time the text of the German-Polish Border Treaty was agreed. This Treaty was signed in Warsaw on 14 November 1990 by ministers Skubiszewski and Genscher. In October 1990 the content of the Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation was also discussed.

In the context of the Neighbourliness Treaty, a possible link between that Treaty's content and benefits for victims of the Nazi regime was debated. Questions concerned the possible inclusion of the compensation issue in the Neighbourliness Treaty or a separate regulation parallel to the Treaty, but there was also the issue of the timing: the Polish objective was to make the compensation agreement official concurrently with the signing of the Neighbourliness Treaty or its ratification. It was not that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to link the content of the Treaty to the compensation issue at all costs. The essence of the pragmatic formula was its focus on the actual benefits to be passed to the victims and – if necessary – the avoidance of reawakening legal controversies in both Poland and Germany. This approach was fundamentally uncontroversial. The Polish embassies in West and East Germany expressed similar views on the content of the Neighbourliness Treaty.⁴²

⁴¹ More information in: J. Barcz, *Sprawa odszkodowań wojennych od Niemiec a Traktat „2+4”*...

⁴² Cf. Uwagi i propozycje dot. szerokiego układu między Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec (przedłożone przez Ambasadę w Kolonii, 13 września 1990 r.), [Comments and proposals concerning the Polish-German Neighbourliness Treaty from the Polish embassy in Cologne, 13 September 1990], (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 76, p. 413 and Uwagi nt. stosunków i II traktatu z Niemcami (Ambasady w Berlinie z 1 października 1990 r.), [Comments on Polish-German relations and the second treaty from the Polish embassy in Berlin, 1 Octo-

The pragmatic solution also became the objective of parallel negotiations between the FRG and the Soviet Union. During the Two Plus Four Conference, the Soviet Union, like the three other powers, did not raise the issue of reparations. Compensation claims of individuals (prisoners of concentration camps and forced labourers mainly) became a topic of bilateral negotiations which followed the pragmatic formula designed by Poland. The German-Soviet Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation was signed on 9 November 1990.⁴³ This Treaty did not contain direct references to compensation for Nazi regime victims. Preliminary bilateral talks on 'humanitarian regulations' were held on 21 February 1991. They were finalised after the Soviet Union collapsed; appropriate agreements were signed and foundations were established in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk.⁴⁴

In general, Polish academics and politicians agreed with the arguments for a pragmatic solution not directly linked to the Neighbourliness Treaty.⁴⁵ However, the proposals of Artur Hajnicz, then influential Head of the Centre for International Studies (created as an advisory body in matters of foreign policy in 1989 at the request of the Presidium of the Polish Senate), took a somewhat different turn. He emphasised the relevance of potential claims of Germans expelled from Poland after the Second World War (under forced resettlement) and argued that during the negotiations both parties should "refrain from making claims at the state level, meaning both German claims for compensation for property lost and Polish claims for compensation for Polish forced labourers".⁴⁶

The Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs carefully monitored all German pronouncements related to the claims of the expelled. They were viewed, however, as an element of the political situation in the FRG, which Chancellor Kohl could not totally ignore. During the bilateral negotiations, the claims of the expelled voiced by German politicians were seen rather as a negotiating "technique". Equating the expellees' potential claims and claims of the victims of the Nazi regime was out of the question, along with any version of the so-called zero option (close to that suggested by Hajnicz). The Polish stance was that individual claims of the victims were strongly grounded in international law, but the multitude of obstacles and the passage of time pressed for a pragmatic solution to help the victims. Procedural disputes

ber 1990] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 79, p. 422.

⁴³ *Europa-Archiv*, 1991, No. 3, p. 85ff.

⁴⁴ More in: J. Barcz, *Sprawa odszkodowań wojennych od Niemiec a Traktat „2+4”*...

⁴⁵ Cf. Problemy i wnioski z dyskusji w dniu 9.10.1990 r. w sprawie polityki niemieckiej RP (punkt 5 – odszkodowania), [Issues raised and conclusions of the discussion on Poland's policy towards Germany held on 9 October 1990 (item 5: compensation)] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 80, pp. 428-429.

⁴⁶ Uwagi dyrektora Ośrodka Studiów Międzynarodowych przy Senacie RP dla ministra spraw zagranicznych w sprawie stanu stosunków polsko-niemieckich (Wokół polsko-niemieckiego traktatu), Warszawa, dnia 31 grudnia 1990 r. [Comments by the Head of the Polish Senate's Centre for International Studies on current Polish-German relations, addressed to Minister Skubiszewski] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 86, p. 469.

were out of place. On the other hand, the possible claims of the ‘expelled’ had no legal justification,⁴⁷ and were specifically forbidden under the Treaty (*Überleitungsvertrag*) transitional agreement that formed part of a series of agreements signed by West Germany and the Western powers in the early 1950s. Importantly, this position was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights on 7 October 2008,⁴⁸ when the Court declared inadmissible an application submitted by *Preußische Treuhand GmbH & Co. KG a. A.* against Poland. The applicant company claimed – on behalf of 23 individual applicants – that Poland had violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by illegal expropriation of German properties located within the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line which after the World War II were transferred to Poland.

During the first round of Polish-German negotiations (on 30–31 October 1990 in Warsaw) the wording of the German-Polish Border Treaty was finally agreed upon (on the first day). On the second day the issues to be covered in the Neighbourliness Treaty were accepted, including no mention of compensation for the victims of the Nazi regime provided that a parallel pragmatic solution was negotiated and agreed.⁴⁹

On 8 November 1990, the issue of the compensation for the victims was brought up again during talks between Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Frankfurt/Oder and Słubice. Mazowiecki announced that a dedicated foundation would be established in Poland. He said that he did not wish this matter to be part of the Neighbourliness Treaty, but that it should be resolved at the same time. Chancellor Kohl agreed with the solution formula, but still hesitated. He referred to the difficult situation in Germany, as elections were approaching and compensation claims being made by other groups of people, especially Jews. He suggested that the compensation issue should be discussed again before the Neighbourliness Treaty’s ratification.⁵⁰ On 4 January 1991 Tadeusz Mazowiecki was replaced as Prime Minister by Krzysztof Bielecki.

⁴⁷ In 2004 this was confirmed by Frowein and Barcz in their expert report commissioned by the governments of Poland and Germany: *Gutachten zu Ansprüchen aus Deutschland gegen Polen in Zusammenhang mit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erstattet im Auftrag der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen von Prof. Dr. Jan Barcz und Prof. Dr. Jochen A. Frowein* (2. November 2004), ZaöVR 65 (2005), 1-26.

⁴⁸ DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 47550/06 by PREUSSISCHE TREUHAND GmbH & Co. KG a.A. against Poland, <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22fulltext%22%3A%5B%5C%2247550%2F06%22%5D%22itemid%22%3A%5C%22001-88871%22%5D%7D>; more in: J. Barcz, *Orzeczenie ETPCz z 7 października 2008 r. Długi dzień historii, Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 2009, No. 1.

⁴⁹ Cf. J. Sułek’s comments in: *Od odszkodowań indywidualnych do pomocy humanitarnej i świadczeń finansowych. Bilans wyplat z Niemiec z lat 1991-2011 dla ofiar nazizmu w Polsce* (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie...*, pp. 554-555.

⁵⁰ Zapis rozmów Premiera RP, Tadeusza Mazowieckiego z Kanclerzem Federalnym RFN, Helmutem Kohlem w dn. 8 listopada 1990 r. we Frankfurcie/O i Słubicach. [Transcript of talks between Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl held on 8 November 1990 in Frankfurt/Oder and Słubice] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 84, pp. 460-461. See also: Ważniejsze ustalenia z rozmów Premiera T. Mazowieckiego i Kanclerza H. Kohla we Frankfurcie/O 8 listopada br. Departament Europy (Dyrektor Departamentu Europy, J. Sułek), Warszawa, 9 listopada 1990 r. (notatka przekazana M. Niezabitowskiej, rzecznicze rządu) [Main issues

Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, in his parliamentary *exposé* concerning Poland's foreign policy (14 February 1991) underlined the significance of German compensation for Polish citizens who were victims of the Nazi regime and of the relevant agreement, which was to be signed alongside the Neighbourliness Treaty. Skubiszewski emphasised that the compensation issue had to be agreed and concluded concurrently to the conclusion of the Neighbourliness Treaty.⁵¹ The concept of the 'conclusion' of an international agreement is not unambiguous – it may refer to its signing, or to its ratification and coming into force. In the following months this ambiguity gave rise to some controversies. Poland wanted to finalise the agreement and to publish it as quickly as possible. Chancellor Kohl's hesitance delayed its signing. Finally, the agreement was signed and published during the last phase of the ratification procedure of the Neighbourliness Treaty.

During this phase of negotiations, however, it was essential that the formula of a dedicated foundation, receiving funds from the Federal Republic of Germany to pass on to victims of the Nazi regime, had been accepted. Naturally, as well as the pace of finalisation of the agreement, an important issue was the amount of money to be passed to the new foundation in Poland. This was a key matter in the political dialogue between Poland and Germany in February and early March 1991.⁵² The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked hard on an acceptable formula for the foundation and its management of compensation money.⁵³ It was emphasised that the timing of the pragmatic solution had to be parallel to the signing of the Neighbourliness Treaty, and that it had to be the subject of a bilateral international agreement.

The issue of social and political legitimisation of the foundation to be established in Poland, and the principles governing the distribution of funds, were also carefully considered. This was important because the new international agreement could be

agreed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl on 8 November 1990 in Frankfurt/Oder, written by Sulek on 9 November 1990 and passed to the Polish government spokesperson]. Author's archive.

⁵¹ Author's archive.

⁵² The issue was raised, for instance, by a delegation from the Polish Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, who paid an official visit to Germany on 25–26 February 1991. Cf. *Problem odszkodowań dla żyjących w Polsce ofiar zbrodni nazistowskich. Materiał na wizytę w RFN w dniach 25-26 lutego 1991 r. delegacji senatorów z Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Senatu*. Departament Europy MSZ, Warszawa, 13.02.1991 r. Author's archive. An important signal of the German position was given by visiting Bundestag speaker Rita Süßmuth at a meeting on 5 March 1991 with the Sejm's Committee for National and Ethnic Minorities: "Germany has made its political decision for a positive solution to the compensation issue." The foundation formula was agreed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki and Chancellor Kohl during their meeting in Frankfurt/Oder. Notatka Departamentu Europy MSZ nt. spotkania przewodniczącej Bundestagu R. Süßmuth z Sejmową Komisją ds. Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych w dniu 5 marca 1991 r., Warszawa, 7.03.1991 r. [Note by the Europe Department, MSZ, on the meeting of Bundestag speaker Rita Süßmuth with the Sejm's Committee for National and Ethnic Minorities on 5 March 1991, dated 7 March 1991] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 88, p. 475.

⁵³ Powołanie Fundacji „Pomoc ofiarom zbrodni nazistowskich”. Opracowanie Departamentu Europy MSZ (J. Barcz) z lutego 1991 r. [Establishing the Foundation "Aid for victims of Nazi crimes", written by J. Barcz (Europe Department, MSZ) in February 1991]. Author's archive.

expected to refer to some degree to the principles of the foundation's operation, and the definition of groups of victims to receive money from the foundation would be directly linked to the amount of funds to be provided to the foundation by the German government.

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT PLENIPOTENTIARIES

The direct stimulus to begin detailed negotiations was the visit of Prime Minister Krzysztof Bielecki to Germany and his talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 5 March 1991.⁵⁴ It was Kohl who first referred to the prior arrangements. He confirmed his approval for a foundation in Poland which would distribute the benefits. He also upheld the expectation that the compensation agreement would not be part of the Neighbourliness Treaty, but a separate agreement concurrent with the Treaty. In upcoming negotiations Kohl clearly wished to limit the group of the victims entitled to benefits from the foundation to the *Härtefälle*, i.e. hardship cases (victims of pseudo-medical experiments and prisoners of concentration camps).

The issue of who was entitled to receive benefits and aid turned out to be controversial. The German side tried to reduce the foundation's funding by limiting the number of victims entitled to benefits. Initially the largest group, consisting of former forced labourers, was to be excluded, and later only the farm workers from among that group. Bielecki reminded Kohl that "the compensation payments are awaited" by about 800,000 forced labourers and "their expectations must be seriously considered when establishing the foundation". It was finally decided to appoint plenipotentiaries to hold detailed discussions: Dieter Kastrup, leading German diplomat, Secretary of State and the chief negotiator of the Two Plus Four Treaty; and Krzysztof Żabiński, Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers. The two plenipotentiaries met in Bonn on 19 April 1991.⁵⁵ They agreed on the main courses of action and identified controversial issues.⁵⁶ In two cases in principle agreement was reached.

Firstly, it was confirmed that the 'pragmatic solution' included the establishment of a foundation by the Polish government (under Polish law), to which the German government would pass a lump sum. The transfer of money was to be based on an international agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the appointed plenipotentiaries.

⁵⁴ Zapis z rozmowy Premiera J.K. Bieleckiego z kanclerzem H. Kohlem (5 marca 1991 r.), [Transcript of talks between Prime Minister Bielecki and Chancellor Kohl held on 5 March 1991] (in:) *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 89, p. 478.

⁵⁵ Kastrup was chiefly assisted by Höynck, who negotiated the Polish-German Neighbourliness Treaty, and Żabiński by Barcz (Deputy Head of the Europe Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

⁵⁶ The following is a paraphrase of the cryptogram from the Polish embassy containing a report on the first negotiations held by Kastrup and Żabiński on 19 April 1991 (author's archive) and the author's notes.

Secondly, a compromise was reached on who would be entitled to receive benefits from the foundation. It was decided that the Polish party (the foundation) was to define who would be entitled. To avoid disagreements, it was decided that in the agreement references would be made only to “persons damaged as a result of Nazi crimes”.

On two key issues, however, clear differences remained.

Firstly, there was the size of the lump sum. Minister Żabiński gave reference amounts of DM 20,000 for each former concentration camp prisoner (about 40,000 people) and DM 2,000 for forced labourers (about half a million, although the number might be higher by 100,000). In total this meant about 1.8 billion German marks. Dieter Kastrup said he could not speak about the actual sum, because the issue was still being debated by German politicians. He pointed out, however, that the Polish and German visions of the size of the sum diverged significantly.

Secondly, there was the issue of the agreement settlement clause (*Erledigungsklausel*). Germany wanted the agreement (exchange of notes) to include a statement that once the lump sum had been paid by the FRG, the government of Poland would recognise that the issue of compensation for individuals was closed. Żabiński said that such a clause was possible, but its exact wording was to be negotiated.

The negotiations between the plenipotentiaries on 19 April 1991 were thus successful in terms of the agreed legal and political framework of the agreement on aid for Polish victims of the Nazi regime. However, they did not resolve the key issue of the size of the lump sum to be transferred to the foundation by the German government. On the other hand, it was unrealistic to expect that the amount would be decided at this stage. The decision was clearly one that would rest with the heads of government.

DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF THE LUMP SUM AND THE LINK BETWEEN THE COMPENSATION AGREEMENT AND THE NEIGHBOURLINESS TREATY

The pace of the actions that followed was determined by the conclusion of the negotiations on the Neighbourliness Treaty, the initialling of that Treaty (approval of the negotiated text) on 6 June 1991 in Warsaw, and its official signing on 17 June 1991 in Bonn. For Poland, the agreement on compensation was an urgent matter.⁵⁷ The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the option that the exchange of notes would take place on 17 June together with the signing of the Treaty. This was based on the assumption that on that day the heads of governments might agree on

⁵⁷ The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to work on the draft agreement without waiting for German proposals. Notatka z 27 maja 1991 r. wicedyrektora Departamentu IV Jana Barcza w/s porozumienia z RFN nt. odszkodowań dla ofiar zbrodni nazistowskich [Note by Jan Barcz, deputy head of Department IV, on the agreement with the FRG on compensation for the victims of Nazi crimes, 27 May 1991]. Author's archive. Recommendations in that document were approved by minister Skubiszewski, and after minor amendments by minister Żabiński provided the basis for further negotiations.

the lump sum.⁵⁸ Consequently, instructions were sent to Poland's ambassador to Germany Janusz Reiter, and Żabiński sent a separate letter to Kastrup. The matter was to be discussed on 6 June 1991 when the text of the Neighbourliness Treaty was to be initialled by its chief negotiators, Jerzy Sułek and Wilhelm Höynck.⁵⁹

After his many talks at the German Federal Foreign Office, at the beginning of June Polish ambassador Reiter reported that the German side was continuing to debate the text of the agreement (and it was too early for negotiations between experts). He confirmed that the amount of the lump sum was to be decided by the heads of government, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Bielecki, during their meeting. Reiter suggested that a good opportunity to discuss the matter would be Höynck's next visit to Warsaw. Höynck was to conduct further negotiations on the agreement.

On 6 June 1991, after the ceremony of the initialling of the Neighbourliness Treaty, Minister Skubiszewski and ambassador Höynck held a meeting in the governmental hotel on Parkowa Street in Warsaw. Skubiszewski again emphasised the importance of the concurrent timing of the Neighbourliness Treaty and the agreement on compensation for Polish victims of the Nazi regime. He said that there had been delays in the realisation of matters agreed earlier, and that the amount of the lump sum should be settled by the heads of government when they met to sign the Neighbourliness Treaty. Höynck explained that Kastrup could not present the German draft of the agreement by the appointed time, because German politicians were still debating the agreement. He said that only Chancellor Kohl had the power to specify the amount of the lump sum. Höynck also said that "the Polish objectives are understood well" and at the meeting of the heads of government on 17 June "much progress" would certainly be made. He also gave a firm assurance that matters agreed so far would not be questioned.⁶⁰

In preparing the meeting of Prime Minister Bielecki and Chancellor Kohl, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concentrated on current issues, which included a report on the compensation negotiations thus far. In this respect, the main issue was the amount of the lump sum which the German government was to transfer to the foundation. The Ministry quoted reference amounts proposed by Żabiński at his meeting with Kastrup on 19 April 1991: DM 2,000 for each former forced labourer and about DM 20,000 for every former concentration camp prisoner (which was close to the amount paid to victims of pseudo-medical experiments). Administrative costs of the new foundation were also mentioned. An important point was the reminder that Poland had made a major concession in asking for benefits for surviving victims only

⁵⁸ Pilna notatka służbowa z 31 maja 1991 r. wicedyrektora Departamentu IV MSZ, Jana Barcza, dla Pana Ministra Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego w sprawie odszkodowań dla ofiar zbrodni nazistowskich (zatwierdzona przez Ministra 31 maja 1991 r.) [Urgent memo by Jan Barcz, deputy head of Department IV, for Minister Skubiszewski on compensation for the victims of Nazi crimes, dated 31 May 1991 (and approved by the Minister on the same day)]. Author's archive.

⁵⁹ A paraphrase of the cryptogram sent by ambassador Reiter from Cologne on 2 June 1991. Author's archive.

⁶⁰ Author's own notes on the meeting.

(about 40,000 - 42,000 prisoners of concentration camps and 500,000 - 600,000 forced labourers).⁶¹

On 17 July 1991 Prime Minister Bielecki and Chancellor Kohl signed the Neighbourliness Treaty and held a meeting.⁶² Bielecki referred to the negotiations on compensations for war victims in Poland and the importance of making the negotiated agreement concurrent with the Neighbourliness Treaty ratification process. Chancellor Kohl's confidential response (due to internal issues in Germany and negotiations with other countries) was that the Polish foundation might receive DM 500 million. He also announced that his envoy Horst Köhler, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, would come to Warsaw in the next few days, carrying a letter confirming the said amount. Later this letter could be presented to members of the Polish parliament. Prime Minister Bielecki accepted Chancellor Kohl's scenario.

Horst Köhler came to Warsaw on 28 June, met with Prime Minister Bielecki and handed him the promised letter confirming that the federal government of Germany intended to transfer 500 million German marks to the new foundation. (Other parts of the letter referred to "debt-for-nature" swaps.) The reference amount was to remain confidential until the agreed notes were exchanged and the Neighbourliness Treaty ratification process was close to completion.⁶³

EXPERTS' NEGOTIATIONS

The later course of the negotiations was as follows. On 22 July 1991 Günter Knackstedt, Germany's ambassador to Poland, passed the German draft agreement to Krzysztof Żabiński, Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers.⁶⁴ Three days later, on 25 July, ambassador Knackstedt received the alternative Polish draft.⁶⁵ The differences between the two drafts concerned the division of the lump sum into instalments and the payment date of the last of them, the identification of victims entitled to receive benefits from the new foundation, and most importantly the wording of the agreement settlement clause. The settlement clause in the German draft stated:

⁶¹ *Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989-1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne...*, Document No. 95, p. 528.

⁶² Zapis z rozmowy Premiera J.K. Bieleckiego i min. K. Skubiszewskiego z kanclerzem H. Kohlem i min. H.-D. Genscherem, Bonn, 17 czerwca 1991 r. [Transcript of talks between Prime Minister Bielecki, Minister Skubiszewski, Chancellor Kohl and Minister Genscher held on 17 June 1991 in Bonn] *Ibid.*, Document No. 97, pp. 530-533.

⁶³ Notatka informacyjna dot. oficjalnej wizyty Premiera J.K. Bieleckiego i Ministra K. Skubiszewskiego w RFN (Bonn, 17-18 czerwca 1991 r.), Warszawa, 3 sierpnia 1991 r. [Information note on the official visit of Prime Minister Bielecki and Minister Skubiszewski to the FRG (17-18 June 1991, Bonn), dated 3 August 1991] *Ibid.*, Document No. 98, pp. 539-540.

⁶⁴ Author's archive.

⁶⁵ Author's archive.

[...] the government of the Republic of Poland accepts this offer [lump sum] and, moreover, accepts that this financial contribution fully meets the expectations of the Government of the Republic of Poland, which will not present any further claims of the citizens of Poland in relation to the events of World War II.

This gave rise to serious reservations in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁶ The settlement clause in the Polish draft stated the following:

The said amount having been transferred, the Government of the Republic of Poland states that the matters of this agreement are resolved between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This agreement does not affect claims valid under the national law of any country involved or other agreements.

These two drafts formed the basis for negotiations in Bonn on 30 August 1991. The chief negotiators were ambassador Wilhelm Höynck (aided by a group of lawyers from the Federal Foreign Office) and the Director of the Department of Europe in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jerzy Sulek (aided by Jan Barcz, Vice-Director in that Department). In the course of the negotiations all matters were resolved except for the settlement clause.⁶⁷

- The procedure for the transfer of the lump sum (500 million German marks) was agreed. It was to be paid in three instalments (Germany had proposed four and Poland two). The timing of the transfers was shortened: the first instalment of 250 million was to be paid immediately on the foundation's establishment, the second was to be 150 million, and the third 100 million (payable by July 1993).
- The issue of identification of the beneficiaries was settled similarly. Those entitled to benefits and aid provided by the new foundation were "the particularly affected victims of Nazi persecutions, who suffered grievous bodily injury and are in a difficult financial situation at present". The exact criteria were to be defined by the board of the new foundation. This solution made it possible to avoid the significant differences between the parties. Originally Germany wished to limit the potential beneficiaries to victims of pseudo-medical experiments and former prisoners of concentration camps only. Germany did not wish to include forced labourers, especially those who had served as farmhands. The negotiated wording allowed the foundation room to manoeuvre (within the limits of the agreed total sum).
- In the German draft, the statutes of the foundation were to be agreed with the German side. The agreed solution was close to that in the Polish draft. The draft of the statutes was to be the subject of consultation, and an "independent

⁶⁶ Cf. Notatka z 22 lipca 1991 r. J. Barcza dla Ministra K. Skubiszewskiego nt. odszkodowań dla polskich ofiar zbrodni nazistowskich [Barcz's note to Minister Skubiszewski on compensation for the Polish victims of Nazi crimes, dated 22 July 1991]. Author's archive.

⁶⁷ Conclusions on the negotiations. Cf. a paraphrase of Sulek's cryptogram sent from the Polish diplomatic outpost in Cologne to minister Skubiszewski. Author's archive.

eminent person” recommended by the German government was to be invited to join the supervisory board of the foundation.

- The German side was highly reluctant to accept one proposal in the Polish draft: that the German government “facilitate” the transfer of further contributions from various German entities to the foundation. After a lengthy debate it was agreed that “the foundation may also receive means from natural persons and legal entities. Both governments will welcome this support.” This solution was good for the foundation (and its beneficiaries) because it opened the door to the receipt of aid from other sources.

The issue of the settlement clause remained to be agreed. Ambassador Höynck insisted on the German draft version, which stated that the Polish government “will not present any further claims of the citizens of Poland in relation to the events of World War II”. After another lengthy discussion he altered the German clause slightly: the Polish government “will not seek redress for further claims of citizens of Poland in relation to Nazi persecutions”. Both German versions were unacceptable to the Polish side. First of all the government of Poland had no right to resign over claims of individuals. It could only limit the scope of diplomatic protection. To an extent the modified German wording (“will not seek redress” only) was closer to the Polish stance. Nevertheless, both German draft versions went beyond the scope of the agreement. These versions referred to victims who might not be the foundation’s beneficiaries. Polish negotiators insisted on: “This agreement does not affect claims valid under the national law of any country involved or other agreements”. This warranted that the ‘pragmatic’, ‘extra-legal’ agreement would not interfere with claims of a legal nature.

The Polish proposal to include the confirmation by Poland “that matters of this agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany are resolved” was not very controversial. The German side wished to add that the government of Poland “will not seek redress for further claims of citizens of Poland in relation to Nazi persecutions”. This was not accepted by the Polish negotiators, who instead proposed adding: “This agreement does not affect claims valid under the national law of any country involved or other agreements”. In the end the Polish negotiators placed the German proposal ‘in brackets’ and the German negotiators did the same with the Polish proposal. This meant that the full wording of the agreement was agreed upon except for what was ‘in brackets’ and had to be negotiated further.

AGREEMENT OF THE FINAL TEXT

In September and early October 1991 the settlement clause was negotiated further by the heads of government, their plenipotentiaries, foreign ministers and diplomats.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Przegląd najważniejszych etapów negocjacji: Geneza powstania formuły oświadczenia rządu polskiego (min. Zabińskiego) w związku z przekazaną przez RFN sumą, przeznaczoną na pomoc finansową

The political situation was turbulent. Because of the Bielecki government's growing difficulties, early parliamentary elections were to be held in Poland on 27 October 1991. These were the first fully free elections since the fall of communism. With the level of political fragmentation extremely high, many parties on both the left and right of the political scene used anti-German sentiments to win votes. In this situation, Bielecki's government did its best to complete all of the Polish-German agreements and treaties before the coming elections. The ratification of the German-Polish Border Treaty and the Neighbourliness Treaty took place in this new and difficult situation. Prime Minister Bielecki stepped down on 6 December 1991.

The wording of the settlement clause was eventually agreed by foreign ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Krzysztof Skubiszewski at a meeting in New York in late September (while attending the United Nations General Assembly).⁶⁹ The agreed wording of this clause (after some minor later adjustments) was:

The Government of the Republic of Poland confirms that the matters of this agreement have been finally settled.

The Government of the Republic of Poland will not seek redress for further claims of citizens of Poland in relation to Nazi persecutions.

Both governments agree that this should not limit the rights of citizens of both countries involved.

There was little time to complete the agreement. On 18 October 1991 the Polish parliament was to debate the ratification of the Polish-German treaties and agreements.⁷⁰ At the same time the Bundestag was working on the ratification of the Treaties. It was known that Germany would ratify the Treaties, but this was a sensitive matter because the 'expelled' had their impact on the political situation in Germany.

Political tensions related to disclosure of the amount of the compensation lump sum and the text of the agreement were eased once the diplomatic notes were exchanged on 16 October 1991. The timing was essential. The steps taken were as follows: in Bonn, Poland's ambassador Reiter received the note signed by Dieter Kastrup, the German Secretary of State; at the same time Germany's ambassador to Poland Günter Knackstedt received (in Warsaw) the note signed by Krzysztof Żabiński, Head of the Polish Office of the Council of Ministers. The two documents together constituted an international (bilateral) agreement in terms of international law, which came

dla polskich ofiar prześladowanych przez III Rzeszę. Departament Europy MSZ, Warszawa, 4.10.1991 [Review of the main negotiation stages: the genesis of the Polish settlement clause (formulated by Minister Żabiński) in the context of the FRG's transfer of a lump sum to aid Polish victims persecuted by the Third Reich. Europe Department, MSZ, Warsaw, 4 October 1991]. Author's archive.

⁶⁹ Paraphrases of minister Skubiszewski's cryptograms of 26 and 27 September 1991 (from New York) to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Author's archive.

⁷⁰ Very urgent memo on compensation by Barcz, deputy head of the Europe Department, MSZ, addressed to Minister Skubiszewski, dated 11 October 1991 (This memo on compensation was highly urgent and was endorsed by minister Skubiszewski in the margin.) Author's archive.

into force when the notes were exchanged. In Poland the details of the agreement were announced by Żabiński during the parliamentary sitting on 18 October 1991.⁷¹

The structure of this agreement corresponded to the compensation agreements that the German federal government had signed with eleven Western European countries.⁷² Three essential issues were regulated: the transfer of the lump sum, its distribution, and the settlement clause. In this clause three essential matters were settled.

Firstly, the document states that “matters of this agreement have been finally settled”. The first matter was the allocation and transfer of 500 million German marks by the federal German government and via a foundation to aid the victims of Nazi persecution. It followed that with the last instalment paid, the federal German government would consider the matter settled.

Secondly, the Polish government stated that it “will not seek redress for further claims of citizens of Poland in relation to Nazi persecutions”. The agreement could not satisfy and has not affected individual claims for compensation for Nazi crimes. The Polish government stated that it would not “seek redress” for individual claims of Polish citizens, which means that it limited its diplomatic protection (possible representation of some categories of Polish claimants). It is important to note in the context of this statement that this did not limit the involvement of the Polish government in supporting the claims of former forced labourers in the course of the 1998–2000 negotiations.⁷³ Moreover, at this later stage, Germany did not refer to this statement to exclude the Polish government from further compensation negotiations. Leaving the concurrent moral and political issues aside, the federal German government fell into its own trap. In 1990–1991 it decidedly wished to exclude the forced labourers as a category entitled to benefits paid by the new foundation. However, the very general identification of the entitled persons in the agreement merely papered over the differences between the German and Polish positions.

Thirdly, should there be claims grounded in Polish, German or international law, this agreement did not affect them. The third paragraph of the settlement clause stated that “Both governments agree that this should not limit the rights of citizens of both countries involved”. “This” clearly referred to the seeking of “redress” by the Polish government. In this third paragraph, reference was made to citizens of “both countries involved” because there was ongoing discussion in Germany about possible compen-

⁷¹ For general comments on the agreement cf. Departament Europy. Notatka informacyjna nt. zawartego 16 października br. porozumienia Notatka informacyjna nt. zawartego 16 października br. porozumienia międzyrządowego w sprawie powołania Fundacji ds. pomocy polskim ofiarom prześladowania nazistowskiego. Warszawa, 24 października 1991 r. [Information note on the intergovernmental agreement of 16 October 1991 on establishing a foundation to aid the victims of Nazi persecution. Warsaw, 24 October 1991. Europe Department, MSZ]. Author’s archive.

⁷² For legal analysis of the agreement see J. Barcz, *Pomoc dla ofiar prześladowania nazistowskiego (Polsko-niemieckie porozumienie z 16 X 1991)...*

⁷³ Cf. J. Kranz, *Rokowania wielostronne z Niemcami – od końca 1998 r. do 17 lipca 2000 r.* (in:) J. Barcz, B. Jałowiecki, J. Kranz, *Między pamięcią a odpowiedzialnością. Rokowania w latach 1998-2000 w sprawie świadczeń za pracę przymusową*, Warsaw, 2004, p. 23.

sation for certain groups of German citizens excluded by the German Compensations Law (*Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*) of 1956, and on the other hand, this German–Polish agreement did not prejudice the possible granting of assistance to citizens or former citizens of Poland who had been victims of Nazi crimes and who lived abroad after the war.

CONCLUSIONS

In reviewing the agreement of 16 October 1991, it is difficult to separate legal issues from political and historical ones. In the background there were also humanitarian and moral matters, which played a huge role at the last stage of its negotiation. The agreement was concluded concurrently with the ratification of the Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation and the German–Polish Border Treaty both in Germany and in Poland. In fact, the Polish parliament approved their ratification on 18 October 1991, the Bundestag having done so a day earlier. Both parliaments adopted appropriate resolutions.⁷⁴ A week later parliamentary elections were held in Poland. Undoubtedly, the pre-election atmosphere there caused some Polish politicians to voice critical comments.⁷⁵ They were most critical about three matters:

- the absence of appropriate regulations on compensation in the Neighbourliness Treaty (this criticism concerned the Treaty rather than the Agreement);

⁷⁴ Proceedings in both parliaments had a wider context in both Poland and Germany. The text of the Bundestag resolution of 16 October 1991 mentioned “those expelled from their homelands”. The context of this phrase, however, implied the expellees’ possible positive role in the reconciliation process. In the case of compensation the Bundestag “expressed satisfaction that the establishment of the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation will provide assistance to victims of Nazi persecutions as the final humanitarian gesture”. It appears that this statement was to emphasise that the transfer of money to the Foundation was to firmly close (for Germany) the issue of compensation (although nothing of this sort was in the agreement). The resolution urged the federal government to formally pass the document “expressing [...] expectations” of German MPs to the Polish authorities. To avoid legal ambiguities in the interpretation of the weight of the ‘expectations’, minister Skubiszewski at his meeting with the German ambassador to Poland on 15 November 1991 (when the ambassador passed on this resolution) handed him the following written declaration: “For the relations between the parties, both treaties and the obligations arising from the exchange of notes are binding. The parliamentary resolution of one country is not binding for the other country. A parliamentary resolution is not part of international-legal obligations. I understand that the resolution of the *Bundestag* is – in the spirit of its last words – the expression (*Ausdruck*) of expectations (*Erwartungen*) of the *Bundestag*. Should the German federal government take an official stance on the texts of resolutions of the Sejm and Senate [two houses of the Polish parliament] of the Republic of Poland, Poland reserves the right to take a stance on the resolution of the *Bundestag* and possible German interpretation of resolutions of the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland.” Author’s archive.

⁷⁵ More in: J. Sułek, Polski wkład do ostatecznego uregulowania pokojowego w odniesieniu do Niemiec. Wspólne przewyciężenie polsko-niemieckiego sporu granicznego (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie...*, pp. 146-147; M. Tomala, *Zachodnia granica Polski po II wojnie światowej. Dokumenty i materiały*, Warsaw, 2002, p. 245ff.; S. Sulowski, Krytycznie o Traktacie o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 1991 r. (in:) *Przełom i wyzwanie...*, pp. 319-320.

- the settlement clause and its second paragraph (“The government of the Republic of Poland will not seek redress for further claims of citizens of Poland in relation to Nazi persecutions”); and
- the insufficient amount of the lump sum to be paid by Germany.

The first matter, why the issue of compensation was not part of the Neighbourliness Treaty negotiations, has been explained above.⁷⁶ In short, the divide between the German stance and the Polish one was very deep, and Germany repeatedly held to its legal position. In this situation, negotiating the compensation issue as part of the Neighbourliness Treaty could have led to a breakdown or freezing of the negotiations on that Treaty. At the same time, a ‘pragmatic’ solution became an option. This was an opportunity to negotiate benefits and aid for the survivors of Nazi crimes, but separate and lengthy negotiations had to be pursued.⁷⁷ From the viewpoint of the victims, the form of the relevant legal act and its relation to other acts was of secondary importance. The issue was to receive some financial aid as soon as possible, since it had been delayed for much too long. Undoubtedly, this was the main criterion that decided the choice of negotiation strategy. The number of survivors was rapidly decreasing and they needed concrete financial aid, not promises to be implemented at some vague future time, not a whitewash and certainly not disputes on legal ‘principles’.

The second paragraph of the settlement clause aroused high emotions. It was also questioned later in the 1990s.⁷⁸ In this paper the mounting difficulties during its negotiation have been presented. In the final version of the agreement, although limitations were placed on Poland’s diplomatic protection, it was also stated that the agreement did not affect the possible compensation claims of individuals. Such claims involve filing an individual suit in court.⁷⁹ The criticism of the settlement clause almost ceased after the second round of negotiations in 1998-2000. German enterprises – threatened with proceedings before American courts – collected large amounts of money in cooperation with the federal German government. This money was allocated to national foundations, including the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation. As discussed above, the settlement clause in the agreement of 16 October 1991 did not block the involvement of the Polish government in the second round of negotiations, and this was highly relevant for the outcomes of these later negotiations.

⁷⁶ More in: J. Sulek, *Od odszkodowań indywidualnych do pomocy humanitarnej i świadczeń finansowych. Bilans wypłat z Niemiec z lat 1991-2011 dla ofiar nazizmu w Polsce* (in: *Przełom i wyzwanie* ..., p. 554.

⁷⁷ Cf. the speech by minister Skubiszewski at the plenary session of the Polish parliament on 13 September 1991 concerning ratification of the Neighbourliness Treaty. Author’s archive.

⁷⁸ For example: Pismo z 21 maja 1997 r. Stowarzyszenia Polaków Poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę do Marszałka Sejmu RP, J. Zycha [Letter of the Association of Polish Victims of the Third Reich to Józef Zych, Marshal of the Sejm, dated 21 May 1997]. Author’s archive.

⁷⁹ See, for example: Odpowiedź z dnia 6 maja 1998 r. Ministra B. Geremka na interpelację posła M. Podsiadło [Minister Geremek’s reply dated 6 May 1998 to a parliamentary interpellation by Mirosław Podsiadło, MP]. Author’s archive.

The amount of the lump sum transferred by the federal German government to the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation was controversial for obvious reasons, particularly since victims resident in Poland had been almost totally excluded from compensation payments in the post-war years. In this light, even the reference amount proposed by the Polish side, which was the starting point of negotiations, would not be considered sufficient. The final determination of the lump sum amount remains a ‘secret’ of the then heads of government: Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Bielecki. It was not without reason that Germany was blamed for its lack of sensitivity and for valuing pragmatism over morality.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the agreement and the benefits consequently paid by the Foundation for Polish–German Reconciliation were morally and practically significant to the victims.⁸¹

It should also be noted that, thanks to the agreement of 16 October 1991, the amount of the lump sum allocated to victims of the Nazi regime living in Poland was the highest negotiated by all ‘eastern’ countries whose citizens had earlier been excluded as beneficiaries of benefits and aid provided by the FRG. Under other compensation agreements based on a similar formula, in 1993 Germany allocated⁸² a billion marks (€0.51 bn) in total to foundations in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: foundations in Moscow and Kiev received DM 400 million each, and the foundation in Minsk DM 200 million. About 15,000 victims living in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were paid benefits by the foundations in Moscow and Minsk. The Czech–German Fund for the Future (set up under the Czech–German Declaration of 1997) was allocated DM 140 million (€71.58 million). Victims of the Nazi regimes in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia jointly received DM 80 million (€40.9 million) in 1998–2000, mainly via their national Red Cross organisations.

The historic watershed of 1989–1990 facilitated *ex gratia* payments of some delayed compensation for the victims of the Nazi regime. Importantly, the pragmatic solution motivated by humanitarian reasons has no limited duration and no formal limitations. It has opened the door for transfers of further contributions to the Foundation. This includes the outcomes of the 1998–2000 negotiations as well as various individual contributions.⁸³

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Key words: Germany, Poland, negotiation, compensation for victims, agreement of 16 October 1991

⁸⁰ S. Sulowski, *Krytycznie o Traktacie o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 1991 r. ...*, p. 320.

⁸¹ Cf. J. Sułek, *Niemiecka pomoc humanitarna i finansowa w latach 1991 – 2004 dla poszkodowanych przez III Rzeszę w Polsce...*, p. 376.

⁸² Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen. *Entschädigung von NS-Unrecht. Regelungen zur Wiedergutmachung*, Berlin, 2012.

⁸³ Cf. J. Sułek, *Od odszkodowań indywidualnych do pomocy humanitarnej i świadczeń finansowych. Bilans wypłat z Niemiec z lat 1991-2011 dla ofiar nazizmu w Polsce...*, p. 552ff.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to analyse the negotiation of the Agreement of 16 October 1991 on Compensation for Victims of Nazi Crimes Living in Poland. This Agreement was overshadowed by the more important Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, the German–Polish Border Treaty and the Two Plus Four Treaty (Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany), and its provisions have received little analysis, in spite of its relevance to the new chapter in Polish–German relations. In this article, recently published documents are analysed. The negotiations preceding the Agreement lasted for more than two years and were difficult for many reasons. They resulted in a pragmatic solution which avoided debate of significant differences in legal positions (which had formerly blocked the payment of compensation by West Germany) and opened the door to the provision of real financial aid to the victims of Nazi persecution living in Poland.

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**THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA
AFTER 2013 IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CHALLENGES,
THE RUSSIAN–UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AND QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY**

The years 2013 and 2014 were important dates in the history of the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. The Revolution of Dignity and the Russian–Ukrainian conflict showed how great a trap was the concept of *russkij mir* for the Orthodox circles that had direct ties to the Moscow hierarchy. The annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Ukraine put the Orthodox Church with institutional links to Moscow in a particularly difficult position.¹

STATE AND RELIGION

Modern forms of state–church relations can generally be represented by three models.² The first, the so-called separation model, seeks to completely separate state and religion in all spheres of social life. The second – the cooperationist (partner) model – provides for cooperation between the church and the state in matters of culture, education or social programmes (this applies to both organisational issues and the financing of certain activities). The third model is referred to as paternalistic (protectionist): according to this model the church, as a culture-forming and nation-forming entity, comes clearly under the patronage of the state. In this case, the church often becomes an instrument in the hands of politicians.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there took place a theological and sociological reflection on the complementarity of Orthodoxy and democracy. Analysing a social model based on Christian values, Thomas Hopko stated that reli-

¹ This is an extended and updated version of an article published in Polish in „Przeгляд Zachodni” [*Western Review*] no. 1/2018 (366). The text was submitted for printing on 25 June 2019.

² For more on different models of state–church relations see: J. Krukowski, *Kościół i państwo. Podstawy regulacji prawnych*, Lublin 2000, pp. 22–43; M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie*, Lublin 2000, pp. 69–79; cf. also: *Kościół w Unii Europejskiej*, <http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/X/XU/kosciolwobecue.html> (11 December 2011).

gious pluralism and moral liberalism resulting in the “privatisation”³ of the religious world view cannot be combined with the values of Orthodoxy.⁴ The problem lies not so much in the approach to democracy (the idea of *sobornost* and decentralisation of church structures in Orthodoxy may be closer to democracy than the “monarchist” and centralised system of the Catholic Church) as in the attitude towards religious pluralism. However, what the Orthodox Church does is not at odds with the functioning of civic society. There is potential here in the tradition of elective hierarchs, work ethos, and the strength of the Orthodox Church’s actions in the social, educational and cultural spheres. However, the Moscow Patriarchate treats liberal democracy cautiously, usually identifying it with Western imperialism. The Russian Orthodox Church opposes the absolutisation of human rights and freedoms, indicating that there are values which rank “not lower” than those rights and freedoms: faith, morality and the homeland.⁵

The Church can influence state policy in an institutional sense through the actions performed by the church structures and clergy. The universality of the ideas that it preaches means that it often claims the right to comment on many aspects of state functioning and citizens’ activity. In the context of foreign policy, the foreign activity of churches (as non-territorial and transnational units) is a challenge for every country. Such church activities can reinforce or weaken foreign policy depending on the relationships between the secular and church authorities.⁶

From the perspective of the state viewed as an actor in international relations, the identification function of the Church is important.⁷ In the case of co-creation of an “internal identity”, religion performs the function of integrating the society. At the same time, it creates the image of the state to the outside world, thus determining an “external identity”. If religion is a component of national (state) identity, it may serve as a source of legitimisation of foreign policy or as a mobilising factor. In addition, various operational tasks of religious institutions (mediation, conciliation or organisation) should be mentioned here.⁸ In the case of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine,

³ The term was introduced by Thomas Luckmann, who claimed that religions were not disappearing despite the progress of technology and globalisation. Two contradictory processes can be observed – the shrinking of religion and its simultaneous expansion in other parts of the world. In post-industrial societies, the *sacrum* moves from the public to the “private” and non-institutionalised dimension. See T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, 1967.

⁴ T. Hopko, Orthodoxy In Post-Modern Pluralistic Societies, *The Ecumenical Review*, 1999, vol. 51, no. 4.

⁵ *Основы учения Русской Православной Церкви о достоинстве, свободе и правах человека*, 26 June 2008, for the full text see: <http://pravoslavie.ru/27021.html> (30 January 2018).

⁶ A. Curbanović, *Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Warsaw 2010, p. 41; A. Curbanović, *Religia jako czynnik Soft Power Federacji Rosyjskiej*, in: *Religia we współczesnym świecie*, B. Bednarczyk, Z. Pasek, P. Stawiński (eds.), Kraków 2010, pp. 195–206.

⁷ Sociology also distinguishes many other functions of the church: ideological, communicative, regulatory, legitimising and culture-forming.

⁸ A. Curbanović, *Czynnik religijny...*, pp. 42–43. The socio-political situation in Russia and also Ukraine at different times allows us to reflect on the politicisation of religion and the involvement of

most of these functions were particularly noticeable at the time of the political-social crisis at the turn of 2013 and 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and during the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.

THE PATH TO DIVISION OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE

A feature of the religious situation in Ukraine is the coexistence of four Eastern Churches within one state: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).⁹

Based on numbers of parishes (*hromada*), religious orders and clergy, the UOC-MP is institutionally the strongest, followed by the UOC-KP, the Greek Catholic Church and the UAOC.¹⁰ Comparing the statistics for 2005 and 2007, it is found that the UOC-KP is the fastest growing in terms of the number of parishes. The institutional division of the Orthodox Church took place in the early 1990s.

In the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, only the Russian Orthodox Church of the Eastern Churches was tolerated by the authorities. The last patriarchal exarch and metropolitan of Kiev in Soviet times was Archbishop Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko).¹¹ For the Russian Orthodox Church, most of whose parishes were in Ukraine (ca. 65%) and most of whose clergy came from that Republic, the Ukrainian exarchate was the primary source of income.¹²

religion in politics. Considering these trends, Sergey Filatov points to the religious component of Russian identity. С.Филатов, *Традиционные религии, «русская цивилизация» и суверенная демократия*, [in:] *Религия и конфликт*, А. Малащенко, С. Филатов (eds.), Москва 2007.

⁹ A. Szeptycki, *Ukraina wobec Rosji. Studium zależności*, Warsaw 2013, pp. 250–360; K. Jędraszczyk, *Cerkiew w życiu społeczno-politycznym Ukrainy w latach 1991-2010*, *Studia Europaea Gnesnansia*, 3/2011, pp. 55–77.

¹⁰ According to data for 1 January 2005, numbers of religious communities (*hromada*) in Ukraine were as follows: UOC-MP 10,566, UOC-KP 3484, UAOC 1172, Greek Catholics 3386. Religious orders: UOC-MP 158, UOC-KP 36, UAOC 5, Greek Catholics 93. Numbers of clergy: UOC-MP 8936, UOC-KP 2693, UAOC 702, Greek Catholics 2103. See website of the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, <http://www.risu.org.ua/ukr/resourses/statistics/ukr2005/> (12 April 2005.) According to data for 1 January 2017, numbers of *hromada* were: UOC-MP 12,328, UOC-KP 5114, UAOC 1195, Greek Catholics 3394. Religious orders: UOC-MP 208, UOC-KP 60, UAOC 13, Greek Catholics 102. Numbers of clergy: UOC-MP 10,289, UOC-KP 3479, UAOC 709, Greek Catholics 2755. Звіт про мережу церков і релігійних організацій в Україні станом на 01.01.2017 р., Дані Департаменту у справах релігій та національності Міністерства культури України, <https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/statistics/ukr2017/67269/>.

¹¹ Later the main initiator of the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. A controversial figure (he was suspected of embezzling property of the former Orthodox Church, financing UNA-UNSO nationalist militias, and cooperating with the KGB).

¹² Wyznania religijne na Ukrainie, *Biuletyn Ukraiński*, no. 8–9, August–September 1994.

In January 1990, the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a resolution on the self-governance of the church in Ukraine.¹³ In October 1990, the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church was renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In early 1991, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Kiev adopted a resolution on full canonical autonomy (autocephaly)¹⁴ and asked the Russian Orthodox Church for consent in this matter, following the rule that the “Mother Church” must agree to such a move. Given the great importance of the Ukrainian Church, the Russian Orthodox Church objected to this decision.¹⁵ The head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was then Metropolitan Filaret.

The situation was further complicated by President Leonid Kravchuk himself and democratic politicians who favoured the creation of a “national church”. President Kravchuk supported the idea that the Orthodox Church should be “nationalised” and then merge with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Such a church was to be a useful tool facilitating the faster Ukrainisation of society and contributing to its consolidation. This approach was favoured by Metropolitan Filaret.

Another request for the granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, made at the beginning of 1992, led to a schism in that Church. Some bishops exercised their right to renounce their allegiance to Filaret. Opponents of Filaret and of the Church’s independence from Moscow held a meeting in Zhytomyr in April 1992 and won the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. In May 1992, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church met in Kharkiv. It removed Metropolitan Filaret from his position as the head of the Church and appointed Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of Rostov and Novocherkassk in his place.¹⁶ Filaret was deprived of all his privileges and holy orders, but he still enjoyed the support of the state authorities.

In June 1992, another council was held with the aim of uniting the supporters of autocephaly associated with Filaret and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. However, complete unification of the Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriar-

¹³ Autocephaly (canonical autonomy) of the Orthodox Church has been a tradition in Ukraine. Introduced under the inspiration of clergy and lay activists in 1919, it survived until 1934, when the Holy Synod decided to remove the Ukrainian autocephaly and incorporate its parishes into the Russian Orthodox Church. Autocephaly was restored during World War II. The hierarchs of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church became involved in supporting the Nazi occupiers and had to leave Ukraine after the war. The autocephalous branch survived only among the Ukrainian diaspora (mainly in Canada and the USA).

¹⁴ In the case of Ukraine, the status of an autocephalous Orthodox Church should be attained via a defined procedure: announcement of the fact by the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, and recognition by all autocephalous Orthodox churches, with the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow at the forefront. See: W. Sereda, W poszukiwaniu pojednania, *Biuletyn Ukraiński*, no. 7/8 (19/20) 1995, pp. 13–15. The statute of the Orthodox Church stated that it was independent and self-governing.

¹⁵ Besides the loss of sources of income and the reduction in “canonical territory”, the loss of the Kiev Metropolis amounts to a loss of prestige (associated, for example, with the right of succession to the Church of Kievan Rus’ and the authority of the oldest Orthodox church in the Slavic world).

¹⁶ W. Pawluczuk, *Ukraina. Polityka i mistyka*, Kraków 1998, pp. 131–132; T. Szyszlak, Trony i ołtarze. Religia i polityka na Ukrainie, *Więź* 2007, no. 7 (585), pp. 81–95.

chate and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church was not achieved. Some of the clergy and their parishes took the side of Filaret, while others, including Patriarch Mstyslav (head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church), did not accept a union forced by Archbishop Filaret and the secular authorities. A significant number of “autocephalists” recognised the authority of Patriarch Mstyslav and aimed to preserve the autonomy of their church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, independent from the Moscow Patriarchate, was created in 1992. As a result, instead of one “national” Orthodox Church, there are still three Orthodox denominations, which continue to have difficulty reaching agreement.¹⁷

Myroslav Marynovych made a systematic analysis of the divisions within the Eastern Churches in Ukraine.¹⁸ He identified three lines of conflict:

1) The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate vs. the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. The conflict is politically motivated, and rests on a division into “national” and “foreign” Orthodox Churches. The “national” Churches believe the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to be tied to Russian interests and imperial ambitions. This accusation is countered by the argument of the “universality and trans-ethnicity of the Orthodox Church”. On this basis, the Moscow Patriarchate argues that the creation of a separate Church in Ukraine is harmful.

2) The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church vs. the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. The underlying cause of these tensions may be said to be one of tradition: it is linked to the Orthodox Church’s interpretation of the Brest Union of 1596 as an act that destroyed Orthodox unity and represented the aggressive proselytism of the Roman Catholic Church. A “pseudo-council”, as it is called by the Greek Catholics, organised by the NKVD in 1946 took a decision on the “self-dissolution” of the Greek Catholic Church and the transfer of its property to the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁹

3) The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church vs. the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. This division is related to canonicity. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church are canonical churches. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate declare their independent status, but have not yet been formally recognised by the Moscow Patriarchate.

¹⁷ A. Wilson, *Ukraincy*, Warsaw 2002, p. 249.

¹⁸ М. Маринович, Роль Церков у будівництві посткомуністичного суспільства в Україні, ”Г”, 22/2001.

¹⁹ In the early 1990s, due to the re-legalisation of the Greek Catholic Church, the problem of the return of goods became the main source of religious tensions in Ukraine.

THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES IN 2013–2017

After Vladimir Putin returned as president and Kirill ascended to the patriarchal throne in Moscow, the state (geopolitical) and church concepts of *russkij mir* overlapped, becoming a tool in the hands of the secular authorities. The proximity of the “throne and the altar”, and thus relations concerning both image and finances, reduced the Russian Orthodox Church to the role of a structure seen as subordinate to and opportunistic with regard to the authority of the president of the Russian Federation.

2013 and 2014 were important years in the history of the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. The Revolution of Dignity and the Russian–Ukrainian conflict showed how great a trap is the concept of *russkij mir* for the Orthodox Church, especially when it has direct ties to the Moscow hierarchy. The annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Ukraine put the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church in a particularly difficult position.

During the Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Greek Catholic Church entered some kind of revival phase. The public equated them with “national” Churches and made them respond to political and social problems. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which had to prove its solidarity with those fighting for the dignity and sovereignty of the country, faced the most difficult task. The boundaries between “secularity” and “sanctity” were broken, and the presence of clergymen from various churches in the Maidan, the hospital in St. Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery, and the calls of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations for the parties of the conflict to sit at one table and reach an agreement became symbols of the process. At that time, the Orthodox Churches did not operate as institutions taking the side of the authorities, but participated in the process along with the public, showing that they were a part of civic society. Providing social assistance and collecting donations in aid of troops active in the so-called ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation)²⁰ were important activities of the churches, especially the Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate supported the demands of the Maidan, as symbolised by the opening of the St. Michael’s Monastery, which belonged to that Church, and the admission on 30 November 2014 of a group of about 350 participants of the Euromaidan seeking shelter from Berkut hit squads. From that time on the monastery became the temporary headquarters of the protesters, organising vigils and round-the-clock prayers and distributing hot drinks and overcoats. Young clergymen from the Kiev Orthodox Theological Academy also actively

²⁰ The parish of Dymitrij Solunsky, which raised funds to equip six ambulances, was a prime example of that kind of activity. A church community associated with the main military hospital raised over 0.5 million hryvnias. There were dozens of similar cases. In November 2014, Filaret initiated an unprecedented declaration in the Orthodox Church on the recognition of corruption as a social evil and the prevention of those guilty of it from receiving the Holy Communion (*до святого причастя*).

helped the protesters. In the following days, other surrounding buildings, including the nearby Roman Catholic church, were adapted for use as places of refuge.²¹ The night of 10 December 2013 passed into legend when the warning bells pealed for the first time since the Tatar invasion of 1240. The storming of the Maidan and its final dispersion were supposed to take place on that day. At the sound of the bells, people gathered in the Maidan.

In the spring of 2014, the Orthodox Church had a unique opportunity to reverse the split. Patriarch Filaret even planned to join parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (around 14,000 parishes) to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (around 4500 parishes); however, this did not happen. It was estimated that between 100 and 300 parishes could be transferred from the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, but in fact the latter had formally succeeded in taking over only three parishes by December 2014, with another fourteen still subject to dispute. Even the planned incorporation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was ideologically “closer”, was not successful. The witnessed religious revival simultaneously with the revival of the idea of national unity in the face of a common external enemy inspired the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to begin talks on unification on 8 March 2015. However, on 9 July 2015, the Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church declined to give its consent to unification. The unsuccessful outcome of the talks is believed to have been related to pressure from Moscow and a proposal for talks between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UOC-MP + UAOC).²²

The Greek Catholic Church also displayed increased social activity. That Church was particularly vulnerable to criticism from Moscow, which called it the “Church of nationalists”. Meanwhile, from the start, the Greek Catholic hierarchs made efforts to ensure that the Maidan ended peacefully. The remonstrances of the Russian Orthodox Church against the Greek Catholics were not effective. Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev)²³ offered an apology to the Greek Catholics at the opening ceremony of

²¹ Protoiereus Alexander Trofymljuk (a protoiereus in the Orthodox Church is a superior of cathedral clergy or head of a larger parish, possibly equivalent to a dean or prelate of a cathedral or collegiate chapter) told Halina Tytysh about the events related to the giving of shelter to students and reporters on 30 November 2013. Г. Титиш, *Рятивник з Михайлівського собору: Автобус з “беркутівцями” в 10 метрах від церкви сів паніку серед людей*, 4 December 2013, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2013/12/4/143967/>. For similar reports see: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/11/30/7003742/> (12 March 2017).

²² *В УАПЦ назвали винних у зриві процесу об’єднання*, 14 July 2015, https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/confessional/orthodox_relations/60543/ (12 September 2017).

²³ Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) chairs the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, and on 24 December 2015, by decision of the Council, was appointed representative of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Interreligious Council of Russia. *Журнали засідання Священного Синода от 24 декабря 2015 года*, Журнал № 98, <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4304773.html> (23 January 2018).

the General Council of the Greek Catholic Church. This caused consternation among Greek Catholic priests, as it was an unprecedented event.²⁴

In February 2017, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, Greek Catholic archbishop, went to Rome to inform Pope Francis in person about the situation in Ukraine. He also invited the Pope to visit Ukraine to “give the faithful hope for peace.” The archbishop told Vatican Radio: “We know that the conflict in Ukraine will not be solved by military means. Therefore, I am calling for the international community to continue its diplomatic efforts to appease the aggressor so that fighting can be stopped”.²⁵ On 14–15 February 2017, Archbishop Claudio Gugerotti (along with Jan Sobilo, auxiliary bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kharkiv-Zaporizhia, coordinator of the humanitarian “Pope for Ukraine” project) went to eastern Ukraine. The hierarchs visited the city of Avdiivka, which had been under fire from pro-Russian separatists for several weeks, and the children evacuated to Sviatohirsk. After returning from eastern Ukraine, the apostolic nuncio in Kiev stated that “the first martyrdom of the local people is the international silence about their situation”.²⁶

After its annexation in 2014, Crimea was not brought under the canonical jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, but remained under the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This put the Crimean parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate in a particularly difficult position. By the beginning of 2016, nine of the 41 parishes of the Kiev Patriarchate had been dissolved. That Church faces difficulties associated with the “besieged fortress syndrome” and its believers’ fears of being persecuted because of their religion or language.

Churches in the territories occupied by separatists are in an even more difficult position. In 2014, the Religious Freedom Institute carried out monitoring in the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic. The report revealed cases of plundering of church property belonging to Protestants, Greek Catholics or Catholic and Orthodox parishes, about forty cases of beatings of clergymen, one murder of the whole family of a clergyman, and the taking over of buildings, office equipment, furniture, cars or documents for the “needs of separatists”. Alexander Zakharchenko, self-appointed leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, announced that only four confessions – Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Muslim and Jewish – were considered legitimate in the republic. He warned that he would “fight tooth and nail with sectarianism”, i.e. other denominations.²⁷

²⁴ Ю. Чорноморець, *Про два тити православ’я: християнський і язичницько-геополітичний*, <https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/blog/suspilstvo/ukrayinski-cerkvy-2014-go> (14 April 2017).

²⁵ Archbishop Szewczuk, *Nie zapomnijcie o Ukrainie, powstrzymajcie agresora*, http://pl.radiovaticana.va/news/2017/02/23/abp_szewczuk_nie_zapominajcie_o_ukrainie,_powstrzymajcie_ag/1294644 (15 April 2017).

²⁶ *Nuncjusz w Kijowie: męczeństwo we wschodniej Ukrainie*, http://pl.radiovaticana.va/news/2017/02/20/nuncjusz_w_kijowie_m%C4%99cze%C5%84stwo_na_wschodniej_ukrainie/1293732 (16 April 2017).

²⁷ М.Басин, *Итоги 2014 года. Донбасс и Крым: новые вызовы для религиозной свободы*, 13 January 2015, http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1496:1&catid=37:art&Itemid=64 (12 September 2017).

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
OF THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE

The 2004 election showed the Church's pro-Moscow stance to be no asset in its efforts to gain social influence in Ukraine. After the Orange Revolution, the "Ukrainisation" of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has clearly progressed.²⁸ A sign of this was given by the Church's council in 2007, when it condemned "political Orthodoxy". This was interpreted as official condemnation of organisations with Orthodox links that promoted neo-imperialist ideas.

A few days before the Vilnius summit of 2013, during which the issue of Ukraine's association with the European Union was to be settled, the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate signed a joint statement, one that might have been of particular significance for the former, as it contradicted the idea of *russkij mir* with which it was identified. The message of the declaration was that Ukraine has European roots, especially when it comes to the system of values, education and the quality of social life. The hierarchs of the different Churches emphasised that the country had to choose which path to follow, in accordance with its aspirations to be part of the circle of "free European nations".²⁹ This clearly undermined the essence of the *russkij mir* concept. In the face of President Yanukovich's refusal to sign the Association Agreement and the further bloody events, this declaration did not have great political significance subsequently. However, for astute observers of the church institutions, it was an indicator of emancipatory tendencies in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The Maidan events, the annexation of Crimea and separatism in the Donbas placed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in a difficult position. During the riots in the Maidan, Onufriy (Berezovsky) – from 24 February 2014 *locum tenens*³⁰ bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – called upon priests to take care of those who came to churches and explicitly asked to be taken care of.³¹ Priests were to limit themselves to providing social assistance

²⁸ For more on the Orthodox Church during the Orange Revolution see: T. Szyszlak, *Religijny wujtiar rotaranczowej rewolucji, Religijnyj faktor pomarančewoї rewoluciji*, [in:] Історія релігій в Україні 2007, Науковий щорічник. Книга II, З. Білик, Я. Дашкевич, Л. Моравська (eds.), Lviv 2007, pp. 443–449.

²⁹ *Звернення Церков і релігійних організацій до українського народу щодо дискусії про європейські цінності в Україні*, http://ugcc.ua/official/official-documents/zvernennya/zvernennya_2013/zvernennya_tserkov_%D1%96_rel%D1%96g%D1%96ynih_organ%D1%96zats%D1%96y_do_ukrainskogo_narodu_67584.html (30 November 2017); see also: M. Wawrzonek, *Prawosławie jako element kultury politycznej na współczesnej Ukrainie*, *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, 2015, vol. 5, p. 215.

³⁰ On 13 August 2014, the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate elected Onufriy as the new Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine.

³¹ Churches advocating pacifism (Protestant ones), and also the UOC-MP, focused on helping civilians who had suffered as a result of the conflict. An example of such action is the UOC-MP mission "Mercy without Borders".

during crises. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was often unfairly perceived by the public as the Kremlin's political tool, and the apparent lack of initiative on the part of the hierarchs was viewed as anti-national and corresponding to the attitudes of Moscow and Kirill and the idea of *russkij mir*.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is dominant in eastern Ukraine. Some of its clergy supported the actions taken by Russia and the separatists, although their number decreased as the conflict escalated. The Russian-language media published statements made by several UOC-MP clergymen who had fled to Russia and were criticising the new authorities in Kiev from there.³² Publicity was given to acts of support for pro-Russian rebels and blessing of the flags of the separatist republics in Donetsk and Luhansk by priests. These incidents did significant harm to the reputation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, although in fact the hierarchs of that Church and of the Church of the Kiev Patriarchate responded to the Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea in quite similar ways, and their statements differed not so much in their content as in their emotional overtones.

However, it became increasingly difficult for the Orthodox bishops of Ukraine subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate to remain loyal to both the Ukrainian state and the church authorities in Moscow. In the spring and summer of 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate took an official stance on Russia's policy. The threats that Russian troops could enter Ukraine were sharply criticised, and demands were made for Patriarch Kirill to intervene in this matter.³³ In addition, Georgi Kovalenko, press secretary of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, announced that by deciding to launch its intervention in Ukraine, the Russian authorities were violating the Ten Commandments. He also warned the head of the Russian Orthodox Church that if he supported Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Ukrainian Church would turn away from him. He stressed that the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate were first and foremost Ukrainian citizens.

Onufriy, the acting administrator of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and Metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna,³⁴ called on those tak-

³² K. Chawryło, *Ukraińska gra patriarchy Cyryla*, 14 August 2014, OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-08-14/ukraińska-gra-patriarchy-cyryla#_ftn31.

³³ Metropolitan Onufriy's letter to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, 1 March 2014, <http://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-chernovickij-onufrij-prosit-patriarxa-kirilla-ne-dopustit-krovoprolitiya-v-ukraine/>.

³⁴ He performed this role after Metropolitan Volodymyr's death (5 July 2014). While Metropolitan Volodymyr was still alive, Onufriy had already performed the duties of head of the UOC-MP, and he was elected to that position on 13 August 2014. From the start, Onufriy was considered Volodymyr's most likely successor and viewed as a continuator of his balanced stance, which on the one hand envisaged a deepening of the UOC-MP's autonomy, while on the other maintaining canonical relations with the Moscow Patriarchate. See: K. Chawryło, *Ukraińska gra patriarchy Cyryla*, 14 August 2014, OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-08-14/ukraińska-gra-patriarchy-cyryla#_ftn31 (15 March 2017).

ing part in military action against the central authorities to lay down their weapons: “The situation in eastern Ukraine is still tense. In connection with the recent incidents in the region, we call upon all those who illegally carry weapons to lay down their arms and stop the bloodshed” – said the statement by Onufriy on behalf of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, which he chaired.³⁵ The Council of Churches also called for the release of all hostages, including clergy, and for comprehensive assistance to the victims of the armed conflict. The document reaffirmed the Council’s position on the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This was called the fundamental value for the Ukrainian people. The appeal emphasised that the division of the country must be prevented, because it would be a sin against God and future generations.³⁶

In October 2014, Georgi Kovalenko, a close associate of Volodymyr who acted as the Metropolitan’s spokesman, made official comments on the participation of the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Revolution of Dignity: “The Moscow Patriarchate was absent in the Maidan. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was there. Because it is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is the church of the nation of Ukraine, while the Moscow Patriarchate remains the church of the Soviet Union”.³⁷ It can be assumed that the priest was thus expressing the aspirations of some younger elites of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, whose representatives did not feel that they were “Moscow’s people”.³⁸

Such declarations gave the appearance of uniting the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. However, the public paid great attention to symbolic behaviours of their hierarchs which contradicted their declarations. During a special session of the Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) on 8 May 2015, Metropolitan Onufriy and the bishops accompanying him did not stand for the reading of the names of 21 soldiers fighting in the east who had been awarded the title Hero of Ukraine, ten of them posthumously. The incident was widely criticised not only by the Ukrainian media, but also by followers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Later, the Metropolitan explained that with this gesture he had wanted to express his opposition to any kind of war. The refusal of entry to Ukraine to Metropolitan Hilarion on 9 May 2014 gave a certain measure of the attitude of the state authorities towards the Russian Orthodox Church and the concept of *russkij mir*. He had flown to the airport in Dnipropetrovsk (now Dnipro) to celebrate the 75th birthday of Iryney, Metropolitan

³⁵ Митрополит Черновицкий Онуфрий: *Обращаемся ко всем, кто незаконно держит в руках оружие, сложить его и прекратить кровопролитие*, 14 July 2014, <http://www.klikovo.ru/news/5753.html> (12 November 2017).

³⁶ *Prawosławny metropolita do separatystów: złożcie broń 11 lipca 2014*, <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/prawoslawny-metropolita-do-separatystow-zlozcie-bron,448875.html> (12 April 2017).

³⁷ After: M. Wawrzonek, *Prawosławie jako element kultury politycznej na współczesnej Ukrainie*, *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, 2015, vol. 5, p. 215.

³⁸ M. Wawrzonek, *Prawosławie jako element kultury politycznej na współczesnej Ukrainie*, *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, 2015, vol. 5, p. 215.

of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in that city. At passport control he was informed in writing that he was prohibited from entering Ukraine. This prompted protests from Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁹

Patriarch Kirill responded to the Ukrainian crisis relatively late, confining himself to calling for reconciliation. In a second statement, Kirill recognised Ukraine's right to national self-determination, although he did not acknowledge the imperial ambitions of which Moscow is usually accused by Ukrainian nationalists. In his sermon in Christ the Saviour Cathedral on 14 March 2014, Patriarch Kirill said: "At least 400 years ago, attempts were made to split and divide the Russian world. When we say *russkij*, we should not treat it the way our opponents do, referring to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. What we are referring to is the *russkij mir*, the great Russian civilisation that came from the Kievan baptismal font and spread across the huge expanse of Eurasia. (...) Today, there are independent states in this world and we respect their sovereignty, their readiness and desire to build independently their own national lives. But this does not mean that the realisation of this sovereignty should be accompanied by the destruction of a common, united spiritual space."⁴⁰

The absence of Patriarch Kirill during the signing ceremony of the agreement on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia on 18 March 2014 was a significant gesture, as was his declaration of 19 March stating that the Orthodox Church should resist all kinds of misunderstandings and external parties and that "the Church's borders are not determined by political preferences, ethnic differences or even state borders". As has already been mentioned, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church did not take any decisions regarding the parishes in Crimea, leaving them formally under the guidance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁴¹

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate understands that the increasing destabilisation of Ukraine and Russia's aggressive policy contribute to a growing dislike of the Orthodox Church which is associated with hierarchical dependence on Moscow, and that the idea of *russkij mir* as a geopolitical strategy of the Russian authorities will lead to disputes and the deepening of religious divisions. The Kremlin's policy is clearly detrimental to the image and interests of the Orthodox Church, and the only thing that the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate can do in this situation is try to soften their image. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict probably led to a drop in the number of people declaring their affiliation with the UOC-MP, or at least, this is what can be concluded from the answers given by respondents to a sociological study conducted by the Ra-

³⁹ МИД РФ требует от Киева объяснений из-за провокации в отношении митрополита Илариона, <http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/05/12/mid-rf-trebuat-ot-kieva-obyasneniy-izza-provokatsii-v-otnoshenii-mitropolita-ilariona.html> (12 April 2017).

⁴⁰ Р. Лункин, *Украинская революция и христианские церкви (СМИ)*, 31 July 2014, <http://www.invictory.com/news/story-52360>.

⁴¹ Ibidem.

zumkov Centre (compare the figures for 2013 and 2016 given in the table). On the other hand, the survey shows that in the same period the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate recorded an increase in the number of its declared followers.⁴²

Table 1

Which Orthodox church do you identify with? (% of respondents declaring themselves to be Orthodox Christians)

	UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UAOC	Simply Orthodox	Don't know
2000	9.2	12.1	1.3	38.6	4.6
2005	10.6	14	0.8	33.4	1.9
2010	23.6	15.1	0.9	25.9	1.6
2013	19.6	18.3	0.8	28.8	2.5
2014	17.4	22.4	0.7	28.1	1.4
2016	15	25	1.8	21.2	2

Source: Survey by the Razumkov Centre, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1122

Russia has been losing its formal and informal influence in Ukraine. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church are not readily welcomed even by the followers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁴³ The Russian Orthodox Church ought to show that it is a neutral institution with regard to the conflict in Ukraine, and that its aim is the good of the religious community. Roman Lunkin, however, points to the major changes that have taken place in the Russian Orthodox Church in the wake of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Bearing in mind that all of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine declared their readiness to defend sovereignty and civic values⁴⁴ and that the dynamics of political change may lead to a gradual emancipation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,⁴⁵ the

⁴² There was no question on religious affiliation in the 2001 census. Therefore, the number of followers of particular denominations can be estimated only on the basis of surveys. The Razumkov Centre research (http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1122) has been conducted for several years. This kind of survey must serve in place of official lists. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine does not carry out similar research. However, churches submit annual reports on numbers of parishes, religious orders, seminaries and clergy. Дані Департаменту у справах релігій та національностей Міністерства культури України, <https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/statistics/ukr2017/6726>.

⁴³ For example, Kirill did not attend the funeral of UOC-MP Metropolitan Volodymyr in July 2014 for fear of protests of its followers; Patriarch Kirill also did not attend the anniversary celebration of the Baptism of Rus'; Metropolitan Hilarion was not allowed to enter Ukraine. Cases of whole parishes accepting the jurisdiction of the UOC-KP were also reported.

⁴⁴ Р. Лункин, *Крушение русского мира. Взгляд из Москвы*, 21 May 2014 (30 January 2018), <http://www.internetsobor.org/index.php/stati/roman-lunkin-krushenie-russkogo-mira-vzglyad-iz-moskvy>.

⁴⁵ K. Jarzyńska, *Ukraińska gra patriarchy Cyryla*, OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, no. 144, 14 August 2014, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-08-14/ukrainska-gra-patriarchy-cyryla>.

Orthodox Church in Moscow is gradually revising its attitude towards *rususkij mir*. These changes are difficult for observers to grasp, as the Ukrainian and Russian media – albeit for different reasons – portray the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution which supports the Russian President and whose voice accords with the political decisions of the state authorities. According to Lunkin, the Orthodox Church in Russia was forced to distance itself from the policy of *rususkij mir* in “Putin’s form”. The reason for this was the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which destroyed *rususkij mir* in the form originally understood by Kirill (fraternal nations). Since 2014, the idea of *rususkij mir* in its new form has been mainly confined to Russia. In his dealings with Ukraine, Kirill has avoided the rhetoric of the unity of civilisation, the danger of the ideas of Western liberalism, and the like.

At the end of 2017, a separate chapter on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was added to the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Bishops’ Council of that Church. This section of the document states that the centre of control of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is in Kiev.⁴⁶ The Ukrainian media present the action taken by the Orthodox Church in Russia in a negative light, painting it as another attempt by the Russian Orthodox Church to gain formal control over the increasingly emancipated Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Questions of trust have arisen since the 2014 crisis. Before the Revolution of Dignity, three churches – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church – were identified with the national idea. Today, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate has particularly strengthened its position, and Patriarch Filaret, its head, takes advantage of the presence of his Church in the Maidan and the emotional speeches made by the hierarchs associated with him or the help provided for the army. According to research by the Rating Sociological Group (30 April 2016), Patriarch Filaret (UOC-KP) is considered by Ukrainians to be the most trusted religious leader, with a rating of 40%, followed by Pope Francis on 35%.⁴⁷ When asked who they trusted the least, 39% of respondents indicated Kirill (ROC) and 25% chose Metropolitan Onufriy (UOC-MP).⁴⁸

⁴⁶ In Ukraine, mention of the name of the head of the UOC-MP (in this case Metropolitan Onufriy) after the name of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill sometimes aroused controversy. Theoretically, this is generally accepted church law, but after 2014 many priests deliberately omitted mention of Patriarch Kirill so as not to irritate their parishioners with the words “Moscow” and “Kirill”. Р. Лункин, „Українська глава” в уставі РПЦ, 5 December 2017, <http://polit.ru/article/2017/12/05/upc/>.

⁴⁷ It should be remembered that the Pope is also the head of the Greek Catholic Church, which is identified with the national idea.

⁴⁸ According to data from the Rating Sociological Group, 30 April 2016, after: М. Коваленко, Ю. Каздобіна, *Актуальний стан православних церков України в умовах війни: надії на об’єднання, утиски на Донбасі та суспільно-політична позиція*, УНЦПД, №14/739, 28 July 2015, http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81:aktualnij-stan-pravoslavnih-cerkov-ukra-ni-v-umovah-v-yni-nad-na-ob-dnannya-utiski-na-donbas-ta-susp-lno-pol-tichna-pozic-ya&catid=8&lang=ua&Itemid=201 (30 April 2016).

PLACES OF WORSHIP AND POLITICS

In the last year of his rule, President Yanukovich and his parliamentary majority backed the attempts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to take over buildings of key importance for Orthodoxy. One example was the Pochayiv Lavra. The Lavra lies within a “sea of Ukrainian-ness”, being the westernmost large religious centre of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. It was even described as “*rususkij mir* in the centre of Banderism”.⁴⁹ The symbolic significance of the Lavra is also related to the fact that it was a functioning church throughout the entire Soviet period. Monks of non-Ukrainian descent used to be sent there, which caused the church to be perceived as a bastion of the conservative Orthodox clergy and a guarantor of the pro-Moscow policy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. From the point of view of the geography of religion, this region is the place where all the Orthodox churches meet. The Lavra is of paramount importance as a pilgrimage site, a place of life and ministry for over 100 monks, and an important point on the map of seminaries. Every year the school for clergy produces another generation educated in line with a particular vision.

In 2003, the Yanukovich government issued Regulation No. 438-p “On the Exclusion of the Buildings of the Holy Dormition Pochayiv Lavra from the Kremenchuk-Pochayiv State Historical-Architectural Reserve”,⁵⁰ under which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate could use the Lavra free of charge for 49 years. The general opinion was that it was equivalent to the state transferring the buildings and monuments of the Lavra to that Church. This was strongly opposed by the authorities of the Ternopil region, and this opposition gained momentum especially after Viktor Yanukovich became president. During the Revolution of Dignity, the Lavra was a place of protests, and there were even attempts by members of other churches to take it over. It was believed that Yanukovich might have taken refuge within the Lavra walls, and that the monks were printing anti-Ukrainian publications for the separatists and for the purposes of the hybrid war. Following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, steps were taken to annul the Regulation. Members of the Ternopil Oblast Council unanimously approved a document requesting the Council of Ministers to restore the Lavra’s status of a national historical museum.⁵¹

The most important place of worship for Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the Pechersk Lavra in Kiev, classified as a national monument of the highest class. In mid-2013, the Ukrainian government handed over about 75 structures and buildings of the Pechersk Lavra to the monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate for use free of charge. A relevant draft regulation of the Council of Ministers was

⁴⁹ Г. Терещук, *Почайівська лавра – «русский мир» посеред «бандерівців»*, 7 July 2014, <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25448715.html> (12 March 2017).

⁵⁰ *Про виключення зі складу Кременецько-Почайівського державного історико-архітектурного заповідника споруд Почайівської Свято-Успенської лаври*, www.zakon.gov.ua.

⁵¹ *Тернопільські депутати вимагають в Яценюка повернути Почайівську Лавру державі*, <http://zz.te.ua/ternopilski-deputaty-vymahayut-povernuty-pochajivsku-lavru-derzhavi/>.

adopted by the government at its meeting on 11 July 2013. Culture minister Leonid Novochatko gave an assurance that the permission for use concerned only the Lower Lavra, with no transfer of ownership, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate would bear the maintenance costs of the facilities.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER CHURCHES

On 12 February 2016, Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis met at the airport in Havana. The outcomes of the meeting, according to Sergey Chapnin, are difficult to predict, and the media impact was too short-lived to satisfy Kirill. Paragraph 26 of the Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill states that the heads of the two Churches deplore the hostility in Ukraine, express grief for the victims of the conflict, and call for reconciliation and ending of the humanitarian crisis. Both parties said that they hoped the schism between Orthodox churches in Ukraine might be overcome through existing canonical norms.

Opinions on how to interpret this document are sharply divided. Criticism was made that Greek Catholics were not directly mentioned, and the declaration is very cautious about identifying the parties to the conflict. According to Archbishop Sviatoslav, the document echoes the Russian propaganda claiming that the conflict in eastern Ukraine was of an internal nature.⁵² Emphasising the importance of canon law in overcoming the divisions undermines churches other than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch was prepared in secret, with only five people, those most faithful to the Patriarch, taking part in the negotiations. The Patriarch had not said a word about it, even during the Bishops' Council that had met the week before the meeting in Havana. Thus, he showed his Episcopate that he was ready to disregard canon law and, acting on behalf of the whole Orthodox Church, did not have to respect the decisions of the Bishops' Council. According to Chapnin, none of the bishops dared to voice their opinion in public, but privately they criticised the Patriarch's attitude. Kirill's actions reinforced the model of governance of the Russian Orthodox Church that resembles an "archaic form of papacy". The Patriarch met with the Pope almost exclusively to demonstrate his position as the "world leader" of Eastern Christianity, which is indeed a role that the head of the Russian Orthodox Church claims. At the same time, he diminished the role of Constantinople.⁵³ This strategy was underpinned by Kirill's absence from the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church held in Crete from 19 to 26 June 2016. The Council sat with-

⁵² М. Коваленко, Ю. Каздобіна, *Актуальний стан православних церков України в умовах війни: надії на об'єднання, утиски на Донбасі та суспільно-політична позиція*, УНЦПД, №14/739, 28 July 2015, http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81:aktualniy-stand-pravoslavnih-cerkov-ukra-ni-v-umovah-v-yni-nad-na-ob-dnannya-utiski-na-donbas-ta-susp-lno-pol-tichna-pozic-ya&catid=8&lang=ua&Itemid=201 (30 April 2016).

⁵³ *Jakie rezultaty po ubieglorocznym spotkaniu Franciszka z Cyrylem?*, <https://ekai.pl/jakie-rezultaty-po-ubieglorocznym-spotkaniu-franciszka-z-cyrylem/> (23 November 2017).

out Russia, Bulgaria and Georgia, which ruled out the chance of working out a way to proclaim autocephaly for Ukraine and once again discredited the Patriarchate in Constantinople.

A few days before the Council in June 2016, the Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The deputies said that due to the conflict with Russia, Ukrainian Orthodox Christians had rejected the religious sovereignty of Moscow. They asked the Patriarch of Constantinople to pronounce the act of 1686 invalid because it was adopted in breach of the Orthodox Church's holy canons. By that act, jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev, which was part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, was passed to Moscow. The appeal was supported by 245 deputies in the 450-member Verkhovna Rada. The Rada also appealed to Patriarch Bartholomew to convene, under his aegis, a Ukrainian unifying council which would unify all Orthodox Churches in Ukraine.

In the face of the events of the Revolution of Dignity, followed by the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill, under whose sovereignty the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine remains, had difficulty in defining his position. On the one hand, direct support for the actions of the government in Kiev was conducive to breaking ties with the authorities in the Kremlin (which could have had further economic and prestige consequences for both the Russian authorities and the Orthodox Church itself); on the other hand, open condemnation or admission that Russia was the cause of the conflict could result in the further intensification of emancipation processes making the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into an independent "national" Church. Both options might have resulted in the loss of significant influence. Patriarch Kirill recognised the post-Maidan authorities in Ukraine and extended his congratulations to Petro Poroshenko after his presidential election victory.⁵⁴ This was seen as having certain undertones and reflecting a hope at least for Poroshenko's neutrality with respect to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁵⁵

The situation in Ukraine has clearly shown how important an instrument of power is the Russian Orthodox Church in the so-called *russkij mir*. From Kirill's point of view, passivity or neutrality, expected by both the Russian Orthodox Church and indeed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, was the most sensible position. Such a stance was perceived negatively by a large part of Ukrainian society. In the face of increased civic activity among society as a whole and among

⁵⁴ Poroshenko did not conceal his strong attachment to the UOC-MP. His religiousness is seen as authentic and not – as in the case of Yanukovich, who favoured the UOC-MP – as opportunistic. He is believed to have played a role in the designation of Onufriy as Metropolitan of Kiev. Poroshenko spent his youth in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Nowadays, however, Moldovans and Romanians associate not only with the UOC-MP, but also with the UOC-KP. For more see: П. Кралюк, *Церква Порошенка*, "Волинські новини", 28 травня 2014, after: Religious Information Service of Ukraine, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/monitoring/society_digest/56595.

⁵⁵ П. Кралюк, *Церква Порошенка*, "Волинські новини", 28 травня 2014, after: Religious Information Service of Ukraine, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/monitoring/society_digest/565956 (17 April 2017).

other Churches, this attitude was sometimes judged to be behaviour unworthy of the clergy.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is internally diverse, and generational differences are also noticeable. Part of the older generation has strong ties with the hierarchs in Russia, and displays openly hostile attitudes towards the Ukrainian Church's full autocephaly. The younger generation, often not remembering the Soviet era, sees in formal independence from Moscow an opportunity for its own development and that of the Orthodox Church as an institution. These trends have become particularly vivid in the last three years.

As it seems, internal divisions are not strong enough to cause a split in the canonical Orthodox Church, but they have an effect on its image and weaken its structures. Currently, the "autocephalists" represent a more pragmatic and progressive option. A manifestation of the centrifugal tendencies was the convening in February 2014 by the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate of a special commission for dialogue with other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, which was to consider the prospects for unifying the Orthodox Churches of different jurisdictions and creating a national Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarchate. These prospects, however, seemed quite distant.

In spite of attempts to bring order to the mosaic of Ukrainian Churches, overcoming the divisions will undoubtedly be a difficult and lengthy process. The prospect of creating a "national church" seems distant. Although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, which aspires to this title, became canonical on being granted the *tomos*, though remaining only a metropolis, it still has organisational and image problems in the Orthodox world. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church has entirely lost its identity. The Greek Catholic Church, though local in character, also aspires to be a national church.

The religious factor plays a unique role in Ukraine; the Churches are directly involved in politics, and the religious affiliation of public figures is discussed during elections. Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, the overthrow of Yanukovich, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass made the Church a focal point of political processes. Today's world view of the Ukrainian religious communities has been shaped by the "Maidan theology" shared by all,⁵⁶ which grew out of the Revolution of Freedom and Dignity. During the Maidan, various Churches consolidated their positions, which was reflected in the statements of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations.⁵⁷ Council members are in agreement with regard to Ukraine's European integration, the need to protect the country's sovereignty and integrity, acknowledgement of Russia's aggression, and the importance of demo-

⁵⁶ A term used by R. Lunkin. С. Солодовник, *Україна: православие против православия*, 16 June 2015, https://www.religion.in.ua/zmi/foreign_zmi/29456-ukraina-pravoslavie-protiv-pravoslaviya.html.

⁵⁷ The Council was established in 1996, and became more active during Yushchenko's presidency. The Council includes all Orthodox jurisdictions, Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics and a number of Protestant structures (Lutherans, Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists).

cratic values for the country. The Churches recognise the right of the people to oppose authorities that resort to violence.

In the vast majority of cases, Ukrainian clergy representing both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate display a patriotic attitude towards the Ukrainian state. There were, of course, numerous cases where the Orthodox Church supported the separatists, but a negative moral evaluation of the policy of the Russian authorities and appeals to stop further escalation of the conflict prevailed. Despite its relatively high and stable level of trust, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine is still not exploiting its potential to build civic society. The Revolution of Dignity revealed the existence of this potential, but now the Church is again on the defensive.

Roman Lunkin described the changes in Russian society and its mindset using the metaphor of Shakespearian theatre, which is full of scenery and props, but all put on the stage at the same time, so that each troupe is forced to play in front of its own scenery as well as that left by previous actors. The props of the Third Rome, the USSR, *russkij mir*, landed gentry, “Ruthenian Orthodox civilisation”, Komsomol songs and liturgical songs appear simultaneously and side by side. “Finding the truth underneath the layers of decoration and make-up is difficult, but it is possible.”⁵⁸

THE TOMOS AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF UKRAINE

The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople paid no regard to the existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church as schismatic structures within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. At the same time, it did not accept the term “canonical territory”, as used by the Russian Orthodox Church, according to which the area of former Russia and the Soviet Union is to remain under the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchs. A turning point came in April 2018, when the Phanar⁵⁹ accepted the petition for autocephaly filed by both non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, and declared that it would examine it “as the true Mother Church”. The source of the change in the attitude of Patriarch Bartholomew I can most probably be seen in Moscow’s thwarting of an undertaking that was of great importance to him – the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete in 2016, convened for the first time in a thousand years. The boycott of the Council by Russian, Georgian and Bulgarian delegations and the Patriarchate of Antioch⁶⁰ deprived it of its universality and made it an ordinary conference.⁶¹ The Orthodox

⁵⁸ Р. Лункин, *Крушение русского мира. Взгляд из Москвы*, 21 May 2014, <http://www.internet-sobor.org/index.php/stati/roman-lunkin-krushenie-russkogo-mira-vzglyad-iz-moskvy> (31 January 2018).

⁵⁹ Phanar, a district of Istanbul, common name for the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

⁶⁰ One of the four ancient patriarchates, today based in Damascus, and therefore closely dependent on the Syrian authorities, which in turn are strongly dependent on the Kremlin.

⁶¹ T. Olszański, *Kijów czeka na autokefalię*, 18 June 2018, <https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/kijow-czeka-na-autokefalie-153467>

Church in Moscow, with the participation of the state authorities, increased its efforts to form a coalition against Ukrainian attempts to be granted autocephaly. However, in procedural terms, the opinion of other Orthodox Churches is not binding on Patriarch Bartholomew I – it was he, as head of the Mother Church, who could take a sovereign decision.

On 19 April 2018, at the request of President Petro Poroshenko, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine supported the petition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Constantinople for the granting of autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. This decision raised many concerns in Ukraine, as the successful completion of the process was seen as inevitable, and at the same time the proclamation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Particular Orthodox Church (*Ukrainska Pomisna Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva*) might lead to another wave of religious conflicts. Once again, it was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate that was to find itself in a difficult situation. It was expected that some of the faithful and priests would remain loyal to Moscow, the Moscow Patriarchate would support that group, while the Ukrainian authorities would strongly promote the development of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Particular Orthodox Church.

The efforts of the Ukrainian authorities to have autocephaly granted by the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I, and the anticipated religious conflicts, were of great political significance as they were expected to increase, at least in theory, President Poroshenko's chances of re-election in 2019. His power base counted on a rise in popularity among the patriotic electorate, whereas the opponents of autocephaly were expected to support pro-Russian parties, which would help to put a pro-Russian politician (Yurij Boyko, as then anticipated) into the run-off vote. Such an arrangement would favour the current president.⁶² The establishment of a Kiev Patriarchate, recognised by the Orthodox world (except for Moscow and its satellites) as canonical, was supposed to be a success that would secure another term in office. Poroshenko assumed that it would allow him to portray himself as the “unifier and patron of the nation” and that other competitors from the patriotic camp, with Yulia Tymoshenko at the forefront, would not be able to challenge his role and determination in the process of gaining independence for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In his election campaign, Poroshenko used the slogan “Army, language and faith!” which emphasised the need for patriotic unity and a united identity, and the granting of the *tomos*⁶³ became one of the priorities in the last year or so of his presidency.

The reasoning underlying the decision of the Patriarch of Constantinople to grant *tomos* was made public in April 2018. When Kievan Rus', the forerunner of Ukraine, Belarus and north-western Russia, adopted Christianity, the Kiev metropolis was es-

⁶² The elections in March/April 2019 produced a surprise result – Volodymyr Zelensky won a place in the run-off vote, in which he defeated Petro Poroshenko.

⁶³ A *tomos* is a decree of particular importance for the system and structure of the Orthodox Church, issued by the patriarch.

tablished and quickly received autocephaly (canonical self-governance). From 1299 to 1458, metropolitans of Kiev and all Rus' resided in Vladimir on the Klyazma River and then in Moscow. In 1458, the Moscow metropolis announced its separation from Kiev, and in 1589 the Moscow metropolitans were made patriarchs. A hundred years later, against the will of the Ecumenical Patriarch (he was made to give his consent *ex post*; it was revoked in 1924), the patriarchs of Moscow took control over the metropolis of Kiev, and this state of affairs persisted until our times. The Ecumenical Patriarch had no doubt that from the canonical point of view the Orthodox Church in Constantinople and not that in Moscow was the Mother Church for Kiev.⁶⁴

In its decision of 11 October 2018, the Council of the Ecumenical Patriarchate restored the Kiev Metropolis to the jurisdiction of Constantinople, but at that time did not grant it autocephaly. This had to be preceded by the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Synod also lifted the anathema (excommunication) imposed on the heads of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and by confirming the canonical nature of these two communities, also confirmed, among other things, the validity of the sacraments administered by them.⁶⁵ The Council meeting was attended by representatives of all three Orthodox Churches (42 from the UOC-KP and 12 from the UAOC, namely all of the bishops) and two bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (out of 73 currently active). The Council approved the metropolitan statute and elected the superior, whose title would be Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine.

The establishment of a new Orthodox Church of Ukraine, independent from Russia and yet fully recognised, was announced on 15 December 2018 at Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kiev. Representatives of the previously unrecognised Ukrainian Orthodox Churches who gathered there elected 39-year-old Epiphanius (Dumenko)⁶⁶ as the primate of an independent autocephalous church.

⁶⁴ The Synod's announcement of April 2018, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=gr&id=2475&tla=gr>. See: T. A. Olszański, *Walka o kanoniczną samodzielność ukraińskiego prawosławia*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2018-06-13/walka-o-samodzielosc-kanoniczna-ukraińskiego-prawosławia>; <https://hromadske.radio/v-odyn-klik/tomos-dlya-ukrayiny-istoriya-perebig-podiy-i-struktura-ukrayinskoyi-pomisnoyi-cerkvy>.

⁶⁵ T. A. Olszański, *Konstantynopol: autokefalia dla Ukrainy*, 17 October 2018, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2018-10-12/uznanie-przez-patriarchat-ekumeniczny-niezaleznosci-prawoslawnej>; <https://hromadske.radio/v-odyn-klik/tomos-dlya-ukrayiny-istoriya-perebig-podiy-i-struktura-ukrayinskoyi-pomisnoyi-cerkvy>.

⁶⁶ Serhij Dumenko was born on 3 February 1979 in the district of Odessa, but he moved in his early childhood to Chernivtsi. In 1996 he joined the theological academy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate in Kiev. In 2003 he defended his PhD thesis in theology, and he studied philosophy at the University of Athens in 2006–2007. He was a lecturer at the Kiev Theological Academy. He took religious vows in 2007 and was ordained a priest a year later; in 2009 he was made a bishop. At that time he also became secretary to Patriarch Filaret, and in 2010 he was appointed Dean of the Kiev Theological Academy. In 2012, he was appointed Metropolitan of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky and Boryspil, and in June 2013 governor and guardian of the throne of Patriarch Filaret with the right of succession. He is a rep-

Metropolitan Onufriy, as the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, unambiguously declared his loyalty to Moscow. Both the Kremlin and the Moscow Orthodox Church responded in very strong terms to the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, warning of the most serious split in Eastern Christianity since the Great Schism of 1054. Until that time, the only Orthodox Church in Ukraine considered canonical had been the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. By granting the *tomos* of autocephaly to the unified uncanonical Orthodox churches, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople had questioned the historical and legal foundations of Moscow's religious sovereignty as the Mother Church over Ukraine. On 12 October, two months before the Council, Bartholomew I sent a letter to Onufriy, informing him that the moment the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was unified, he would no longer be the Metropolitan of Kiev. Should he insist on retaining that title, his actions would be considered uncanonical.⁶⁷ After the election of Epiphanius, Vladimir Legoyda, spokesman for the Moscow Patriarchate, stated that "the authority of Metropolitan Onufriy remains in force; today there is one metropolitan in Ukraine, as it should be according to the canons of the Church."⁶⁸ The Russian Orthodox Church stated that the decisions of the unification council held in Ukraine were not binding. Also, the Orthodox Churches in Poland,⁶⁹ Serbia and Syria officially sided with Russia.

On 31 December 2018, Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, called on the Patriarch of Constantinople to abandon his efforts towards canonical recognition of the new Orthodox Church in Ukraine. "Retreat now from communion with the schismatics and refrain from participating in the political gamble of their legalisation", he wrote in a letter to Bartholomew I.⁷⁰ Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the "Constantinople provocation" and Washington for "directly and publicly backing it." On the same day the matter became the subject of a special meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and Dmitry Peskov, press secretary for the Russian President, announced that Russia would "defend the interests of the Orthodox", which, however, bearing in mind the importance of the Patriarch of Constantinople in the Orthodox world, would not be an easy matter for Russian politicians.⁷¹

Despite the formal independence of the Orthodox Church from the state, Petro Poroshenko actively participated in mediation, decision-making and the Council itself. When the proceedings were concluded, he and the new Metropolitan Epipha-

representative of the new generation, not tarnished by cooperation with the KGB, educated in independent Ukraine, and at the same time a continuator of Filaret's work.

⁶⁷ B. Bodalska, *Tomos dla Cerkwi Prawosławnej Ukrainy*, 7 January 2019, <https://www.euractiv.pl/section/polityka-zagraniczna/news/tomos-dla-cerkwi-prawoslawnej-ukrainy/>

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ Interview with Metropolitan Sawa of Poland, W. Romanowski, *Autokefalia tak, ale zgodna z prawem*, *Polityka*, 6 January 2019, <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1777214,1,autokefalia-tak-ale-zgodna-z-prawem.read>.

⁷⁰ B. Bodalska, *Tomos dla Cerkwi ...*

⁷¹ Ibidem.

nius came out on to the square in front of Saint Sophia Cathedral, where he attended a rally chaired by culture minister Yevhen Nyshchuk. Once the Minister had formally presented Metropolitan Epiphanius, President Poroshenko gave a speech in which he declared the end of religious subordination to Moscow and the existence of a “Putin-free church”.⁷²

The *tomos* granting autocephaly to the Kiev Metropolis was presented in Constantinople on 6 January 2019, on Christmas Eve (according to the Julian calendar). Since unification and the granting of the *tomos*, the new church has been named the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (*Pravoslavna Tserkva Ukrainy*), which is intended to emphasise its universality for all those living in Ukraine. Avoidance of the adjective “Ukrainian” is supposed to stress the inclusive, unifying and supra-ethnic nature of the Church.

Contrary to widespread expectations in Ukraine, the unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine was not given the status of patriarchate, but only that of metropolis. It is not clear when and whether it will be elevated to the status of patriarchate. Modern Orthodoxy does not create new patriarchates. Moreover, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople will probably not wish to further antagonise the Orthodox world. The *tomos* issue is also complicated by the ambitions of Filaret, incumbent patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, who elevated Kiev to the status of patriarchate himself without the consent of Moscow or Constantinople. Bartholomew I probably did not approve of him as a candidate for Metropolitan. Filaret became an “honorary patriarch” and has openly protested against the downgrading of the Orthodox Church. The convening of a “local council” in St. Volodymyr’s Cathedral in Kiev on 20 June 2019 was an indication of his ambitions.⁷³ Only two bishops out of the forty invited attended the council. Filaret announced that he did not recognise the subordination of the Ukrainian church to Constantinople, and that the Kiev Patriarchate established by him had not been dissolved and all its assets were still held within the existing structure.⁷⁴ Filaret believes that the hierarchs were deceived and Constantinople did not reveal the details of the *tomos*, for example, those concerning the creation of a Kiev metropolis. In Filaret’s view, Ukraine deserves the status of patriarchate, but in the current situation the prospects of its creation are very doubtful.

⁷² T. Olszański, *Historyczne zjednoczenie Kościołów prawosławnych Ukrainy*, OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) Commentaries, 17 December 2019, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2018-12-17/historyczne-zjednoczenie-kosciolow-prawoslawnych-ukrainy>.

⁷³ Почесний Патріарх Філарет розсилає священнослужителям запрошення на свій Собор, 17 June 2019, https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/76174/; «Якби знав про домовленості між Філаретом та Епіфанієм – не пішов би на Собор»: інтерв’ю з митрополитом Драбинком, <https://hromadske.ua/posts/domovlenosti-mizh-filaretom-epifaniyem-ta-poroshenkom-mogli-buti-ale-pro-nih-niht-ne-znaye-mitropolit-drabinko>.

⁷⁴ Собор Филарета восстановил УПЦ КП со всеми ее структурами и собственностью и раскритиковал текст Томоса, 20 June 2019; https://risu.org.ua/ru/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/76218/.

In response to Filaret's actions, the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church convened on 24 June 2019, distanced itself from the actions of its Honorary Patriarch, who, as a matter of fact, had not attended the synod ("for no valid reason"), deprived Filaret of the opportunity to run parishes and monasteries, denied him the right to manage the revenues of the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and excluded the clergy participating in the synod convened by Filaret from the episcopate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Thus, all parishes and property related to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate came under the management of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The synod decided that the meeting convened by Filaret five days earlier had not been a synod and that its provisions had no legal force. It was confirmed that only the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is the legitimate, canonical and historical successor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and Honorary Patriarch Filaret can clear his doubts by asking the synod through Metropolitan Epiphanius⁷⁵.

The new structure is suffering damage to its reputation, and a potential conflict and schism most certainly encourage criticism, especially from Russia. Even if Filaret is supported by certain circles, the *tomos* cannot be formally withdrawn.⁷⁶

Despite the obvious influence of the state on the new Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Epiphanius tried to keep his distance during the election campaign, deliberately avoiding associations with the term "Poroshenko's Church". In the last weeks before the election, Epiphanius stressed that there was no question of interference by the authorities in Church matters, and no desire to make it a national Church. The hierarchy tried to encourage participation in the election, but he refrained from supporting any particular candidate.

In Ukraine there is a large group of believers who describe themselves as "simply Orthodox", who either ignore the rift between the Orthodox Churches or do not understand its causes and consequences. There is also a large group of "cultural Orthodox believers", that is, those for whom confessional affiliation is primarily or solely a part of social identity. They pay little attention to regular practices and sacraments. The most important task for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will be to win over the parishes remaining under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁷⁷ In the first six months, around 500 such parishes moved to the

⁷⁵ Press- release on the results of the session of the Holy Synod of the UOC (OCU), <https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/press-release-on-the-results-of-the-session-of-the-holy-synod-of-the-uoc-ocu/24.06.2019>.

⁷⁶ Почесний Патріарх Філарет розсилає священнослужителям запрошення на свій Собор, 17 June 2019, https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/76174/.

⁷⁷ Statistics for March 2019 show that up to 500 pastoral institutions previously linked to Moscow had moved to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. A. Szczupak, Kandydatów wielu, wyzwań również. Religijne dylematy kampanii wyborczej Petra Poroszenki, *Nowa Europa Wschodnia*, 30 March 2019, <http://www.new.org.pl/6005-kandydatow-wielu-wyznan-rowniez-religijne-dylematy-kampanii-wyborczej-petra-poroszenki>.

Orthodox Church of Ukraine.⁷⁸ Although it is a simplification and generalisation to say so, those of the faithful with national and patriotic preferences will probably join the new Church (or possibly the Greek Catholic Church), while others – those with anti-patriotic (anti-Kiev) attitudes – are more likely to remain within their existing Church.

At the turn of 2018 and 2019, by the decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and with the support of the Ukrainian political authorities, a new reality became fact in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which does not mean that the split has been overcome. This is only the beginning of a long process which may cause many conflicts related to the building of camps within the structures of the world's Orthodoxy, conflicts within Ukraine and in Ukrainian–Russian relations. There will be two hostile, equal and comparably strong structures in Ukraine, politically backed by Ukraine and Russia, and this will draw those countries into conflicts over their religious structures and the wealth that their communities possess. Thus, instead of a gradual move of the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to a new structure, one can expect an increase in instability and a gradual loss of the Church's authority. The individual ambitions of hierarchs and different visions of the Church's future do not further unification. At this stage, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will rely primarily on the potential of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and this fact in turn will hinder the transfer of bishops and priests associated with the Moscow Patriarchate.

The future of the unification process is also dependent on finding a solution to disputes concerning the use of sacred buildings, especially in those places where there is only one temple, and also in the case of buildings of key historical and religious significance (such as the Kiev Pechersk Lavra and the Pochayiv Lavra). It is to be expected that there will be conflicts in which significant roles will be played both by the Ukrainian Orthodox communities, by political circles wishing to maintain a relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate, and by groups centred around monasteries, Metropolitan Agatangel of Odessa, or the Orthodox laity.

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Keywords: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, political culture, Ukraine, church–state relations, national church, *tomos* of autonomy

⁷⁸ Detailed data are collected and plotted on an interactive map: https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1XQR0sfHFFiiXyGiVYq11mNylJ9fFPdnh&ll=49.4742385410442%2C28.04668874999993&z=7&fbclid=IwAR0tZD7PJmR8Fz4pQJG_EZtiz1E_md2nc6dOanWsURfdlejLCH512LJu-o. See: <https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/exclusive/review/74069/>.

ABSTRACT

The aim of the article is to analyse the place and importance of the Orthodox Church in the society and political culture of Ukraine after 2013. The new political realities following the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created new challenges for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Particularly important is the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church's authority over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

At the turn of 2018 and 2019, by a decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and with the support of the Ukrainian political authorities, a new reality became fact in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (as a metropolis) does not mean that the split has been overcome. There will be two hostile, equal and comparably strong structures in Ukraine, politically backed by Ukraine and Russia, and this will draw those countries into conflicts over their religious structures and the wealth that their communities possess. At this stage, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will rely primarily on the potential of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and this fact in turn will hinder the transfer of bishops and priests associated with the Moscow Patriarchate. The rift will be difficult to repair.

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POLISH SPORT UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE SWASTIKA A HISTORIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

The history of Second World War (WW2) is one of the leading research themes in modern historiography. In the early 1970s, the German historian Werner Maser identified over 100,000 research publications on WW2.¹ Since then, this number has significantly increased. The history of WW2 is investigated not only by historians but also by lawyers, sociologists, political scientists, economists, statisticians, medical scientists and cultural anthropologists. There are two predominant areas in this research: 1) military and political issues and 2) genocide. Within their scope, researchers tackle various aspects of the war, which are viewed from an increasingly distant time perspective. As new sources are still being discovered, historians are gaining better insights into a wide range of issues relating to WW2 on the global, continental, national and regional scales. There is an increasing number of interdisciplinary and comparative publications, some of which can even surprise their readers with unconventional approaches. In Polish historiography, a good example of this trend is research by Jerzy Holzer. This historian of European renown views WW2 “predominantly as a tragedy which unites rather than divides European nations”. Obviously, as Holzer argues, this should not translate into:

covering up the truth about the countries or nations from which the initial stimuli leading to tragedy came and either attributing blame to everybody or attributing equal blame. There were those who set the crime machine in motion and there were those who operated it. There were those who became infected with hate and sought revenge, often to compensate their own suffering or the suffering of their nearest and dearest. Some spread the plague across Europe whereas others became infected with it and kept spreading it; some others, however, became impervious to it.²

For years, Polish historians have focused their research potential on the fate of Poles and Poland in 1939-1945. The need for conducting this research derives from the scope of crimes committed against the Polish people, including the genocide against Polish Jews, as well as the enormous material damage to all sectors of the

¹ W. Maser, *Hitlers Briefe und Notizen. Sein Weltbild in handschriftlichen Dokumenten*, Düsseldorf 1973.

² J. Holzer, *Europejska tragedia XX wieku. II wojna światowa*, Warsaw 2005, pp. 8-9.

economy and culture. The research on the history of Poland and the Polish people during WW2 includes a wide range of aspects and concerns the entire history of Polish territory as well as all areas of the activity of Poles who remained outside their home country in the war period.

In providing an overview of the Polish historiographical works on WW2, a key factor that should be considered is the time when particular studies were conducted and when their results were published. According to Andrzej Feliks Grabski, in communist Poland research on the 1939-1945 period:

encountered insurmountable difficulties which concerned politically sensitive issues, especially the assessment of the Soviet policy. A breakthrough did not come until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the green light was given to publications that defied the previous official interpretation of the Polish history of that period and shed new light on Polish military activity during World War II and the history of the Polish Underground State.³

After 1989, Polish researchers in modern times gained much better access to archive materials, and state censorship was lifted. No doubt, these factors led to increased research and resulted in the publications of numerous monographs, biographies, synthetic works, source materials, memoirs and diaries. Also, a great number of foreign publications were translated into Polish, including many classical historiographical works devoted to modern times.

Having been given freedom to conduct research on Poland's modern history, after 1989, historians were able to verify many previous findings and reinterpret many claims. They were also free to address new issues and ask bold research questions. A good case in point is the Holocaust and the Polish-Jewish relations in WW2.⁴ The works published by the Polish Centre for Holocaust Research are among the greatest achievements of Polish historiography in modern times. The Centre's most recent publication, *Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski* [Night continues. The fate of Jews in selected counties of Poland under occupation],⁵ on the one hand has enjoyed great popularity among readers, but on the other it has aroused strong emotions in Poland. This is not surprising as this source-based monograph explicitly shows the scope of Poles' involvement in the extermination of their Jewish fellow citizens (on a much larger scale than it was previously assumed by both ordinary people and historiographers). As the book's reviewer Marcin Zaremba put it, this two-volume monograph is the result of "the most extensive research in the field of modern history".⁶

³ A. F. Grabski, *Zarys historii historiografii polskiej*, Poznań 2003, p. 227.

⁴ P. Forecki, *Od Shoah do strachu. Spory o polsko-żydowską przeszłość i pamięć w debatach publicznych*, Poznań 2010.

⁵ *Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski*, edited by B. Egelking and J. Grabowski, volumes 1-2, Warsaw 2018.

⁶ M. Zaremba, *Żydowskie strategie przetrwania*, "Polityka" 2018, issue 21, pp. 52-54.

The present contribution focuses on Polish sport in WW2 and does not aim to provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject matter. This topic can be approached from the perspective of the everyday life of Poles under Nazi occupation and the civilian underground movement in the times of war. Compared to various other research areas that correspond to the components of Poland's history in 1939-1945, the issue of sport is an under-researched topic. To date there is no source monograph devoted to the entirety of Polish sport in 1939-1945, which would address such issues as: conspiratorial sports activity in the General Government and the Reich-annexed territories, Poles in Soviet sports life in the Eastern Borderlands of pre-war Poland, sport in Upper Silesia, in POW camps, internment camps, and in the Polish Armed Forces, sports life in the Nazi concentration camps, open and occupier-controlled forms of sporting activities, the engagement by athletes in combat on all war fronts as well as in the military and civilian underground movement of the Polish Underground State as well as the human and material losses to Polish sport.

The first information about Polish sport in WW2 reached the broader general public just a few months after the war ended. These were accounts and recollections of the participants of sports events published in dailies and the sports press. Due to the short time lapse after the war, these accounts are highly emotional in tone, yet perfectly genuine and rich in factual data. By and large, they are free from fabrications, which quite commonly occur in memoirs and diaries. The first texts, written just after the war, concerned various forms of Polish sports activity under the occupation. These accounts dwelled extensively on the underground sports activity, predominantly on sport in occupied Warsaw.⁷ But in 1945-1946, there were also press accounts of the underground sports life in other cities, such as Poznań and Kraków.⁸ A profoundly disturbing tone permeates the accounts from the concentration camps in Auschwitz, Dachau and Mauthausen-Gusen.⁹ The first extensive account of the sports life in Oflag

⁷ G. Aleksandrowicz, *Pilka nożna w stolicy podczas pięciu lat okupacji*, "Echo Stadionu" issue 12 of 3 June 1945, p. 8; idem *Piłkarstwo stołeczne w okresie okupacji*, "Przegląd Sportowy" of 13 September 1946, p. 3; W. Fajge, *W koszulkach piłkarskich na Pawiak*, "Przegląd Sportowy" of 26 July 1945, p. 3; Z. Królewski, *Z lodowiska do Oświęcimia. Tragiczna droga rekordzisty Polski Dembowskiego*, "Ilustrowany Kurier Polski" of 30 October 1945, p. 4; K. Tłoczyński, *Korty tenisowe siedliskiem konspiracji*, "Przegląd Sportowy" of 20 March 1946, p. 3.

⁸ *Lekkoatleci poznańscy ustanawiają rekordy w czasie okupacji*, "Sportowiec Poznański" issue 15 of 15 November 1945, p. 4; J. Marcinkowski, *Wiceprezes KS „Warta” pisze o rozgrywanych w czasie okupacji piłkarskich mistrzostwach Poznania*, "Kurier Sportowy" issue 58 of 14 November-17 November 1946, p. 6; L. Leszko, *Narciarze za okupacji*, "Życie Sportowe" issue 11 of 16 December 1946, p. 2. This text was published in the volume *Sport akademicki w relacjach i wspomnieniach*, selected and edited by R. Wryk, Poznań 2009, pp. 334-337.

⁹ *Sport w Oświęcimiu narzędziem sadyzmu. Wstrząsające przeżycia boksera warszawskiego Z. Małeckiego*, "Dziennik Polski" issue 139 of 26 June 1945, p. 4. This account, titled "Sport" w Oświęcimiu, was also published in "Kurier Sportowy" of 16 August 1945. A. Labenz, *Wigilia sportowców w Dachau. Rok 1940*, "Kurier Sportowy" issue 66 of 23 December-29 December 1946, p. 6; K. Małycha, *Mecz piłkarski Polska-Hiszpania w Mauthausen. Polacy zwyciężyli w turnieju pucharowym*, "Kurier Sportowy" issue 1 of 1945, p. 3; idem, *Sport w "kacecie"*, "Kurier Sportowy" issue 43 of 23 September - 25 September 1946, p. 6.

II-C Woldenberg was published in the summer of 1945 in the *Przegląd Sportowy* daily by the actor Kazimierz Rudzki. Writing about the 1944 camp games, he argued:

These unusual Olympic Games held in 1944 in Woldenberg were something more than just sports fun. They epitomised faith in the value and sense of the Olympic idea despite everything what was going on outside the barbed wire fences of the camp.¹⁰

However, it was more than 20 years after the war before historians addressed the issue of sport in 1939-1945. Studies were launched at the Department of the History of Physical Culture, headed by Prof. Ryszard Wroczyński at the University of Physical Education in Warsaw.¹¹ Another centre investigating this topic was the Poznań Higher School of Physical Education (now the University of Physical Education), largely through the inspiration of Prof. Zdzisław Grot.¹² In the Warsaw centre, research on this issue was pioneered by Henryka Młodzianowska. Her first studies concerned sport in the POW camps and underground sports activity.¹³ In Poznań, the issue of sport was first taken up by Jerzy Gaj, who drew on source materials.¹⁴ The late 1960s saw the publications of press articles based on memoirs; worthy of mention are contributions by Wojciech Lipoński, which heralded his later research on this topic.¹⁵ In 1968, a book by sportswriters Andrzej Jucewicz and Włodzimierz Stepiński

¹⁰ K. Rudzki, *Sport w niewoli*, "Przegląd Sportowy" issue 2 of 19 July 1945, p. 3 and issue 3 of 26 July 1945, p. 3. This text was published in the volume *Sport akademicki w relacjach...*, pp. 312-319.

¹¹ J. Nowocień, *Zakład Historii Kultury Fizycznej i Olimpizmu*, in: *Akademia Wychowania Fizycznego Józefa Piłsudskiego w Warszawie 1929/1930-2009/2010. Księga Pamiątkowa*, edited by K. Hądzelek and K. Zuchora, Warsaw 2010, pp. 243-246.

¹² J. Gaj, T. Ziółkowska, *Poznańskie badania historii kultury fizycznej*, in: *Wkład poznańskiej AWF w rozwój teoretycznych podstaw kultury fizycznej*, edited by Z. Drozdowski, Poznań 1975, pp. 202-210.

¹³ H. Młodzianowska, *Z badań nad dziejami polskiej kultury fizycznej w latach drugiej wojny światowej*, in: *Materiały dorocznej Sesji Naukowej Akademii Wychowania Fizycznego 1966*, Warsaw 1966, pp. 136-148; Idem, *Rozwój wychowania fizycznego i sportu w Polsce w latach 1914-1944*, in: *Z dziejów kultury fizycznej w Polsce. Materiały na Plenum GKKFiT z okazji 100-lecia sportu polskiego*, Warsaw 1967, pp. 63-140; Idem, *Wychowanie fizyczne i sport w obozach jenieckich oficerów polskich w III Rzeszy*, "Kultura Fizyczna" 1970, issue 6, pp. 246-249. Henryka Młodzianowska often emphasised the need for including the issue of the underground sports activity in works devoted to Polish history in WW2. Cf., e.g., *Studia Warszawskie*. Tom XVII. *Warszawa lat wojny i okupacji 1939-1944*; vol. 3, Warsaw 1973, pp. 425-428 (Henryka Młodzianowska's talk at the conference "Society and resistance movement in Warsaw of the war and occupation period 1939-1945"); H. Młodzianowska, *Trampkarze ruchu oporu?*, "Życie Literackie" issue 23 of 9 June 1985, p. 8.

¹⁴ For more on J. Gaj's contribution cf. B. Woltmann, *Działalność profesora Jerzego Gaja w dziedzinie historii kultury fizycznej*, in: *Z dziejów kultury fizycznej. Księga dedykowana profesorowi Jerzemu Gajowi z okazji 65 rocznicy urodzin*, edited by B.J. Kunicki and B. Woltmann, Gorzów Wlkp. 1996, pp. 5-17; M. Łuczak, L. Nowak, *Profesor dr hab. Jerzy Gaj (1929-2016). Wybitny historyk kultury fizycznej*, "Kultura Fizyczna" 2017, vol. XVI, issue 2, pp. 11-26.

¹⁵ W. Lipoński, *Igrzyska za drutami*, "Nurt" 1968, issue 10, p. 19; Idem, *Gdy deptano pokój Boży*, "Kierunki" issue 51-52 of 24 December 1968, pp. 6-7. This article was reprinted in another work by this author: *Ucieczka ze stadionu*, Warsaw 1972, pp. 9-16. Wojciech Lipoński analysed the issue of sport in 1939-1945 drawing on the memoirs published in the press after the war and in non-fiction

entitled *Chwała olimpijczykom* [Glory to the Olympians] 1939-1945 was published.¹⁶ Sticking to the journalistic convention, the authors presented the profiles of 27 Olympians who had been killed and murdered in WW2. This work is not free from blatant factual and interpretative errors and, from today's research perspective, it can hardly be regarded as an authoritative source. However, it needs to be remembered that this was the first book on Polish sport in the years 1939-1945.

The following is an overview of the literature of the subject. We will begin with the writings on the underground sports activity in the General Government and the Reich-annexed territories.

From the early days of their occupation, the German Nazis embarked on the destruction of Polish cultural life in all of its dimensions as they abolished all institutions of culture in a broad sense. Besides the Polish theatres, museums, libraries, cinemas, publishing houses, bookshops and various cultural associations, the occupiers destroyed the sports clubs, associations and organisations. Their assets, facilities and documentation were appropriated by the institutions of the Third Reich. The Polish clubs' facilities, appliances and equipment were given to the German sports organisations, which began to be established on the occupied territories from the spring of 1940. The occupiers banned Poles from playing any sports for two main reasons: first, they wanted to strip them of all sports achievements and traditions, and, second, they strove to biologically exterminate the Polish nation. Poland was the only occupied country where the Germans imposed a total ban on any sort of activity in the fields of physical education, sport and tourism.

The lost September 1939 campaign did not crush the nation's morale for too long. Nearly all Poles were keen and willing to continue the fight, which took on various forms. One of them was to oppose the Nazi invaders at every step of the way. Notwithstanding the draconian regulations and bans, Poles wanted to live normal lives under the occupation. Despite the heavy ordeal, repressions and risk of death, sports activists were determined to carry on. The Polish sports movement kept evolving in many cities and towns against the official ban. Its organisers and participants felt the strong need to engage in sports for health reasons and to bring back at least some of their daily routines. However, sport under the occupation was

literature. He also addressed the topic in his later works devoted to the broadly understood humanities of sport; his book contributions on the topic include W. Lipoński, *Sport-literatura-sztuka*, Warsaw 1974, pp. 283-286; Idem, *Humanistyczna encyklopedia sportu*, Warsaw 1987 (here the entries "Obozowe igrzyska" on pp. 222-223 and "Sport w Polsce" (Sport pod okupacją niemiecką 1939-1945) on p. 333; Idem, *Encyklopedia sportów świata*, Poznań 2001 (here the entry "Obozowe sporty" on pp. 330-331); Idem, *Polacy na olimpiadach*, Poznań (no publication year), pp. 34-39; Idem, *Olimpizm dla każdego*, Poznań 2000, pp. 125-128; Idem, *Historia sportu na tle rozwoju kultury fizycznej*, Warsaw 2012, pp. 563-572; Idem, *The Truth of Sport. A monograph of selected issues*, Szczecin 2016, pp. 236-240 and pp. 273-286.

¹⁶ A. Jucewicz, W. Stepiński, *Chwała olimpijczykom*, Warsaw 1968.

of a different nature as it took on conspiratorial forms and was a tool of resistance in the fight against the German invaders. For both athletes and spectators, sport in those hard times provided an opportunity to relax and forget about the horrors of the war.

The underground sports movement in the occupied Polish territory developed most actively in the General Government, with Warsaw playing the most prominent role (just as in all other areas of the civilian underground movement). The first attempt to provide a full picture of Warsaw's underground sports activity was made by Hanna Dąbrowa and Wanda Rzeszowska in their 1966 article published in the *Sport Robotniczy* journal.¹⁷ On the basis of the press materials published after the war and other accounts and recollections, the authors discussed the engagement of the residents of occupied Warsaw in sports such as: football, volleyball, skating, cycling, and track and field athletics. They proved that sports activity as part of the resistance movement was well-organised and was promoted predominantly by pre-war officials and, often, by outstanding athletes. The initiatives were also spontaneously undertaken by young people who felt the need (quite natural for their age) to let off steam in free space and in sports competition.

In Warsaw it was football that rose to greatest prominence. In December 1941, the underground Warsaw District Football Association was established. It coordinated the Warsaw Football Championship contested in 1942-1944 by approximately 50 teams. The matches enjoyed huge popularity and attracted an average crowd of about 1,000. However, there were games, such as the one between the left-bank Warsaw team and the right-bank Warsaw team played in the summer of 1942, which had 5,000 spectators. Besides Warsaw, football matches were played in its suburban towns: Piaseczno, Jelonki, Włochy, Mirków, Kaczew, Konstancin, and Gołków. The information about underground football competitions comes from published memoirs¹⁸ and historical publications. In his source-based monograph *Futbol dawnej Warszawy* [The football of old Warsaw], Robert Gawkowski, a Warsaw expert and sports historian, discussed this topic in a separate chapter entitled *Zakazany futbol* [Banned football] 1939-1945.¹⁹ Of special interest are the author's generalisations and his exposition of the Nazis' approach to sport under the occupation. The author surprisingly concludes that this was not "football for the price of life", as has previously been argued. The history of football in Warsaw during the occupation ordeal

¹⁷ H. Dąbrowa, W. Rzeszowska, *Sport w okupowanej Warszawie*, "Sport Robotniczy" 1966, pp. 111-130.

¹⁸ M. Szymkowiak, *Warszawski sport w podziemiu*, "Stolica" 1959, issues 48-52 and issues 1, 2, 4, 5 from 1960; G. Aleksandrowicz, *Moja przygoda z piłką i gwizdkiem*, Warsaw 1984, pp. 12-31; S. Mieloch, *Sportowe sprawy i sprawki*, Warsaw 1963, pp. 33-43.

¹⁹ R. Gawkowski, *Futbol dawnej Warszawy*, Warsaw 2013. Cf. Idem: *Offizielle und geheime Fußballspiele im Generalgouvernement (1939-1944)*, in: *Vom Konflikt zur Konkurrenz. Deutsch-polnisch-ukrainische Fußballgeschichte*, edited by D. Blecking, L. Peiffer, R. Traba, Göttingen 2014, pp. 156-171; Idem: *Futbol w Warszawie w czasach wojny (1939-1944)*, "Szkola Nawigatorów" 2014, issue 2, pp. 17-26.

was discussed in detail by Juliusz Kulesza, who drew on his own experiences and the compiled documentation. His 2014 book *Zakazane gole* [Banned goals] enjoyed great popularity among readers.²⁰

Along with football, another sport that was highly popular in occupied Warsaw was volleyball. The initiative to organise underground volleyball competitions came from Warsaw activists of the Academic Sports Association (AZS) Zygmunt Nowak and Romuald Wirszyła. In 1941-1944, the Warsaw volleyball championships were contested. For security reasons, the games, which brought great interest among volleyball fans, were often played outside Warsaw, mainly in the towns of Włochy, Konstancin and Jeziorna. The history of volleyball in occupied Warsaw is fairly well documented in the source literature.²¹

The sports underground movement was joined by representatives of the Warsaw sailing community as early as in November 1939. Their activity was diverse as it comprised the production of sailing boats²² and training schemes. Regular secret sailing training courses began in the spring of 1941. Until the outbreak of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, a total of 69 people earned the rank of sailor and 47 achieved the rank of inland helmsman. Sailing courses were combined with military exercises. The Vistula river hosted secret races attended by course participants and the training staff. The sailing community was strongly engaged in the military resistance movement. For example, Henryk Fronczak, a pioneer of underground sailing and one of its organisers, was involved in a wide range of activities within the Home Army's intelligence and counter-intelligence. The most extensive information on Warsaw's underground sailing movement can be found in the source-based monographs by Włodzimierz Głowacki²³ and Kazimierz Leski.²⁴

We know there were other sports in occupied Warsaw, including tennis, swimming, cycling, fencing and athletics. However, they were played by small groups of people, which is why, as can be assumed, they were not investigated in separate publications. The first WW2 historian to address the issue of underground sports activity was Tomasz Szarota. In 1973, he published his seminal monograph *Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni* [Everyday life in occupied Warsaw], which has been

²⁰ J. Kulesza, *Podziemny futbol 1939-1944*, Warsaw 2012; Idem, *Zakazane gole. Futbol w okupowanej Warszawie*, Warsaw 2014.

²¹ *50 lat piłki siatkowej AZS Warszawa 1924-1974*, edited by R. Wirszyła, Warsaw 1989; pp. 22-24, 67-71; R. Wryk, *Narodziny i rozwój Akademickiego Związku Sportowego do roku 1949*, Poznań 2014, pp. 218-220.

²² Z. Milewski, *Polskie budownictwo jachtowe w czasie wojny oraz pierwszych latach powojennych*, "Świat Żagli" 1973, pp. 103-121.

²³ W. Głowacki, *Wspaniały świat żeglarstwa. Z dziejów żeglarstwa w Polsce i na świecie*, Gdańsk 1970, pp. 248-260; Idem, *Dzieje żeglarstwa polskiego*, Gdańsk 1989, pp. 368-392.

²⁴ K. Leski, *Życie niewłaściwie urozmaicone. Wspomnienia oficera wywiadu i kontrwywiadu AK*, Warsaw 1989, pp. 317-328. Kazimierz Leski's life was the subject of the academic biography by Maciej Roszkowski which addresses the theme of underground sailing. Cf. M. Roszkowski, *Kazimierz Leski „Bradł”*. *Życie dobrze spełnione*, Warsaw 2010.

re-edited several times and has been translated into German under the title *Leben und Alltag im besetzten Warschau*. In it, he provided a full picture of sport in Poland's capital. In the concluding sections of the book, he argued: "Underground sport gave young people in occupied Warsaw an impression of normal life, it helped them keep fit, it offered them moments of relaxation, and it allowed them to enjoy youth, which just happened to come at that time."²⁵

There is a greater amount of available research on underground sports life in Kraków, as compared to Warsaw. In-depth source-based studies on this topic were initiated by Stanisław Chemicz in the early 1970s. They resulted in a monograph entitled *Pilka nożna w okupowanym Krakowie* [Football in occupied Kraków], which was published by the Wydawnictwo Literackie publishing house in a print run of 10,000 copies.²⁶ As the source material the author used underground printed matter (reports, regulations, notices, competition schedules, and lists of players) to reconstruct the history of football competitions in Kraków, starting with the first match under the occupation, which was played between the teams of Wisła and Krowodrza on 22 October 1939 on a pitch in the then suburban town of Bronowice. Chemicz found that there were a total of 67 underground football clubs in occupied Kraków. The book features valuable supplements, such as: memoirs of 16 participants of underground football, bios of 64 footballers and sports officials who were killed or murdered in 1939-1945, and an appendix with selected source documents. Since the book had high readership, it was republished in the year 2000 in a revised and extended version.²⁷ As time went by, Chemicz broadened his research scope to include underground activity related to other sports and the engagement of Kraków athletes in the military and civilian resistance movement. He published the results of his studies in a 2003 source-based monograph entitled *Sport w Krakowie w latach 1939-1945* [Sport in Kraków in 1939-1945]²⁸. In it, the author attempts to prove that the underground sports movement in Kraków was linked with the military resistance movement, forming a contact and recruitment platform for various structures of the Home Army. In the conclusion he argues that:

sports officials and athletes became so actively involved in the organised football competitions because: first, they strove to defy the Nazi regulations to close Krakow's sports clubs and, second, they wanted to keep fit. At the same time, this was a form of struggle against the occupier, against its plans to destroy the Polish nation. That struggle strengthened the sense of patriotism and national belonging.²⁹

²⁵ T. Szarota, *Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni. Studium historyczne*, Warsaw 1988, p. 408.

²⁶ S. Chemicz, *Pilka nożna w okupowanym Krakowie*, Kraków 1982.

²⁷ S. Chemicz, *Pilka nożna...*, second edition, Kraków 2000.

²⁸ S. Chemicz, *Sport w Krakowie w latach 1939-1945*, Kraków 2003. The author's work on this monograph was heralded by his synthetic article *Sport polski w Krakowie w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej* [Polish sport in Kraków under Nazi occupation] published in the journal "Sport Wyczynowy" 1984, issue 9, pp. 49-54.

²⁹ S. Chemicz, *Sport w Krakowie...*, pp. 215-216.

While agreeing with this point, it is, however, worth considering another approach to Kraków's underground sport, which was presented by Andrzej Chwałba in his 2002 monograph *Okupacyjny Kraków w latach 1939-1945* [Kraków under occupation in 1939-1945]. The author states:

In fact, sports life under occupation, although it was illegal, evolved on a mass scale. The Germans tolerated the organisation of sporting events viewing them as a way of unleashing frustrations. They would rather see Poles chasing a ball than engaging in the resistance movement. For this reason, Kraków frequently hosted sporting competitions organised without the Germans' (official) consent but with their knowledge.³⁰

It is hard to believe that the Nazi authorities could have been oblivious to the fact that in occupied Kraków there were nearly 70 football clubs and that the football games were sometimes attended by several thousand spectators. As is often mentioned in the source literature, the match between the local team of Wisła Kraków and the Polonia Warsaw-based club called *Walter Toebbens Club* (WTC – translated as “the Warsaw Association of Blacks”), played at the Garbarnia stadium in late May 1944, drew a crowd of 15,000 and brought a revenue of 38,000 zlotys. Could the Nazis have failed to notice that event? Definitely not. According to the expert and researcher Robert Gawkowski, both in Kraków, Warsaw and other cities and towns of the General Government where games were played:

in most cases, the Germans were passive and most of them, in their uniforms, would watch the Polish competitions. Occasionally (e.g., in Karczew and Konstancin), there were roundups of spectators but they could occur whenever there were gatherings of Polish people.³¹

The cited research works on the underground sports life in the General Government focus on the metropolitan areas of Warsaw and Krakow. There are no publications on the resistance sports movement in other cities of this administrative region under the occupation. It is thus necessary to embark on source-based research pertaining to the Lublin District, Radom District, Warsaw District and Kraków District. Its findings should provide a relatively full picture of Polish underground sport in the General Government.³²

The Germanisation of the Polish territories annexed to the Third Reich was much more forceful than in the General Government. This policy affected both the military and civilian sections of the Polish resistance movement. However, despite the dire

³⁰ A. Chwałba, *Okupacyjny Kraków w latach 1939-1945*, Kraków 2002, p. 338.

³¹ R. Gawkowski, *Futbol dawnej Warszawy...*, pp. 144-145.

³² There are no references to underground Polish sport in occupied Poland in the publications by western historians. A good case in point is the first non-Polish work on the General Government, *The Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe: Nazi Rule in Poland Under the General Government* by Martin Winstone. The Polish translation of this highly interesting monograph, *Generalne Gubernatorstwo. Mroczne serce Europy Hitlera*, was published in Poznań in 2015. In the chapter devoted to everyday life, the author dwells on various forms of Polish illegal activity; however, he does not mention sport in this context.

conditions in those regions, Poles were engaged in the same forms of resistance as in the General Government (they were, however, smaller in range).³³ Underground sports work was also done, primarily in the larger cities and towns of the *Reichsgau Wartheland*. It was most extensive in Poznań, where the origins of the organised sports activity can be traced back to the spring of 1940 with football playing a key role. In 1940-1943, the Poznań football championships were contested under the auspices of an ad hoc underground football association featuring a referees' department and the department of sports and games. Much less popular in Poznań were other underground sports, such as track and field athletics and basketball. The former was done by a small number of enthusiasts assisted by pre-war officials and athletes, including a 1936 Olympian, Karol Hoffmann. In 1940, basketball was played by players from Poznań clubs, KPW, AZS and Warta, such as Florian Grzechowiak and Jerzy Patrzykont, who had competed in the Berlin Olympics. Sports, predominantly underground football, were also played in other towns of the Wielkopolska region, including Kalisz, Śrem, Jarocin, Swarzędz and Luboń.

Research on underground sports life in Wielkopolska was initiated in the 1960s by Jerzy Gaj. He presented his findings in a paper published in the *Sport Robotniczy* journal and in a monograph on physical culture in Wielkopolska, co-authored by Zdzisław Grot.³⁴ Underground football in Poznań was addressed by Bogdan Dohnke, who drew on source materials.³⁵ This topic is dealt with most extensively in a recent publication by Jarosław Owsiański and Tomasz Siwiński. Their *Historia futbolu wielkopolskiego* [A history of football in Wielkopolska] includes many new, so far unknown facts, and is rich in superb iconographic material compiled from private collections.³⁶ A synthetic (albeit very short) overview of Poznań's underground sport has been provided by Wojciech Lipoński. The author is right in saying that:

³³ Cf. E. Serwański, *Wielkopolska w cieniu swastyki*, Warsaw 1970; Cz. Łuczak, *Pod niemieckim jarzmem (Kraj Warty 1939-1945)*, Poznań 1996; R. Kaczmarek, *Górny Śląsk podczas II wojny światowej. Między utopią niemieckiej wspólnoty narodowej a rzeczywistością okupacji na terenach wcielonych do Trzeciej Rzeszy*, Katowice 2006.

³⁴ J. Gaj, *Podziemne życie sportowe w okupowanej Wielkopolsce (1939-1945)*, "Sport Robotniczy" 1968, vol. IV, pp. 49-69; Z. Grot, J. Gaj, *Zarys dziejów kultury fizycznej w Wielkopolsce*, Warsaw-Poznań 1973 (here the chapter by J. Gaj "Kultura fizyczna w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej (1939-1945)", pp. 276-294).

³⁵ B. Dohnke, *Konspiracyjne rozgrywki piłkarskie w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej w mieście Poznaniu*, "Roczniki Naukowe WSWF w Poznaniu" 1971, vol. 19, pp. 69-92. Bogdan Dohnke's findings are cited in research literature; cf., e.g., T. Jurek, *Piłka nożna w latach okupacji*, in: *75 lat Poznańskiego Okręgowego Związku Piłki Nożnej 1921-1996*, edited by B. Woltmann, Poznań 1996, pp. 120-124.

³⁶ J. Owsiański, T. Siwiński, *Historia futbolu wielkopolskiego*, Poznań 2013, pp. 152-174; cf. also J. Owsiański, R. Szubert, *Rozgrywki piłkarskie na terenie Wielkopolski a kształtowanie patriotyzmu polskiej młodzieży w latach 1906-1923 i 1939-1943*, "Rozprawy Naukowe AWF we Wrocławiu" 2016, vol. 55, pp. 100-113. In October of 2018, Jarosław Owsiański defended a PhD thesis entitled *Polska piłka nożna w Wielkopolsce w latach 1907-1945* [Polish football in Wielkopolska in 1907-1945], written under the supervision of Prof. Piotr Godlewski at the Poznań University of Physical Education.

The results of sports work, if they were assessed under normal conditions, were extremely modest. However, in the context of everyday life under Nazi occupation, they demonstrated the remarkable vitality and high morale of the Polish sports community.³⁷

Besides Poznań, another major city in the *Reichsgau Wartheland* where, despite restrictions, underground sports life was up and running was Łódź. It was also football that rose to greatest prominence here. From the spring of 1940 onwards, several underground Łódź clubs organised regular practice sessions and competitive games. Within the next several months, two footballing institutions were established: in June 1940 – the Referees' Department while in the spring of 1942 – the Łódź Underground Football Association which oversaw the city's football championship. In the autumn of 1942, the Association invited a Pogoń Lwów footballer and a 1936 Olympian, Michał Matyas, who came to Łódź to hold a practice session for local footballers and give a talk on football tactics and technique. Besides football, other major underground sports in Łódź were track and field athletics and volleyball. A picture of underground sports life in this industrial, multi-ethnic and multicultural city based on accounts and archive materials was recreated by Andrzej Bogusz.³⁸ Underground football was also played in the nearby towns of Pabianice and Zgierz.

The discussion of sports life in Łódź would not be complete without mentioning a phenomenon that occurred in the Łódź Ghetto and was unprecedented in Nazi-occupied Europe. In the second half of 1942, its occupants established an organisation called the Official Sports Club of the Jewish Elders in Litzmannstadt (*Beamten-Sport-Club des Aeltesten der Juden in Litzmannstadt*) headed by M. Narwa. The club's founders intended to provide opportunities for playing chess and table tennis.³⁹ According to Włodzimierz Jastrzębski, who, however, does not cite any source material, in 1940, the Łódź Ghetto hosted football matches.⁴⁰

While describing the underground sports life in the *Reichsgau Wartheland* we need to keep in mind that there are a number of issues that need to be investigated through source materials and explained. One such issue which is key to the objective presentation of this section of day-to-day life under the occupation is the Nazis' approach to underground sport. Here is what historian of the Nazi occupation Włodzimierz Jastrzębski says in his most recent work entitled *Okupacyjne losy ziem polskich wcielonych do III Rzeszy* [The history of the Polish lands annexed to the Third Reich under occupation] (1939-1945):

³⁷ *Dzieje Poznania 1918-1945*, vol. 2**, edited by J. Topolski and L. Trzeciakowski, Warsaw-Poznań 1998 (here the chapter by Wojciech Lipoński: *Sport i wychowanie fizyczne*, pp. 1500-1502).

³⁸ A. Bogusz, *Sport łódzki w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej*, "Wychowanie Fizyczne i Sport" 1980, No. 1, pp. 125-134. Idem, *Dawna Łódź sportowa 1824-1945*, Łódź 2007, pp. 415-434.

³⁹ A. Bogusz, *Dawna Łódź sportowa...*, p. 434.

⁴⁰ W. Jastrzębski, *Okupacyjne losy ziem polskich wcielonych do III Rzeszy (1939-1945)*, Bydgoszcz 2017, p. 252.

Polish sport in the Reichsgau Wartheland evolved as an underground movement. However, with time, as the Nazis saw that it was not particularly harmful to the security of the Reich, that it engaged Poles and distracted them from undertaking hostile action against the occupiers, they gave approval to the Polish organisers and did not persecute them. Thus, the Polish sports movement was tolerated; however, whenever sports competitions drew too many athletes and spectators into one place and generated increased excitement, police forces would disperse the participants.⁴¹

Was the Polish sports movement indeed tolerated in the Reichsgau Wartheland by the Nazi authorities? And if so, what was the scope of this tolerance? Did it remain unchanged throughout the entire occupation or did it evolve relative to the developments at the war front? What exactly determined the tolerant approach of the Nazis towards the Poles? Without any source-based research, it is hard to subscribe to Jastrzębski's explicit stand on this issue.

We will now go on to explore another area annexed to the Third Reich, i.e. the territory of the pre-war Silesian Voivodeship. Almost immediately after the September invasion, the Nazi occupiers set out to ruthlessly eradicate all traces of Polish identity. Due to increasing repression and terror, Polish political, social, cultural and sports organisations ceased their activity and their property was confiscated. To preserve a pretence of normality, in the autumn of 1939, the occupiers began to create Upper Silesian sports structures with a new 'face', drawing on the pre-war club models of Polish sport. Hence, even though the Polish clubs in Upper Silesia had formally been dissolved, they continued to exist under new German names, in accordance with the German law and the Reich's sports model. They were managed by Germans and were made up of the same members as before the war: the citizens of the Second Polish Republic.⁴² In this way, Poles were absorbed by the German sports movement in Upper Silesia, established in the occupation years on the foundations of the pre-war Polish sports system. This issue has been researched by Henryk Rechowicz, who claims that the number of Upper Silesians engaged in sport in 1939-1945 was no smaller than before the war.⁴³ Since sport in Upper Silesia under the occupation is not the subject of this paper, we only mention this issue. However, it needs to be said that we finally have a number of source-based and well-balanced works on this topic which have filled the long existing gap in this area.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 252.

⁴² H. Rechowicz, *Problem ciągłości ruchu sportowego na Górnym Śląsku*, in: *Z najnowszej historii kultury fizycznej w Polsce*, vol. IV, edited by B. Woltmann, Gorzów Wlkp. 2000, p. 66.

⁴³ H. Rechowicz, *Cień „Volkslisty” na polskim sporcie*, in: *Z najnowszej historii kultury fizycznej w Polsce*, vol. V, edited by B. Woltmann, Gorzów Wlkp. 2002, pp. 342-343.

⁴⁴ A. Fryc, *Kultura fizyczna na Śląsku podczas II wojny światowej*, in: *Z dziejów kultury fizycznej na Śląsku. Rozwój kultury fizycznej na Śląsku w latach 1919-1989*, edited by M. Ponczek and K.H. Schodrok, Katowice 2009, pp. 215-229; Idem, *Piłka nożna na Górnym Śląsku i Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim w latach drugiej wojny światowej*, in: *Z dziejów polskiej i niemieckiej kultury fizycznej na Górnym Śląsku w XIX i XX wieku*, edited by M. Ponczek, Katowice 2005, pp. 187-200; W. Waloszek, *Piłka nożna w okupowanej części Górnego Śląska w latach 1939-1945*, in: *Z najnowszej historii kultury fizycznej w Polsce*, vol. II, edited by L. Szymański and Z. Schwarzer, Wrocław 1996, pp. 145-153; T. Urban, *Czarny orzeł, biały orzeł. Piłkarze w trybach polityki*, Katowice 2012; *Górnoślązacy w pol-*

In Upper Silesia, there was no underground sports movement under Nazi occupation. It was only in the Dąbrowa Basin, which was part of the *Katowice Regierungsbezirk* in the war years, that Poles were engaged in underground football in 1943-1944. The matches were played in the Sosnowiec district of Niwka and in the towns of Będzin and Dąbrowa Górnicza. Sometimes the underground football clubs of the Dąbrowa Basin played away games outside the *Katowice Regierungsbezirk* in the towns of Chrzanów, Jaworzno and Siersza. An attempt to recreate the history of this sport in the Province of Upper Silesia, based on source materials (albeit in a limited extent), was made by Mirosław Ponczek.⁴⁵

Another Polish territory annexed to the Reich was Eastern Pomerania (Danzig Pomerania). To date, historians have not identified any traces of Polish underground sports activity in this area. Apparently, the terror of occupation in the *Reichsgau Danzig-West Prussia* thwarted any attempts to create at least a substitute underground sports movement.⁴⁶

In the autumn of 1939, approximately 420,000 Polish army soldiers became Nazi POWs and were placed in German *stalags* (prisoner-of-war camps for non-commissioned soldiers) and *oflags* (prisoner-of-war camps for officers). By August 1944, that number had dropped to about 53,000 due to a number of developments: some of the POWs had been discharged, others (in the face of varying levels of compulsion) had become forced labourers or had been transferred pursuant to the agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union and between Germany and Romania and Hungary. When Warsaw insurgents and the Polish II Corps soldiers were sent to prisoner-of-war camps, there were around 73,000 POWs by late 1944, including 53,000 non-commissioned soldiers and over 20,000 officers. In the beginning, the Poles were held in several dozen camps along with POWs from other countries. With time, several camps only for Polish officers were established, the best-known of which included Oflag II C Woldenberg, Oflag II D Gross-Born, Oflag VII A Murnau, Oflag II E Neu-Brandenburg, and Oflag II B Arnswalde. Moreover, Poles were held in several camps along with allied POWs.

The treatment of enemy prisoners-of-war, from their capture until release, was set out in the Third Geneva Convention, adopted on 27 July 1929 and signed, in-

skiej i niemieckiej reprezentacji narodowej w piłce nożnej – wczoraj i dziś. Sport i polityka na Górnym Śląsku w XX wieku, Gliwice-Opole 2006; P. Czado, J. Waloszek, *Gestapo prosiło żeby grać*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" No. 117 of 21-22 May 2005, pp. 26-27; J. Waloszek, *Pokonany przez historię*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" No. 2 of 3-4 January 1998, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁵ M. Ponczek, *Piłka nożna w Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej (Zarys problematyki)*, "Kultura Fizyczna" 1986, No. 3-4, pp. 16-17; Idem, *Geneza i rozwój kultury fizycznej na Górnym Śląsku 1895-1945. Zarys problematyki*, Katowice 1989, pp. 12-17; Idem, *Z dziejów piłki nożnej w Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim podczas II wojny światowej*, Sosnowiec 1992; Idem, *Z przeszłości polskiej piłki nożnej na Górnym Śląsku (1943-1944)*, "Studia Historyczne" 1995, vol. 2, pp. 253-265.

⁴⁶ W. Wika, *Piłka nożna na Pomorzu Gdańskim w okresie I i II wojny światowej*, "Rocznik Naukowy AWFiS w Gdańsku" 2016, vol. XXVI, pp. 134-142.

ter alia, by Germany. Under the Convention, signatories were required to provide humane treatment for all prisoners-of-war, to guarantee them decent living conditions, and to ensure their engagement in cultural, scientific, educational and sports activities. The organisation of sports life was regulated by the Convention's Article 38 on the treatment of prisoners-of-war, which stated that "the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst prisoners". More specific rules pertaining to the organisation of sport in POW camps were governed by the regulations issued by the camp's German authorities and their superiors in Berlin. In stalags, where non-commissioned soldiers were held, POWs could do sports in their time off work. However, sometimes camp authorities would violate the provisions of the Geneva Convention and would ban sports activity. In some stalags, the POWs played sports in secrecy or only on the approval of the camp's authorities. It was different in oflags, where officers were not supposed to do any labour. As a result, the POWs, with time on their hands, could engage in cultural, scientific, educational and sports activities.

In oflags, sports activities were organised by the POWs themselves. Sport was institutionalised within defined limits. Morning gymnastics and several-minute-long marches to keep fit and mentally agile were compulsory activities and became part of the POWs' daily routine. Sports competitions were run by special organisational units in accordance with the binding regulations. Besides camp championship competitions in specific sports, there were friendly tournaments and exhibition events. Highly popular were POW physical fitness tests. For achieving specific scores, the POW Fitness Badge was awarded. The whole year's physical education and sports activity in oflags was rounded off by such events as "Sports Week" or "The Physical Education Festival". Regulations were issued and sports clubs were established with superordinate units coordinating their work, such as the Association of Military Sports Clubs, which was set up in Oflag II C Woldenberg in the summer of 1940. In 1940 and 1944 some oflags hosted the POW Olympic Games, which had a symbolic nature and a strong ideological appeal. The first such event, credited to PE instructor, platoon leader Jerzy Słomczyński, was held between 31 August and 8 September 1940 in Stalag XIII Langwasser near Nuremberg. The participants included Polish, French, Belgian, Dutch, Yugoslavian and British POWs. In the same year, camp games were also held in Oflag II Arnswalde. In 1944, the POW Olympic Games took place in Oflag II D Gross-Born and Oflag II C Woldenberg. The Games incorporated the entire set of Olympic ceremonies and besides the purely sporting aspect they carried a specific political message. They reminded the world that despite the ongoing war the universal Olympic ideal was still alive.

Sports life in the Nazi POW camps has been relatively well documented. Sports themes in the daily life of the camps can be found in numerous memoirs and diaries.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Publications include the following: *Oflag II C Woldenberg. Wspomnienia jeńców*, Warsaw 1984; T. Niewiadomski, *Olimpiada której nie było...*, Warsaw 1973; *Uniwersytet za drutami. Oświata i nauka oraz sport w Oflagu II C Woldenberg 1940-1945*, Material selection and Introduction by W. Kotański,

Numerous press articles have been devoted to the history of Polish POWs in German captivity.⁴⁸ There are a wealth of publications on this topic, which has also been explored in fiction and films⁴⁹ and has been featured in museum exhibitions.⁵⁰ Finally, for more than 50 years, sport in POW camps has been investigated by historians researching the history of WW2 and the history of sport.

The literature of the subject can be subdivided into two categories. The first one includes works about Poles in German captivity while the other one – writings on Polish sport in 1939-1945. The following is an overview of major publications from the first field of enquiry.

The theme of POWs' sports life is included in monographs devoted to specific oflags. The first such work that should be mentioned is a detailed and source-based publication by Jan Olesik entitled *Oflag II Woldenberg*.⁵¹ In one of the sections of the chapter *Działalność artystyczno-rozrywkowa* [Artistic and entertainment activities] the author focuses on the issues of physical culture and sport. On twelve pages, he provides a fairly exhaustive description of the physical education policy in the camp and various forms of POWs' sports activity. It follows from his research that:

Sports life in Oflag II Woldenberg was intensive thanks to constant engagement in physical education and sport throughout the entire captivity. There were days, however, when class attendance was sharply down. This was largely due to three reasons: when POWs received unwelcome news, when they felt personally threatened and when the longed-for liberation seemed to be disappearing in the distance.⁵²

The themes discussed in Olesik's monograph are elaborated upon in Henryk Tomiczek and Miron S. Zarudzki's book about the POWs' military conspiracy movement in Oflag II Woldenberg. Discussing selected examples, the authors show how sport and physical education were incorporated into the camp's military resistance movement.⁵³ The history of Upper Bavaria-based Oflag VII A Murnau has been thoroughly investigated by Danuta Kisielewicz. As early as in 1990, she published a monograph on this camp, which was well-received by critics and readers.⁵⁴ In the following years, the author continued her research on the Murnau POW community, which resulted in

vol. 9-10, Dobiegniew-Warsaw 1994; A. Brzezicki, *Za drutami*, w: *Olimpijskie laury*, Warsaw 1980, pp. 129-139; J. Bilewski, *Rok olimpijski w Oflagu II C*, in: *50 lat na olimpijskim szlaku*, Warsaw 1969, pp. 119-123; A. Grzesik, *Obozowa „Skra” w Oflagu II C Woldenberg*, in: „Skra”. *Z placu ędzy do tartanu*, edited by J. Mulak, Warsaw 1972, pp. 288-293; Z. Weiss, *Olimpiada za drutami*, in: *Sport akademicki w relacjach i wspomnieniach*, selected and edited by R. Wryk, Poznań 2009, pp. 320-332.

⁴⁸ Cf. The references in W. Pórchłópek, *Wychowanie fizyczne i sport żołnierzy polskich w obozach jenieckich Wehrmachtu i NKWD (1939-1945)*, Opole 2002, pp. 161-171.

⁴⁹ D. Wierski, *Sport w polskim kinie 1944-1989*, Gdańsk 2014.

⁵⁰ Cf., e.g., *Sport za drutami (1939-1945)*. *Informator*, edited by T. Skoczek, Warsaw 2015.

⁵¹ J. Olesik, *Oflag II C Woldenberg*, Warsaw 1988.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 217.

⁵³ H. Tomiczek, M. S. Zarudzki, *Jeniecka konspiracja wojskowa w Oflagu II C Woldenberg*, Poznań 1989, pp. 69-72.

⁵⁴ D. Kisielewicz, *Oflag VII A Murnau*, Łambinowice-Opole 1990.

another publication entitled *Niewola w cieniu Alp. Oflag VII A w Murnau* [Captivity in the shadow of the Alps. Oflag VII A in Murnau].⁵⁵ In both works, while describing the camp's daily life, Kisielewicz focuses on physical education and sport. The author argues that thanks to the camp's location near Geneva, home to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which provided protection for POWs, the German authorities tried to respect the rules protecting POWs by emphasising the development of the camp's scientific, cultural, educational and sports lives. And it was sports activities that were featured during visits by ICRC representatives to the camp. Sports life in Oflag VII A Murnau could flourish thanks to the camp's above average infrastructure, which comprised playing fields, athletics equipment, an indoor hall with an area of 900 square metres and height of 9 metres, equipped with basic gymnastics equipment and featuring a swimming pool (it was a former fire pond which had been adjusted for swimming purposes, with the length of 19 metres, width of 9 metres and depth of 4 metres).

Information about sports life in Oflag II B Arnswalde can be found in a publication by Sławomir Giżyński and Andrzej Szutowicz.⁵⁶ The authors found that from 29 to 31 August 1940 that camp played host to the "Camp Olympics" contested by Polish and French POWs in such sports as: athletics, football and volleyball. This was probably the biggest competition staged in a German POW camp in the Olympic year 1940. That event had not been previously mentioned in the subject literature.

The fate of Polish POWs who were held in camps in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg was investigated in the 1970s by Tadeusz Gasztold and Gracjan Bojar-Fijałkowski. The former researcher focused primarily on the cultural life of POWs. In his 1977 monograph on the cultural life in six oflags in Western Pomerania, the author elaborates upon POW sports activities.⁵⁷ Tadeusz Gasztold also authored a monograph devoted to the biweekly magazine *Za drutami* ("Behind the Wires"), which had been published in Oflag II B Arnswalde and Oflag II D Gross-Born from 1940 to 1942.⁵⁸ The magazine was co-edited by Zygmunt Weiss, a former member of the AZS Warsaw sports club and a 1924 and 1928 Olympian. *Za drutami* which published monographic articles on physical culture and sports reports, played a key role in promoting a healthy lifestyle in the camp's community and sparking the POWs' interest in sport. The source-based monograph by Gracjan Bojar-Fijałkowski focuses on the fate of POWs held captive in the area under the jurisdiction of the Second Military District in Szczecin.⁵⁹ The author provides a detailed description of the organisation of the camp,

⁵⁵ D. Kisielewicz, *Niewola w cieniu Alp. Oflag VII A Murnau*, Opole 2015.

⁵⁶ S. Giżyński, A. Szutowicz, *Oflag II B Arnswalde. Jenieckie losy*, Wrocław 2013.

⁵⁷ T. Gasztold, *Życie kulturalne w obozach polskich jeńców wojennych na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1939-1945*, Koszalin 1977.

⁵⁸ T. Gasztold, „*Za Drutami*”. *Pismo polskich jeńców wojennych 1940-1942*, Koszalin 1980. Cf. also the author's monograph *Zagończyk – Głos Jeńca Polskiego Stalagu XI B Fallingb. Z dziejów prasy polskiej w obozach jenieckich i internowanych 1939-1945*, Koszalin-Słupsk 1983.

⁵⁹ G. Bojar-Fijałkowski, *Losy jeńców wojennych na Pomorzu Zachodnim i w Meklemburgii 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1979.

the extermination of the POWs, their exploitation as a labour force, the resistance movement, cultural and educational activities and the evacuation from the camp in the final months of the war. In his work, Bojar-Fijałkowski also writes extensively about the sports movement. In his view sport was:

one of the most important manifestations of the POWs' daily activity, which – thanks to its universal nature – integrated the entire POW community, both in national and international aspects. To a large extent, it also allowed the POWs to survive the hardship of their evacuation to the West.⁶⁰

The issues of physical education and sport are also addressed in comprehensive works about the fate of Polish POWs during WW2, i.e. in the monographs by Juliusz Pollack *Jeńcy polscy w hitlerowskiej niewoli (Polish POWs in Nazi captivity)* and Danna Kisielewicz *Oficerowie polscy w niewoli niemieckiej w czasie II wojny światowej [Polish officers in German captivity during World War II]*.⁶¹ In both publications, the authors provide a synthetic overview of sports life in camp communities, indicating the kinds of work and the impact of sport in maintaining the physical condition and the psychological balance of Polish POWs. In recent years, an interesting historical and sociological study of the life of Polish officers in Nazi captivity during WW2 was published by Anna Matuchniak-Krasuska. Her 2014 monograph *Za drutami oflagów. Studium socjologiczne [Behind the oflag wires: A sociological study]*⁶² is comprised of seven chapters grouped into two parts. The first part entitled “Oflagi – instytucje totalne” [Oflags – total institutions] contains the following chapters (here given only in English translation): “The architecture of violence”, “The organisation of the oflag”, “Camp life” and “Camp vocabulary”. The second part *Kultura jako źródło wolności [Culture as the source of freedom]* is composed of three chapters: “Camp plastic arts – the art of survival”, “Theatre in the oflag – liberation in captivity” and “Sport in the war enclave”. Each part of the monograph is preceded by an introduction. It should be emphasised that this publication is the first sociological study of oflags in the Polish research literature. In her analysis of the sports life in the POW camps, the author employs the sociological concept of the enclave. She distinguishes two basic sports enclaves, i.e. “the enclave of competitive sport” and “the enclave of physical education”. The POWs' artistic, educational and sports enclaves helped prisoners survive their camp ordeal and maintain dignity.

The most comprehensive information about sports life in POW camps is provided by sport historians. The first research publications on this topic were written at the University of Physical Education in Warsaw.⁶³ In the 1970s, research on sport in POW

⁶⁰ Idem, pp. 329-330.

⁶¹ J. Pollack, *Jeńcy polscy w hitlerowskiej niewoli*, Warsaw 1982; D. Kisielewicz, *Oficerowie polscy w niewoli niemieckiej w czasie II wojny światowej*, Opole 1998.

⁶² A. Matuchniak-Krasuska, *Za drutami oflagów. Studium socjologiczne*, Opole 2014.

⁶³ T. Jakubowski, *Pracownicy i absolwenci CIWF i AWF w obozie jeńców w Woldenbergu*, “Kultura Fizyczna” 1960, No. 7-8, s. 614-623; H. Młodzianowska, *Wychowanie fizyczne i sport w obozach jenieckich oficerów polskich w III Rzeszy*, “Kultura Fizyczna” 1970, No. 6, pp. 246-249.

camps was initiated at the Faculty of Physical Education in Gorzów by Bernard Woltmann, who offered a number of significant source-based contributions on this topic.⁶⁴ They concerned the Nazi POW camps located in the area of the Szczecin Military District. Woltmann's research was continued by his students: Tomasz Jurek⁶⁵ and Renata Urban⁶⁶. The same research trend is followed in the papers by Andrzej Terlikowski⁶⁷ and Krzysztof Walczewski.⁶⁸ The theme of sport in POW camps is also discussed in studies by Wojciech Lipoński and his student Joanna Witkowska.⁶⁹

The greatest contribution to the research on sport in POW camps, however, has doubtless been made by Wojciech Półchłopek. He based his research on extensive source data, drawing on materials found in domestic and foreign archives, museums and private collections. His papers have been published in *Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny* (a periodical devoted to WW2 POW issues) and in specialist magazines.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ B. Woltmann, *Rekreacja fizyczna i sport w obozie jenieckim w Woldenbergu*, "Zeszyty Gorzowskie" 1979, pp. 158-171; Idem, *Kultura fizyczna w oficerskich obozach jenieckich Szczecińskiego Okręgu Wojskowego*, in: *Prace Studium Wychowania Fizycznego i Sportu Uczelni Technicznych Nr 10 (Materiały z I Konferencji Naukowej "Udział sportowców i działaczy kultury fizycznej w wojnie wyzwoleniczej narodu polskiego 1939-1945")*, edited by L. Wojciechowski, Koszalin 1985, pp. 57-76; Idem, *Z życia polskich oficerów w obozie jenieckim w Woldenbergu. Rok olimpijski 1944 w Oflagu II C*, in: *Z dziejów polskiej emigracji (1939-1989)*, edited by M. Szerbiński and T. Wolsza, Gorzów Wlkp. 2003, pp. 447-452; Idem, *Das olympische Jahr 1944 in den Gefangenenlagern für polnische Offiziere II C und II D*, in: *The Olympic Movement "Past-Present and Future" Yugoslav Association of Physical Culture*, L. Zecević (ed.), Sarajevo 1988, pp. 378-392.

⁶⁵ T. Jurek, *Sport jeniecki na środkowym Nadodrzu podczas II wojny światowej*, in: *Studia i szkice z dziejów kultury fizycznej*, Poznań-Gorzów Wlkp. 1992, pp. 233-239; Idem, *Igrzyska olimpijskie w obozach jenieckich podczas II wojny światowej*, in: *Logos i etos polskiego olimpizmu*, edited by J. Lipiec, Kraków 1994, pp. 505-508.

⁶⁶ R. Urban, *Organizacja wychowania fizycznego i sportu żołnierzy polskich w niemieckich obozach jenieckich w czasie II wojny światowej*, in: *Historia polskiego i niemieckiego sportu w XIX i XX wieku. Idee, ludzie, polityka i kultura*, edited by D. Wojtaszyn, W. Stępiński, J. Eider, Poznań 2016, pp. 221-244; Idem, *Olimpiady za drutami*, "Przegląd Uniwersytecki" 2016, Nos. 1-3, pp. 17-19.

⁶⁷ A. Terlikowski, *Życie sportowe na Ziemi Lubuskiej w okresie II wojny światowej*, in: *Kultura fizyczna mniejszości polskiej w Niemczech*, edited by T. Jurek, Gorzów Wlkp. 2012, pp. 39-51.

⁶⁸ K. Walczewski, *Rok olimpijski 1944 w Oflagu II C Woldenberg*, in: *Ruch olimpijski na Ziemi Gorzowskiej*, Gorzów Wlkp. 2007, pp. 43-57.

⁶⁹ W. Lipoński, *On the necessity to initiate research on sport in World War II concentration camps and POW camps*, "Studies in Physical Culture and Tourism" 2012, issue 1, pp. 5-9; J. Witkowska, *British sport in POW camps during World War II*, "Studies in Physical Culture and Tourism" 2012, issue 1, pp. 10-15. Cf. also W. Łukaszun, *W niewoli walczone także sportem i tradycją. Międzynarodowy sportowy bieg myśliwski w Oflagu IV c Colditz w 1941 roku*, "Rocznik Naukowy AWFis w Gdańsku" 2016, vol. XXVI, pp. 154-158.

⁷⁰ W. Półchłopek, *Igrzyska olimpijskie w obozach jenieckich (1940-1944)*, "Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny" 1996, vol. 19, pp. 21-28; Idem, *Kultura fizyczna i sport w oficerskich obozach jeńców wojennych w III Rzeszy (na przykładzie Oflagu VII A Murnau)*, "Kultura Fizyczna" 1997, issues 11-12, pp. 25-28; Idem, *Przejawy życia sportowego w obozach jenieckich w Lamsdorf w latach II wojny światowej*, in: *Szkice z dziejów obozów w Lamsdorf / Łambinowicach. Historia i współczesność*, edited by E. Nowak, Opole 1998, pp. 50-58; Idem, *Formy kultury fizycznej i ich propagowanie w obozach jenieckich na terenie III Rzeszy*, "Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny" 1999, vol. 22, pp. 19-29; Idem, *Działalność Wojskowego*

In 2002, he published a monograph entitled *Wychowanie fizyczne i sport żołnierzy polskich w obozach jenieckich Wehrmachtu i NKWD (1939-1945)* [The physical education and sports activity of Polish soldiers in Wehrmacht and NKVD POW camps (1939-1945)].⁷¹ It is a major publication in Polish sports historiography in the past dozen years and the first one that dwells on sport played by Polish POWs in both German and Soviet captivity. Regarding the German POW camps, the author focuses on such issues as: the legal framework and organisation of sports structures in POW camps, types of physical education and competitive sport, the promotion of sport, the commemoration of POWs from the Olympic years (1940, 1944), and the educational activity of POWs in the field of physical education. All of these issues are discussed in detail based on extensive source materials and literature on the subject. Worthy of special mention is the author's comparison of the types of POWs' sports activity in two different camp systems: German and Soviet. While discussing the approach of Nazi and Soviet camp authorities to POW sports activity, the author states that: "what these two approaches shared was the instrumental attitude to the POWs' sports activity: the camp authorities manipulated the POWs' sports life in order to achieve desired results."⁷²

For the Soviet authorities the acceptable forms of sports activity for Polish prisoners served solely ideological purposes whereas for the Nazi authorities – primarily propaganda purposes.

From 1939 to 1945, in the Third Reich and the occupied countries in Europe, there were 18 concentration camps with hundreds of sub-camps. These camps were the main instrument of terror, exploitation of the prisoner labour and genocide. Besides the underground cultural, artistic and religious movement, the prisoners were engaged in various forms of sports activity.⁷³ Sport in concentration camps was investigated by historiographers through memoirs, the accounts of former prisoners and non-fiction literature.

Klubu Sportowego "Lwów" w Oflagu II C Woldenberg, „Człowiek i Ruch” 2000, issue 1, pp. 36-42; Idem, Wybitni przedstawiciele polskiego sportu w niemieckich i radzieckich obozach jenieckich podczas II wojny światowej, „Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny” 2001, vol. 24, pp. 55-68; Idem, Wychowanie fizyczne i sport żołnierzy polskich w niemieckich i radzieckich obozach jenieckich. Podsumowanie wyników badań, „Łambinowicki Rocznik Muzealny” 2003, vol. 26, pp. 65-73.

⁷¹ W. Półchłopek, *Wychowanie fizyczne i sport żołnierzy polskich w obozach jenieckich Wehrmachtu i NKWD (1939-1945)*, Opole 2002.

⁷² Ibidem, p. 156.

⁷³ Cf., e.g., J. Jaworska, *Polska sztuka walcząca 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1976, pp. 135-159; I. Urbańska, *Życie kulturalne więźniów w KL Auschwitz w świetle relacji i pamiątek*, Toruń 2005; *Przejawy życia kulturalnego w obozach koncentracyjnych jako forma samoobrony więźniów. Materiały na konferencję naukową*, Lublin 1974; Z. Jagoda, S. Kłodziński, J. Masłowski, *Życie kulturalne w obozie oświęcimskim*, „Przegląd Lekarski” 1974, issue 14, pp. 19-39.

The first research text on this issue is the article by Zdzisław Ryn and Stanisław Kłodziński entitled *Patologia sportu w obozie koncentracyjnym Oświęcim-Brzezinka* [The pathology of sport in the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp], published in 1974 in the *Przegląd Lekarski* journal.⁷⁴ The authors employ the concept of *quasi-sport* or *pseudosport*, which is contrasted with sport in the proper sense of the word. The term quasi-sport is used to refer to all sports and pseudosports to exercises administered by camp officers and guards on prisoners, which were designed to exterminate them physically and mentally. These refined “sports exercises” were also a form of repression against prisoners for even the slightest infringements of regulations. The descriptions of various punitive physical exercises provide an image of camp sport, rightly referred to as *quasi-sport*. Camp prisoners were also engaged in real sport, played out of their own free will. At Auschwitz, the most popular sports were football, boxing, team games and gymnastics. For both the participants and the observers, sport served an integrative function. As the authors say, “sport in every form provided a temporary shift to a non-camp reality; it offered recreation and mental relaxation”⁷⁵.

Much more extensive information about sport in concentration camps is provided by Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz. In his large monograph on the resistance movement in Nazi concentration camps, he discusses sport in the chapter devoted to cultural life.⁷⁶ He analyses the phenomenon by elaborating upon various forms of sports activity in such concentration camps as Auschwitz, Majdanek, Stutthof, Gross-Rosen, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Buchenwald, Dora-Mittelbau, Neuengamme, Hannover-Stöcken, and Flossenbürg. Obviously, sport could be played only by a restricted group of better nourished prisoners. However, as the author argues, sports activity, despite its limited range, served an integrative function in the prisoners’ communities, providing a sense of unity and solidarity.⁷⁷

The leading sport was football, which enjoyed the greatest popularity in the Gross-Rosen concentration camp, as we learn from a short source-based contribution by Piotr Weiser.⁷⁸ He found that in 1943 there had been more than a hundred footballers in the camp, playing in a dozen teams, including national teams composed of Polish, German, Czech and Russian prisoners. Special excitement was generated by “international” games, which were attended by nearly all healthy prisoners. According to the author, those matches even attracted interest from the “Muslims”. In Piotr Weiser’s view, “the games competed by Poles were something more than just a sports

⁷⁴ Z. Ryn, S. Kłodziński, *Patologia sportu w obozie koncentracyjnym Oświęcim-Brzezinka*, “Przegląd Lekarski” 1974, issue 1, pp. 46-58.

⁷⁵ Ibidem, p. 57.

⁷⁶ K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Ruch oporu w hitlerowskich obozach koncentracyjnych 1933-1945*, Warsaw 1979, pp. 294-296.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, p. 294.

⁷⁸ P. Weiser, *Mecze piłki nożnej w obozie koncentracyjnym Gross-Rosen*, Wałbrzych 2003. This short contribution, published by the Gross-Rosen Museum, remained unnoticed for a long time. Its informative content and the socio-historical analysis were publicised by Andrzej Krajewski in his article “Futbol w piekle” (Football in hell), which was published in the “Polityka” magazine (No. 22, 2013, pp. 50-52).

event. An average spectator expected a victory and favourable results brought hopes for freedom.”⁷⁹

Polish historiographical sources devoted to sport in concentration camps also include popular science publications and journalistic texts. They play a significant role in disseminating the researchers' findings and fostering historical awareness.⁸⁰

Another theme in the history of Polish sport in 1939-1945 is the engagement of athletes in combat on the front lines and in the military resistance of the Polish Underground State. This issue is most frequently discussed in sports biographies. It is worth mentioning examples of works in which the war and occupation themes are strongly emphasised; i.e. the biographies of the most outstanding athletes of pre-war Poland.

In 1996, Hanna Zdebska published an interesting socio-historical study on one of the most prominent Polish skiers in the history of the sport, a three-time Olympian, Bronisław Czech. As the book was well received by the readers, it has been re-edited twice.⁸¹ The underground activity of the runner Janusz Kusociński, a 1932 Olympic champion, has been thoroughly investigated by Bogdan Tuszyński. His book *Ostatnie okrążenie „Kusego”* [Kusy's last lap] provides the most comprehensive insights into the athlete's life in historiography.⁸² The biography of Stanisław Marusarz, the 1938 world championship runner-up in ski jumping and the legendary Tatra courier, has been published by Wojciech Szatkowski.⁸³ This author has also written an extensive monograph devoted to Polish skiers from the 1924-2003 period. In it, he presents the profiles of Olympians, such as Bronisław Czech, Stanisław Motyka, Stanisław Marusarz, Marian Woyna-Orlewicz, and Stanisław Gąsienica-Sieczka, discussing their war and occupation history.⁸⁴ Similar themes are raised in Paweł Pierzchała's biography of Henryk Reyman, a Wisła Kraków footballer.⁸⁵ The life of Antoni Maszewski, a track and field athlete, Olympian and war hero of Tobruk and Monte Casino, has been popularised by Grzegorz Turlejski.⁸⁶ Another book, written in the same

⁷⁹ Ibidem, pp. 31-32.

⁸⁰ The largest number of these works is devoted to boxing in concentration camps. Cf., e.g., J. Cieślak, A. Molenda, *Tadeusz Pietrzykowski „Teddy” 1917-1991*, Katowice 1995; M. Bogacka, *Bokser z Auschwitz. Losy Tadeusza Pietrzykowskiego*, Warsaw 2012; A. Fedorowicz, *Gladiatorzy z obozów śmierci*, “Focus Historia” 2013, No. 4, pp. 28-37.

⁸¹ H. Zdebska, *Bohater sportowy. Studium indywidualnego przypadku Bronisława Czecha (1908-1944)*, third (extended) edition, Kraków 2007. For earlier works about Bronisław Czech, see K. Chojnacki, M. Krzemińska, A. Matuszyk, *Bronisław Czech (1908-1944)*, Kraków 1983; A. Filar, M. Leyko, *Laury na śniegu. Opowieść o Bronisławie Czechu i Helenie Marusarzównie*, Warsaw 1982, pp. 7-286.

⁸² B. Tuszyński, *Ostatnie okrążenie „Kusego”*, Warsaw 1990. Cf. also L. M. Bartelski, *Janusz Kusociński*, Warsaw 1979; B. Tuszyński, „Kusy”, Warsaw 2000.

⁸³ W. Szatkowski, *Stanisław Marusarz król nart*, Zakopane 1999.

⁸⁴ W. Szatkowski, *Od Marusarza do Małysza. Polscy skoczkowie 1924-2003*, Zakopane 2004.

⁸⁵ P. Pierzchała, *Z białą gwiazdą w sercu. Wiślacka legenda: Henryk Reyman 1897-1963*, Kraków 2006.

⁸⁶ G. Turlejski, *Antoni Maszewski olimpijczyk i żołnierz*, Kamięnsk 2008.

vein, is a biography of Józef Noji, also a track and field athlete and a 1936 Olympian, who was sent to Auschwitz for his underground activity and murdered there in 1943.⁸⁷ There are a number of available publications devoted to the life of Henryk Dobrzański, an outstanding Polish equestrian in the 1920s, a 1928 Olympian and the first partisan of the Polish Underground Army. Two works deserve mention: the 2005 second edition of the attractively published album "*Hubal*" *mjr Henryk Dobrzański 1897-1940* ["Hubal" Major Henryk Dobrzański 1897-1940] by Henryk Sobierajski and Andrzej Dyszyński⁸⁸ and the 2014 biography *Major Hubal. Historia prawdziwa* [Major Hubal: A true story] by Łukasz Ksyta.⁸⁹ This category of publications also includes the most recent biography of the track and field athlete Halina Konopacka, the first Pole to win an Olympic gold medal (in 1928). Written by Maria Rotkiewicz, the book entitled *Z radości życia. Halina Konopacka* [From the Joy of Life: Halina Konopacka]⁹⁰ emphasises the theme of the war years in the athlete's life. A number of valuable insights about the war history of Polish athletes have been offered by Renata Urban. In her source-based contributions she focuses on the elite of the equestrian sport.⁹¹ Bogusław Szwedo has investigated the fate of athletes who have been awarded the War Order of *Virtuti Militari* for their combat actions during WW2.⁹² The wartime lives of nine outstanding Polish athletes from the interwar period were brought into the spotlight by Gabriela Jatkowska in her book entitled *Przerwane igrzyska* [The interrupted games].⁹³

A large number of athletes took part in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. Among the fighters were athletes with considerable achievements, including 28 Olympians, as well as young athletes who were at the start of their international careers on the eve of the war. The engagement of athletes in the Warsaw Uprising is addressed in historiographical publications, such as articles by the sports historians Jerzy Chełmecki and Robert Gawkowski and the sportswriter Zbigniew Chmielewski.⁹⁴ In 2014, the

⁸⁷ F. Graś, *Józef Noji. Sportowiec i patriota*, Gorzów Wlkp. - Drezdenko 1987.

⁸⁸ H. Sobierajski, A. Dyszyński, „*Hubal*” *mjr Henryk Dobrzański 1897-1940*, second edition, Warsaw 2005.

⁸⁹ Ł. Ksyta, *Major Hubal. Historia prawdziwa*, Warsaw 2014.

⁹⁰ M. Rotkiewicz, *Z radości życia. Halina Konopacka*, Warsaw 2018. Cf. also an earlier paper about Halina Konopacka by the same author: *Mistrzyni dysku, pióra i palety* published in: H. Konopacka, *Wznosiłam świat miłością*, Warsaw 1994, pp. 29-65 and H. Konopacka, *Któregoś dnia*, Warsaw 2008, pp. 32-55 and a much more extended version in: M. Rotkiewicz, *Światło Olimpij*, Warsaw 2011, pp. 188-241.

⁹¹ R. Urban, *Jeźdźcy-olimpijczycy Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Gorzów Wlkp. 2012, Idem, *Losy polskich jeźdźców olimpijczyków w latach drugiej wojny światowej i po jej zakończeniu*, in: *Sport na przełomie tysiącleci: szanse i nadzieje*, edited by Z. Dziubiński, Warsaw 2000, pp. 214-223.

⁹² B. Szwedo, *Na bieżni i w okopach. Sportowcy odznaczeni Orderem Wojennym Virtuti Militari 1914-1921, 1939-1945*, Rzeszów 2011.

⁹³ G. Jatkowska, *Przerwane igrzyska. Niezwykli sportowcy II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw 2017.

⁹⁴ R. Gawkowski, *Sportowcy na barykadach*, "Rzeczpospolita" No. 229 of 2 October 2014 r. (Supplement to the "Rzeczpospolita" daily "Rzecz o Powstaniu"); J. Chełmecki, *Udział pracowników i studentów AWF w II wojnie światowej i Powstaniu Warszawskim*, "Kultura Fizyczna" 2004, Nos. 11-12, pp. 7-10.

latter published a richly illustrated book entitled *Sportowcy w Powstaniu Warszawskim* [Athletes in the Warsaw Uprising],⁹⁵ which provides new findings on this topic. The book was re-edited three years later under the same title.⁹⁶ This work shows the relations between the sports community and the Polish Army and the Home Army, emphasising the 1944 uprising. It also features rich iconographic material.

The latest monograph on the topic is the book *Igrzyska życia i śmierci* [The games of life and death] by Agnieszka Cabała, an acclaimed young researcher of the Warsaw Uprising. Her nearly 400-page book contains source-based texts about 34 athletes who fought in the Warsaw Uprising.⁹⁷ However, these pieces are not biographies of the athletes but analytical texts about their sports careers and engagement in the uprising. Underlying each text is the author's question: what kind of person was the athlete? Thanks to this research focus, readers are provided with new images of the athletes from the pre-war period, images that are markedly different from the ones presented in the previous works on this topic. In the conclusion of this extremely appealing book, the author states that:

There was a very large proportion of athletes fighting in the regular army, in the underground army and in the Warsaw Uprising. Why? For a simple reason: this group is endowed with special character traits which predispose its members to take up fight on the field and in life. Courage bordering on bravado. Passion and determination. A strong psyche and a winner's mentality. A focus on accomplishing an immediate task. Faith in success. Last but not least, perseverance and consistency in action.⁹⁸

The subject literature to date is lacking in a monograph that would provide a comprehensive record of the combat activities undertaken by athletes during WW2. The few available articles on this topic offer only fragmentary insights, dwell on randomly selected facts and lack general conclusions.⁹⁹ It is only the activity of the pre-war Olympians that has been relatively well documented and systematically described.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Z. Chmielewski, *Sportowcy w Powstaniu Warszawskim*, Warsaw 2014.

⁹⁶ Z. Chmielewski, *Sportowcy w Powstaniu Warszawskim*, Warsaw 2017.

⁹⁷ A. Cabała, *Igrzyska życia i śmierci. Sportowcy w Powstaniu Warszawskim*, Oświęcim 2018.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 315.

⁹⁹ E. J. Kuś, *Sportowcy polscy na stadionach i w okopach II wojny światowej*, in: *II Krajowa Konferencja Naukowa Polonijna Kultura Fizyczna (Rogi 25-26 października 1982 r.)*, Poznań 1986, pp. 209-246; Z. Kapała, *Losy i postawy członków „Sokola” na Górnym Śląsku w latach wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej*, in: *Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne „Sokół” na Górnym Śląsku*, edited by H. Przybylski i J. Ślężyński, Katowice 1986, pp. 75-87; S. Chemicz, *Udział sportowców Krakowa na frontach II wojny światowej (1939-1945) i w antyhitlerowskim ruchu oporu*, in: *Prace Studium Wychowania Fizycznego i Sportu Uczelni Technicznych Nr 10 (Materiały z I Konferencji Naukowej „Udział sportowców i działaczy kultury fizycznej w wojnie wyzwoleniczej narodu polskiego 1939-1945)*, edited by L. Wojciechowski, Koszalin 1985, pp. 94-103; M. Nowak, *Losy absolwentów CIWF-AWF w latach 1939-1945*, "Roczniki Naukowe AWF w Poznaniu" 1983, vol. 32, pp. 179-187; M. Boruszczak, *Sportowcy polscy w zmaganiach wojennych na obczyźnie (1939-1945)*, in: *Funkcje utylitarne kultury fizycznej*, edited by L. Gondek, Gdańsk 1991, pp. 142-192.

¹⁰⁰ R. Wryk, *Olimpijczycy Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Poznań 2015; Idem, *Sport i wojna. Losy polskich olimpijczyków w latach drugiej wojny światowej*, Poznań 2016; Idem, *Polscy olimpijczycy na fron-*

Another research topic addressed in this paper is the issue of human losses for Polish sport in WW2. In the academic community, this issue was first raised in 1983 in Koszalin during the conference “The engagement of athletes and sports officials in the liberation war of the Polish nation 1939-1945” organised by the Koszalin Higher School of Engineering. Its participants argued for the need to conduct research on the human losses among Polish athletes during WW2 and to formulate its methodological and organisational assumptions. They also indicated an organisational model for this research: the Central Record of Polish Intelligentsia Losses at the Western Institute in Poznań.¹⁰¹ The conference’s proposal to establish a nationwide research team was not embraced by sport historians. Hence, research was conducted on an individual basis in Poznań and Warsaw.

At the Institute of History at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, research has focused on human losses among members of the academic sports community. Its findings were published in the 1991 book *Straty osobowe Akademickiego Związku Sportowego w latach II wojny światowej 1939-1945* [Human losses among members of the Academic Sports Association during World War II 1939-1945] by Ryszard Wryk,¹⁰² the first historiographical monograph devoted to human losses among Polish athletes. It provides an overview of the human losses among the AZS members and includes bios of 241 athletes who were victims of WW2. The monograph’s source-based findings have been cited by historians investigating WW2.¹⁰³

In Warsaw, research on human losses for Polish sport was undertaken by Bogdan Tuszyński in the early 1990s. In its first stage, he focused on the fate of athletes who were taken into Soviet captivity in the autumn of 1939. In 1993, after several years of research on this topic, Tuszyński published a book entitled *Przerwany bieg. Sportowcy z Kozielska, Ostaszkowa i Starobielska* [Interrupted run: Athletes from the Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobielsk POW camps].¹⁰⁴ In it he presented the profiles of 153 athletes, coaches, instructors, sports activists, and officials from the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training, who were all prisoners of Soviet POW camps, brutally murdered in the spring of 1940. The author’s point of departure was a list published by the *Tempo* sports daily in April 1990 which included the names of 75 athletes and officials who were held prisoner in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobielsk

tach II wojny światowej, in: *Historia polskiego i niemieckiego sportu w XIX i XX wieku. Idee, ludzie, polityka i kultura*, edited by D. Wojtaszyn, W. Stepiński, J. Eider, Poznań 2016, pp. 203-219.

¹⁰¹ R. Wryk, *O potrzebie badań nad stratami osobowymi sportu polskiego w latach 1939-1945*, in: *Prace Studium Wychowania Fizycznego i Sportu Uczelni Technicznych nr 10 (Materiały z I Konferencji Naukowej „Udział sportowców i działaczy kultury fizycznej w wojnie wyzwoleniczej narodu polskiego 1939-1945)*, edited by L. Wojciechowski, Koszalin 1985, pp. 19-27.

¹⁰² R. Wryk, *Straty osobowe Akademickiego Związku Sportowego w latach II wojny światowej 1939-1945*, Poznań 1991.

¹⁰³ Cf., e.g., P. Matusak, *Edukacja i kultura Polski Podziemnej 1939-1945*, Siedlce 1997.

¹⁰⁴ Bogdan Tuszyński, *Przerwany bieg. Sportowcy z Kozielska, Ostaszkowa i Starobielska*, Warsaw 1993.

and then murdered by the NKVD. Tuszyński drew upon the most recent literature of the subject, notably on Jerzy Tucholski's monumental work *Mord w Katyniu* [Murder in Katyn]. His other major sources included "Materiały do epitafiów katyńskich" ["Materials for Katyn epitaphs"] and the documentation containing the lists of Starobielsk, Kozelsk and Ostashkov prisoners, which was provided by the Soviet Union to Poland in April 1990. As a result, Tuszyński extended the original list to include 153 athletes, thereby significantly contributing to the research on human losses for Polish sport during WW2. Most of the biographical notes in this work are source-based in nature and were written on the basis of the Central Military Archives materials and printed sources. As the author had accessed vital records, he corrected many previous errors that occurred in Polish sports biographies. He also managed to enrich the athletes' biographies with new facts, which had hitherto been unknown to historians.

The bios differ in length and do not follow a predetermined consistent format. The narrative content is determined, on the one hand, by the sources and, on the other hand, by the athlete's position in sport and physical education. The author fails to explain what qualification criterion he has adopted in placing the Polish athletes on the list of the victims of Soviet genocide. He only generally states that he wants to "reveal the names and biographies of all officers held in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobielsk whose sports, social and professional activity was linked with physical culture". Hence, besides outstanding athletes, Olympians, international event medal winners, Polish champions and record holders, the book mentions individuals whose sports activity is described concisely: "he took interest in sport", "motorcyclist and rally driver", "chess and bridge player", "top athlete at school and in the regiment", "successful in fencing, football and skiing" or "enjoyed horseback riding".

Tuszyński's book provides a number of valuable insights. It is hard to underestimate its contribution to the biographical writings and research on Polish sport during WW2. This work is quoted not only by sports historians but also by researchers investigating the Katyn massacre and the martyrology and extermination of the Polish intelligentsia in WW2. The case of the Polish athletes murdered by the Soviets in the spring of 1940 was brought to life by Tuszyński in his mid-1990s press articles, published in the sports press, *Kultura fizyczna*, *Życie Warszawy*, *Polska Zbrojna* and the New York-based *Nowy Dziennik*. His publications from this research area are included in Maria Harz's 1993 *Bibliografia zbrodni katyńskiej* [The bibliography of the Katyn massacre].¹⁰⁵

Investigating the fate of the Polish athletes who were taken into Soviet captivity in the autumn of 1939 was the first stage of Tuszyński's research on the human losses for Polish sport in 1939-1945. The next stage entailed a truly daunting task for a single historian: Tuszyński aimed to comprehensively investigate a problem which for years had held the status of a research postulate in Polish sports historiography. The author set himself the following objectives:

¹⁰⁵ M. Harz, *Bibliografia zbrodni katyńskiej. Materiały z lat 1943-1993*, Warsaw 1993.

a) to verify the names of WW2 victims (1 September 1939 – end of 1945) which have so far been mentioned in sports literature; b) to supplement and enrich their biographies with information from the archives in order to eliminate the long-existing errors and inadequacies; c) to expand further research to the maximum in order to reveal new and numerous victims among athletes, coaches, physical education instructors and teachers, officials and patrons of Polish sport.

To accomplish his objectives, Bogdan Tuszyński conducted meticulous research in archives and libraries, which resulted in the 1999 extensive publication *Księga sportowców polskich, ofiar II wojny światowej 1939-1945* [The book of Polish athletes – WW2 victims 1939-1945].¹⁰⁶ The book contains 1,421 biographical notes of people of sport who were victims of WW2. All of the entries are provided with reference information, as is typically done in research biographies. Most of them feature photographs, which makes the book more appealing. This contribution was very well received by sports historians and WW2 researchers. It was frequently discussed and reviewed in the press and journals. The author's research efforts were appreciated by the Polish Olympic Committee, which in the year 2000 conferred on Tuszyński the award of "the Olympic laurel".

Bogdan Tuszyński offered yet another contribution devoted to the human losses for Polish sport in 2006, when he published the book *Za cenę życia. Sport Polski Walczącej 1939-1945* [For the price of life: The sport of Fighting Poland, 1939-1945]. In the first part, titled *Sport za cenę życia* [Sport for the price of life],¹⁰⁷ he included a schedule of the most important Polish sports events. The author focused not only on the social dimension of the events of 1939-1945 but also on the fate of the outstanding athletes, coaches, officials as well as sports clubs and associations from the pre-war period. The second part, *Walka – Ofiary – Straty* [Struggle – Victims – Losses], features the list of 1,511 Polish athletes who lost their lives in WW2. The list contains concise biographical entries, written in an encyclopaedic format. The author did in fact tremendous research work, thereby making a permanent contribution to sports historiography and the history of WW2. The list is extended by appendices which categorise human losses according to the circumstances of death, age group, occupational background, sports disciplines, regional distribution and club affiliation. Moreover, the author included a list of 59 Polish Olympians who had lost their lives during WW2. This is an important finding which provides significant new insight into the war history of the elite of Polish pre-war athletes, to which the Olympians belonged.¹⁰⁸ The appendices also feature the lists of 133 athletes fallen in the Warsaw Uprising and 263 athletes murdered by the NKVD in the spring of 1940. The total number of 1,511 athletes who lost their lives in WW2 is shocking. However, we also need to remember about a large group of Jewish athletes who were victims of that

¹⁰⁶ B. Tuszyński, *Księga sportowców polskich ofiar II wojny światowej 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1999.

¹⁰⁷ B. Tuszyński, *Za cenę życia. Sport Polski Walczącej 1939-1945*, Warsaw 2006.

¹⁰⁸ It is known today that out of the 327 Polish pre-war Olympians, as many as 65 lost their lives during WW2. Cf. R. Wryk, *Sport i wojna. Losy polskich olimpijczyków w latach drugiej wojny światowej*, Poznań 2016, pp. 203-220.

war. The necessary inclusion of this community in further studies is bound to provide a more accurate, albeit still incomplete, image of human losses for Polish sport in that most cruel of all wars.¹⁰⁹

By way of conclusion, it should be stated that the literature on Polish sport during WW2 is relatively rich. However, as this overview has shown, most of these works are of a fragmentary and a contributory nature. With the exception of the issue of sport in POW camps, which was dealt with in a separate monograph, there are no comprehensive publications devoted to underground sport, sport in internment and concentration camps, sport in the Polish Armed Forces in the West. Nor are there any monographs dealing with the engagement of athletes in combat on various WW2 fronts and in the Polish Underground State's armed and civilian underground activity. Thus our historiography is lacking in a comprehensive and multifaceted overview of Polish sport in 1939-1945. The contributions by Jerzy Gaj,¹¹⁰ contained in the synthetic works on Polish sport, or the general sports history publications by Ryszard Wroczyński¹¹¹ and Wojciech Lipoński¹¹² do not fully explore the topic in question cognitively or interpretively. Hence, the issue of Polish sport during WW2 is yet to be comprehensively and thoroughly investigated.

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¹⁰⁹ To complete the list of publications from this research area, two other works should be mentioned: W. Moska, *Polskie straty gdańskiego sportu w okresie II wojny światowej*, Gdańsk 2004; J. Dębski, *Pilkarze, narciarze i działacze Towarzystwa Sportowego Wisła Kraków i Wisła Zakopane w Koncentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau 1940-1945*, "Biuletyn Towarzystwa Opieki na Oświęcimiu" 2007, No. 51, pp. 63-77. In the first one, the author presents the list of human losses among the athletes from the Free City of Danzing, which includes 413 athletes. Jerzy Dębski, after a detailed search query, found that out of the 24 Wisła Kraków and Wisła Zakopane athletes held in the Auschwitz concentration camp, a total of 21 had lost their lives there.

¹¹⁰ J. Gaj, K. Hądzelek, *Dzieje kultury fizycznej w Polsce w XIX i XX wieku. Koncepcje, uwarunkowania i efekty instytucjonalnej działalności*, Poznań 1991 (The chapter "Polska kultura fizyczna w okresie okupacji ziem polskich", pp. 215-228); J. Gaj, K. Hądzelek, *Dzieje kultury fizycznej w Polsce*, Poznań 1997 (The chapter: "Polska kultura fizyczna w okresie okupacji ziem polskich", pp. 170-180); *Zarys historii sportu w Polsce 1867-1997*, edited by J. Gaj and B. Woltmann, Gorzów Wlkp. 1999 (The chapter: "Straty biologiczne i materialne ruchu sportowego i jego nielegalna działalność organizacyjno-sportowa w czasie II wojny światowej", pp. 147-158).

¹¹¹ R. Wroczyński, *Powszechne dzieje wychowania fizycznego i sportu*, Wrocław 1979 (The subchapter "Wychowanie fizyczne i sport w okresie okupacji", pp. 341-343). Idem, *Powszechne dzieje wychowania fizycznego i sportu*, 2nd extended edition, Wrocław 1985 (The subchapter: "Wychowanie fizyczne i sport w czasie drugiej wojny światowej", pp. 347-349).

¹¹² W. Lipoński, *Historia sportu na tle rozwoju kultury fizycznej*, Warsaw 2012 (The subchapter "Sport podczas II wojny światowej", pp. 563-572).

ABSTRACT

The paper addresses the issue of Polish sport during World War II (WW2). This problem concerns two spheres: the everyday life of Poles under Nazi occupation and the civilian underground movement. In broader terms, the paper dwells upon the fate of Poles during the war. Despite considerable literature on this topic, the Polish sport of that period is still awaiting a comprehensive source-based study. The paper shows the position of Polish sport in the years 1939-1945 in Polish historiography. In the literature devoted to this subject, historians have investigated such problems as the underground sports movement in the General Government and the Reich-annexed territories, sport in POW camps, sports life in Nazi concentration camps, the engagement of athletes in campaigns on all war fronts as well as in the armed and civil underground resistance movement of the Polish Underground State, and human losses for Polish sport in the years 1939-1945. Although the literature on Polish sport during WW2 is quite abundant, most of the studies are fragmentary and quite often merely contributory in nature. As yet, Polish historiography has not ventured to produce a synthetic study offering a multifaceted discussion of the problem of Polish sport during WW2.

TOMASZ SIKORSKI
Szczecin

A PROPAGANDISED IMAGE OF POLISH SPORT IN THE POLISH FILM CHRONICLE DURING THE STALINIST PERIOD (1949-1956)

Sport in the Polish People's Republic, like other areas of social and cultural life, was influenced by political (and in a way also ideological), social and economic factors. From the autumn of 1944 onwards, the Red Army-controlled territory saw the re-establishment of local associations, organisations (e.g., the Young Men's Christian Association – YMCA, the Academic Sports Association – AZS, the “Sokół” Gymnastics Society, etc.) and sports clubs. Despite the destroyed sports infrastructure, relatively soon the first competitions were contested in football, basketball, volleyball, track and field athletics, boxing, motorcycling and cycling. The lively and spontaneous sports movement was joined by pre-war officials, predominantly nonpartisan, without any political-ideological background but equipped with a wealth of experience.

This “lively” process was brought to a gradual halt in early 1946 with the establishment of the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training (PUWFiPW) at the Ministry of National Defence and the State Council of Physical Education and Military Training (PRWFiPW). Both institutions were to provide training to new teams of instructors and coaches, prepare draft legislation on general physical education, coordinate military training, and manage the reconstruction or construction of sports facilities.

The PUWFiPW's “ideological” objective was to “develop and maintain the physical fitness of Polish citizens with a view to educating and training Citizen Soldiers for the Polish armed forces, who would defend Poland's borders and its democratic system.”¹ The institution came to be headed by Tadeusz Kuchar, a nonpartisan pre-war official in Lwów (now Ukrainian Lviv). That nomination was designed to give the impression of continued tradition and full pluralism in Polish sport. The PUWFiPW and the PRWFiPW oversaw the work of the Association of the Polish Sports Associations (ZPZS), also established in March 1946, and headed by Alfred Loth. The same

¹ A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy w polityce państwa 1944-1989*, Kraków 2012, p. 91; A. Nowakowski, *Dekrety styczniowe 1946 roku o kulturze fizycznej*, [in:] *Historyk i historia. In honorem Henryk Dominiczak*, edited by J. Walczak, Częstochowa 1999, pp. 115–123.

month saw the reactivation of the Polish Olympic Committee, whose task was to maintain relations with the international Olympic movement.

In the first years after the war, transformations in Polish sport were primarily influenced by two parties: the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which boasted rich pre-war sports traditions, and the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), which had little experience in this area. At the same time, the Polish People's Party (PSL) had already, in 1944, reactivated the Union of Rural Youth "Wici", along with its associated sports clubs (since the pre-war time), and the People's Sports Teams (LZS) that had formally been subjected to the Association of Peasants' Self-Help (ZSCh). Even though the two "allied" parties, the PPS and PPR, shared the view that it was necessary to make sport and physical culture accessible to everyone, they differed in their approaches to the organisation of the sports movement. The PPR was in favour of adopting Soviet solutions although initially it did not specify their scope. By contrast, the PPS was more inclined to build on the model followed in pre-war Poland. Arguments were made for the need to separate sport and physical education from military training and it was proposed to establish a ministry of physical education.

This relative pluralism at the conceptual level faded as the PPR strengthened its grip following the rigged parliamentary elections in January 1947. As a result, in the spring of 1947, work began on the project of reorganising the sports management structures. In February 1948, pursuant to the law on "the general obligation of professional training, physical education and military training for the youth and of the organisation of physical education and sport", the PRFWiPW and the PUW-FiPW were replaced with a new Soviet-modelled central office: the Central Office of Physical Culture (GUKF). Soon after, provincial offices of physical culture and county inspectorates of physical culture were established.² The execution of general recommendations (guidelines) pertaining to physical culture and sport was to be supervised by the Superior Council for Youth and Physical Culture Issues, headed by Stefan Ignar. Military training, in turn, was to be directly managed by the General Organisation "Service for Poland" ("Służba Polsce", SP), whose chief commandant was Col. Edward Braniewski. The organisation was politically controlled by the PPR and then by its successor, the Polish United Workers' Party – PUWP (PZPR) via youth organisations, such as the Union of Rural Youth (ZMW) and the Union of Polish Youth (ZMP).³

² P. Godlewski, *Sowietyzacja sportu w Polsce (1948-1956)*, [in:] *Studia z dziejów kultury fizycznej. Księga Pamiątkowa dla Profesora Bernarda Woltmanna*, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2002, pp. 448-450; Id., *Proces upolityczniania sportu w PRL*, [in:] *Z dziejów turystyki i sportu w PRL*, edited by T. Jurek, K. Obodyński, S. Zaborniak, Rzeszów 2009, pp. 150-151.

³ "Service for Poland" was dissolved in 1955 and replaced in 1958 by the Voluntary Labour Corps. For more on SP, cf. K. Lesiakowski, *Werbunek młodzieży do brygad Powszechnej Organizacji „Służba Polsce” (1948-1955)*, "Dzieje Najnowsze" 2004, issue 2, pp. 155-175; Id., *Powszechna Organizacja „Służba Polsce” (1948-1955): powstanie, działalność, likwidacja*, vol. 1-2, Łódź 2008; L. Szuba, *Powszechna Organizacja „Służba Polsce” w latach 1948-1955*, Lublin 2006.

The 40-person GUKF comprised representatives of several ministries (e.g. National Defence, Health and Education) as well as delegates of youth organisations, sports associations, trade unions and the Ministry of Public Security (e.g. Apolinary Minecki). The establishment of GUKF triggered the process of “purges” both in central and local sports management institutions. Tadeusz Kuchar was replaced with a party apparatchik, Lucjan Motyka (before the war he was linked with the Youth Organisation at the Workers’ University Association – OMTUR). A leading ideological role at the time was played by GUKF Secretary, Henryk Szemberg, a former adjutant to Gen. Karol Świerczewski, employed at the Main Political-Educational Board of the Polish Army, and Józef Bordziłowski, a Soviet general who represented the Ministry of National Defence (MON). Pre-war officials belonging to the “alien class” were removed from managerial and other positions in the sports unions and associations at the provincial and county levels. They were accused of favouring “the reactionary bourgeois trends” in sport. As part of the so-called “class struggle” they were replaced by young and ideologically trained “comrades”. Old and experienced officials in sports clubs and associations were substituted by party apparatchiks. Already in 1947, “Sokół” units (originally called nests) and the YMCA were delegalized. A year later, the AZS was reorganised while the ZPZS and the ZRSP (The Polish Workers’ Sports Federation) were dissolved (the latter’s structures were subordinated to the Inter-Association Council of Physical Culture and Sport at the Central Council of Trade Unions – CRZZ). By a superior decision, the youth organisations (OMTUR, ZMW “Wici”, ZMW and ZMD – the Union of Democratic Youth) were also “unified”, forming the Union of Polish Youth (ZMP).⁴ On 22 December 1948, sports associations and clubs were, as part of the new organisational framework, subordinated to the following five institutions, the Union of Occupational Associations (KCZZ), ZSCh, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of National Defence and the AZS. Physical education and sport in rural areas were to be coordinated by the Central Council of Rural Sport, which oversaw the local units of LZS. The lowest units in this structure were sports circles in companies, universities, city districts, etc. No sports club could work outside this framework; in this way, the Communist party and the administrative-state apparatus took full control of Polish sport.

The Soviet-modelled centralisation of sport, along with its propaganda ideologisation (more specifically, Stalinisation) gained momentum after the so-called unification of the workers’ movement and the establishment of the Polish United Workers’ Party (15 December 1948). Of major importance was the resolution by the Political Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee (CC) “On the issue of physical culture and sport”, which deserves a little more attention. In the very introduction, it was emphasised that sport and physical culture are an inseparable component of the construction of “socialist foundations of People’s Poland” and the formation of a human being as

⁴ For more on ZMP cf., e.g., M. Wierzbicki, *Związek Młodzieży Polskiej i jego członkowie: studium z dziejów funkcjonowania stalinowskiej organizacji młodzieżowej*, Warsaw 2006; „*My z Zetempe...*”. *Upadek i likwidacja Związku Młodzieży Polskiej (1955-1957)*, edited by M. Wierzbicki, Warsaw 2004.

“a conscious creator of the new just system”. Much in line with the ideological offensive, criticism was targeted at the pre-war traditions and experiences of sport and physical culture. The resolution said:

“The Sanatian regime used sport to divert the youth’s and the working masses’ attention from the struggle fought by the working class. The sports organisations managed by the Sanatian dignitaries raised their members in the spirit of nationalism and chauvinism. There was no commitment to the massification of physical education. Sport was primarily available to the owning classes, and the sports successes achieved by talented young people from the working class were frequently exploited by the reactionary ‘patrons’ of sport to increase their incomes. The countryside was totally neglected when it comes to sport; it was intentionally underdeveloped economically and culturally and artificially pitted against the city”.⁵

“The new Poland”, with the new socialist, and thus progressive, just and “truly democratic” system was to guarantee each citizen access to physical culture and sport.

“Poland heading towards socialism should be a country of healthy people who enjoy life, a country where physical education and sport will develop willpower, composure, courage, perseverance and foster collective life and effort, and where people are committed to working for the benefit of their socialist homeland and to defending its borders, if necessary. General access to physical education and mass sport in People’s Poland is the multiplication of efforts undertaken by the builders of socialist Poland; it is a way of educating society in the spirit of the international solidarity of the forces of progress and it is also part of the struggle for permanent and democratic peace”, the resolution said.⁶

The resolution also confirmed the legitimacy of the full centralisation of Polish sport and of the enhancement of its ideological (Marxist) “quality” in accordance with Soviet models. It also emphasised the need for “ridding” Polish sport of “bourgeois” traces and for instilling an appropriate ideological atmosphere. The document also raised the issue of training new professional and also ideologically conscious staff equipped with high political and educational qualifications. Regarding organisational issues, the Political Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee (CC) announced “the subordination of physical culture and sport to a single national and social supervising authority”. The newly established Central Office of Physical Culture (GKKF) at the Council of Ministers, which was *de facto* dependent on the ruling party (The Department of Propaganda and Agitation at the PUWP CC), was meant to manage, coordinate and supervise physical culture and sport, as well as to enhance the “ideological and professional level of propaganda”.

Barely three months after the adoption of the above resolution, the Sejm (the Polish parliament) passed the “Law on the organisation of physical culture and

⁵ Cf. *W sprawie kultury fizycznej i sportu. Uchwała Biura Politycznego KC PZPR z dn. 28 września 1949 r.*, [in:] *O budownictwie partyjnym. Uchwały Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej 1949-1953*, Warsaw 1954, pp. 269–270 [also: *Uchwały i dokumenty w sprawie kultury fizycznej za rok 1950*, Warsaw 1951, pp. 10–11].

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

sport”.⁷ It was then that the GKKF was formally established with L. Motyka, the chairman of the GUKF, appointed as its head. From 1951 onwards, the GKKF started abolishing the sports associations, which were turned into sections of larger sports organisations. What should be viewed as a symbol of the time was the abolishment of traditional (termed “bourgeois” or “Sanatian” by the communist propaganda) club names, such as Wisła, Ruch, Lech or Polonia. Following the Soviet experiences, as in other areas of social and economic life, top positions in the sports movement at the central and regional levels were awarded to trusted and “ideologically conscious” apparatchiks, who were loyal to the PUWP. Most frequently, these were party members who most often had barely any connections with physical culture and sport.⁸ At regular religious sect-like conventicles, old and experienced officials were intimidated and forced to offer self-criticism (as were filmmakers, architects, visual artists and writers). They had to pledge unswerving loyalty to the party’s ideological stance, promise to enhance their “work efficiency” “in the section of sport and physical culture”, and renounce their earlier reactionary approach, attributing it to the lack of class consciousness. The frequent phenomena of drinking among athletes and officials and hooliganism (devastation of sports facilities and intentional destruction of clothing items, particularly trainers) were regarded as remnants of “the bourgeois-capitalist system”. That sports ritual was also marked by bureaucratic reporting, immense statistics, “expert appraisals”, and the obligation to attend regular meetings, trainings and ideological chats.

The new “sports administrators” strongly emphasised ideological, educational and propaganda work. The issues of sport were incorporated into the six-year plan, just like other industries. That policy was designed not only to expand the sports infrastructure or equipment production but also, and perhaps first of all, to eradicate “old habits”, to raise the ideological level and strengthen “class vigilance”. From then onwards, sport was meant to be an inseparable part of politics and ideology. Class consciousness forced the politicisation of sport. That was to be its strength and essence.⁹

The models were to be provided by the Soviet experiences. Based on the principles of Marxism and Leninism and Soviet research achievements, guidelines and hi-

⁷ *Ustawa z dn. 30 XII 1949 r. o organizacji spraw kultury fizycznej i sportu*, [in:] *Uchwały i dokumenty...*, p. 17–21. Cf also: A. Zagórska, A. Nowakowski, *Ustawa o kulturze fizycznej w Polsce z 1949 roku* [in:] *Z najnowszych dziejów kultury fizycznej w Polsce (1918-1989): zagadnienia dydaktyczne dla studentów pedagogiki z wychowaniem fizycznym oraz historii in honorem Zdzisław Pawluczuk*, edited by B. Maksimowski, A. Nowakowski, S. Podobiński, Częstochowa 1999, pp. 73–85.

⁸ For more, cf.: A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 115ff.; Id., „Menadżerowie” sportu ..., pp. 223–236; P. Godlewski, *Sport w Polsce...*, pp. 265–277; M. Ordyłowski, *Kadry – „Oko, ucho i ręka” władzy ludowej w sporcie polskim 1945-1989*, [in:] Id., *Szkice z dziejów kultury fizycznej*, Zielona Góra 2005, pp. 181-194.

⁹ Cf. P. Godlewski, „Kultura fizyczna” – termin i system na usługach marksistowskiej ideologii, [in:] *Sport jako kulturowa rzeczywistość*, edited by Z. Dziubiński, Warsaw 2005, pp. 520–527; Id., *Sport w Polsce...*, pp. 17–30; 282–310.

erarchies of tasks were to be proposed. The GKKF's telegram to the Soviet All-Union Committee of Physical Culture and Sport at the Council of Ministers read:

“Your enormous contribution to the development and dissemination of physical culture and to the construction of the world-leading mass sports movement, which is based on the granite foundations of Marxism and Leninism and inextricably linked with the achievements of socialist construction, is for us an inexhaustible source of models and experiences. Your example and your fraternal help allowed us to achieve progress in the dissemination of physical culture and the construction of the mass sports movement. We firmly believe that the expanding cooperation of Soviet and Polish athletes will contribute to the tightening of the fraternal alliance of our nations and to strengthening the power of the camp gathered around Great Stalin – the camp of the struggle for peace and socialism.”¹⁰

During their meetings, sports officials used political newspeak. The language of sport incorporated phrases that had not previously been used in this variety, such as “work in the section”, “production”, “competitiveness” or “norms”. Athletes were supposed to be educated in the spirit of “passionate commitment to the socialist homeland”, “love for the Soviet Union and fraternal nations”, and “hate for the United States”, “capitalism”, “landowners’ reactionary views” and “imperialist perpetrators of genocide”. In this context, it is worthwhile quoting the following statement by GKKF Secretary Eugeniusz Skrzypek:

“To enhance the ideological and educational level of the sports movement, athletes need to be educated in the spirit of overwhelming love for our People’s Homeland. It is also necessary to develop and strengthen attachment to the People’s Army, educate athletes in the spirit of warm friendship with our ally, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries, develop and strengthen their solidarity with the imperialism-oppressed nations, fighting for their liberation and peace. We must uncover the murderous actions of imperialist war instigators and activate our athletes (...) We must also conduct educational work among athletes, harden their will, perseverance, fighting activity, approach, camaraderie and discipline (...) It is necessary to make our athletes achieve better results and set new records in sport, i.e. to mobilise them to perform tasks set by the people’s state in the section of industry and agriculture plans and in the section of school education.”¹¹

By February 1950, sports officials had managed to develop a set of exercises and standards required to be awarded a special badge called “Fit for Work and Defence”. May of that year saw the passing of a resolution regarding titles and distinctions: “Distinguished Service to Physical Culture” and “Distinguished Service to Sport”. All of these distinctions were modelled on similar awards that had already been granted for service to Soviet Sport.¹² The athletes, officially called “state amateurs” (“state-

¹⁰ *Do Wszeczwiązkowego Komitetu dla Spraw Kultury Fizycznej przy Radzie Ministrów ZSRR, [in:] Uchwały i dokumenty...*, p. 57.

¹¹ E. Skrzypek, *O pracy propagandowej i ideowo-wychowawczej w ruchu sportowym*, [in:] *Uchwały i dokumenty...*, p. 100.

¹² Cf., e.g., Z. Dall, *Kultura fizyczna i sport w ZSRR*, Warsaw 1953; A. Wohl, *Socjalistyczny model sportu*, “Kultura Fizyczna” 1979, issue 7, pp. 6–9; W. Reczek, *Radziecka kultura fizyczna przoduje światu*, “Świat” 1953, issue 28, p. 5; A. Pasko, *Spoleczno-polityczne aspekty sportu w ZSRR i krajach bloku*

supported” amateurs), besides the capacity for teamwork (individual results did not matter as much as team performance), the enhancement of work quality and their own results, and training attendance, were above all supposed to be model citizens: not only on the track, in the stadium or on the skiing slope, but also in the family home, at work and at school. They were also supposed to be actively engaged in social and ideological work. Thus, after 1949, just like “people of culture”, athletes were invited to talks in connection with sports competitions and shows in cities, towns and villages, in cooperatives and agricultural combines, companies and factories. The purpose of those talks was to encourage “broad masses” to take care of physical culture. Athletes and officials attended events on state holidays, such as: the International Workers’ Day (1 May), PKWN Manifesto Day (22 July), Victory Day (9 May), Polish People’s Army Day (12 October), October Revolution Day (7 November), International Women’s Day (8 March), celebrations of revolution leaders’ birthdays (Lenin and Stalin), industry holidays, e.g., the Metalworker’s Day (March), the Steelworker’s Day (May), the Chemist’s Day (June), Cooperative Movement Day (June), the Railwayman’s Day (September), the Coalminer’s Day (December), the Foundry Worker’s Day (December) and the Citizens’ Militia and Security Service Day (7 October). The athletes were also actively engaged in social actions, such as collecting signatures under the Stockholm Appeal or aid for the victims of the Korean war; they also endorsed the initiatives of the Polish Committee of Peace Defenders.

The state and party propaganda was no longer satisfied with “evidence” for the growth of the Polish industry, eradication of extreme poverty or construction of Polish factories, steelworks, ironworks, coalmines, schools, motorways, railway lines, theatres and cinemas. The propaganda was not so much concerned with material assets or tangible evidence of socialism construction; instead, it focused on “the emotional moments”: dedication, obedience, work discipline, efficiency and ideological commitment. In other words, the aim was to educate “a citizen-soldier-athlete”, who would be ideologically shaped, have class consciousness, be committed to the construction of socialism and, last but not least, be an efficient and devoted defender of the state’s borders.¹³

That image of an athlete was to be generated by a propaganda offensive. The aforementioned politburo resolution from September 1949 emphasised the need to raise the ideological and professional level of the propaganda and to make wider use of publications (“sports propaganda leaflets and sports press), newspapers and magazines, radio and television with a view to “publicising the achievements and enhancement of physical education and sports movement”¹⁴. GKKF resolutions also appealed

sojalistycznego do 1989 r., “Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie” 2011, vol. 10, p. 120.

¹³ For more insights on the image of the individual in the Polish communist propaganda see M. Mazur, *O człowieku tendencyjnym. Obraz nowego człowieka w propagandzie komunistycznej Polski Ludowej i PRL 1944-1956*, Lublin 2009.

¹⁴ *W sprawie kultury fizycznej...*, p. 274.

to sports officials and athletes themselves for greater involvement in organising presentations, talks, lectures and “ideological instructional classes” in connection with sports shows. It was ordered that playing fields, sports halls, swimming pools, rural and factory community centres and cultural centres should display newsletters, photo newsletters, bills, posters and charts featuring slogans popularising mass sport and that poems and songs glorifying the achievements of People’s Poland and the Soviet Union should be disseminated.

A special role was assigned to films (especially documentaries), which had previously been underappreciated. It was soon realised that film could prove to be an effective propaganda tool, which is visually appealing, easily accessible to the mass audience and extremely popular in society. In the first post-war years, that role was fulfilled by newsreels produced by the Polish Film Chronicle (PKF – *Polska Kronika Filmowa*).¹⁵

The origins of the PKF should be traced back to the Film Vanguard (Pol. *Czołówka Filmowa*) – the Polish People’s Army’s Film Studio, established in 1943 at the war front. This special section of filmmakers was established by the Union of Polish Patriots at the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division.¹⁶ In November 1944, by order of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army General Michał Rola-Żymierski, the Film Vanguard was replaced with the Film Studio of the Polish Army, which was directly subordinated to the Main Political-Educational Board of the Polish Army.¹⁷

¹⁵ For more information on PKF see: M. Cieśliński, *Piękniej niż w życiu. Polska Kronika Filmowa 1944-1994*, Warsaw 2006; Id., *Polska Kronika Filmowa. Podglądanie PRL-u*, Olszanica 2016.

¹⁶ January 1944 saw the first episode of “Fighting Poland” (“Polska Walcząca”), produced by the Film Section. It was subordinated to the Ministry of Information and Propaganda of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), and personally to Stefan Jędrzychowski from the Polish Workers’ Party. Its main task was to register the situation at the front and document everyday life in the liberated territories. Another episode of “Fighting Poland” premiered only after 11 months, in November 1944, in Lublin’s Apollo Cinema. The nearly 20-minute compilation featured stories from the front, recruitment to the 4th Jan Kiliński Infantry Division, and a report on the discovery of a painting by Jan Matejko in a village near the city of Lublin.

¹⁷ The first edition of the PKF aired on 1 December 1944. Its first editor-in-chief was Jerzy Bossak, the deputy-in-chief was Ludwik Perski and the editing director was Waław Kaźmierczak. The commentaries were written by Bossak and Rojewski while the footage was shot by Adolf and Władysław Forbert, Stanisław Wohl, Olgierd Samucewicz, Ludmila Nekrasova and Evgeny Jefimov. Besides Jefimov, Nekrasova and Samucewicz, who were recruited from the Soviet *Soyuzkino*, most of these people had previously been involved with the leftist (but not communist) Association of Artistic Film Admirers “Start”. Later, the Newsreel team was joined, among others, by Stefan Bagiński, Antoni Bohdziewicz, Stanisław Ryszard Dobrowolski, Seweryn Kruszyński, Stanisław Rodowicz, Jarosław Brzozowski, Franciszek Fuchs, Henryk Makarewicz, Sergiusz Sprudin, Bogusław Lambach and Karol Szczeciński. The first PKF newsreaders included Władysław Hańcza, Jerzy Pichelski, Feliks Żukowski, Kazimierz Rudzki and from 1946, Andrzej Łapicki. The commentaries were written by: J. Bossak (pseudonym: Jerzy Szelubski), Karol Małcużyński, and L. Perski, less frequently by A. Bohdziewicz, J. Kott, T. Makarczyński, J. Rojewski, K. Swinarska, and E. Cękański. Besides the PKF’s head office in Łódź, regional centres were established: in Warsaw (the Forbert brothers, Wawrzyniak, Szczeciński), with a network of correspondents in Poznań (Zdzisław Śluzar), Kraków (Jarosław Brzozowski), northern Poland (Sprudin) and Silesia (Makarewicz and Lambach).

Originally the PKF, most frequently called “the film weekly”, was aired on an irregular basis depending on the developments at the war front: sometimes every five days, another time – after a two-month interval. From the spring of 1945 onwards, the situation began to stabilise. In 1945, a total of 36 regular (including six thematic) and five special episodes were produced. A single episode featured from six to ten stories. In 1945-1946, the PKF episodes were seen by four to five million viewers, which was a figure that exceeded the daily press readership rate. In 1946, the PKF employed 15 directors and 12 cameramen. It should be remembered that those early years were marked by a symbiosis of the documentary and the newsreel with a great proportion of documentaries shown as special editions of the PKF. The year 1946 saw the airing of 45 PKF episodes, three episodes of the PKF Military Review, three episodes of the PKF Sports Review and 10 documentaries (out of a total of 33 that were made that year). After the following three years, the output was slightly increased, with 52 PKF episodes, 30 special (or periodical) editions and 35 documentaries. Eight years later, in 1957, the Newsreel was broadcast regularly, twice a week in 11-minute episodes A (they were shown in all cinemas across the country) and in episodes B (copied onto the broad stock). At the time, the PKF’s staff consisted of 12-15 cameramen and a similar number of directors.

Initially the Film Section of the Polish Army and its successor, PKF, focused on stories from the war front, the progressing offensive of the First and Second Polish Army and the Soviet Army (1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front) and other war-related issues. In the following years, new topics were covered, such as the reconstruction of the destroyed country (its infrastructure, economy and culture), the development of the Recovered Territories, sports and research events as well as stories from abroad. The next cross-thematic episodes of the Polish Film Chronicle also featured tedious and very official (in content and form) film reports (from visits, celebrations, jubilees, state and industry holidays, etc.), stories that combined direct observation, information and explication of issues (usually social), poetic impressions and journalistic documentaries, which by definition were most vulnerable to propaganda.

The new documentary, as Jerzy Bossak put it in 1945, was primarily meant to be “a seismograph of the current social needs”.¹⁸ Although Bossak did not explicitly mention the political aspect, the birth of the post-war documentary could not have been free from politics. From 1945 onwards, the PKF invariably featured sports stories and a regular supplement entitled “The Sports Review”. However, it should be emphasised that sports themes at that time were of relatively little interest to the documentary decision-makers and production staff. In the Stalinist period, a mere 5% of the PKF’s content was devoted to sports issues (80% of those stories concerned domestic events while 20% were devoted to international events).¹⁹ The Newsreel’s increased running time did not translate into greater interest in sport. For example, in 1951, when the PKF’s content increased threefold compared to 1945, the sports stories decreased by 50%. That trend

¹⁸ *Film i propaganda*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny Filmu Polskiego” 11 October 1945 [special edition].

¹⁹ Cf. M. Cieśliński, *Piękniej niż w życiu...*, p. 68.

remained unchanged until 1956. After October 1956, the issues of sport and physical culture (including entertainment) were addressed in approximately 15% of the stories but it was not until “Gierek’s golden decade” that sport became a very popular topic (there was an increased number of stories from abroad).

In terms of topics raised (specific sports and events), in the PKF’s sports stories, the greatest coverage was given to team (“collective”) sports, such as football, volleyball, cycling (the Peace Race), speedway (motorsport competitions), boxing, track and field athletics, artistic gymnastics. Much less attention was given to gliding, parachuting (how-to pieces), shooting, tennis or sailing. The PKF’s special episodes were most frequently devoted to international events, such as the Peace Race, the 1953 European Amateur Boxing Championships, international matches (football, volleyball, speedway and track and field) and multisport events (e.g. the 1951 National Spartakiad). Of interest to historians are also stories that created an image of athletes as builders of socialism (e.g. Feliks Stamm, Alfred Smoczyk, Florian Kapała, and the Polish boxers returning from the 1952 Helsinki Games), who are engaged in ideological chats in companies and factories and who are also shown in private (e.g. family) settings.

One of the priority sports in communist Poland not only for the ruling party but also for fans was football (both at the club and international level). Since before WW2, great interest had been aroused by the derby matches between two Kraków teams: Wisła and Cracovia. In 1948, the PKF featured a story on the first post-war national championship play-off between these teams. The match was played on the pitch of Garbarnia Krakow, a club known for its rich interwar tradition, from 1949 renamed to Związkowiec Kraków. The game ended 3:1 in Cracovia’s favour but this was not the most important thing. The cameramen went to great lengths not to show the scandalous conditions on the pitch. It was only thanks to the newsreader that we learned that “the mud-covered pitch was more suitable for a peat bath”. Far more important for the documentarians was the fully packed stadium. Among the audience were not only the old loyal fans of both teams, waving their jackets and caps, but also soldiers from the Polish People’s Army and Internal Security Corps (KBW) as well as militiamen who were deploring the defeat of their team (Wisła Krakow was a militia club, that had been forced to change its name to ZS Gwardia Krakow in 1949).²⁰

Football in Krakow was also covered in the PKF’s extra sports section of July 1956. At that time, the Juliusz Słowacki Theatre in Krakow, decorated in red flags, portraits of the revolution leaders, and banners promoting socialist mass sport, hosted the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Cracovia sports club.²¹ Among the in-

²⁰ The Archives of the Warsaw Documentary Film Studio [henceforth: AWDFS], PKF 51/48, *Mecz piłki nożnej Wisła – Cracovia*.

²¹ From 1949 to 1955, the club was renamed several times: in 1949 to Związkowy Klub Sportowy [The Association Sports Club] Ogniwo Kraków; in 1950 to Związkowe Koło Sportowe [The Association Sports Circle] Ogniwo MPK Kraków; in 1952 – to Terenowe Koło Sportowe [the Local Sports Circle] Ogniwo MPK Kraków; 1954 – Terenowe Koło Sportowe [the Local Sports Circle] Sparta Kraków. The year 1955 saw the return of the traditional name.

vited guests were local dignitaries from the PUWP's Provincial Committee, sports officials, coaches and Cracovia's legendary athletes. The event's honorary guest was the GKKF's Chairman Włodzimierz Reczek. Almost the entire story focused on the presentation of the Gold Cross of Merit to the sports officials and on the decoration of the team's flag. Among the awarded individuals was Jan Wiecheć, the club's kitman, an ordinary worker and a devoted fan of his team. What bridged past and present was footage from the game between Cracovia and Wisła, which ended in a 2-2 draw, and an interview between Cracovia's legendary goalkeeper Józef Lustgarten (a former Piłsudski legionnaire, a referee, an honorary member of the Polish Football Association, and a former prisoner of the Soviet forced labour camps) and the footballers.²² The PKF also covered a friendly between Poland and Denmark; however, the course and the result of the match (Poland lost 1-2) were of barely any interest to the cameramen. They focused their attention on the Polish Army Stadium (formerly the Marshal Józef Piłsudski Legia Warsaw Municipal Stadium) and the fans' emotional reactions. The joy after the goal for the home side and the fans' scuffles and tussles are intermingled with the sadness after the defeat. In the background, viewers can spot the waving state flags, the portraits of revolutionary leaders and generals (e.g. of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky). The final images are particularly evocative as they show the devastated benches and the cluttered stadium as the symbol of "the national team's dumpster".²³

Another match that was assigned the status of a great sports event was the game between Spartak Moscow and Unia Chorzów (formerly Ruch Chorzów). Yet again the Polish side's defeat had little significance, given that the fans were supposed to be equally engaged in cheering on the "fraternal Soviet team". The documentarians reduced the coverage of the game to the minimum, focusing on the tifo display (waving flags and banners as well as portraits of the communist leaders) and the VIP box, which seated special guests: Soviet Ambassador to Poland Georgy Popov, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz and Stefan Jędrzychowski (the then deputy prime minister and member of the PUWP CC).²⁴ A different, more subdued, approach was used in another PKF report from 1954 on the football match between Unia Chorzów and Dynamo Kiev. In contrast to other related stories from the Stalinist period, this one provides "objective coverage" of the game. Its collective hero is the victorious Polish side (the Chorzów footballers), i.e. the goal scorers: Eugeniusz Pol, Henryk Alszer, Franciszek Tim, Jerzy Wyrobek and Czesław Suszczyk.²⁵

The PKF also followed the Soviet volleyball players who visited Warsaw in December 1952. However, the story by Helena Lemańska, just over two minutes long,

²² AWDFS, PKF 28/56, PKF's extra sports section No 10, *50 lat Klubu Sportowego Cracovia*. Cf. also: M. Kozłowski, *Naród Wybrany – Cracovia Pany. Z wielokulturowej historii polskiego sportu*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 16–18; J. Kukulski, *Pierwsze Mecze... Pierwsze Bramki*, Krakow 1988, p. 303.

²³ AWDFS, PKF 27/49, *Mecz piłki nożnej Polska-Dania*.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, PKF 49/53, *Spartak-Unia. Mecz Spartak-Unia*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, PKF 46/54, „Unia” zwycięża 5:0. *Mecz Dynamo-Unia. Unia zwyciężyła*.

is not a typical account of the game against Poland as it does not refer to any sports competition. Of greater importance were the run-up to the game, the warm-up, the team's greeting, "friendly" chats with the Soviet players, and the reactions of the audience that cheered on both teams. In the finale, the camera closed up to the joyous audience waving the banner that read "Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union".²⁶ A similar convention is used in the 17-second story on the first post-war Women's European Volleyball Championship, held in 1949 in Prague. The tournament's infrastructure did not look good: the games were played outdoors and the fans had to stand to watch the games. The Newsreel's producers tried to neutralise those organisational "faults" through a propagandised image of the achievements of the socialist sports movement. Thus the viewers could see the banners (e.g. "The People's Democracies welcome the volleyball players"), the portraits of Joseph Stalin and Klement Gottwald (the president of Czechoslovakia, and the Chairman of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). The account of the game between Poland and Czechoslovakia is intermingled with the images showing the emotional reactions of the Soviet team, the top favourite of the championship.²⁷ It is worth emphasising that among the tournament's top seven teams, there was only one team from Western Europe, the Netherlands, which took the last 7th place, without winning a single set.

June 1948 saw the inauguration of speedway competitions in Poland. That sport was of great significance to the party apparatus mainly because a large proportion of the teams were based in companies, factories and industry groupings while the riders predominantly came from the working class.²⁸ In September 1950, the PKF covered the national team championship competitions in Warsaw and Poznań. The title was won by the PKM Warsaw club with Alfred Smoczyk (the 1949 Polish individual champion) as a team member. Just two weeks later, Smoczyk was killed in a car accident. In 1950, he was awarded the title of Honorary Polish Champion (the Polish championship was won by Józef Olejniczak of Unia Leszno). The PKF's one-minute story included footage from the speedway competition. Far more important, though, was the newsreader's commentary: "Motorcycle speedway, which was unknown before the war, is drawing hundreds of thousands of ardent fans. Within just a few years, our young riders have earned the reputation of excellent and daring contestants".²⁹

In 1953, the PKF producers also filmed a story on the Polish individual championships contested on the monumental socialist-realist Olympic Stadium in Wrocław. The story showed the pictures from the races, the reactions of the 75-thousand strong audience, dusted with gravel, and the images of the winners: Florian Kapała (Kolejarz Rawicz), Bolesław Bonin (Gwardia Bydgoszcz) and Tadeusz Fijałkowski (Budowlani

²⁶ Ibid., PKF 51/52, *Siatkarze radzieccy w Warszawie. Mecz siatkówki ZSRR – AZS*.

²⁷ Ibid., PKF 40/49, *Czechosłowacja. Mistrzostwa w siatkówce*.

²⁸ Most of the top Polish riders had working class backgrounds, e.g. Alfred Smoczyk, Florian Kapała, Andrzej Wyglenda, Paweł Waloszek, Jerzy Szczakiel. Cf. R. Noga, *Żużel w PRL u. Sport żużlowy w Polsce w latach 1948 – 1989*, Toruń 2016, pp. 300–303.

²⁹ AWDIFS, PKF 37/50, *Na torze żużlowym. Wyścigi motocyklowe na żużlu*. Cf. also R. Noga, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–149.

Warsaw). The story's hero, however, was Kapala, not just because he won the title (he also won the special Recovered Territories Cup) but, as the newsreader put it, "Kapala is not only a speedway rider but also a Polish Red Cross driver from Rawicz".³⁰

The Polish Film Chronicle also covered international speedway competitions, including matches against Austria and Sweden. Poland lost both of them but according to the PKF, the Polish riders showed "fortitude and combative spirit".³¹ In the autumn of 1955, Warsaw hosted the Belle Vue Manchester team along with the icon of English speedway, Peter Craven (the 1955 and 1962 individual speedway world champion).³² After the event, the English coach and riders smoked cigars – "a symbol of western imperialism".

In 1954 the PKF also showed a story on a motocross competition (a sport not very popular in Poland), which took place in Warsaw's Młociński Park.³³ In that same year, the PKF covered a motorcycling competition within the 12th Tatra Rally. Besides amateur athletes and fans of motoring, the event was attended by Stanisław Maruszak, a four-time Olympian, a ski jumper, an alpine skier, a Nordic combined skier, the 1951 Honorary Master of Sports, a role model of "a citizen-athlete". The competition in Zakopane was also open to women (the pictures show a female participant putting on lipstick just before the start of the rally), female motorcyclists who were "pursuing male passions".³⁴

Several PKF episodes were devoted to track and field athletics, covering club competitions and international matches. The producers of those stories were to the same extent interested in the setting of the competitions, artistic performances, speeches by sports officials, coaches and party dignitaries as in the actual competition among athletes, which took place in a friendly and "fraternal atmosphere". In such cases, the sports results or the winners' prizes (medals or cup) were of little significance.³⁵

The Newsreel provided extensive coverage of boxing events. In 1952, it featured a story on the return of the Polish boxers from the Helsinki Olympics. Its producers ignored the overall poor performance by the entire Olympic team, which in fact accelerated the dismissal of GKKF Chairman Józef Faruga. When the Batory ship with the Polish boxing team on board arrived in Gdynia, it was greeted by cheering crowds of fans, soldiers, militiamen, company delegations, scouts, ZMP activists and school

³⁰ Ibid., PKF 44/53, *Kapala mistrzem Polski. Mistrzostwa Żużlowe we Wrocławiu*. Also: W. Dobruszek, *Żużlowe ABC*, vol. I, Leszno 2004, p. 209, R. Noga, *op. cit.*, p. 163; Id., *Asy żużlowych torów. Florian Kapala*, Leszno 2011.

³¹ Ibid., PKF 44/55, *Ze sportu. Żużel Austria – Polska. Międzynarodowe zawody na żużlu Austria – Polska. Wyścig rowerowy „Dziennika Zachodniego”. X kolarski wyścig „Wieczoru”*; PKF 27/49, *Sport. Zawody motocyklowe*.

³² Ibid., PKF 46/55, *Ze sportu. Mecz bokserski Jugosławia-Polska. Spotkanie na żużlu Manchester-Warszawa*.

³³ Ibid., PKF 27/54, *Motocross*.

³⁴ Ibid., PKF 35/54, *XII Rajd Tatrzański*.

³⁵ Cf. e.g., Ibid., PKF 42/53, *Sportowa niedziela. Zawody lekkoatletyczne Finlandia-Polska. Mecz piłkarski Tirana – Warszawa*; PKF 45/53, *Na Dzień Wojska. Na wiosłach do Warszawy. Delegacja marynarki płynie do Warszawy. Zawody sportowe*; PKF 46/54, *Czechosłowacja. Kuc bije rekord świata*.

students. The port buildings were decorated with flags and portraits of Stalin and Bierut. The boxers returning to Poland were depicted as victors. As the newsreader put it, the medallists Zygmunt Chychła and Aleksy Antkiewicz “made a contribution to the building of socialism. The victory should also be credited to Feliks Stamm, the most caring guardian and coach of our boxers.”³⁶

The PKF also covered Poland’s boxing matches against Yugoslavia, Hungary, Finland and Czechoslovakia. The stories focused on the Polish champions including Henryk Kukier, Leszek Drogosz, Zbigniew Pietrzykowski, Zenon Stefaniuk, Jerzy Krawczyk, Zygmunt Chychła, and – last but not least – their legendary coach Feliks Stamm, the educator, teacher and instructor of the Polish Olympic and European champions.³⁷ The final test before the 1953 European Boxing Championships in Warsaw came during the national championship held in Poznań, in March of the same year. Besides the traditional elements of propaganda (the portraits of Bierut and Rokossovsky and the boards with quotes from Stalin’s and Bierut’s speeches), the PKF story mentioned the gold medal winners: Józef Piński, Henryk Kukier, Zbigniew Piórkowski, Zenon Stefaniuk, Antoni Gościański, Józef Kruża, Zygmunt Konarzewski, Leszek Drogosz, Leszek Leiss and Tadeusz Grzelak.³⁸ In February 1953, the entire PKF episode was devoted to the Polish boxers’ preparations for the European Championships. The documentary was instructional in nature as it showed the boxing training exercises and clips of sparring bouts under the watchful eye of Stamm. The boxing head coach was the sole character of a November 1953 story, which was shot after the European Boxing Championships in Warsaw. The event was attended by 117 participants from 19 countries, including ten Polish contestants, who won a total of nine medals in nearly all weight classes. A few victories over the Soviet boxers went down in history, including Zenon Stefaniuk’s defeat of Boris Stepanov, Józef Kruża’s defeat of Aleksandr Zasukhin, and – last but not least – Zygmunt Chychła’s knockout of 10-time welterweight Soviet champion Sergei Scherbakov. The communist party press extolled Stamm’s boxing school. According to the “Trybuna Ludu” daily, the success would not have occurred had it not been for the massification of sport, friendly competitiveness and the provision of opportunities to do sport by the socialist homeland.³⁹ For the communist regime, however, far more important than the Polish boxers’ victories was the domination of the Eastern Bloc countries over the West European countries, which won only two gold medals.⁴⁰ Lemańska’s story depicted

³⁶ Ibid., PKF 35/52, *Powrót olimpijczyków. Polscy bokserzy wrócili z Olimpiady*.

³⁷ P. Osmólski, *Leksykon boksu*. Warsaw 1989, p. 231; *Leksykon. Sport*, ed. D. Matyja, Warsaw 2000 p. 233.

³⁸ AWDFS, PKF 15/53, *Wielka batalia na ringu. XXIII Mistrzostwa Bokserskie*.

³⁹ Cf., e.g., *Walki ćwierćfinalowe wykazały zdecydowaną przewagę pięściarzy ZSRR i krajów demokracji ludowej*, “Trybuna Ludu” 23 May 1953, No. 142; *Wielki sukces pięściarzy polskich na X Mistrzostwach Europy*, “Trybuna Ludu” 25 May 1953, No. 144.

⁴⁰ For more, see: A. Pasko, *Mistrzostwa Europy w Boksie w 1953 r. w ocenie władz partyjnych i sportowych*, “Teki Archiwalne” 2006, vol. 9 (31), pp. 273–285. In June 1953, the PKF shot a story on the farewell of the Soviet boxers heading home from the Warsaw train station. The “heroes” were to be

Stamm not only as a coach and the main architect of the Polish boxing successes but also as a perfect “citizen of the socialist homeland”, a husband and a father concerned with the proper education of his children: Adam, who was a machinist by occupation, and Ryszard, a student at Warsaw’s University of Physical Education. Stamm’s image was polished by showing him in private settings, on a morning walk with his dog, at a family breakfast, or in the kitchen, helping his wife.⁴¹

In the Stalinist period, sport was designed to strengthen the “fraternal friendship” and solidarity with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. Serving as a perfect vehicle for the international promotion of the slogans of socialism, progress and peace was the International Bicycle Race Warsaw-Prague-Warsaw (in 1950, renamed to the Peace Race).⁴² The race was held in 1948, and was officially organised by the official newspapers of the communist parties: the Polish “Głos Ludu” (later “Trybuna Ludu”), the Czechoslovak “Rude Právo”, and, from 1952, the East German “Neues Deutschland” as well as by the Polish, Czechoslovak, and (a little later) German cycling associations.

Besides the sports objectives, the race served primarily political and ideological purposes. It was held through the joint efforts of not only the cycling associations and sports organisations but, above all, the PUWP CC and the party’s provincial, county and municipal committees as well as youth and social organisations, the press, schools (lessons were cancelled in all schools within 10 km of the race route) and national councils. The local party activists were supposed to provide an appropriate setting for the competition. The route of the race was decorated with flags, propaganda banners, portraits of communist leaders and model workers. Besides food and board, the riders also received flags and banners and in their free time, they took part *en masse* in International Workers’ Day parades. The Peace Race was accompanied by other amateur cycling races, sports shows, ideological conferences, artistic ensembles, bands, film shows promoting sport and physical culture and meetings with journalists and athletes. The prominence of the event was marked by the presence of the party dignitaries of “the three fraternal nations”, who followed the “sports competition” from the VIP stand. The race was also designed to promote the Polish bicycle industry and prove that Polish bicycles are superior to “capitalist” bicycles from Italy. It should also be borne in mind that cycling has always been a team sport, where team members do their best to help a single rider win the race. That strategy was perfectly suited to the communist model of sport.

The Newsreel covered all editions of the Peace Race. In 1953, the event was covered in three separate stories, which did not focus too much on the sports com-

seen off by crowds of Varsovians, school students and the army. Cf. AWDFS, PKF 25/53, *Pożegnanie. Pożegnanie bokserów radzieckich*.

⁴¹ AWDFS, PKF 47/53, *Feliks Stamm*.

⁴² For more on the Peace Race, cf., e.g., B. Tuszyński, D. Marszałek, *Wyścig Pokoju 1948-2001*, Warsaw 2002; J. Ferenc, *Sport w służbie polityki. Wyścig Pokoju 1948-1989*, Warsaw 2008; A. Pasko, *Wyścig Pokoju w dokumentach władz partyjnych i państwowych 1948-1980*, Kraków 2009.

petition given that the race was won by a Danish rider, Christian Pedersen, and that the best Polish rider, the legendary Stanisław Królak (who later went on to win the 1956 edition) finished “only” in eighth place.⁴³ Interestingly, Soviet riders did not compete in the race. All of the PKF stories focused on propaganda artefacts, such as flags and banners. The international pack of riders “fighting for peace and friendship among all nations of the world” was greeted by crowds of spectators, including East German factory workers, who had stopped their work to see the peloton riding by. The pictures from the race show only riders from the Eastern Bloc countries; the West European riders, with the exception of the Scandinavians, were totally marginalised.⁴⁴ The PKF episode of 20 May 1953 ignored the overall winners of the 6th Peace Race, focusing instead on Stanisław Królak, who took the last stage at the Polish Army Stadium in Warsaw, as well as on the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian riders. Królak’s win was applauded by the members of the PUWP CC, the Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak ambassadors, Polish and Soviet generals and Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz.⁴⁵ Although the actual course of the race and its results were manipulated for propaganda purposes, the PUWP CC was highly critical of the atmosphere in the Polish team. The ideological and political work did not bring expected results for the Polish riders. According to the propaganda, they demonstrated class immaturity, “showing affection for the beautiful technical progress of the capitalist countries.”⁴⁶

The propaganda role to be played by Polish sport in the building of socialism was perfectly shown in the PKF stories on mass events. In September 1951, the first National Spartakiad was held in Warsaw and Łódź. The event featured nine sports: boxing, cycling, artistic gymnastics, basketball, track and field athletics, swimming, shooting, volleyball and competitions at the obstacle course. The schedule also included equestrian competitions and the semi-finals and final of the Polish Cup in football. The Spartakiad was attended by 2,600 athletes from Poland’s largest sports organisations. Besides the promotion of mass sport and physical culture, the aim of the event was “the ideological mobilisation” of the athletes. The authors of the propaganda brochure published on the occasion of the Spartakiad wrote:

“Poland building socialism needs as many healthy, energetic and brave people as possible on its way toward implementing the six-year plan. We remember the time before the war, when Poland was ruled by a clique of capitalist and land-owning bloodsuckers. At that time, the youth from the working and peasantry classes, deprived of its social rights, condemned to extreme poverty, exploitation and unemployment, became separated from education. They were impaired and mistreated at every step of the way and it did not have any opportunities to become engaged in sports life. Elite sports

⁴³ Sixth place was taken by Aleksander Pawlisiak representing the team of the Polish-French community.

⁴⁴ AWDFS, PKF 18/53, *1 maja rozpoczyna się VI Wyścig Pokoju*; PKF 21/53, *Z VI Wyścigu Pokoju. Wyścig Pokoju*; PKF 22/53, *Na mecie. Finisz Wyścigu Pokoju*.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, PKF 22/53, *Na mecie. Finisz Wyścigu Pokoju*.

⁴⁶ A. Pasko, *Wyścig Pokoju w dokumentach...*, p. 111.

served the interests of the property-owning class. Today, the sons of workers and peasants have secure employment, attend schools and universities in droves, and are broadly engaged in culture and sports life. Physical culture and sport serve the interests of the working masses”.⁴⁷

The PKF documentarians were not interested in how the competition in particular sports ran. They solely focused on the Spartakiad’s opening ceremony. The cameramen filmed the stadium decorated with banners, flags of sports organisations, pennants, portraits of Stalin, Bierut and Cyrankiewicz. “The first Spartakiad is an overview of the achievements of our people’s sport (...) In People’s Poland sport educates joyful, courageous and healthy people who are committed to the causes of socialism and peace”, the commentary says. The focal point of the documentary is the athletes’ parade viewed from the VIP box by members of the state and party apparatus. Marching like soldiers in a parade formation were the athletes, sports officials, members of the PUWP, ZMP, CWKS (Central Military Sports Club) and CRZZ. On the field, the gymnasts formed the words “Peace Bierut” with their bodies. At the end of the ceremony, the letter from President Bierut was read by Maria Ilwicka, a track and field athlete. The story features some “heroes of the second background”: Rusek (first name unknown) – a locksmith and a long-distance runner, Stefański (first name unknown) – a KBW soldier, Krystyna Paprotówna – a member of the Włóknierz (Eng. textile worker) Łódź sports club and Renata Gryszczyk, a talented swimmer but, more importantly, a coal miner’s daughter.⁴⁸ The PKF Spartakiad story could serve (and it actually did) as an exemplary material for future similar stories on other mass events (the preparation stage and their course). Thus a similar convention and rhetoric were employed in the Newsreel’s stories on the CRZZ Sports Games (1948)⁴⁹, the Polish Academic Championships (1951)⁵⁰, the swimming competition held on the Polish Army Day (1953)⁵¹, the Polish Army Winter Championships (1951)⁵², the LZS National Championships (1953)⁵³, and the 3rd Polish Army Spartakiad (1953)⁵⁴.

The PKF producers also became actively engaged in the promotion of physical culture and sport among broad groups of workers and peasants. The PKF’s regular episodes and extra sports sections included stories on the rural “strongman

⁴⁷ Z. Nawrocki, M. Rogowski, *Spartakiada 1951*, Warsaw 1951. Cf. also: B. Pędzawska-Sołtys, *Współzawodnictwo sportowe w ruchu spartakiadowym w Polsce na przełomie lat sześćdziesiątych i siedemdziesiątych, XX wieku*, “Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie” 2015, issue 2, p. 126.

⁴⁸ AWDFS, PKF 38/51, *Spartakiada 1951. Otwarcie spartakiady*.

⁴⁹ Ibid., PKF 36/48, *Igrzyska sportowe Związków Zawodowych. Otwarcie igrzysk Związków Zawodowych*.

⁵⁰ Ibid., PKF 26/51, *Akademickie mistrzostwa sportowe. Międzyuczelniane akademickie mistrzostwa sportowe*.

⁵¹ Ibid., PKF 45/53, *Na Dzień Wojska. Na wiosłach do Warszawy. Delegacja marynarki płynie do Warszawy. Zawody sportowe*.

⁵² Ibid., PKF 8/51, *Mistrzostwa zimowe WP*.

⁵³ Ibid., PKF8/53, *Mistrzostwa LZS. Centralne mistrzostwa LZS*.

⁵⁴ Ibid., PKF 39/53, *Ze Spartakiady Wojska Polskiego. III Spartakiada WP*.

competitions” organized by the LZS Sadowne club in the local production cooperative,⁵⁵ a story on the bicycle race for postmen from the towns of Żychlin and Nowa Ruda,⁵⁶ the competition for LZS clubs from Ostrów Wielkopolski and Kalisz counties,⁵⁷ LZS Wyszatyce’s competition for the SPO (Fit for Work and Defence) Badge,⁵⁸ the LZS skiers’ exercises during a camp in the town of Wisła⁵⁹ (there was also a similar story on the skiers from the Bashkirian kolchozes).⁶⁰

In 1952, the PKF featured a story on Krystyna Sobiech, a model worker from the Rosa Luxemburg Electrical Engineering Plant in Warsaw. The main character was an active member of the ZMP as well as the Women’s League, and an excellent athlete, who was the company’s table tennis champion and who engaged in motoring in her free time. “For her model work, she received a two-room flat in the MDM (a residential area built in the social-realistic style), which she shares with two sisters who work in the radio factory. In a society which views work as a matter of honour for every citizen, people like Krystyna Sobiech are held in general esteem”, intones the newsreader.⁶¹

Similar rhetoric is used in the story from the 22 July Confectionary in Warsaw. In April 1951, the female members of the production sports brigade were visited by Aleksandra Englisz-Krzyżanowska (a volleyball player, and a world and European championship medallist), who set up sessions of gymnastic exercises willingly performed by the company’s workers during work breaks. After finishing a day’s work, the sports brigade began a volleyball practice session.⁶² The massification of sport was also promoted through radio programmes. Karol Hoffman, a track and field athlete and a radio journalist, ran morning gymnastics sessions on the radio. A PKF story shows how various radio listeners join in, such as a young boy, who has stopped shaving, Bożena – a member of the Stal sports club, and a housewife, who has taken a break from her daily errands.⁶³

The PKF producers also filmed stories on elite and extreme sports in the socialist state, which, according to the announcer, even the American imperialists could envy. For instance, there was a story on a football match played on car roofs⁶⁴ in Częstochowa. Other examples include stories on ice-sailing⁶⁵ or powerboating competitions.⁶⁶ The PKF stories on gliding and parachuting (through editing they were

⁵⁵ Ibid., PKF 7/56, *Dodatek sportowy PKF. Silacze. Zawody ciężarowców w Sadownem.*

⁵⁶ Ibid., PKF 42/51, *Listonosze wiejscy. Sylwetka listonosza Jamroza. Listonosz wiejski Jan Głogowski. Bieg kolarski listonoszy.*

⁵⁷ Ibid., PKF 32/49, *Wiejscy sportowcy.*

⁵⁸ Ibid., PKF 36/51, *Sportowcy z Wyszatyc. Ludowy zespół sportowy w Wyszatycach.*

⁵⁹ Ibid., PKF 5/50, *Narciarze z LZS. Obóz Ludowych Zespołów Sportowych w Wiśle.*

⁶⁰ Ibid., PKF 5/51, *Narciarze z baszkirskich kolchozów.*

⁶¹ Ibid., PKF 8/52, *Przodownica Krystyna Sobiech.*

⁶² Ibid., PKF 15/51, *Produkcyjna brygada sportowa. Gimnastyka podczas pracy.*

⁶³ Ibid., PKF 1/52, *Mgr Karol Hoffman prowadzi gimnastykę. Gimnastyka przez radio.*

⁶⁴ Ibid., PKF 29/48, *Częstochowa. Mecz piłki nożnej na samochodach w Częstochowie.*

⁶⁵ Ibid., PKF 1/51, *Na bojerach*; PKF 13/52, *Na Jeziorze Niegocińskim.*

⁶⁶ Ibid., PKF 26/55, *Sport. O puchar Rafala Pragi. Regaty motorowodne. Zawody motorowodne o puchar Rafala Pragi. Regaty motorowodne o puchar „Expresu Wieczornego”.*

instructional in nature) besides the sporting aspects, were meant to justify the fitness and readiness of young Poles to defend the people's homeland.⁶⁷ Elite sports, such as tennis,⁶⁸ sailing⁶⁹ or canoeing⁷⁰ were associated with the tradition of "the musty West", which is why they received marginal treatment. Thus the stories covering such events featured an adequate tautological newsreader's commentary, which frequently overshadowed the work of cameramen, cinematographers and screen writers.

By showing various contexts of sport, the PKF producers approached it as a multifaceted and heterogenous phenomenon. They focused not only on sports competition or individual and team victories (real and exaggerated) but also on everything that made sport an element of politics and ideology. Sport and physical culture were designed to mobilise the masses to take collective effort, to become engaged in defence issues, and to strengthen the foundations of socialism. The Polish Film Chronicle promoted and embraced the regime's slogans of classlessness, massification and accessibility of sport. It also created the image of an athlete as a model citizen of the People's Poland who is endowed with ideological, political and class consciousness. In other words, great effort was taken to generate an image of a human being that would match the challenges of "the new times". Domestic sport, based on the Soviet experiences and traditions (not only in institutional and organisational terms), was contrasted with the "bourgeois-imperialist" elite model of western professional sport, which existed in a crippled and flawed world unconcerned with personal development, physical fitness, and societal health issues. Sport in Poland became an emanation of the will of the party ("the leading force of the nation"). It followed the direction set by Marxism and Leninism and justified the superiority of the socialist system over capitalism at all levels, from social to economic. It legitimised the solidarity of the Eastern Bloc countries, the promoters of peace, justice and progress. The PKF's presentation of reality was incomplete, falsified, subject to censorship, and generated an image that was far from true and non-genuine. As time went by, PKF newsreels became a visual propaganda tool which was eagerly used in the following decades. It survived the subsequent "thaws" and "freezes", and lived its own life in sync with the political (state) calendar.

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⁶⁷ Ibid., PKF 21/51, 121, 122, 123. *Kurs spadochronowy*; PKF 35/52, *Uprawiamy sport spadochronowy*; PKF 27/52, *Rekord Wandy Szemplińskiej*.

⁶⁸ Ibid., PKF 26/50, *Polska–Irlandia 3:2. Mecz tenisowy Polska–Irlandia*. The story ends with a scene showing the fans throwing Władysław Skonecki (an outstanding Polish tennis player) into the air. In 1951, after the match against Switzerland, Skonecki did not return to Poland. He was immediately turned from hero to "renegade" and "traitor". Cf. A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 189.

⁶⁹ Ibid., PKF 43/53, *Żagle na Bałtyku. Żeglarskie Mistrzostwa Polski*.

⁷⁰ Ibid., PKF 22/48, *Szczawnica. Zawody kajakowe*; PKF 40/48, *Sport. Regaty wioślarskie Polska – Szwecja*; PKF 25/53, *Górskie mistrzostwa kajakowe*, PKF 22/56, *Na Dunajcu*.

ABSTRACT

This article deals with the propagandised image of Polish sport as presented in the Polish Film Chronicle (PKF). The time range covered is the Stalinist period from 1949 to 1956. The article consists of two parts. The first presents the institutional reorganisation of sport after the Second World War, the process of party and government driven ideological indoctrination through sport, and the place of sport in the propaganda machine. The second part presents an analysis of PKF sport related materials produced between 1949 and 1956. Attention is focused on the ideological and propaganda aspects of sport and physical education and not the artistic or aesthetic value of the documentaries. The article's objective was to analyse the content of documentaries produced by the PKF, treated as a tool of propaganda, in order to create a falsified or distorted view of social reality, in this case sport, broadly understood. The leading hypothesis is that sport in the Polish People's Republic was subjected to propaganda (ideological) pressure that resulted from subjugating it to the Marxist and Leninist doctrine and ideological and pragmatic objectives of the governing communist Polish United Workers' Party. The following subsequent hypotheses are derived from considerations on close relations between sport, politics and ideology: 1) using visualisation, editing, camera work, script, directing, and verbal tools (stylistics – the language of commentary), the PKF constructed a propagandised image of sport; 2) the PKF promoted the party and government programme of popularising and endorsing sport and physical education; 3) the PKF created an image, a model "citizen sportsmen", politically, ideologically and class informed; 4) the PKF promoted the thesis of the superiority of sport in the Eastern Bloc (socialist) over sport in western (capitalist) states; 5) within the context of sport, the PKF endorsed the idea of solidarity and friendship with the USSR and "brotherly" nations.

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THE CASE OF POLISH CANDIDATES FOR AND MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE DURING THE COMMUNIST ERA

It is common knowledge that after World War II the situation in Poland changed drastically. Poland's borders were altered, its area shrank, as did the population, with changes also affecting the political and economic systems as well as social life. The country's name also changed, albeit until 1952 the pre-war name was still officially in use. However, after the passing of the new constitution into law on 22 July 1952, it was replaced with the new name, i.e. the People's Republic of Poland. The entire post-war period (until the fall of communism) is also referred to as People's Poland (*Polska Ludowa*), a colloquial name which never made its way into any legal acts from that period. That country came under Soviet influence and was under the strict control of its eastern neighbour.¹ One of the consequences of that dependency was that the Polish regime commonly followed Soviet patterns, from the political system to social life, a key component of which was sport. This translated into the adoption of the Soviet sports model in Poland.² More importantly, though, the communist regime sought to attain its political objectives through sport. The victories of athletes from Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, were intended to demonstrate the superiority of the Eastern bloc over western countries.

It should be emphasised here that the key factor behind the Soviet Union's involvement in the Olympic movement and the Olympic Games was the political situation. After all, in the interwar period the Soviet Union was not a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), nor did it participate in the Olympics. The rationale behind the Soviet accession to the IOC after World War II was linked with potential political benefits.³ The IOC executives invited Soviet athletes to participate in the first post-war Olympic Games, held in London in 1948. The Soviets did not

¹ J. Eisler, *Czterdzieści pięć lat, które wstrząsnęły Polską. Historia polityczna PRL*, Warsaw 2018, p. 73ff. B. Fijałkowska, T. Godlewski, *Polskie dylematy polityczne 1939-1995*, Olsztyn 1996, p. 62ff.

² For more cf. A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy w polityce państwa 1944-1989*, Kraków 2012; see also: P. Godlewski, *Sport w Polsce na tle politycznej rzeczywistości 1944-1956*, Poznań 2006.

³ For more on the circumstances of the Soviet entry into the IOC, cf. A. Pasko, *Kulisy przyjęcia ZSRR do Międzynarodowego Komitetu Olimpijskiego*, „Dzieje Najnowsze”, Year's issue L – 2018, No. 1, pp. 149-159.

go there, but they took part in the following Olympics in Helsinki four years later. No doubt the Soviet example provided an impetus for the remaining Eastern Bloc countries, which could also participate in the Olympic movement. Most likely, had the Soviets not participated in the Olympic Games, the other communist countries, including Poland, would have followed suit. Thus the price of these nations' involvement in the Olympic movement was the political engagement of sport. If the Polish communist government had not seen any prospects of political gains, after World War II the Polish Olympic Committee (POC) would not have been revived, or – at best – it would have been revived only for a short while.

The POC was *de facto* reactivated in March 1946, when Warsaw hosted a convention of the Association of the Polish Sports Associations.⁴ The Association came to be headed by a pre-war sports activist, Alfred Loth. In accordance with the pre-war regulations, the Board of the Association of the Polish Sports Associations (APSA) served as the Polish Olympic Committee. Hence Loth became president of the POC. Almost certainly, the POC reactivation in 1946 was a grassroots initiative undertaken predominantly by pre-war sports activists. Little did they know that only three years later all reforms of the sports system would imitate the Soviet model. Those activists had even reasons to assume that the pre-war tradition of Polish Olympism would not be lost. After all, the early 1946 saw the rise of the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training, which clearly drew on the pre-war model.⁵ However, already in 1948, when the communists strengthened their grip on the state and society, that institution was replaced by the Soviet-modelled Central Office of Physical Culture.

In the first half of 1947 it became apparent (although it was not common knowledge) that the Soviet authorities endorsed their country's participation in the international Olympic movement. The source of this information is the May 1947 correspondence between the then IOC president, Sigfrid Edström, and the president of the Soviet All-Union Committee of Physical Culture and Sport, Nikolai Romanov. In his letter, the IOC president referred to the Soviet attempts to join the international sports organisations and federations, offering practical advice on this topic.⁶

On 24 February 1947 the Polish Olympic Committee was re-established not as a body of the APSA, but as an independent institution. However, this information was not officially disclosed until early April 1947, when "Przegląd Sportowy" (the biggest Polish sports daily)⁷ published President Loth's declaration: "It won't be long that we should elect permanent delegates to the IOC. This issue is urgent because at the end of April, the IOC will hold its session, probably in Geneva, and it would be good if

⁴ *Sejm sportu polskiego w Warszawie*, "Przegląd Sportowy", No 13, 25 March 1946 r., p. 1; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego Komitetu Olimpijskiego z Polskim Komitetem Olimpijskim (1945-1989). Wybór dokumentów*, Białystok-Kraków 2015, p. 45.

⁵ For more, cf. A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*

⁶ For more, cf. A. Pasko, *Kulisy przyjęcia ZSRR...*, p. 149ff.

⁷ *Pierwsze sygnały Olimpiady 1948. Prezes Pol. Kom. Olimp. Inż. A. Loth: Rozpoczynamy intensywną pracę w myśl szczytnych haseł nowoczesnych igrzysk*, „Przegląd Sportowy”, No. 27, 3 April 1947, p. 2.

the case of our delegates was finally resolved during this meeting”.⁸ In fact, the IOC session in question was held nine months later, on 29 January 1948, not in Geneva but in Saint Moritz. It was then that, along with two other candidates, Prof. Jerzy Loth (Alfred Loth’s brother) was unanimously elected a member of the IOC.⁹ He was Professor of Geography at the University of Warsaw, a pioneer of the Polish Olympic movement and belonged to a group of pre-war experienced sports officials.¹⁰

It should be added that before World War II, two Poles were members of the IOC: Ignacy Matuszewski and Stanisław Rouppert. After the war ended, they stayed in the West. By the time Jerzy Loth was elected an IOC member, they had both died (Matuszewski on 3 August 1946 in New York while Rouppert on 13 August 1945 in Edinburgh).¹¹

It might seem that in the first years after World War II, the Loth brothers in some ways dominated the Polish Olympic movement. However, this opinion was not reflected in reality. Alfred Loth, who officially headed the POC, must have been in a weak position as he was not included among the 13 officials who accompanied 23 Polish athletes during the London 1948 Olympic Games. The Olympic team was headed by Janusz Zarzycki.¹² Today we know that Prof. Jerzy Loth did not enjoy a comfortable position as an IOC member either because on 21 July 1948 the POC sent an official letter to IOC President Sigfrid Edström. The letter recommended two Polish candidates for new IOC members: the aforementioned Janusz Zarzycki and Stanisław [Władysław] Wolski.¹³ They were both confidants of the new regime and apparatus officials of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR).

The first official was known by the name of Janusz Neugebauer by 1946, when – on the approval of the Polish Army command – he changed his name to Zarzycki. Given his prominent position, he was young, aged 33 in 1948. At that time he stood out with his educational credentials, having studied from 1934 to 1938 at the Faculty of Architecture at the Warsaw University of Technology. He had served in the Polish Army in the 1939 defensive war and obtained the rank of Second Lieutenant. The most important fact, however, was that he had been a PPR member since 1942. In December 1948, he joined the Central Committee of the PUWP. Since 1945, he had served in the Polish Army as the second deputy of the Chief of the Main Political-

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ The Archives of the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne (AIOC), *Comite International Olympique, Session de St. Moritz 1948, Séance du 29 janvier 1948*, p. 2.

¹⁰ A. Pasko, *Polski Komitet Olimpijski w okresie stalinizmu*, “Dzieje Najnowsze”, Year’s Issue XLII-2010, p. 112; *Mala encyklopedia sportu*, Warsaw 1986, vol. 2, p. 92ff.; the Archives of New Acts in Warsaw [Archiwum Akt Nowych], the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (CC PUWP), File No. 237/XXII-180, *Personal Data*, sheet 60.

¹¹ M. Słoniewski, *Zarys działalności polskiego ruchu olimpijskiego w latach 1919-1939*, Warsaw 1990, pp. 113, 119.

¹² *Reprezentacja Olimpijska Polski składa się z 23 zawodników*, „Przegląd Sportowy”, No. 57, 15 July 1948, p. 2.

¹³ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, *Andrzej Przeworski’s letter to the IOC presenting candidates for IOC members*, unnumbered sheet; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 69.

Educational Board of the Polish Army, and exactly a year later, he was promoted to the Chief of the Board. For two years, from December 1947, he remained at the “disposal of the Defence Ministry”, and in 1949 was sent to the reserves. Earlier on, he had become Chairman of the Union of Polish Youth, which was established on 21 July 1948.¹⁴

The other candidate for an IOC member, Władysław Wolski (the name ‘Stanisław’ was mistakenly used in the letter to the IOC), born Antoni Piwowarczyk, was aged 47 in 1948. Born into a working class family, he was involved in the communist movement already before the war. In March 1922, he was sentenced to seven years in prison, but was released four years later for health reasons. In 1934, he left for the Soviet Union, where a year later he was arrested by the NKVD and convicted of counter-revolutionary activity and sentenced to five years in labour camp.¹⁵ According to Józef Światło, a perfectly-informed high-ranking official of the Polish security apparatus, Piwowarczyk “served as an NKVD agent in the labour camp”.¹⁶ In 1943, Wolski was parachuted into the Vilnius region, where he remained until the Soviet offensive. In August 1944, he became Deputy Minister of Public Security, and in October that year he was appointed head of the State Repatriation Office. In 1945-1948, he served as Deputy Minister of Public Administration and Recovered Territories while in 1949 he became Minister of Public Administration.¹⁷ From the communist regime’s perspective, Władysław Wolski had high political “qualifications”. However, he did not have a sound general education. Nonetheless, a short biographical note sent to the IOC said that Wolski had allegedly graduated with a law degree and as a student supposedly played sports, such as hockey and skiing. According to the same note, in 1922 he allegedly became a national champion in skiing. It was also emphasised that in the past 25 years the candidate had been actively involved in the organisation of the sports sector in Poland. Beyond doubt, the note was based on false information. Wolski did not graduate in law; nor did he win a Polish championship title in skiing. He was not involved in the organisation of sports life in Poland, either. However, the communists were aware that the IOC executives would hardly have the opportunity to verify the information supplied to them.

However, it should be stressed that the POC’s official letter to the IOC, allegedly “on behalf of” Alfred Loth, was signed by Andrzej Przeworski.¹⁸ It can be speculated

¹⁴ Central Military Archives [Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe] (CMA), File No. 1600/76/404, *Teczka osobowa. Janusz Zarzycki s. Edmunda*, sheet 1ff.

¹⁵ CMA, File No. 439/57/147, *Teczka osobowa. Władysław Wolski s. Aleksandra*, sheet 1ff.; T. P. Rutkowski, *Sprawa Antoniego Piwowarczyka – Władysława Wolskiego*, „Zeszyty Historyczne”, vol. 153, Paris 2005, p. 131ff.

¹⁶ Z. Błażyński, *Mówi Józef Światło. Za kulisami bezpieki i partii*, Łomianki 2012, p. 214

¹⁷ CMA, File No. 439/57/147, *Teczka osobowa. Władysław Wolski s. Aleksandra*, sheet 1ff.; T. P. Rutkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 131ff.

¹⁸ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, *The Polish Olympic Committee’s letter to the IOC President dated 21 July 1948* (in English), unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Polski Komitet Olimpijski...* p. 112.

that in actuality either Loth did not know anything about the letter or he did not want to authorise untrue information by signing it. Yet the following question arises: why in early 1948 did the communists approve Prof. Jerzy Loth, a pre-war official, as a candidate for IOC membership? After all, just six months later, it was clearly evident that the regime was keen to install their confidant into the IOC. Both Alfred and Jerzy Loth could not be trusted in this respect. It is not easy to provide an unequivocal answer to this question. It can only be assumed that in late 1947 and early 1948, as Prof. Jerzy Loth was preparing for the IOC session in St Moritz, the communists did not have clearly defined objectives as to the Olympic movement. They probably formulated them within the next few months. As before World War II Poland had two IOC members, the communists hoped that this number would be maintained, which would make it possible to introduce supporters of the regime into the Committee.

However, the IOC executives were not inclined to increase the number of the Committee's members. A few months after receiving the POC's letter with new Polish recommendations, the Secretary-General of the IOC, Otto Mayer, in his letter to President Sigfrid Edström explicitly wrote that in his view admitting new Polish and Czechoslovakian members would not be a wise solution.¹⁹ Today, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that following Stalin's decision about the Soviet accession to the Olympic movement, other Eastern Bloc regimes attempted to install new communist-associated officials into the IOC. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, these attempts failed as the International Olympic Committee favoured experienced sports officials in its ranks. For this reason, Poland was represented in the IOC by Alfred Loth and Hungary by Ferens Mező, while Czechoslovakia by Josef Gruss.²⁰ They all served as IOC members until the 1960s, and it was only the inevitable passage of time that could force a generational change. It is hard to assess to what extent the IOC demonstrated its political awareness, anticipating that the Eastern Bloc countries would attempt to dominate the Committee by installing their representatives as new members. It might have been a manifestation of a practical approach to the issue as well: after all, experienced officials could be more useful in the IOC work.

No doubt, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the communist regime exploited the Olympic movement and the POC. The latter was regarded as "the only remnant of the bourgeois sports structure" in Poland.²¹ This attitude was reflected by the decision "to shut down" the Polish Olympic Committee on 1 September 1948 right after the London Olympics. Originally, the institution was to be reopened on 15 October 1948²²;

¹⁹ AIOC, P04-004 Presidents CIO – S. Edström correspondence (president) 1949, *Otto Mayer's letter to Sigfrid Edström dated 16 February 1949*, unnumbered sheets.

²⁰ D. Miller, *The Official History of the Olympic Games and the IOC: Athens to Beijing, 1894-2008*, Edinburgh 2008 [Polish translation: *Historia igrzysk olimpijskich i MKOl. Od Aten do Pekinu 1894-2008*, Poznań 2008, p. 493].

²¹ Archiwum Akt Nowych [The Archive of New Files] (ANF), Główny Komitet Kultury Fizycznej [The Head Commission for Physical Education] (GKKF), File No. 162/4, *Tezy w sprawach olimpijskich*, sheet 195.

²² *PKOl w stanie likwidacji*, "Przegląd Sportowy", No. 77, 6 September 1948, p. 6.

however, by 1950 there was no information that the Committee was to resume its work. Interestingly, however, while the POC was “shut down”, letters to the IOC were sent from... the Polish Olympic Committee. From the perspective of the communist regime, those actions were political in nature as they concerned new IOC members. The first unsuccessful attempt to install confidants into the IOC did not discourage the communists from making another. On 7 April 1949 a letter was officially sent from the POC, stating that the two previous candidates, Janusz Zarzycki and Władysław Wolski, had been withdrawn. At the same time, two new candidates were proposed: Colonel Henryk Szemberg and Henryk Motyka. Interestingly, just as in the previous letter Wolski was mentioned with the wrong first name (Stanisław) in the April letter Lucjan Motyka was erroneously referred to with the first name ‘Henryk’.²³ The letter also included the candidates’ biographical notes, which emphasised their past sports activity. As part of his education, Szemberg was allegedly involved in swimming, handball and figure skating.²⁴ We can assume that a strong argument in his favour was the information that he held the position of deputy head of the Commission for Physical Culture and Sport.²⁵ However, such an institution did not exist in Poland at the time; instead, there was the Central Office of Physical Culture.²⁶ The letter also highlighted Motyka’s sports activity and involvement in sports as an official even though his sporting track record was poor. We learn that in his youth he played football and was interested in motoring. In fact, a similar description would be true of practically every male individual. His organisational achievements looked better, though. Even before the war, Motyka, who was a member of the Polish Socialist Party, was engaged in popularising sport and tourism.²⁷ Interestingly, the POC’s official letter endorsing the new candidates was signed by the alleged president of the Committee, Stefan Askanas, who never held this post. We can assume that once again the letter was sent without the knowledge of the POC’s official president, Alfred Loth. On the other hand, could he still be called the president of the POC if, according to the “Przegląd Sportowy” daily, this institution was “shut down”? No doubt, this is an odd question and the answer depends on determining whether the POC was operational or not. It is hard to deny that, especially in the Stalinist period, this institution had a strongly limited scope of action. However, both candidates’ biographies deserve a closer look.

As a candidate for IOC membership, Henryk Piotr Szemberg was young, at just 27 years of age in 1949. Born into a rich Warsaw family, he received his secondary school graduation certificate in 1939, before the outbreak of the war. From Octo-

²³ AIOC, *Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958*; 09728, The Polish Olympic Committee’s letter to the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne dated 7 April 1949 (in French), unnumbered sheets.

²⁴ A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 74

²⁵ The actual text said: «COMITE DE LA CULTURE PHYSIQUE ET DU SPORT». See: AIOC, *Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958*; 09728, *Biographie (Szemberg Henryk Pierre)*, unnumbered sheet; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 76.

²⁶ For more, cf. A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 69.

²⁷ AIOC, *Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958*; 09728, *Biographie (Motyka Lucian)*, unnumbered sheet; Idem, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 78.

ber 1939 he stayed in Lviv, and from 1940 in Samarkand, in the Soviet Union. In 1942 he joined Anders' Army, but – as he put it in his resume – he was discharged a few months later. In 1943, he volunteered for the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, where he served in the political section. In April 1945, he joined the PPR and his political career gained momentum. Back in 1944, he was a warrant officer (*chorąży*) while in 1946, he received the rank of lieutenant colonel (*podpolkownik*). Also in 1946, Szemberg became a deputy to the second Deputy Minister of National Defence whereas in 1947-1948 he worked in the Main Political-Educational Board of the Polish Army. In February 1948, Szemberg was seconded to work for the Central Office of Physical Culture.²⁸

Lucjan Motyka, aged 34, was a bit older than Szemberg. Before World War II, he first belonged to the Communist Party of Poland and then to the Polish Socialist Party. He was a political prisoner in Bereza Kartuska. During the war, he was deported to the Auschwitz concentration camp, which he highlighted in his resume sent to the IOC. In December 1948, following the so-called unification of the workers' movement, he joined the PUWP. In February 1949, he became head of the Central Office of Physical Culture.²⁹

On 3 May 1949, President IOC Sigfrid Edström replied to the April letter from the Polish Olympic Committee. It turned out that once again the communists' attempts failed. In this context, the same question can be asked: did the negative response result from political awareness or from the president's practical approach? He argued that the IOC Executive Committee refused to accept new members from countries which already had their representatives in the IOC because their number was so large that it increasingly hampered the Committee's work. The president was also of a good opinion about Jerzy Loth's track record in the IOC.³⁰ Obviously, this could have been a very convenient excuse, which was in fact reflected in reality. Both Edström and Mayer must have viewed the POC's letters with suspicion; they were actually signed by random people. The proposals of new candidates from communist Poland, submitted every few months, could not have looked serious. Alfred Loth maintained private contact with the IOC president. However, the following question arises: was this correspondence genuinely private or was it meant to be regarded as such?³¹ After all, in the Stalinist period, it was impossible to send a letter from Poland to Lausanne or Stockholm, where Edström lived, without any control from the security apparatus. In all likelihood, Loth was able to explain many problems related to the situation in Poland during the official IOC meetings; these, however, were held rather infrequently. In the IOC archives there are some items of correspondence between Jerzy

²⁸ Idem, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 75. For more, cf. P. Godlewski, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff.

²⁹ Idem, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 75.

³⁰ AIOC, *Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958*; 09728, *IOC President J.S. Edström's reply to the POC letter dated 7 April 1949*, unnumbered sheet; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 81.

³¹ See: A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 142ff.; A. Pasko, *Polski Komitet Olimpijski...*, p. 114ff.

Loth, the only Polish IOC member at the time, and the IOC executives. They show that Loth many times informed at least Edström and Mayer about the situation in the Polish Olympic movement. From the available documentation it can be inferred that the first information reached the IOC, more precisely IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, in November 1950. In early December, the chancellor provided it to Edström and Brundage. In 1950, J. Loth sent a few other letters to the IOC but their number and content remain unknown. In the second half of 1950, with the help of Swiss embassy staff in Warsaw, Loth sent a letter to Lausanne explaining the situation in Poland (as Otto Mayer put it). Based on that letter, the original of which is probably lost, Mayer informed Edström that the POC had practically been dissolved with all of its members being replaced by people who obeyed the communists, or “politicians”, as J. Loth literally put it.³² The POC did not include Jerzy Loth among its members. The prime objective of the communist regime was to establish a new national Polish Olympic committee in the context of the upcoming Helsinki 1952 Olympic Games. Mayer was aware of the situation in Poland. He informed the IOC president that he had sent a letter to the POC which stated that Loth’s removal was inconsistent with the policies of the Olympic movement. However, as Mayer said, the recipients of the letter ignored that message.³³ As a result, J. Loth remained an IOC member even though he was not a POC member, which was actually a violation of the existing rules.

It seems thus that the IOC executives were well aware of the situation in the Olympic movement in Poland and, probably, in the remaining communist countries. We also know that the POC’s letters were sent without the knowledge of Jerzy Loth and possibly his brother Alfred as well. Thus, in order to hide this correspondence from them, one of the letters was signed by Andrzej Przeworski while another one by Stefan Askanas. Moreover, by submitting the two candidates for IOC membership, the POC “executives” attempted to remove Prof. Jerzy Loth from the IOC. In the communist regime’s view, Loth could remain an IOC member only if the IOC consented to the appointment of another member, endorsed by the Polish government. However, the IOC executives refused to accept such terms. The communists were understandably inclined to keep Loth as one of two Polish IOC members. A potential second candidate of their own choice would have ensured the achievement of their goals and would have “kept an eye” on J. Loth.

Of interest was Jerzy Loth’s information to the IOC about the attempt to establish a new Polish Olympic Committee before the 1952 Summer Olympics. That institution was designed to be composed of the communist regime’s supporters. In a way it shed additional light on explanations regarding the appointment of the new head of the POC. That position was taken by Apolinary Minecki, a Russian of Polish descent.³⁴

³² Loth’s text was written in English.

³³ A. P04-005 Presidents CIO – S. Edström correspondence (president) 1950, *Otto Mayer’s letter to S. Edström and A. Brundage dated 9 December 1950*, unnumbered sheets.

³⁴ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *POC Secretary-General Edward Wieczorek’s letter to IOC President Otto Mayer*; unnumbered sheet; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego ...*, pp. 52, 94.

The appointment was likely part of the plan launched a year earlier. Luckily for Polish sport, Minecki retired from this post directly after the Helsinki Games.

It must be admitted that the communist regime showed great persistence in pursuing its goals. The President of the Central Office of Physical Culture (GKKF) and of the Polish Olympic Committee, Lucjan Motyka (in the latter post he was succeeded by Minecki), sent a letter to the IOC, dated 30 April 1951, once again submitting two new candidates for IOC membership: Jerzy Putrament and Edmund Kosman.³⁵ They were both introduced as members of the Polish Olympic Committee. The letter said that Kosman was Rector of the University of Physical Education in Warsaw, a former Polish champion in gymnastics, and an Olympian, which was not true. Putrament, in turn, was introduced as a writer and president of the Polish Sailing Association. It followed from the letter that the regime was keen to remove Prof. J. Loth from the IOC. However, as has already been said, the professor, in secret from the Polish authorities, carried on correspondence with the IOC executives. In December 1951, he sent a private letter to IOC President Sigfrid Edström. In it, he wrote about the GKKF leadership's intentions of installing a regime confidant into the IOC. However, Loth also added that, in his view, the election of another Polish candidate into the IOC would be welcome because otherwise he himself might be forced to resign. According to Loth, Putrament could be a suitable candidate for IOC membership.³⁶ It follows from Loth's letter that he was faced with a difficult task and was probably under strong pressure from the communists, which was aggravated by the fact that they had little opportunity to influence the situation. The only way in which the communist regime could try to push its agenda was through pressure on J. Loth.

IOC President Sigfrid Edström decided to learn more about Jerzy Putrament and Edmund Kosman. To this aim, he turned to the Hungarian IOC member, Ferenc Merő, who collected general information about Putrament. He confirmed Putrament's involvement in POC work but could not say anything about Kosman.³⁷

There is no denying that Jerzy Putrament was a confidant of the communist regime. Born in 1910, before World War II, he studied at Vilnius University, where he earned an MA in Philosophy.³⁸ In 1939-1941, he lived in Lviv, where he was engaged in the pro-communist Writers' Union. It was then that he allegedly became an NKVD

³⁵ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *The Polish Olympic Committee's letter to the International Olympic Committee dated 30 April 1951*, unnumbered sheets.

³⁶ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *Prof. Jerzy Loth's letter to IOC President Sigfrid Edström dated 26 December 1951*, unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 143ff.; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 96.

³⁷ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *Dr. Franz Merő's letter to IOC President Sigfrid Edström dated 24 January 1952* (in German), unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Sport wyczynowy...*, p. 143.

³⁸ CMA, File No. 1555/74/295, *Teczka osobowa. Jerzy Putrament s. Władysława*, sheet 1ff.; L. Szymański, *Ze studiów nad modelem kultury fizycznej w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1980*, Wrocław 1996, p. 40.

agent.³⁹ Then he left for Kuybyshev, where he stayed until 1943. After the war, in 1945-1947, he was Ambassador to Switzerland and then, until 1950, Ambassador to France. From 1950 to 1953 he was Secretary General of the Polish Writers' Union. From 1948 he was a deputy member of the CC PUWP.⁴⁰

Edmund Kosman should also be regarded as a confidant of the communist regime. Born in 1911, before the war he was a gymnast, a two-time Polish all-around champion. After the war he was Secretary of the GKKF and Rector of the University of Physical Education in Warsaw (1950-1956).⁴¹

Probably the final attempt to push its candidate into the IOC was made by the communist regime on 10 January 1952 in a POC letter to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer. The letter endorsed Jerzy Putrament as the only candidate for IOC membership.⁴² A question that remains unanswered is whether the communists hoped that Putrament would replace J. Loth.

Ultimately, the IOC president and executives did not give in to the Polish government's pressure: they did not vote another Pole into the Committee; nor did they replace J. Loth with a communist-supported candidate. Today we know that in this respect great credit should be given to J. Loth who probably influenced the IOC leadership's decision. He found a way to circumvent the communist control and managed to inform the IOC top officials, including Edström, about the real situation in Poland and the Polish Olympic movement. On the other hand, the communists found it easier to accept the existing state of affairs upon the election of the Russian Konstantin Adrianov into the IOC at the Vienna session in May 1951.⁴³ After all, he was able to monitor the Polish IOC member and the representatives of the other Eastern bloc countries from within the organization. This did not mean that the Polish communists gave up on their attempts to install "their man" into the IOC; they simply waited for a suitable time. This time came in the wake of the October 1956 events in Poland, after which the communist regime was much better perceived in the West. Włodzimierz Reczek, President of the GKKF and POC since 1952, and, undoubtedly, a well-educated and intelligent person, was much better regarded than his predecessors. This change of attitude can be clearly seen in the 1960 correspondence between W. Reczek and Edström's successor as IOC President, Avery Brundage, whose letter to Reczek was written in an almost friendly tone.⁴⁴ Also Otto Mayer's letter to the POC, dated

³⁹ *Jerzy Putrament (1910-1986)*, <http://dzieje.pl/postacie/jerzy-putrament-1910-1986> (accessed: 12 July 2018).

⁴⁰ CMA, File No. 1555/74/295, *Teczka osobowa. Jerzy Putrament s. Władysława*, sheet 1ff.

⁴¹ A. Pasko, „Menedżerowie” sportu w Polsce w okresie stalinizmu (1949-1956), „Studia Podlaskie”, vol. XVIII, 2009/2010, p. 223ff.; *Mała encyklopedia sportu*, vol. 1, Warsaw 1984, p. 298.

⁴² AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, unnumbered sheet; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, pp. 54, 98.

⁴³ For more cf. A. Pasko, *Kulisy przyjęcia ZSRR...*, p. 155.

⁴⁴ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *IOC President A. Brundage's letter to POC President W. Reczek dated 16 April 1960*, unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 110.

November 1960, regarding Reczek's candidacy for IOC membership differed in tone from the letters written just a few years earlier.⁴⁵

Finally, in 1961, at the 58th IOC Session in Athens, Włodzimierz Reczek became a member of this organisation.⁴⁶ We know that two other Polish candidates were formally introduced but there are no specific data available. Obviously, these people had no chance of being elected.⁴⁷ J. Loth officially resigned as an IOC member and was awarded honorary membership of the Committee. He died on 30 September 1967.⁴⁸ Włodzimierz Reczek served as an IOC member until 1996, and from then on he was an IOC honorary member until his death in 2004.⁴⁹

* * *

In the communist period only two Poles could boast IOC membership: J. Loth and W. Reczek. There were far more candidates who stood for this position, or – more precisely – were recommended by the communist regime. Until recently, these candidates were completely unknown; nor was there any available information about attempts to install them into the IOC in the 1940s and 1950s. However, those people were not at the centre of attention. What mattered was the political objective, which was the dominance of the Olympic movement by the Eastern Bloc countries. This objective was never abandoned. The Polish communist regime, just like the remaining countries of the Soviet Bloc, sought to accomplish the task which was planned in the Kremlin (such a scenario can only be speculated upon due to the lack of documentation). The late 1940s and early 1950s saw heightened activity on the part of the communist regimes which tried to install their confidants into the IOC. The communist countries did not intend to sit on the sidelines of this organisation and hence they needed trusted and committed individuals who were to accomplish their political tasks within the IOC. We can infer that upon the election of the Soviet IOC member, Konstantin Adrianov, the task of inducting “suitable” people into the Committee became less important. Adrianov was able to personally monitor whether the IOC members from the Soviet Bloc served the Kremlin's interests.

However, it seems necessary to highlight Prof. J. Loth's considerable involvement in thwarting the Polish communists' plans in the special field of sport. This was likely their sole serious defeat in this area. Yet that defeat did not make the com-

⁴⁵ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer's letter to the POC in connection with W. Reczek's candidacy for IOC membership*, unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 112.

⁴⁶ AIOC, 58th Session. International Olympic Committee. Athens – Senate House – June 19th, 20th and 21st 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁷ AIOC, Pologne Correspondance 1919-1958, 09728, *IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer's letter to POC Vice-President Czesław Foryś in connection with W. Reczek's candidacy for IOC membership*, unnumbered sheets; A. Pasko, *Korespondencja Międzynarodowego...*, p. 113.

⁴⁸ D. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 493.

⁴⁹ *Death of Włodzimierz Reczek, IOC honorary member*; <https://www.olympic.org/news/death-of-wlodzimierz-reczek-ioc-honorary-member> (accessed: 12 July 2018).

munists abandon their plans. They were aware of the imminence of a generational change in the IOC. That change occurred just ten years after the last attempt to push a new Polish candidate into the IOC. As the Polish IOC member, Loth was succeeded by Włodzimierz Reczek, a party and state apparatus official. It can be assumed this change was also accepted by Loth himself, who upon his resignation was aged 81 but still enjoyed good health. In theory, he could continue his tenure because in the 1960s the IOC members held their positions for life.⁵⁰ Reczek himself served as an IOC member for 35 years. When in 1996 he resigned from this honourable post, he was awarded honorary membership of the IOC.

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Keywords: POC, IOC, members, president

ABSTRACT

After World War II, the Polish Olympic Committee was reactivated. In the new political reality this institution was regarded by the communists as “a remnant of the bourgeois sports structure” but it was deemed necessary as sport could be used for the political propaganda of the system prevailing in the Eastern Bloc countries. Therefore, the Kremlin accepted an invitation to join the International Olympic Committee as well as the Olympic movement. Coupled with this was the issue of Polish members in the IOC. Formally, the IOC was governed by the principle of “reverse” membership, so that IOC members represented the national committees from their home countries. However, the communists intended to install their confidants into the IOC so that they could shape the profile of this organisation along with their counterparts from the other Eastern Bloc countries. The communists made several unsuccessful attempts to induct such individuals into the IOC. They finally succeeded in 1961, when Włodzimierz Reczek was elected an IOC member

⁵⁰ *Encyclopedia of the modern Olympic movement*, edited by J. E. Findling, K.D. Pelle, Greenwood Press, Westport (year of publication missing), p. 442.

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